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GANDHIjrS CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE GOVERNMENT
1942-44
NAVAJIVAN PUBLISHrNG HOUSE
AHMED ABAD
First Edition 1945: Copies 1600
Printed and Published by Jivanji Dahyabhji Desai,
Navajivan. Mudranalaya. Kalup&t. Ahmedabad
CONTENTS
Foreword M. K. GandSi u
Introduction Pyarelal xiii
Covering Letter M. K. Gandhi sxvui
1. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT
OF BOMBAY
A
ROUGH-HANDLING OF SHRI G C MEHTA AND
SOME OTHER MATTERS
1 10-8*42 M K Gandhi to Sir Rogci Lumley 1
2 14-8-42 Secretary to the Govt, of Bouihay to M. K Gandhi 3
B
REGARDING C ORRE-SPONDENCE
3 26-8-42 Rules about corievpjrndcncc by Security Prisoners 3
4. 27-8-42 Gandhiji to Sciictaiy to the Govt of Bombay 4
5. 22-9-42 Secretary to the Go\t of Bombay to M K. Gandhi 5
6 25-9-42 M K Gandhi to Secittary to the Govt of Bombay 6
C
ON WlRt AROUT MAHADE\hHAl’S DEATH
7 15-8-42 M. Is C'andhi to Shn Chiraanl.il 6
8 19-9-42 M K Gandhi to Sosrvtarv to the Govt, of Bombay 6
t) 24-'-'>-12 Serrs'tarv to ths- Govt of Bonihav to M K Gandhi 7
D
CONFISCATION OF NAVAJIVAN PRESS PROPERTY
and BURNING OF 'HARIJAN'
10 26-10-4.’ M K. Gandhi to Sccietary to the tovr of Bombay
J.1 Enclosure to No 10
'2 5-11-12 Secretary to the Govt > of Lomhay lo M K Gand*.
E.
PROF. BHANSAIVS FAST
13. 24-11-42 M. K. Guiidhi to Secretary to the Govt of Bombay
14. 25-11-42 M K. Gandbi to Insi->cttt>r General of Piiions
15. 30-11-42 Additional Serretan, Govt, of Bombay (H. D)
to M. K Gandhi
16 4-12-42'*M K Gandhi U' Additional Sei rctaiy Gevernment
See also No 41
of Bombay
8
8
10
11
11
12
IV
II. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD LINLITHGOW
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
A
EARLIER CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT AUGUST DISTURBANCES
17. 14-8>42 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow
18. 22-8-42 Lord Linlithgow to M. K. Gandhi
19. 23-9-42 M. K. Gandhi to the Secretary to the Govt, of
India ( H. D. )
20. 13-2-43 Pyarclal to Sir Richard Tottenham
21. 3-4-43 Reply to No. 20, Communicated by the Superintendent
to M. K. Gandhi
CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD LINLITHGOW LEADING TO THE FAST
AND AFTER
22. New Year's Eve '42 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow 30
23. 13-1-43 Lord Linlithgow to M. K. fiandhi 22
24. 19-1-43 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow 24
25. 23-1-43 Lotd Linlithgow to M. K. Gandhi 26
26. 29-1-43 M. K. Gandhi to Lord I.inlithgow 2f
27. 5-2-43 Lord Linlithgow to M. K. Gandhi 30
23. 5*2-43 Sir G. Laithwaifc to M. K. Gandhi
29. 7-2-43 M. K, Gandhi to Sir G. Laithwaite
30. 7-2-43 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow
31. 29-1-43 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow (Enclosure to No. 30)
32. 7-2-43 Sir R. Totenhara to M. K. Gandhi
33. 7-2-43 Advance copy of the proposed Govt.' Communique on
Gandhiji's Fast
34. 8-2-43 M. K. Gandhi to Sir Richard Tottenham
35. 9-2-43 Sir Richard Totti-nham to M. K. Gandhi
36. 9-2-43 Government Communique on the fast 4 .
37. 27-9-13 M. K. Gandhi to Lord Kinlitligow 51
38. 7-10-43 Lord Linlitli^ow to M. K. Gandiii 51
III. CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE FAST
39. 12-2-43 M. K. Gandhi to Col. Bhandari 52
40. 12-2-43 Government order regarding interviews, communicated
by the Superintendent of the Detention Camp 54
41. 16-2*43 Government order on points rai'cd in letter No. 39
(Communicated by the Suiierintcndent. Detection Camp) 54
42. 24-2-43 M. K. Gandhi to Col. Bhandari 56
V
43. 26-2-43 Government order in reply to letter No. 42. (Communicated
by the Superintendent, Detention Camp.) 57
44. 2-3-43 M. K. Gandhi to Col. Bhandarii > 57
45. 12-3-43 Drs. Gilder and S. Nayyar to Col. Bhandari 58
46. 13-3-43 M. K. Gandhi to Col. Bhandari 59
47. 13-3-43 Drs. Gilder and S. Nayyar to Col. Bhandari 59
48. 20-3-43 Pyarelal to Col. Bhandari 60
IV. CORRESPONDENCE AFTER THE FAST
A
PYARELAL'S LETTER ON GOVT. COMMUNIQUE
49. 8-2-43 Pyarelal to Sir Richard Tottenham 61
50. 24-2-43 Mr. S. J. L. Olver to Pyarelal 67
B
CORRESPONDENCE ON SIR REGINALD MAXWELL'S SPEECH
51. 2P-5-43 M. K. Gandhi t* SSr Reginald Maxwell 67
52. 17-6-43 Sir Reginald Maxwell to M. K. Gandhi 83
53. 23-6-43 M K Gandhi to Sir Reginald Maxwell 83
C
LETTER TO QUAIU-I-AZAM A.ND CCIRESPONDENCF. ON IT .
54. 4-5-43 M. K. G.andhi to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah 84
55. 4-5-43 M. K. Gandhi to the Secy., Govt, of India (H. D.) 84
56. 24-5-43 Sir Richard Tottenham to M. K. Gandhi 85
57. Press Ciimmunique. (Enclo. to No, 56) ' 85
58. 27-5-43 M. K. Gandhi to Sir Richard Tottenham 86
59. 28-5-43 M. K. Gandhi to Sir Richard Tottenham 88
60. 4-6-43 Mr. Conran Smith to M. K. Gandhi, 88
61 7-6-43 Mr. Conran Sraitli to M. K. Gandhi 88
D
LETTER TO LORD SAMUEL ^ND CORRESl’ONDENCE ON IT
62. 15-5-43 M. K. Gandhi to Loid Samuel 89
63. 26»5-43 Sit Riciiard Tottenham to M. K. Gandhi 98
64. 1-6-43 M. K. Gandhi to Sir Richard Tottenham 98
65. 7-6-43 Mr. Conran Smith to M. K. Gandhi 98
E
CONTRADICTION OF FALSE RUMOURS
66. 16-^-43 M. K. Gandhi to the Addl. Secy, to the Govt, of India 99
67. 29-7-43 Sir Richard Tottenham to M. K. Gandhi 99
VI
V. CORRESPONDENCE ON GOVERNMENT’S
INDICTMENT OF THE CONGRESS
68. 5-3-43 Pyarelal to Sir Richard Tottenham 100
69. 23-3-43 Pyarelal to Sir Richard Tottenham 100
70. 19-3-43 Sir Richard Tottenham to Pyarelal 101
71. 26-3-43 Pyarelal to Sir Richard Tottenham 101
72. 5-4-43 Sir Richard Tottenham to Pyarelal 101
73. 15-7-43 M. K Gandhi’s reply with appendices to "Congiess
Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43 " 102
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. — BRITISH WITHDRAWAL 170-201
(A) Confusion (Haitjai> May 24th 1942, p. 161) 170
(B) Out of touch (
(C) Free India can help best
“ I am not pro-Japanese "
No secrecy
To resist .slave drivers
(D) Why non- violent
non-cooperati* i ’ (
A bad job
The crucial test
(E) Implications of withdr iwal
(F) Its meaning
(G) Only if they withdraw
(H) Deliberate distortion
(K) A poser
(L) A fallacy
(M) Oh ! tlte troops
(N) Friends' Ambulance
Unit in India
(O) If Harijan is suppressed
(P) The Waidha interview
If imprisoned
Negotiations
Shape of things to come
Free India's contribution
(Q) American opinion may be
antagonized
(R) To American friends
„ 31st
P. 175)
121
djiinc 7fh
. p 183/184
172
172
173
174
174
. 14th
p 185/187)
176
177
178
May 24th
p 166
179
June 21st
p 197
181
.. ,.
p 198
181
.. 28th ,
p. 203
182
.. 28th ,
p. 204/205
183
July 5th
p 210
183
5tb
p. 212
184
5th „
p. 215
185
.. 19th .
. p. 229
188
.. 19tli
p. 233-? 4
190
190
191
191
192
.. ^6th
p 242-^3
193
Aug 9th
. p 264
195
vn
(S) Justice of Congress demand ( Extracts from article " A Plea
for Reason” in Harijan of August 2, 1942. p. 252, as
reproduced in Bombay Chronicle of August 3, 1942)
196
Azad's statement cited
196
Nothing to cavil at Extract from “ Important Interview ”
197
(T) What about Muslim
June 14th
ss
p. 187
198
(U) Foreign soldiers in India
April 26th
••
p. 128
199
APPENDIX 11 — NOT PRO- JAPANESE
201-14
(A) If they really mean ?
April 26th
p. 136
201
(B) Friendly advice
May 31st
»«
p. 172
202
(C) If they come
June 14th
p. 189
203
(O) What about radio messages ?
June 21st
,,
p. 197
204
(E) If Japanese come ?
July 26th
,,
p. 248
205
(F) Question Box
June 7th
,,
p. 177
205
(G) Unfair to America 7 „
June 7th
p. 181
206
(H) Mirnben’s letter to Lord Linlithgow and enclosures
207
Miraben’s questions
My reply to the above
(K) Fire raging in me
Aug. 2nd
p. 257-58
207
(L) Letter to Chiang-Xai-Shek ( Hindustan Times Aug. 15. 1942 )
210
APPENDIX III CONGRESS NOT FOR POVER
214-217
(A) Not right [Hanjan May 31st 1942
P. 173)
214
(B) What about Muslims ? ..
June 14 th
p. 187
215
(C) To Muslim corre.spondents
July 12 th
,,
p, 220
215
(D) An appropriate question
Aug. 9th
,,
p. 261/62
215
IE) Unseemly if true
.. 9th
..
p. 261
216
APPENDIX IV — ABOUT NON-VIOLENCE
218-29
(A) Expedience (Hanjan Apr. 12rh 1942
p. 116)
218
(B) Non-violent non-co-
operation
May 24th
p. 167
218
(c) Scorched earth policy
May 24th
p. 167
220
(D) What would free India d .> !
June 14th
p. 187
221
(E)* A challenge
June 28th
,,
p. 201
222
(F) Extract from Hiirijan
July 12th
,,
p. 217
223
(G) Guru Govind Singh
July 12th
p. 219
223
(H) The conflSgration
.. 12th
.
p. 228
224
(K) In case of illness
.. 19th
9
p. 229
225
(L) Fasting in non-violent action .,
26th
p. 248
225
(M)* What about nopj violence ? ,.
June 21st
99
p. 197
227
(N) Another discourse
Sept. 8th
■40
P..274
228
:230-235
viu
APPENDIX V — EXTRACTS FROM FT. JAWAHARLAL'S
UTTERANCES
(A) Extracts from Pt. Neluu's address to the
Journalists' Association at Allahabad ( Bom. Chronicle l>8-42 ) 230
(B) From Pt. Nehru’s speech at Tilak day celebrations,
Allahabad ( Bombay Chronicle 3-8-42 ) 232
(C) From Pt. Nehru's statement on the seized documents
( Bombav Chronicle 5-8-42 ) 233
(D) From Pt. Nehru’s speech at the A. I. C. C. meeting
( Bombay Chronicle 8-8-42 ) 235
APPENDIX VI — EXTRACTS FROM MAULANA A. K. AZAD'S
SPEECH at the A. I. C. C. Meeting, August 7th'
1942 ( Bombay Chronicle 8-8-42 ) 236-40
APPENDIX VII — EXTRACTS FROM SARDAR VALLABHBHAI
PATEL’S PUBLIC SPEECHES 240-41
«
(A) From speech at Chaupati. Bombay, on August 2. 1942
( Bombay Chronicle 3-8-42 ) 240
(BJ From speech at Surat .. .. ,, 241
(C) From speech at the A I C. C. meeting, 7th August, 1942
« ( Bombav Chronicle 8-8-42 ) 241
APPENDIX VIII — EXTRACTS FROM DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD’S
SPEECH ( Bombav Chronicle 2-8-42 ) 242
APPENDIX IX — LETTER TOH.E. THE VICEROY, OF
August 14th. 1942 242
End Appendices
74. 10- 9-43 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the Govern-
ment of India (H D.) 243
75. 20- 9-43 Sir Richard Tottenham to M. K. Gandhi 243
76. 14-10-43 Additional Secretary to the Government of ^
India (H. D) to M. K. Gandhi 243
77. 26-10-43 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the
Government 6{ Ind'a (H. D) 248
78. 3-11-43 Additional Secretary to the Government of India (H.D.)
to M. K. Gandhi 2.50
79. 18-11-43 Additional Secretary to the Government of India (H. D.)
to M. K. Gandhi 251
IX
VI. CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT SMT. KASTURBA
GANDHI
80. 12-3-43 Drs. Gilder and S. Nayyar to Col. Bhandari 251
81. 18-11-43 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of
Bombay 252
82. 37-1-44 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the
Government of India ( H. D. ) 253
83. 27-1-44 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of
Bombay ( H. D. ) 255
84. 31-1-44 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of
Bombay ( H. D. ) 255
85. 31-1-44 Communication from the Government conveyed through
the Superintendent of the Detention Camp 256
86. 31-1-44 Gandhiii's reply to No. 85 256
87. 31-1-44 Drs. Gilder and S. Nayyar to Col. Bhandari 256
88. 3-2'-44 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of Bombay 257
89. 3-2-44 Secretary to the Govt, of Bombay to M. K. Gandhi 258
90. 11-2-44 M K Gandhi to Government of Bombay 259
91. 14-2-44 M K. Gandhi to Inspector General of Prisons 259
92. 16-2-44 M K. Gandhi to Inspector Gcnc'.al of Prisons 260
93. 18-2-4-I M K. Gandhi to Inspector General of Prisons 262
94. 22-2-44 M. K. G.indhi lo In.spcctor General of Prisons 263
95. 4- 3-44 M. K. Gandhi to Addin an.il Secretary to the
Government of India ( H, D. 1 264
96 21- 3-44 Additional Secy, to the Government of India (H. D.)
to M. K. G.indhi 266
97 1- 4-44 M. K. Gandhi to Addition.il Secretary to the
Government of India / H D. ) 268
(with appendices from A to H)
98. 2- 4-44 M. K. Gandhi to Col Bhandari 274
99 2- 4-44 M K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the
Government of India ( H. D. ) 274
99 a. 20- 5-44 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the
•Government of India (H.D.) 275
100. 30- 3-44 Additional Secretary to the Govt, of India ( H. D. )
to M. K. Gandhi 276
101. 13- 4-44 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the
Government of India ( H- D. ) 278
\02. 24- 4-44 Additional Secretary to the Govt, of India ( H. D. )
to M. K. Qandhi 278
X
VII. CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNMENT ON
SHRIMATI MIRABEN’S LETTER TO GANDHIJI
ABOUT ORISSA
103. Cluiscmas Eve '42 Miraben to Lord Linlithgow (with 2 enclosures) 279
104. Enclosure (i) (Miraben's Report and questions (rom Orissa) 281
105. Enclosure (ii) (Gandhiji's Reply to Miraben dated 31-5-42) 283
106. 26-2-44 M. K. Gandhi with 3 enclosures to Secretary to
the Government of India 285
107. 11-3-44 Additional Secretary to the Government of India
to M. K. Gandhi 287
Vm. CORRESPONDENCE WITH H. E. THE
VICEROY (LORD WAVELL)
108. 17- 2-44 M. K. Gandhi to H. E the Viceroy 288
109. 25- 2-44 H. E. the Viceroy to M. K. Gandhi 290
110. 9- 3-44 M. K. Gandhi to H. E. jhc Viceroy 290
111. 28- 3-44 H. E. the Viceroy to M. K. Gandhi 298
112. 9- 4-44 M. K. Gandhi to H. E. the Viceroy 301
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A
REGARDING AMENDMENT OF SALT CLAUSE
113. 16- 2-44 M. K. Gandhi to Hon. Finance Member 304
114. 25- 2-44 Hon. Finance Member through Bomb.ay Government to
M. K. Gandhi 304
B
ABOUT TRANSFER
115 4- 3-44 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the Government
of India 305
116. 21- 4-44 M. K. Gandhi to Additional Secretary to the Govern-
ment of India 306
C
INTERVIEWS DURING ILLNESS
117. 3- 5-44 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of Bombay 307
D
ABOUT ACQUISITION OF THE SITE OF SAMADHI
118. 6- 5-44 M. K. Gandhi to Secretary to the Government of Bombay 307
119. 7- 7-44 Secretary, Government of Bombjiy to M. K. Gandhi 308
120. 9- 7j44 M. K, Gandhi to Secretary, Government of Bombay 309
FOREWORD
I have read the introduction as also the originals. The
introduction may be good enough for the hasty reader, but
the publication is not designed for the hasty reader. It is
designed for the serious worker who can affect the politics
of his country and even the world affairs. To such my advice
is that he must read the originals. The introduction may be
used as such and an aid to memory. I want the readers 1
have in view to take me at my word. I have written as I
felt at the moment as a seeker of long standing of Truth and
Non-violence. I have written* without reservation and without
embellishment.
After my accidentally premature discharge from detention
and convalescence I studied from reliable witnesses the
happenings of the two years after the incarceration of principal
Congressmen and myself. I have heard nothing to modify
the opinion expressed in my writings under review.
1 know firsthand what has happened, since my discharge,
m the various spheres of life. And I have found bitter con-
firmation of what 1 have said in the following pages. Indeed,
the whole of India is a vast prison. The Viceroy is the
irresponsible superintendent of the prison with numerous jailers
and warders under him. The fou* hundred millions of India are
not the only prisoners. There arc others similarly situated in
the other parts of the earth under other superintendents.
A jailer is as much a prisoner as his prisoner. There is
no doxjbt a difference. From my point of view he is worse.
If there is a Day of Judgment, i, c. if there is a Judge whom
we do not see but who nevertheless is much more truly than
we exist for a brief moment, the judgment will go hard against
the jailer and in favour of the prisoners.
India is the only place on earth which knowingly has
chosen Truth and Non-violence as the only means for her
deliverance. But deliverance to be obtained through these
means must be deliverance for the whole world including the
jailers otherwise described by me as tyrants and Imperialists.
I need not mention Fascists or Nazis or Japanese. They seem
to be as good as gone.
The war will end this year or the next. It will, bring
victory to the Allies. The pity of it is that it w’ill be only
so-called if it is attained with India and the like lying prostrate
at the feet of the Allies. That victory will be assuredly a
prelude to a deadlier war, if anything could be more deadly.
I know that I do not need to plead for non-violent India.
If India has the coin with Truth ^.on one face and Non-violence
on the other, the coin has its own inestimable value which
will speak for itself. Truth and Non-violence must express
humility at every step. They do not disdain real aid from
any quarter, much less from those in whose name and for
whom exploitation is practised. If the British and the Allies
aid, so much the better. Deliverance will then come sooner.
If they do not, deliverance is still certain. Only the agony
of the victim will be greater, the time longer. But what are
agony and time if they are spent in favour of liberty,
especially when it is to be brought about through Truth and
Non-violence !
Sevagram,
7 - 3-1945
M. K. Gandhi
INTRODUCTION
During his convalescence at Juhu after his discharge in
May .last year Gandhiji caused a hmitcd number of copies
of his correspondence with Government, while he was in
detention, to be prepared for private circulation among friends.
It was divided into two parts, his reply to the Government’s
pamphlet “ Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances,
1942-43 ” constituted a separate volume ( part II ), the rest
of the correspondence being included in part 1. About 200
cyclostylcd copies were in this way distributed with a prefatory
covering letter which too is icproduccd in this volume. Great
precaution was taken and no copy was sent to the press.
Enterprising news agencies however got scent of it and after
a tussle with the central authority released parts of the
correspondence to the press. A plucky Bombay daily published
the whole of it in two instalments. Soon after the Government
themselves brought out the political correspondence included
m the two cyclostyled volumes as a government publication
with a highly tendentious and misleading ‘summary’ which
was handed to the press, especially the foreign press, along
with it. Only a limited edition was published. Popular demand
for a full edition has since continued to groiv. The present
volume i.s in answer ro that demand.
The correspondence is divided into nine sections.
Hie fir'st section consisting of letters 1 to 16 is of a
miscellaneous character and is illustrative of the tone and
temper of the authorities in those early days of August, 1942,
immediately after the mass .arrests of Congressmen. The
first letter in the series is addressed to the Government of
Bombay on the day after Gandhiji’s arrival in the Aga Khan
siv
Palace. It refers to the incident of the manhandling of a fellow
Satyagrahi prisoner on the way as the party were being
brought from Bombay to Poona, and contains a request for
the Sardar and his daughter being put with him, and for
being supplied with newspapers. Other matters dealt with
are restrictions on the nature and scope of permissible corres-
pondence and the inordinate delay of over three weeks in
the delivery of a condolence message which Gandhiji had
sent to the wife and son of the late Shri Mahadev Desai
on the latter’s death. Government’s replies which arc very
characteristic will be found in letters 2, 5 and 9.
Of special interest is the admission in letter No. 12 that
the District Magistrate of Ahmedabad who had been charged
with conducting action against the Navajivan Press had
misinterpreted orders that had* been issued to him- so that
“ all the old files of the Harijan since 1933 ” had “ actually
been destroyed”.
In the month of November, 1942, when Prof. Bhansali
was fasting in connection with Chimur happenings, Gandhiji
sought Bombay Government’s permission to establish direct
telephonic contact with him to dissuade him from the fast
if he found it to be morally unjustified. The permission was
refused. (Letters Nos. 13-16)
11
This section is the correspondence with Lord Linlithgow
and the Government of Indi^ about the August disturbances
and in connection with Gandhiji’s fast of February, 1943.
The first letter to Lord Linlithgow, dated 14th August,
1942, is a reply to the Government’s communique on the
August Resolution of the Congress and the subsequent action
taken by the Government thereon. The special interest of th,
letter written by Gandhiji five Jays after his arrest lies in thi
fact that it contained a most categorical denial of the charge
that tlic Congress had contemplated violence at any stage.
XV
, The non-violent policy of the Congress was reiterated by him
with even greater emphasis in a letter which he wrote to
the Government of India a few weeks later (letter No. 19).
The letter to the Viceroy referred to the readiness of
the Congress to identify India with the Allied cause and its
offer loyally to accept any national government that might
be formed by the Muslim League. It ended by pleading for
a reconsideration of the Government of India’s whole policy.
A fact to be noted in this connection is that, although the
Government continued to accuse the Congress of encouraging
violence and to use it to justify their repression policy, they
neither published these letters till their hands were forced
by Gandhiji’s fast nor took any action on them.
On New Year’s Eve, after an interval of over four
months, Gandhiji re-opened correspondence with Lord
Linlithgow by addressing him a personal letter. Gandhiji in
his letters pointed out that :
1. It was not the passing of the ‘ Quit India.’
resolution but the hasty action of the Government that
had precipitated the crisis. He had openly declared that
he intended asking an interview with the Viceroy to
explore avenues for a settlement. The Government should
have waited at least rill lie had written to the Viceroy,
especially as civil disobedience was not to be started
unless the negotiations broke down.
2. The aim of (he ‘ Quit India ’ resolution was
to bring about conditions under which India could effec-
tively participate m the war effort of the Allies.
•3. The Congress Iwd made no preparations ‘ danger-
ous ’ or other beforehand. The only per.son, namely
Gandhiji, who had been authorized to start civil disobe-
dience in the name of the Congress in a certain contin-
gency, was arrested before he could do souir even issue
any inkructions.
4. Whilst he continued to be as confirmed
believer in non-violence as he ever 'was, he could n(
condemn alleged popular violence on the basis of heavil
censored newspaper reports and one-sided governmer
statements which had often proved to be incorrect i
the past.
The Government’s stand as set forth in Lord Linlithgow’
letters was that :
(a) Gandhiji . had “ expected ” his policy to lea(
to violence, that he was “ prepared to condone it ”, tha
there was “ ample evidence ” to show that the violenc«
tliat ensued was planned beforehand by the Congres;
leaders, and therefore Congress and especially Gandhij
could not disown responsibility tor the consequences that
followed from the adoption of * Quit India ’ policy.
(b) The only basis for negotiations with Gandhiji
could be :
i. repudiation by him of, and disassociation from,
the resolution of 8th of August and the policy which
that resolution represented;
ii. appropriate assurances as regards the future.
Against this Gandhiji contended that it was for the
Government to prove their charges against him and the
Congress by producing proofs “ which should correspond to
the canons of English jurisprudence.”
Although he had a right to demand a judicial trial be-
fore an impartial tribunal he was prepared to waive that
demand, but should at least have a personal interview with
the Viceroy or some one who knew the Government’s mind
and could carry conviction might be sent to him, so that, if
convinced of his error, he could make ample amends. If, on
the other hand, it was desired that he should act on behalf
of the Congress he should be put among the members of
the Congress Working Committee for consultation and
necessary action.
The Government refused to consider either request and
Gandhiji decided to undertake a twentyone days’ fast.
On being intimated of Gandhiji’s decision the Govern-
ment offered to release him for “the purpose and duration"
of the fast.
Gandhiji replied saying that the fast was not contem-
plated to be taken as a free man. He had no desire to be
released under false pretence.®. He was quite content to fast
as a prisoner or detenu. This letter was not published by
the Government at the time and Gandhyi’s position was
distorted in their press communique to mean that Gandhiji
wanted to fast in order to .secure his release anyhow f
Gandhiji’s last letter Lord Linlithgow was by way of
a final appeal addressed (o the conscience of the retiring
Viceroy to bring home to him the wrong ot ‘‘ having
countenanced untruth with regard to one whom he once
rcgaidcd as his friend" Lord Linlithgow’s reply showed that
the appeal had JaJlcii absolutely llat so tar as he was
concerned.
Ilf
The ten items (39-48) included in this section describe
how Gandhiji was treated during the fast. Facilities like
receiving visits trom friends and rchitivcs during the fast and
having nurses and medical advi.scr® of his own choice were
nernntted by the Government. But grace and goodwill were
singularly lacking in Government’s subsequent behaviour.
Gandhfji had to write again and again seeking clarification
of the position with regard to the operation ot these facilities.
Some of the orders seemed to he deliberately calculated to
prevent full use being made ot the facilities provided. For
instance, when, because of his growing weakness during the
fast, he' asked for being allowed to carry on conversation wdth
the visitors by proxy, the permission was refused ( Iterp No. 43).
XVIU
IV
The first letter in this series which Gandhiji caused tc
he written soon after the commencement of his fast contains
an answer to some of the charges brought against him in
the Government’s press communique. Extracts from Gandhiji’s
own utterances before his arrest are quoted and chapter
and verse given to show that such expressions as “ open
rebellion ”, “ short and swift ”, “ fight to the finish ", occur-
ring in Gandhiji’s writings and utterances of which much
had been made in the Government’s communique, were used
in an entirely non-violent context. It is further shown that
the injunction “Do or Die” which had been cited by the
Government as a proof that the struggle was not meant to
be non-violent was actually intended by him to serve as
a badge to distinguish every soldier of non-violence from
other elements. They were to win freedom for India or die
in the attempt to achieve it non-violcntly.
The attempts to calumniate Gandhiji and the Congress
continued. On the I5th of February the Home Member made
a speech in the Assembly repeating the accusations mentioned
already and some more. It bristled with inaccuracies and
misrepresentations. Gandhiji read the .speech after the fast
and replied in a long letter written on the Loth of May, 1943
{item No. 5X). In it he pointed out the various errors and
misrepresentation.s in which the Home Member had indulged.
The Home Member, instead ot cither substantiating or
retracting hi.s charges, replied that as there was a “fundamental
difference ” in their outlook there was nor any use in dis-
cussing the various points raised m Gandhiji’s letter I
Gandhiji’s contention that the “ fundamental difference ”
between them should be no bar to an “admission and correction
ot discovered errors ” remained unanswered.
In response to an inviration by Mr. Jinnah in a public
speech t& write to him, Gandhiji addressed him a letter on
4th May, 1943, suggesting a visit from him and a personal
discussion with a determination to find a solution of the
communal problem, or if that was not possible, to write
to him on the subject. Government refused to forward
this letter but sent Gandhiji a copy of the press communique
which they proposed to issue and which contained a mis-
leading gist of the letter.
Gandhiji wrote to the Government protesting against
this procedure. He suggested some alterations in the press
communique (letter No. 58) and requested that the corres-
pondence between him and the Government on the subject
might be released to the Press. The Government declined
to concede either request.
After the fast, Gandhiji read in the Hindu a report of
Lord Samuel’s speech in the House of Lords containing a
number of grossly unjusr strictures against himself and the
Congress. Gandhiji replied in a long letter giving a categorical
refutation of all the charges.
In pursuance of their pohey to allow no chance to im-
prisoned Congre.ssmen to answer or refute false propaganda
that was being made behind their back, the Government
refused to forward this letter to Lord Samuel. Gandhiji
protested that Government’s decision in the present case
amounted to a “ ban on the ordinary riglit belonging even
to a convict of correcting damaging misrepresentations ’.
but Ins protest went unheeded.
In the months of June and July all kinds of rumours
appeared in the press to the effect that Gandhiji had written
to the Government withdrawing the August Resolution.
Gandhiji asked the Government to contradict these reports
as he had neither the desire nor the authority to withdraw
the resolution. This rcquesi like the previous ones was
turned down.
XX
V
After the commencement of Gandhiji's fast the Govern-
ment of India published an indictment of the Congress and
Gandhiji entitled “Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances,
1942-43 Gandhiji sent a long reply to it on the 15th of July.
Extracts from his writings had been torn from their context
and a sinister meaning put upon them by presenting them in a
false setting. Gandhiji in his reply restored them to their proper
context and elucidated the true meaning. Considerable space
had to be devoted to an analysis of the technique of deliberate
misquotation, distortion, innuendo, supprcssio ven and
suggestio falsi cmplojcd by the writer of the pamphlet.
A flagrant case of misquotation is held up in para 34
where the “famous words” attributed to Gandhiji, “There is
no room left in the proposal fdt withdrawal or negotiation.
There is no question of one more chance. After all it is
an open rebellion”, arc shown to be “ partly a distortion and
partly an interpolation " not to be found in the authentic
published report of the Wardha interview. Not satisfied with
giving a wrong quotation when the correct text was before
him the writer had tacked on to it two more apocryphal
sentences from an unauthentic Associated Press report and
quoted them without asterisks between sentences that appear
apart in the Associated Press report !
Confronted by this damaging disclosure, the Government
instead of making amende honorable sought to brazen it
out by disbelieving Gandhiji’s version and even impugning
his good faith. Unfortunately for them the “ Statesman ”
of 16th July, 1942, ( Mofussil edition ) has the portion of the
Wardha interview in question in the following form ;
Later, answering quc-stions on the resolution at a pres.-, inn rvicw
at Sevagram, Mr. Gandhi said '
“ There is no room left in the propo.sal for withdrawal for nego
nations; either they recognize India’s independence, or they don't."
This version which is also by the A. P. I. completely bears
out Gandhiji’s statement and refutes the Government’s. It
should further be noted that the sentences “ There is no
question of one more chance. After all it is an open
rebellion " are not to be found in the Statesman's report.
Paras 12 to 16 refute the charge that Gandhiji had
asked for the physical withdrawal of the British from India.
What he had asked for was the withdrawal of British power,
not of individual Englishmen. He had even agreed to the
use of India as a base for military operations against Japan.
Charges against the Congress and Gandhiji of being
defeatists and pro-Japanese are dealt with in paras 18 to
40. Far from being “ convinced that Axis would win the
war ”, he had proclaimed the contrary belief from the
housetop (Paras 19, 21 and 25). Paras 30 and 31 contain
a refutation of the statement that his opposition to the
Government’s scorched caAh policy was actuated by a
sordid or pro-Japanese solicitude for industrial prosperity.
Finally, it is shown that the statement that he was “ even
prepared to concede to their (Japanese) demands ” is wholly
at variance with known facts and that, indeed, the boot is
on the other leg! (paras 22 and 32).
Paras 45 to 63 contain a detailed reply to the accusation
that cither he or the Congress had planned or precipitated
.1 conflict or sanctioned or shown a readiness to condone
violence. The education given by the Congress to the people
had been wholly non-violcnt. In the past whenever outbreaks
had occurred the most energetic measures had been taken
by the whole of the Congress organization to deal with
them On several occasions he had himself resorted to fasting
(para 52). He had even said that if Congressmen indulged
m an orgy of violence thev might not find him alive in
their midst (para 66). The exhortation to every Congress-
man ro consider" himself fiee to act for himself* under
Since much lu)& been m.idc iif this portion ot the August Resolution
wi the Government publication it may be mentioned here that there is
lotlimg extraordinary about it An identical decision was tak^n by the
XXll
certain circumstances and the use of military terms in
connection with the contemplated struggle was wholly
innocent and apt when coupled with the condition of non-
violence. (paras 48 and 49).
To support his calumny the author of the pamphlet
had dismissed every reference to non-violence in the forecasts
of the form the movement would take and in the post arrests
programme and instructions as “valueless” or as mere “ lip
service”. This was on a par with the omission of ‘ nots ’
from the Commandments and quoting them in support of
stealing, murder etc. (para 46). In robbing Gandhiji of the
one thing he lived by and lived for, the author of the
pamphlet had robbed him of all he possessed.
The use of the expression ^ “Do or Die” to which the
Government reverted later in their correspondence (letter
No. 76) had already been dealt with in letters No. 49 and
Working Committee m Fob. 1931 when Gandhi-Irwin talks threatened to
bceak down. Subsequent events however rendered the publication of that
resolution unnecessary. Here is the description of it by Pandit Nehru in
his autobiography ;
“ So far, the practice had been for each Acting President to nominate
his successor in case of arrest, and also tu fill by nomination the
vacancies in the Working Committee. The substitute Working
Committees hardly functioned and had little authority to take the
initiative in any matter. TTicy could only go to prison. There was
always a risk, however, that this continuous process of substitution
might place the Congress in -a false position. There were obvious
. dangers to it. The Working Committee in Delhi, therefore, decided
that in future there should be no nominations of Acting Presidents
or substitute members. So long as any members ( or member ) of
the oiiginal Committee were out of gaol they would function as the
full Committee. When all of them were in prison, then there would
be no Committee functioning, but. we said rather grandiloquently,
the powers of the Working Committee woulU then vest in each
man and woman in the country, and we railed upon them to cairy
on the struggle uncompromisingly."
[Jawaharlal Nehru — An Autobiography — John Lan'e The
Bodley Head, June 1942 edition. Chapter XXXIV — The Delhi
fact — page 256.]
XXIU
51. Similarly the anonymous ‘ last message ' attributed to.
Gandhiji (Appendix X of the Indictment) was already covered
by his general denial that he had issued no instructions
whatever (para 46). This so-called last message as a matter
of fact is only an assortment of pointers from Gandhiji’s All
India Congress Committee speeches on the 7th and 8th of
August, 1942, as recapitulated by the present writer to groups
of Congress workers who came to Birla House on the morning
of 9th of August, 1942, and recorded by some of them I
Gandhiji left unanswered Chapters IV and V of the
indictment which dealt with the nature of the disturbances
etc. as he could not properly do so on the strength of one-
sided statements and unauthenticated documents. The neces-
sity of this caution will be apparent from the case of Shri
Krishnan Nair whose case was cited in the Indictment m
proof of Congress responsibility for the disturbances follow-
ing upon the arrests of prominent Congressmen. He was
prosecuted for complicity in violence. The following interpel-
lations in the Central Legislative Assembly m this connection
will be found illuminating.
Mr Q.iivum in a ciucstion about KrisJm.in >^aii. .1 Delhi Con-
gresi worker. a.-<kod whether in view of hi' acquittal by the Lahore
High Court, what amends Govcinrcent ytoposed to make to him for
the itatcraent made in the pamphlet Congrest Rcsponsihhtv that ho
was sentenced to two yeai'’ rifforoiis imprisonment.
The Horae Member said that Clovernmcnt did noi nropo.se to
take any .ictiun in the m.itter, it was open to Mi Nair to take any
action to which he was entitled under the law.
SaiJ.ir Sant Singli a'ked it the Home Member was prepared to
withdraw the statement made .11 the pamphlet.
SThe Home Member If theie is a demand for another edition,
I shall make a correction ( L.aughter ).
Mr. Abdul Qaiyiim : Will the Hon. Momhor i.ssuc a con eefion
'lip as III the case of the Intomc-T.w Manual ' (More laughter).
{Hmdu^tan Tvru’s No\. il. W+l )
Shri Krishnan Nair is still in detention under the Defence
of India Rules thus showing that the quashing ot the con-
viction does not help him so far as his discliarge is coi/cerned.
XXIV
The question of responsibility for the disturbances is
dealt with in paras 67 to 73. The argument briefly is as follows :
Government had themselves admitted in the pamphlet
“ Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942-43 ” that
on the 9th there were sporadic “disturbances’* in Bombay.
On the 9th and 10th there were sporadic “ disturbances ” in
some of the other big cities as well. These were confined
to peaceful demonstrations and processions. It was towards
the middle of August that the situation really became serious.
The sequence given in the Government pamphlet thus proves
Gandhiji's contention that it was the Government’s initial
action in the form of the leaders’ arrests en masse and
subsequent heavy repression of peaceful demonstrations that
goaded the people to the point of madness. The loss of self-
control did not imply Congress complicity. It implied that
there were limits to human endurance. As for the Congress
it had set no special stage for a mass movement in pursuance
of Gandhiji’s proposal for British withdrawal. The sole charge
for starting it was vested in Gandhiji and he had taken no
action nor issued any instructions as he contemplated
negotiations with the Government. Congress activity up to
the night of 8th August, 1942, was thus confined to resolutions
only. The dawn of 9th saw the Congress imprisoned. What
followed was therefore the direct result of the Government
action. The attempt “ to paralyze the administration ’’ on
non-acceptance of the Congress demand only proved the
genuineness of the demand. “ It sets the seal on its genuine-
ness by Congressmen preparing to die in the attempt to
paralyze an administration that thwarts their will to fight
the combine against democracy." (Para 43).
The Government had frustrated the aspiration of India
at every step. Out of this frustration was born the cry of
‘ Quit India ’ which gave body to the freedom movement.
The Government instead of appreciating their impatience
to play -their part in the world crisis distrusted those who
XXV
were associated with it. By putting them in prison and
obstructing constructive activity they themselves became the
greatest obstruction in war effort.
He asked therefore that the case against him and his
colleagues should be withdrawn. He also requested the
Government to publish his reply.
To this the Government replied on the 14th of October
that the document had been published for the information
of the public and not to convince Gandhiji ! His request for
publication of his reply was met with a refusal and a veiled
threat held out that they reserved to themselves the freedom
‘ to use at any time and in any manner which they might
think fit ” the various “ admissions ” contained in the communi-
cation which Gandhiji had “ ^voluntarily addressed" to them 1
His request to bo allowed to see the members of the
Working Committee was turned down on the plea that there
was no indication that the views of the members of the
Working Committee differed from his own.
Gandhiji in his rejoinder asked that the charges brought
against him and the counter-charges against the Government
might be referred to an impartial tribunal. If the Government
considered that it was his influence which corrupted people,
they could keep him in prison and discharge the rest of the
Congressmen.
This letter along with Gandhiji’s letters to Sir Reginald
Maxwell and Lord Samuel ( Nos. 51, 53 and 62 ) the reader
must read in full
VI
Items 80-103 included in this section cover Shrimati
Kasturba's protracted illness which started soon after her
arrest in 1942 and ended in her death in detention on 22nd
of February, 1944. Facilities for seeing her near relatives and
getting nursing and medical aid were obtained after protracted
correspondence, and in almost every case the relief when it
came, came too late.
XXV]
On her death the request for her body being handed over
to her sons and relatives was turned down and the cremation
had to take place on the premises of the Aga Khan Palace.
In March 1944 Mr. Butler made a statement in the House
of Commons which gave a highly incorrect and misleading
version of the events relating to Shrimati Kasturba’s illness
and death. Gandhiji protested against it, but Government
refused to make amends. An appeal to Lord Wavell equally
failed to bring any redress and the final letter from the Govern-
ment of India (item No. 1031 only added insult to injury.
VII
In the months of November and December a series
of facsimiles of cartoons and statements of a grossly
libellous character were reproduced from the British press
in some Indian newspapers. They were particularly
directed against Gaudhiji who was shown as a pro-Japanese
Quisling while Shrimati Mirabcn was depicted as his tool
and emissary. Shrimati Mirabcn protested against it in a
letter to Lord Linlithgow dated the Christmas Eve, 1942,
enclosing copies of relevant correspondence which she had
with Gandhiji while she was in Orissa in the early summer
of 1942. These showed that at a time when the Govern-
ment were issuing instructions for the evacuation of civil
authority from the eastern coastal area in Orissa, Gandliiji
was trying to organize a total non-violent non-cooperation
with, and a last ditch resistance to. the prospective Japanecc
invaders. She asked for publication of her letter of protest
and the correspondence with Gandhiji. This letter was not
even acknowledged.
In February 1944 a reference was made to this corres-
pondence in the Legislative Assembly. The Home Member
defended the Government’s position by' saying that the
publication of the correspondence would not help the Con-
gress case because the Government had. not charged it with
being pro-Japanese ! The fact that the correspondence
xxvii
provided documentary proof against the charge of "defeat-
ism ’ and readiness to " concede to the demands ’’ of the
Japanese that had been levelled against the Congress was
conveniently forgotten.
Gandhiji contended that the publication was necessary
in view of the libellous propaganda against her referred to
in Shrimati Miraben’s letter -to Lord Linlithgow. It was
irrelevant whether the publication would help the Congress
case or not. But the Government refused to budge.
VIII ^
On the arrival of the present Viceroy Gandhiji made a
fresh attempt to end the political deadlock and secure justice
tor himself and the Congress which he had failed to obtain
at the hands of the previous Viceroy. He invited him “ to
make a descent ” upon Ahmadnagar and the Aga Khan
Palace “ in order to probe the hearts " of his captives whom
he would find “ to be the greatest helpers in the fight
against Nazism, Fascism and Japanism and the like ". As'
tor the suggestion about the withdrawal of August Reso-
lution, he pleaded that a resolution jointly undertaken could
be honourably, conscientiously and properly withdrawn only
after joint discussion and deliberation.
Lord WavclI’s reply gave an unmistakable indication
that the political issue was intended to be kept in cold
storage and that the previous Viceroy’s policy was to continue.
IX
The final section is of a miscellaneous character. The
matters dealt with include the proposed amendment of the
salt clause in the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement, a request for
being transferred to a regular prison where the expenses
entailed in his detention would be less, conditions of inter-
views during his illness in detention and. the acquisition of
the site of the Samadhi of Shrimati Kasturba and Shri
Mahadev Desai.
PYAREJ-AL
[ GANDHIJI’S PREFATORY COVERING LETTER ]
“ Sunder Bun "
Gandhi gram,
Juhu, 10th June, 1944
Dear Friend,
I send you herewith in two volumes copies of corres-
pondence between the Government of India or the Bombay
Government and myself during my incarceration in the palace
of H. H. the Aga Khan in Yeravada.
The second volume is a copy of my reply to the Govern-
ment of India pamphlet entitled “ Congress Responsibility
for the Disturbances, 1942-43”. The first contains copies of
correspondence arising out of the above mentioned reply and
on miscellaneous matters of public importance.
I had the copies cyclostylcd with the help of kind friends.
For fear of censorship difficulties, I did not try to have the
copies printed at any printing press. But lest the Government
of India may think that there is anything in the correspondence
objectionable from militay standpoint I am circulating for
private use only the copies among friends who, I think, should
know the nature of the correspondence that took place between
the two Governments and me. You arc free to show your
copy to any friends you like, subject to the prec.'iution that
applies to you.
You will confer on me a favour if you will take the
trouble of letting me have your reaction upon the corres-
pondence especially upon the points arising from .my reply
to Government of India pamphlet. I have endeavoured to
answer every item of importance in the Government indictment.
I should like to know the points, if any, which require
elucidation.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
I
CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY
1
10th August, 1942
Dear Sir Roger Lumley,
After the train that carried me and other fellow prison-
ers reached Chinchwad on Sunday, some of us were order-
ed to alight. Shrimati Sarojini Devi, Shrimati Mirabai, Shri
Mahadev Desai and I were directed to get into a car. There
were two lorries lined up alongside the car. I have no doubt
that the reservation of the car for us was done out pf
delicate considerations. I must own too that the officers
in charge performed their task with tact and courtesy.
Nevertheless I felt deeply humiliated when the other
fellow prisoners were ordered to occupy the two lorries. I
realize that all could not be carded in motor cars. I have
been before now carried in prison vans. And this time too
we should have been carried with our comrades. In relating
this incident my object is to inform the Government that
in the altered conditions and the altered state of my mind, I
can no longer accept special privileges which hitherto I have
accept€;4 though reluctantly. I propose this time to accept
no privileges and comforts which comrades may not receive,
except Jfor the special food so long as the Government
allow it for my feodily need.
There is another matter to which I must draw your
attention. I have told ray people that this time our method
1
is not courting imprisonment, that we must prepare for
'much higher sacrifice and so those who choose may peace-
fully resist arrest. So a young man who was in the party
offered such resistance. He was therefore hauled to the
prison van. This was ugly enough. But it was a painful sight
when an impatient English sergeant rough-handled him and
shoved him into the lorry as if he was a log of wood. In
my opinion the sergeant deserves correction. The struggle
has become bitter enough without such scenes.
This temporary jail is commodious enough to take in all
^ who were arrested with me. Among them arc Sardar Patel
and his daughter. She is his nurse and cook. I have great
anxiety about the Sardar who never got over the intestinal
collapse which he had during his last incarceration. Ever
since his release I have been personally regulating his diet
etc. I request that both he ancf his daughter be placed with
me. And so should the other prisoners though not on the
same imperative grounds as are applicable in the case of
the Sardar and his daughter. I submit that it is not right
to separate co-workers arrested for the same cause unless
they are dangerous criminals.
I have been told by the Superintendent that I am not
to be supplied with newspapers. Now I was given by one
of my fellow prisoners on the train a copy of the Sunday
edition of the Evening News. It contains the Government
of India’s resolution in justification of their policy in dealing
with this crisis. It contains some grossly incorrect statements
which I ought to be allowed to correct. This and .similar
things 1 cannot do, unless I know what is going on
outside the jail.
May I expect an early decision on the points raised
herein ?
I am.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
2
No. S. D. V -23
Home Department, (Political)
Bombay Castle, 14th August, 1942
From
The Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire,
The Aga Khan's Palace,
Yeravda
Sir,
With reference to your letter dated 10th instant address-
ed to His Excellency the Governor, I am directed to say
that no change in the conditions of your detention is at
present contemplated, and that therefore your request for
the detention in His Highness the Aga Khan's Palace of
Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel and his daughter cannot be acceded
to, and that it is not at present the intention to supply you
with newspapers
Your obedient servant,
J M. Sladen
Secretary to the Government of Bombay.
Home Department
B
3
Ruli*„ iitioui the wrinnji rfiid rv(Civiii|! ol letters be secunrs prisoners.
CommunicateJ b' the Sujsetmtcndent on 2b-3-'42 0-30 p.m )
, Security prisoners permitted to .send and receive letters
from members of their families only.
The contents of letters to be limited strictly to personal
and domestic matters.
The letters should contain nothing that is likely to
disclose where they arc being detained and that when writing
to their families they should ask the letters sent to them
3
should be addressed “ C/o the Secretary to the Government
of Bombay (H. D.)”.
It has been decided to permit Mr. M. K. Gandhi to
select such newspapers as he would like to see, including
past issues since his arrest, up to the reasonable maxinnim .
A list of newspapers should be obtained from him and
forwarded to Government immediately.
4
To
The Secretary to the Bombay Government (H. D.).
Dear Sir,
With reference to the Government orders about the
writing of letters by the security prisoners, it seems that
the Government do not know that for over thirtyfivc years,
I have ceased to live family life and have been living, what
has been called. Ashram life in association with persons
who have more or less shared my views. Of these Mahadev
Desai, whom I have just lost, was an associate beyond com-
pare. His wife and only son have lived with me for years
sharing the Ashram life. If I cannot write to the widow
and her son or the other members of the deceased’s family
living in the Ashram, I can have no interest in writing to
any one else. Nor can I be confined to wTiting about personal
and domestic matters. If I am permitted to write at all, I
must give instructions about many matters that I had
entrusted to the deceased. These have no connection with
politics which are the least part of my activities. I am
directing the affairs of the A. I. S. A. and kindred associ-
ations. Sevagram Ashram itself has many activities of a
social, educational and humanitarian character. I should be
able to receive letters about tltese activities and write
about them. There is the Andrews Memorial Fund. There
is a large sum lying at my disposal. I should be able to
give instructions about its disposal. To this end I must be in
correspondence with the people at Shantiniketan. Pyarclal
4
Nayar who was co-secretary with Mahadev Desai, and
whose company as also that of my wife was offered to me
at the time of my arrest, has not yet been . sent. I have
asked the I. G. P. about his whereabouts. I can get no in-
formation about him, nor about Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
who was under my care for the control of his intestinal
trouble. If I may not correspond with them about their
health and welfare, again the permission granted can have
no meaning for me.
I hope that even if the Government cannot extend the
facilities for correspondence in terms of this letter, they will
appreciate my difficulty.
Detention Camp, I am. yours etc.,
27-8-’42 M. K. Gandhi
5
N. ‘S. D. V - 1011
Home Department (Pohtical)
From ^ Bombay Castle, 22nd September. '42
The Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department.
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire,
Sir,
In reply to your letter dated the 27th August 1942, I
am directed to reque.st you to furnish me with a list of the
inmates of the Sevagram Ashram with whom you wish to
correspond on personal and domestic matters only. In regard
to your further request that you should be allowed to write
and receive letters on certain matters other than those of
a purely personal and domestic nature, I am to inform you
of the decision of Government that it would not be m
accordalice with the purposes of your confinement to allow
such an extension of the scope of your correspondence.
Your obedient servant,
J. M. Sladen
Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department
5
6
The Secretary, Government of Bombay,
(H. D. Political), Bombay
Sir,
With reference to your letter of 22nd September I beg
to say that I cannot exercise the privilege extended by the
Government since I may not refer in my letters even to non-
political matters mentioned in my letter of 27th August 1942.
Detention Camp, I am. Yours etc.,
25-9- ’42 M. K. Ga.ndhi
C
7
Chimanlal,
Ashram, Sevagram, Wardha
Mahadev died suddenly. G^ve no indication. Slept well
last night. Had breakfast. Walked with me. Sushila, jail
doctors did all they could, but God had willed otherwise.
Sushila and I bathed body. Body lying peacefully covered
v^ith flowers incense burning. Sushila and I reciting Gita.
Mahadev has died yogi's and patriot’s death. Tell Durga,
Babla and Sushila no sorrow allowed. Only joy over such
noble death. Cremation taking place front of me. Shall keep
ashes. Advise Durga remain Ashram but she may go to her
people if she must. Hope Babla will be brave and prepare
himself fill Mahadev's place worthily. Love.
15-8-’42 Bapi
8
The Secretary,
Home Department, Bombay Government, Bombay
Sir,
Khan Bahadur Kateley kindly handed me yesterday the
letters written by late Shri Mahadev Desk’s wife and son.
At the time of handing me the letters, Khan Bahadur told
me that he has to explain to me the delay caused in sending
my ‘ letter”. He could however give no explanation. I missed
6
even a fonaal expression of regret for the inordinate delay.
There appears to have been in the Bombay Secretariat a
disregard of the feelings of a bereaved wife and a bereaved son.
From these letters 1 gather that what was on the face
ot It a telegram, and was handed to the 1. G. P. with the
request that it should go as an express telegraphic message,
was posted as a letter. 1 should like to be infonxved why
the telegraphic message was posted as a letter. May 1 remind
the Government that I am without any reply to my letter
of 27-8- ’42 ’ The widow and her son arc instances in point.
Tliey cannot hut be comforted to receive letters from my
wife and me. But under the prohibitory orders we may
not write to them..
I am, Yours etc.,
Detenuon Camp, M. K. GaNDHI
19th September, '42 (Security prisoner)
9
No. S. D. V. 1084.
From Home Department (Political),
The Secretary to the Bombay Castle,
(lovcmmcnt of Bombay, 24th September, 1942
Home Department
To
M. K. Ga.nohi, Esquire
Sir,
Witji reference to your letter dated the 19th instant, I
am directed to state that the delay in the delivery of your
message to the widow of the late Mr. Mahadev Desai was
due to a misunderstanding which is regretted. As has already
appeared in the press, the Government of India has expressed
regret to the widow for the delay.
7
The CitT Matfistnte dien removed the sentxiee and put upon the
door of die building a notice to the effect that the building was no more
in the possession of the Government. The City Magistrate thereafter .sent
by registered post the keys of the building to the Manager in charge of
the Press, but he refused to accept diem.
Thus the “Navajivan" Kaiyalaya has got back its publications, its
o£Eice library etc., but the quite unworkable and ’dismantled press is still
lying in the building and the “ Navajivan ” Karyalaya is not in possession
of it. Printing papers worth about Rs. 50,000/-, the types, some impiortant
manuscripts and kerosene tins, a typewriter, a cyclostyle, an electric fan
and all the files of the Harijan from start to finish have also not been
returned. Not only that, a local daily published in its issue dated 28-9- '4g
that the files have all been destroyed. Till now the Government has allowed
die report to go uncontradicted.
In the words of the Botihuy Chronicle we refuse to believe that any
government could be guilty of such vandalism. It will bo good for the
authorities concerned to issue a statement on the subject.
Navajivan " Karyalaya. Touts etc..
Abmedabad. 20th October, 1942 KarimbHAI VohRA
12
No. S. D. Ill - 2613
Home Department ( Political ),
Bombay Castle, 5th November. 1942
From
The Secretary to the Government of Bombay.
Home Department
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire,
Sir,
I am directed to inform you in reply to your letter to
me dated October 26th that the Government instructed the
10
District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, to destroy all objectionable
literature seized from tbe Navajivan Mudranalaya sucb as did
copies of tbe Harijan newspaper, books, leaflets and other
miscellaneous papers and to return other articles that were
not objectionable to tbe ownefs.
I have ascertained from tbe District Magistrate that be
interpreted tbe orders as covering all tbe old files of tbe
Hanjan since 1933 and these old files have actually been
destroyed.
Your obedient servant,
J. M. Sladen
Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department
E
13
EXPRES^
Secretary, Home Department,
Bombay Government
Professor Bhansah. one time fellow, Elphinstonc College,
left college 1920 and joined Ashram Sabarmati. He is report*
cd by daily press to be tasting without water near Seva-
gram Ashram Wardha over alleged Chimur e.xcesses. Would
like establish direct telegraphic contact with him through
Superintendent tor j.scertaining cause fasting his condition.
1 would like to dissu.ide him it 1 tind his last morally
unjustified. I make this request for humanity's sake
24-l]-'42 Gandhi
14
The Inspector General of Prisons
Bombay Presidency
SiK.
About 8-45 a. m. yesterday I sent you the text of an
c\pres.s telegram to the Secretary. Bombay Government,
Home Department, about Professor Bhansah who is reported
to be fasting. As tlu; Professor seems to have been fasting
11
since 11th instant according to the report in the Hindu of
Madras and since last Wednesday according to the Bombay
Chronicle. I am naturally filled with anxiety. Time in such
cases is the greatest factor. I shall therefore be obliged if
you could convey by telephone or wire my request to the
Bombay Government for an urgent reply in regard to my wire.
I am etc.,
25-ll-’42 M. K. Gandhi
15
No. S. D. VI -2891
Home Department (Political),
From Bombay Castle, 30 November, 1942
The Additional Secretary to the Government of Bombay.
Home Dep^irtmcnt
To,
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire,
Sir,
. I am directed to refer to your telegraphic message dated
the 24th instant, regarding the fast of Professor Bhansali.
In reply I am to state that Government is unable to
sanction your request to be allowed to communicate with him.
If, how'ever, you desire to advise him, for humanitarian
reasons, to abandon {his fast, this Government will make
arrangements to communicate your advice to him.
Your obedient socv.-int,
Sd-
Additional Secretary to the
Government of Bombay, Home Department
16
Detention Camp,
4th December. ‘42
Sir,
I beg to acknowledge your letter of 30th ultimo receiv-
ed by me yesterday afternoon (3rd instant). I note with
12
deep regret that my telegraphic message with regard to a
dear co-worker, whose life seems to be in jeopardy, should
have been answered by a letter which reached me ten days
after the despatch of my message!
I am sorry for the Government rejection of my request.
As I believe in the legitimacy and even necessity of fasting
under given circumstances, I am unable to advise abandon- '
ment of Prof. Bhansali’s fast, unless I know that he has no
)ustifying reason for it. If the newspaper report is to be
believed, there seems to be legitimate ground for his fast
and I must be content to lose my friend, if I must.
Additional Secretary to the I am, etc.,
Government of Bombay, (H. D.) M. K. Gandhi
.11
CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD LINLITHGOW
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
17
The Agd Khan's Palace,
Yeravda, 14^*42
Dear Lord Linlithgow.
The Government of India were wrong in precipitating
the crisis. Tlic Government resolution jusufying the step
IS full of distortions and misrepresentations. That you had
the approval of your Indian “ colleagues ” can have no
significance, except this that in India you can always com-
mand such services. That cooperation is an addiaonal
justification for the demand of withdrawal irrespective of
what paoplc and parties may say.
The Government ot India should have waited at least
till the time that I inaugurated mass action. 1 had pubhely
stated that I fully contemplated sending you a letter before
taking concrete action.^ It was to be an appeal to you for
an impartial examination of the Congress case. As you
13
know the Congress has readily filled in every omission
that has been discovered in the conception of its demand.
So would I have dealt with every deficiency 'if you had
given me the opportunity. The precipitate 'action of the
Government leads one to think that they were afraid that
the extreme caution and gradualness with which the Con-
* gress was moving towards direct action, might make world
opinion veer round to the Congress as it had already begun
doing, and expose the hollowness of grounds for the Govern-
ment rejection of the Congress demand. They should surely
have waited for an authentic report of my speeches on
Friday and on Saturday night after the passing of the
resolution by the A. I. C. C. You would have found in
them that I would not hastily begin action. You should
have taken advantage of the interval toreshadoveed m them
and explored every possibility of satisfying the Congress
demand.
The resolution says. " The Government of India have
waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might
prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope.” I
suppose ‘wiser counscl.s' here mean abandonment of its
demand by the Congress. Why should the abandonment of
a demand legitimate at all times K' hoped for by a govern-
ment pledged to guarantee independence to India ? Is it a
challenge that could only he met by immediate repression
instead of patient reasoning with the demanding party ? I
venture to suggest that it is a long draft upon the credulity
of mankind to say that the acceptance of the demand
“ would plunge India into confusion." Anyway the summary
rejection of the demand has plunged the nation and the
Government into confusion. The Congress was making
every effort to identify India with the allied cause.
The Government rc.solution says, “ The Governor-
General-in-Council has been aware, too, for some time past,
of dangerous preparations by the Congress party for unlawful
14
and in some cases violent activities, directed among other
things to the interruption of communications and public
utility services, the organization of strikes, tampering with
the loyalty of Government servants and interference with
defence measures including recruitment.” This is a gross
distortion of the reality. Violence was never contemplated
at any stage. A definition of what qould be included in *
non-violent action has been interpreted in a sinister and
subtle manner as if the Congress was preparing for violent
action. Everything was openly discussed among Congress
circles, for nothing was to be done secretly. And why is it
tampering with your loyalty if 1 ask you to give up a job
that is harming the British people ? Instead of publishing
behind the backs of principal Congressmen the misleading
paragraph, the Government of India, immediately they came
to know of “ the preparations”, should have brought to
book the -parties concerned with the preparations. That
would have been an appropriate course. By their unsupported
allegations in the resolution, they have laid themselves open
to the charge of unfair dealing.
The whole Congress movement was intended to evoke
in the people the measure of sacrifice sufficient to compel
attention. It was intended to demonstrate what measure of
popular support it had. Was it wise at this time of the day
to seek to suppress a popular movement avowedly non-violent?
The Government resolution further says, ” The Congress
IS not India's mouthpiece. Yet in the interests of securing
then own dominance and m pursuit of their totalitarian
policy, its leaders have consistently impeded the efforts
made to> bring India to full nationhood It is a gross libel
thus to accuse the oldest natKinal organization oi India
This language lies ill in the mouth of a Government whictv
has. as can -be proved from public lecords. consistently
thwarted every national effort for attaining trccdom, and
sought to suppress rhe Congress by hook or by crook.
15
The Govenunent of India have not condescended to
consider the Congress offer that if simultaneously with the
declaration of independence of India, they could not/trust
the Congress to form a stalble provisional government, they
should ask the Muslim League to do so and that any national
government formed by the League would be loyally accepted
by the Congress. Such an offer is hardly consistent with the
charge of totalitarianism against the Congress.
Let me examine the Government offer. “ It is that as
soon as hostilities cease, India shall devise for herself, with
full freedom of decision and on a basis embracing all and
not only a single party, the form of government which she
regards as most suited to her conditions.” Has this offer any
reality about it ? All parties have not agreed now. Will it
be any more possible after tha war, if the parties have to
act before independence is in their hands? Parties grow up
like mushrooms, for without proving their reprc.scntativc
character, the Government will welcome them as they have
done in the past, if the parties oppose the Congress and
its acivities, though they may do lip homage to independ-
ence. Frustration is inherent in the Government offer. Hence
the logical cry of withdrawal first. Only after the end of the
British power and fundamental change in the political status
of India from bondage to freedom, will the formation of a
truly representative government, whether provisional or
permanent, be possible. The living burial of the authors of the
demand has not resolved the deadlock. It has aggravated it.
Then the resolution proceeds. " The suggestion pur
forward by the Congress party that the millions of India
uncertain as to the future are ready, despite the sad lessons
of so many martyr countries, to throw* themselves into the
arms of the invaders, is one that the Government of India
cannot accept as a true representation of the feeling of the
people of this great country.” I do not know about the
millions. But I can give my own evidence in support of the
16
Congress statement. It is open to the Government not to
believe the Congress evidence. No imperial power likes to
be told that it is in peril. It is because the Congress is
anxious for Great Britain to avoid the fate that has over-
taken other imperial powers that it asks her to shed im-
perialism voluntarily by declaring India independent. The
Congress has not approached the movement with any but
the friendliest motive. The Congress seeks to kill imperialism
as much for the sake of the British people and humanity as
for India. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, 1
maintain that the Congress has no interest of its own apart
from that of the whole of India and the world.
The following passage from the peroration in the resolu-
tion is interesting. “ But on them (the Government) there
lies the task of defending India, of maintaining India's
capacity to wage war, of safeguarding India's interests, of
holding the balance between the different sections of her
people without fear or favour.” Ail I can say is that it is
a mockery of truth after the experience in Malaya, Singapore
and Burma. It is sad to find the Government of India claim-
ing to hold the " balance ” between the parties for whose
creation and existence it is itself demonstrably responsible.
One thing more. The declared cause is common between
the Government of India and us. To put it in the most
concrete terms, it is the protection of the freedom of China
and Russia. The Government ol India think that freedom
of India is not necessary for winning the cause. I think
exactly the opposite. 1 have taken Jawaharlal Nehru as my
mcasunng rod. His personal contacts make him feel much
more the misery of the impending ruin of China and Russia
than I can, and may I say than even you can. In that misery
he tried to forget his old quarrel with imperialism. He dreads
much more than 1 do the success of Nazism and Fascism.
I argued with him for days together. He fought against my
position with a passion which I have no words to describe.
17
0
But the logic of facts overwhelmed him. He yielded when he
saw clearly that without the freedom of India that of the
other two was in great jeopardy. Surely you are wrong in
having imprisoned such a powerful friend and ally.
If notwithstanding the common cause, the Government’s
answer to the Congress demand is hasty repression, they
will not wonder if I draw the inference that it was not so
much the Allied cause that weighed with the British Govern-
ment, as the unexpressed determination to cUng to the
possession of India as an indispensable part of imperial
policy. This determination led to the rejection of the Congress
demand and precipitated repression.
The present mutual slaughter on a scale never before
known to history is suffocating enough. But the slaughter
of truth accompanying the butchery and enforced by the
falsity of which the resolution reeking adds strength to
the Congress position.
It causes me deep pain to have to send you this letter.
But however much I dislike your action, I remain the same
fhend you have known me. I would still plead tor a recon-
sideration of the Government of India's whofe policy. Do
not disregard this pleading of one who claims to be sincere
friend of the British people.
Heaven guide you ! 1 am.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Ga.ndhi
18
The Viceroy’s House.
New Delhi,
22nd August. 1942
Dear Mr. Ga.ndhi,
Thank you very much for your letter dated the 14th
August, which reached me only a day or two ago.
I have read, I need not say, what you have been good
enough to say in your letter with very close attention, and
18
I have given full weight to your views. But 1 fear in the
result that it would not be possible for me either to accept
the criticisms which you advance of the resolution of the
Govcmor-Gencral-in-Council, or your request that the whole
policy of the Government of India should be reconsidered.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi, Esq. Linlithgow
V.)
Secretary,
Government of India (H. D.),
New Delhi
Sir.
In spite of the chorus of approval sung by the Indian
Councillors and others, of the present government policy in
dealing with the Congress, I. venture to assert that had the
Government but awaited at least my contemplated letter to
H. E. the Viceroy and the result thereafter, no calamity
would have overtaken the country. The reported deplorable
destruction would have most certainly been avoided.
In spite of all that has been said to the contrary, I claim
that the Congress policy still remains unequivocally non-
violent. The wholesale arrests of the Congress leaders seemed
to have made the people wild with rage to the point of
losing self-control. I feel that the Government, not the
Congress, arc responsible for the destruction that has taken
place. The only right course for the Government seems to
me to be to release the Congress leaders, to withdraw all
repressive measures and explore ways and means of concili-
ation. Surely the Government have ample resources to deal
with any overt act of violence. Repression can only breed
duscontent and bitternes.s.
Since I am permitted to receive newspapers, I feel that
I ow-e It to the Government to give my reaction to the sad
happenings in the country. If the Government think that
as a prisoner ! have no right to address such communica-
19
tions, they have but to say so and I will not repeat the
mistake.
I am,
23-9-’42 Yours etc.,
M. K. Gandhi
20
Detention Camp,
13th February, 1943
Dear Sir,
Gandhiji in glancing through today's papers has noticed
the following which has appeared as foot-note to annexure
ni of the published correspondence between H. £. the
Viceroy and himself ; “ A formal acknowledgement was sent
to this letter." He directs me to say that he never received
any such acknowledgement and that he would like his
repudiation of the statement iif question to be published.
Yours truly,
Sir Richard Tottenham, PVARELAL
Home Department, Government of India,
New Delhi-
21
Communicated by the Superintendent Camp on 3-4- '43
" Will you please inform Mr. Gandhi with reference to
the letter of 13th February, written on his behalf by Mr.
Pyarelal, that his letter dated 23-9-’42, to the Secretary to the
Government of India. (H. D.) was acknowledged by a message
through the officer I C of the camp and Government con-
siders that a message conveyed in this manner is as formal
as a written communication.”
22
Personal Detention Camp.
New Your’s Eve. 1942
Dear lord linlithgow.
This is a very personal letter. Contrary to the Biblical
injunction I have allowed many suns to set on a quarrel I
20
have harboured against you. But I must not allow the old
year to expire without disburdening myself of what is
rankling in my breast against you. I had thought we were
friends and should still love to think so. However what has
happened since the 9th of August last makes me wonder
whether you still regard me as a friend. I have perhaps not
come in such close touch with any occupant of your gadi
as with you.
Your arrest of me. the communique you issued there-
after, your reply to Rajaji and the reasons given therefor,
Mr. Amery's attack on me, and much else I can catalogue
go to show that at some stage or other you must have sus-
pected my bona fides. Mention of other Congressmen in the
same connection is by the way. I seem to be the fans et
origo of all the evil imputed. to the Congress. If I have not
ceased to be your friend why did you not. before taking
drastic action, send for me, tell me of your suspicions and
make yourself sure of your facts?
1 am quit capable of seeing myself as others see me. But
in this case I have failed hopelessly. I find that all the
statements made about me in Government quarters in this
connection contain palpable departures from truth.
I have so much fallen from grace that I could not estab-
lish contact with a dying friend. I mean Prof. Bhansali who
IS fasting in regard to the Chiinur affair ! ! !
And I am expected to condemn the so-called violencti
of some people reputed to be Congressmen, although I have
no data for such condemnation save the heavily censored
reports of newspapers. I must own that I thoroughly distrust
those reports. 1 could write much more, but I must not
lengthen ray tale of woe. I am sure, what I have said is
enough to enable you to fill in details.
Y ou know I returned to India from South Africa at the
end of 1914 with a mission which came to me in 1906,
namely, to spread truth and non-violence among mankind in
21
the place of violence and falsehood in all walks of life.
The law of Satyagraha knows no defeat. Prison is one of the
many ways of spreading the message. But it has its limits.
You have placed me in a palace where every reasonable
creature comfort is ensured. I have freely partaken of the
latter purely as a matter of duty, never as a pleasure, in the
hope that some day those who have the power will realize
that they have wronged innocent men. I had given myself
six months. The period is drawing to a close. So is my
patience. The law of Satyagraha as I know it prescribes a
remedy in such moments of trial. In a sentence it is. ‘Crucify
the flesh by fasting.’ That same law forbids its use except
as a last resort. I do not want to use it if I can avoid it.
This is a way to avoid it. Convince me of my error or
errors, and I shall make ample, amends. You can send for
me or send someone who knows your mmd and can carry
conviction. There are many other ways if you have the will.
May I expect an early reply ?
May the New Year bring peace to us all !
I am
Your sincere friend,
M. K. GA.MJHr
23
Personal The Viceroy’s House.
New Delhi, 13th Jan., 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi.
Thank you for your personal letter of December 31st.
which I have just received. I fully accept its personal
character, and I welcome it-s frankness. And my reply will
be, as you would wish it to be, as frank and as . entirely
personal as your letter itself.
I was glad to have your letter, for, to be as open with
you as our previous relations justify, I have been profoundly
depressed during recent months first by the policy that was
adopted by the Congress in August, secondly, because while
22
that policy gave rise, as it was obvious it must, throughout
the country to violence and crime (1 say nothing of the risks
to India from outside aggression) no word of condemnation
for that violence and crime should have come from you, or
from the Working Committee. When you were first at Poona
I knew that you were not receiving newspapers, and I
accepted that as explaining your silence. When arrangements
were made that you and the Working Committee should
have such newspapers as you desired I felt certain that the
details those newspapers contained of what was happemng
would shock and distress you as much as it has us all, and
that you would be anxious to make your condemnation of
It categorical and widely known. But that was not the case;
and It has been a real disappointment to me, all the more
when I think of these murders, the burning alive of pohce
officials, the wrecking of trains, the destruction of property,
the misleading of these young students, which has done so
much harm to India's good name, and to the Congress Party,
You may take it from me that the newspaper accounts you
mention are well founded- I only wish they were not, for
the story is a bad one. I well know the immense weight of
your great authority m the Congress movement and with the
Party and those who follow its lead, and I wish I could
feel, again speaking very frankly, that a heavy responsibility
did not rest on you. (And unhappily, while the initial res-
ponsibility rests with the leaders, others have to bear the
consequences, whether as law breakers, with the results that
that involves, or as the victims. )
But if 1 am right in readmg your letter to mean chat
in the Jight of what has happened you wish now to retrace
\c>ur .steps and dissociate yourself from the pohey of last
'ummer, you have only to let me know and I will at once
i.on.sider the m.itter further. And if 1 have failed to understand
your object, you must not hesitate to let me know without
delay in what respect I have done so, and tell me what
23
positive suggestion you wish to put to me. You know me
well enough after these many years to believe that I shall
be only too concerned to read with the same close attention
as ever any message which I receive from you, to give it
the fullest weight and approach it with the deepest anxiety
to understand your feelings and your motives.
Yours sincerely,
Linlithgow
24
Personal Detention Camp,
19-l-’43
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I received your kind letter of 13th instant yesterday
at 2-30 P. M. I had almost despaired of ever hearing from
you. Please excuse my impatience.
Your letter gladdens me to find that I have not lost
caste with you.
My letter of 31st December was a growl against you.
Yours is a counter-growl. It means that you maintain that
you were right in arresting me and you were sorry for the
omissions of which, in your opinion, I was guilty.
The inference you draw from my letter is, I am afraid,
not correct. I have reread my letter in the light of your
interpretation, but have failed to find your meaning in it. I
wanted to fast and should still want to if nothing comes out
of our correspondence and I have to be a helpless witness
to what is going on in the country including the privations
of the millions owing to the universal scarcity stalking the land.
If I do not accept your interpretation of my letter, you
want me to make a positive suggestion. This, I might be
able to do, only if you put me among the members of the
Working Committee of the Congress.
If I could be convinced of my error or worse, of which
you are evidently, I should need to consult nobody, so far
24
as my own action is concerned, to make a full and open
confession and make ample amends. But I have not any
conviction of error. I wonder if you saw my letter to the
Secretary to the Government of India, (H. D.) of 23rd
September, 1942. I adhere to what I have said in it and in
my letter to you of 14th August, 1942.
Oficourse I deplore the happenings that have taken
place since 9th August last. But have I not laid the whole
blame for them at the door of the Government of India ?
Moreover, I could not express any opinion on events which
I 'cannot influence or control and of which I have but a
one-sided account. You are bound pnma facie to accept
the accuracy of reports that may be placed before you by
your departmental heads. But you will not expect me to do
so Such reports have, before^ now, often proved fallible. It
was for that reason that in my letter of 31st December, I
pleaded with you to convince me of the correctness of the
information on which your conviction was based. You will,
perhaps appreciate my fundamental difficulty in making the
statement you have expected me to make.
This, however, I can say from the housetop, that I am
as confirmed a believer in non-violcncc as I have ever been
You may not know’ that any violence on the part of Congress
w irkcrs, I have condemned openly and unequivocally. I
hive even done public penance more than once I must not
veary you with examples. The point I wish to make is
that on every such occasion I was a free man.
This time the retracing, as I have submitted, lies with
the Government You will forgive me for expressing an
opinion jthallcngmg yours. I am certain that nothing but
Rood w'ould have resulted it you had stayed your hand and
Rranred me the interview which I had announced, on the
night of the 8th August. I was to seek. But that was not to be.
Here, may 1 remind you that the Government of India
liave before now owned their mistakes, as for instance, in
25
the Punjab when the late General Dyer was condemned, in the
U. P. when a comer of a mosque in Cawnpore was restored,
and in Bengal when the Partition was annulled. All these
things were done in spite of great and previous mob violence.
To sum up :
(1) If you want me to act singly, convince me that I
was wrong and 1 will make ample amends.
(2) If you want me to make any proposal on behalf of
the Congress you should put me among the Congress
Working Committee members.
I do plead with you to make up your mind to end the
impasse.
If I am obscure or have not answered your letter fully,
please point out the omissions and I shall make an attempt
to give you satisfaction.
I have no mental reservation.
I find that my letters to you arc sent through the
Government of Bombay. This procedure must involve some
loss of time. As time is of the essence in this matter, per-
haps you will issue instructions that my letters to you may
be sent directly by the Superintendent of this Camp.
1 am,
Y our sincere friend,
M. K. Gandhi
25
Personal
The Viceroy’s House,
New Delhi. 25th Jan., 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
Many thanks for your personal letter of the J,9th Janu-
ary, which 1 have just received, and which I need not say
I have read with close care and attention. But 1 am still,
I fear, rather in the dark. I made clear to you in my last
letter that, however reluctantly, the course of events, and
my familiarity with what has been taking place, has left me
26
no choice but to regard the Congress movement, and you
as its authorized and fully empowered spokesman at the
time of the decision of last August, as responsible for the
sad campaign of violence and crime, and revolutionary
activity which has done so much harm, and so much
injury to India's credit, since last August. I note what you
say about non-violence. I am very glad to read your unequi-
vocal condemnation 'of violence, and I am well aware of
the importance which you have given to that article of your
creed in the past. But the events of these last months, and
even the events that are happening today, show that it has
not met with the full support of certain at any rate of your
followers, and the mere fact that they may have fallen short
of an ideal which you have advocated is no answer to the
relations of those who have lost their lives, and to those
•
themselves who have lost their property or suffered severe
injury as a result of violent activities on the part of Congress
and Its supporters. And 1 cannot I fear accept as an answer
vour suggestion that “the whole blame" has been laid by
you yourself at the door of the Governmv'nr of India. We
are dealing with facts in this matter, and they have to be
faced. And while, as 1 made clear in my last letter, I am
very anxious to have from you ansrthing that you may have
to say or any specific proposition that you may have to make,
the position remains that it is not the Government of India,
but Congress and yourself that are on their justification in
tills matter.
It therefore you are anxious to inform me that you
repudiate or dissociate yourself from the resolution of the
*^th Augpst and the policy which that resolution represents,
and if you can give me appropriate assurances as regards
the future, I shall, 1 need not say, be very ready to consi-
der the matter further. It is of course very necessary to be
clear on that point, and you will not, I know, take it amiss
that I should make that clear in the plainest possible words.
27
I will ask the Governor of Bombay to arrange that any
communication from you should be sent through him, which
will I trust reduce delay in its transmission.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi, Esq. Linlithgow
26
Detention Camp,
29th January, 1M3
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I must thank you warmly for your prompt reply to my
letter of 19th instant.
I wish I could agree with you that your letter is clear.
I am sure you do not wish to imply by clearness simply
that you hold a particular opinion strongly. I have pleaded
and would continue to plead .till the last breath that you
should at least make an attempt to convince me of the
validity of the opinion you hold, that the August resolution
of the Congress is responsible for the popular violence that
broke out on the 9th August last and after, even though
it broke out after the wholesale arrests of principal Congress
workers. Was not the drastic and unwarranted action of
the Government responsible for the reported violence ? You
have not even said what part of the August resolution is
bad or offensive in your opinion. That resolution is m no
way a retraction by the Congress of its policy of non-violence.
It is definitely against Fascism in every shape or form. It
tenders cooperation in war effort under circumstances which
alone can make effective and nation-wide cooperation
possible.
Is all this open to reproach ?
Objection may be raised to that clause of the resolution
which contemplated civil disobedience. But that by itself
cannot constitute an objection since the principle of civil
disobedience is impliedly conceded in what is known as the
“ Gandhi-Irwin Pact ’. Even that civil disobedience was
28
not to be started before knowing die result of the meeting
for which I was to seek from you an appointment.
Then, take the unproved and in my opinion unprovable
charges hurled against the Congress and me by so responsible
a Minister as the Secretary of State for India.
Surely I can say with safety thaf it is for the Govern-
ment to justify their action by solid evidence, not by mere
ipse dixit.
But you throw in my iface the facts of murders by
persons reputed to be Congressmen. I see the fact of the
murders as clearly, I hope, as you do. My answer is
that the Government goaded the people to the point of
madness. They started leonine violence in the shape of
the arrests already referred to. That violence is not any
the less so, because it is or^amzcd on a scale so gigantic
that it displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for tooth by that
of ten thousand for one — not to mention the corollary of
the Mosaic law, i. e., of non-resistance as enunciated by
Jesus Christ. I cannot interpret in any other manner the.
repressive measures of the all-powerful Government
ot India.
Add to this talc of woe the privations of the poor
millions due to India-wide scarcity which I cannot help
thinking might have been largely mitigated, if not altogether
prWented, had there been a bema fide national government
responsible to a popularly elected assembly.
If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must
rcsott to the law prescribed for Satyagrahis, namely, a fast
according to capacity. 1 must commence after the early
morning breakfast of the ‘^th February, a fast for twentyone
days ending on the morning of the 2nd March. Usually,
during my fasts, I take water with the addition of salts.
But nowadays, my system refuses water. This time therefore
I propose to add juices of citrus fruits to make water drink-
able. For, my wish is not to fast unto death, but to survive
29
the ordeal, if God so wills. The fast can be ended sooner
by the Government giving the needed relief.
I am not marking this letter personal, as I did the two
previous ones. They were in no way confidential. They
were mere personal appeal.
I am,
Your sincere friend,
M. K. Gandhi
P. S.
The following was inadvertently omitted : — The Govern-
ment have evidently ignored or overlooked the very material
fact that the Congress, by its August resolution, asked nothing
for itself. All its demands were for the whole people. As
you should be aware, the Congress was willing and prepared
for the Government inviting Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah to form a
national government subject to such agreed adjustments as
may be necessary for the duration of the war, such Govern-
ment being responsible to a duly elected assembly. Being
plated from the Working Committee, except Shrimati Sarojini
Devi, I do not know its present mind. But the Committee
is not likely to have changed its mind.
M. K. Gandhi
27
The Viceroy’s Houpe.
New Delhi,
5th February, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
Many thanks for your letter of 29th January which I
have just received. I have read it, as always, with great care
and with every anxiety to follow your mind and to do full
justice to your argument. But I fear that my view of the
responsibility of Congress and of yourself personally for the
lamentable disorders of last autumn remains unchanged.
In my last letter I said that my knowledge of the facts
left me no choice but to regard the Congress movement, and
30
you as its authorized and fully empowered leader at the time
of the decision of last August, as responsible for the campaign
of violence and crime that subsequently broke out. In reply
you have reiterated your request that I should attempt to
convince you that my opinion is correct. I would readily
have responded earlier to that request were it not that your
letters gave no indication, such as I should have been entitled
to expect, that you sought the information with an open
mind. In each of them you have expressed profound distrust
of the published reports of the recent happenings, although
m your last letter, on the basis of the same information, you
have not hesitated to lay the whole blame for them on the
Government of India. In the same letter you have stated
that I cannot expect you to accept the accuracy of the
official reports on which I rely. It is not therefore clear
to me how you expect or even desire me to convinc you of
anything. But in fact, the Government of India have never
made any secret of their reasons tor holding the Congress
and Its leaders responsible for the deplorable acts of violence,,
sabotage and terrorism that have occurred since the Congress
resolution of the 8th August declared a “ mass struggle "
in support of its demands, appointed you as its leader and
authorized all Congressmen to act for themselves in the
event of interference with the leadership of the movement.
A body which passes a resolution in such terms is hardly
entitled to disclaim responsibility for any events that follow
It There is evidence that you and your friends expected
this policy to lead to violence; and that you were prepared
to condone it; and that the violence that ensued formed
part of a. concerted plan, conceived long before the arrest
of Congress leaders. The general nature' of the case against
the Congress has been publicly stated by the Home Member
in his speech in the Central Legislative Assembly on the
15th September last, and if you need further information I
would refer you to it. I enclose a complete copy in case
31
the press versions that you must have seen were not
sufficient. I need only add that all the mass of evidence that
has come to light has confirmed the conclusions then reach-
ed. I have ample information that the campaign of sabotage
has been conducted under secret instructions, circulated in
the name of the A. I. C. C.; that well-known congressmen
have organized and freely taken part in acts of violence and
murder; and that even now an underground Congress
organization exists in which, among others, the wife of a
member of the Congress Working Committee plays a promi-
nent part, and which is actively engaged in planning the
bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism that have disgusted
the whole country. If w’e do not act on all this information
oi^ make it publicly known it is because the time is not yet
ripe; but you may rest assured that the charges against the
Congress will have to be met sooner or later and it will
then be for you and your colleagues to clear yourselves
before the world if you can. And if in the meanwhile you
yourself, by any action such as you now appear to be con-
templating, attempt to find an easy way out, the judgment
will go against you by default.
I have read with' surprise your statement that the
principle of civil disobedience is implicitly conceded in the
Delhi Settlement of the 5th March 1931 which you refer to
as the " Gandhi-Irwin Pact ”. I have again looked at the
document. Its basis was that civil disobedience would be
“effectively discontinued” and that certain “reciprocal action”
would be taken by Government. It was inherent in such
a document that it should take notice of the existence of
civil disobedience. But I can find nothing in it to suggest
that civil disobedience was recognized as being in any circum-
stances legitimate. And I cannot make it too plain that it
is not so regarded by my Government.
To accept the point of view which you put forward
would be to concede that the authorized government of
32
the country, on which lies the responsibilily for maintaining
peace and good order, should allow subversive and revolu>
ti(mary movements described by you yourself as open
rebellion, to take place unchallenged; that they should allow
preparations for violence, for the interruptions of communica-
tions, for attacks on innocent persons, for the murder of
police officers and others to proceed unchecked. My Govern-
ment and I are open indeed to the charge that we should
have taken drastic action at an earlier stage against you and
against the Congress leaders. But my anxiety and that of
my Government has throughout been to give you, and to
give the Congress organization, every possible opportunity
ro withdraw from the position which you have decided to
take up. Your statements of last June and July, the original
resolution of the Working Committee of the 14th July, and
your declaration on the same day that there was no room
left for negotiation, and that after all it was an open rebel-
lion are all of them grave and significant, even without
your final exhortation to "do or die". But with a patience,
rhat was perhaps misplaced, it was decided to wait until
rho resolution of the All India Congress Committee made
It clear that there could be no further toleration of the
Congress attitude if Government was to discharge its res-
ponsibility to the people of India.
Let me in conclusion say how greatly I regret, having
regard to your health and age, the decision that you tell me
that you now have in your mind to take. 1 hope and pray
that wiser counsels may yet prevail with you. But the
Jecision whether or not to undertake a fast with its attendent
ask.s IS clearly one that must he taken by you alone and
the responsibility for which and tor its consequences must
re.st on you atone. I trust sincerely that in the light of what
I have said you may think better of your resolution and I
would welcome a decision on your part to think better of
It. not only because of my own natural reluctance to see
33
you wilfully risk your life, but because I regard the use of
a fast for political purposes as a form of political blackmail
ihimsa) for which there can be no moral justification, and
understood from your own previous writings that this was
also your view.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi, Esq. Linlithgow
28
The Viceroy’s House,
New Delhi,
5th February. 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
In your letter of 29th January to H. E. you mentioned
that you were not marking that letter personal like your
two earlier letters, but that those two earlier letters were
in no way confidential, and were a mere personal appeal. As
you would no doubt have expected H. E. had hitherto
attached to the word ‘ persona! ' its normal conventional
meaning, and had accordingly given the same marking to his
replies. He assumes in the light of what you say that you
would have no objection to his publishing these letters with
his replies to them despite the fact of their personal mark-
ing. Perhaps you would he so kind as to let me know.
Yours sincerely,
M. K Gandhi, Esq G Laithwaite
29
Detention Camp
7ih February. 1943
Dear Sir Gilbert,
I was delighted to see your signature after such a lapse
of time. When I said that the two personal letters were not
confidential I certainly meant what you say. But I meant also
that though they were not confidential on my part, if Hi*'
Excellency wanted to treat them as such, being personal, he
was free to do so, and therefore equally free to regard lii"
34
two replies also as such. In that case he could have the
four letters withheld from publication. So far as I am con-
cerned m; request of course is that the whole correspon-
dence beginning with my letter of 14th August last, and
including my letter to the Secretary to the Government of
India. Home Department, should be published.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
30
Detention Camp,
7-2-’43.
Dear Lord Li.vlithgow,
I have to thank you for your long reply dated 5th
instant to my letter of 29th January last
I would take your last point first, namely, the contem-
plated fast which begins on ^h instant. Your letter, from
a Satyagrahi’s stand-point, ks an invitation to fast. No doubt
the responsibility for the step and its consequences will be
solcy mine. You h.ive allowed an expression to slip ftoin
vour pen lor which 1 was. unprepared. In the concluding
sentence ot the second paragraph you describe the step
.!*• an attempt “ to tind an easy way our ". That you. as a
friend, can impute such a base and cowardly motive to me
passes comprchen.sion You have .il.so described it as “ a
torm of political blackmail ". and you quote my previous
writings on the sub)cct against me. I abide by my writings.
1 hold that there is nothing inconsistent in them with the
contemplated step. 1 wonder whether you h.ave yourself
read those writings
1 do claim tliat I approached you with an open mind
when I asked you to convince me ot my error A “ profound
distrust ” of the published reports is in no way inconsistent
with my having an open mind.
You say that there is evidence that I ( I leave my
friends out for rlie moment ) " expected this policy to lead
35
to violence ”, that I was “prepared to condone it ”, and
that “the violence that ensued formed part of a concerted
plan conceived long before the arrest of Congress leaders”.
I have seen no evidence in support of such a serious charge.
You admit that part of the evidence has yet to be
published. The speech of the Home Member, of which
you have favoured me with a copy, may be taken as the
opening speech of the prosecution counsel and nothing more.
It contains unsupported imputations against Congressmen.
Of course he has described the violent outburst in graphic
lan guag e. But he has not said why it took place when it
did. 1 have suggested why it did. You have condemned men
and women before trying them and hearing their defence.
Surely there was nothing wrong in my asking you to show
me the evidence on which you hold them guilty. What you
say in your letter carries no c6nviction. Proof should corres-
pond to the canons of English jurisprudence.
If the wife of a member of the Working Committee is
actively engaged in “planning the bomb outrages and other
acts of terrorism ” she should be tried before a court of law
and punished if found guilty. The lady you refer to could
only have done the things attributed to her after the wholesale
arrests of 9th August last which I have dared to describe
as leonine violence.
You say that the time is not yet ripe to pubhsh the
charges against the Congress. Have you ever thought of the
possibility of their being found baseless w'hcn they are put
before an impartial tribunal, or that some of the condemned
persons might have died in the meanwhile, or that some of the
evidence that the living can produce might become unavailable?
I reiterate the statement that the principle of civil dis-
obedience is implicitly conceded in the settlement of 5th
March 1931, arrived at between the then Viceroy on behalf
of the Government of India and myself on behalf of the
Congress. I hope you know that the principal Congressmen
36
were discharged before that settlement was even thought
of. Certain reparations were made to Congressmen under
that settlement. Civil disobedience was discontinued only
on conditions being fulfilled by the Government. That by
itself was, in my opinion, an acknowledgement of its legitimacy,
of course under given circumstances. It therefore seems
somewhat strange to find you maintain that civil disobedi-
ence “ cannot be recognized as being in any circumstances
legitimate by your Government. You ignore the practice
of the British Government which has recognized its legitimacy
under the name of “passive resistance*'.
Lastly you read into my letters a meaning which is
wholly inconsistent with my declaration, in one of them, of
adherence to unadulterated non-violence. For, you say in
your letter under reply, that »“ acceptance of my point of
view would be to concede that the authorized Govern-
ment of the country on which lies the responsibility for
maintaining peace and good order, should allow movements
to take place that would admit preparations for violence,'
interruptions of communications, for attacks on innocent
persons, for murders of police officers and others, to proceed
unchecked”, I must be a strange friend of yours w'hom you
believe to be capable of asking for recognition of such
things as lawful.
1 have not attempted an exhaustive reply to the views
.ind statements attributed to me. This is not the place nor
the time for such reply. I have only picked out those things
which in my opinion demanded an immediate answer. You
li-ivc left me no loophole for escaping the ordeal I have set
before for. myself. I begin it on 9th instant with the clearest
possible conscience. Despite your description of it as " a form
'>t political blackmail", it is on my part meant to be an
ipt>eal to the Highest Tribunal fur justice which I have failed
tn secure from you. If I do not survive the ordeal I shall go
10 the Judgment Seat with the fullest faith in my innocence.
37
Posterity will judge between you as representative of an all-
powerful Government and me as a humble man who had
tried to serve his country and humanity through it.
My last letter was written against time and therefore a
material paragraph went in as post-script. I now send here-
with a fair copy typed by Pyarelal who has taken Mahadev
Desai’s place. You will find the post-script paragraph restored
to the place where it should have been.
I am.
Your sincere friend,
End : (1) M. K. Gandhi
31
Detention Camp,
29tb January, 1943
Dear Lord Linlithgow, .
I must rhank you warmly for your prompt reply to my
letter of 19th instant.
I wish I could agree with you that your letter i.s clear
‘I am sure you do not wish to imply -by clearness simply
that you hold a particular opinion strongly 1 have pleaded
and would continue to plead till the last breath that you
should at least make an .attempt to conv ince me of the
validity of the opinion you hold, that the Augu.st resolutuin
of the Congress is responsible for the popular violence that
broke out on the 9th August last and after, even though
it broke out after the whole.sale arrests of principal Congres.s
workers. Was not the drastic and unwarranted action of
the Government responsible lor the reported violence You
have not even said what part of the August resolution is
bad or offensive in your opinion That resolution is in no
way a retraction by the Congrcs.sof its ptilicy of non-violence
It is definitely against Fascism in every shape or form. It
tenders cooperation in war effort under circumstances which
alone can make effective and nation-wide cooperation
possible.
38
The Government have evidently ignored or overlooked the
very material fact that the Congress, by its August resolution,
asked nothing for itself. All its demands were for the whole
people. As you should be aware, the Congress was willing
and prepared for the Government inviting Qaid-i-Azam
Jinnah to form a national government subject to such agreed
adjustments as may be necessary for the duration of the
war, such government being responsible to a duly elected
assembly. Being isolated from the Working Committee, except
Shnmati Sarojini Devi, I do not know its present mind. But
the Committee is not likely to have changed its mind
' Is all this open to reproach ’
Objection may be raised to that clause of the resolution
which contemplated civil disobedience But that by itself
cannot constitute an objection since the principle of civil
disobedience is impliedly conceded in what is known as the
Gandhi-Irwin Pact ’ Even that civil disobedience was
not to be started before knowing the result of the meeting
tor which I was to seek from you an appointment
Then. t,ike the unproved and in my opinion unprovable
thaigcs hurled against the Congress and me by so responsible
1 Ministei as the Secretary ot State for India
Surelv 1 can sav with satorv that it is tor tlio Govorn-
I’lenr to justify rhcir action by solid e\ idenco, not hv mere
ne Ji \it
But you throw in nn ta«.c the tacts ot murders by
persons reputed to be Congiessmen 1 see the tact of the
'luirdeis as clearly, 1 hf>pe. as vou do My answer is
that tlie Government goaded the people to the point ot
madness^ They staited leonine violence m the shape ot
tlie arrests .ilreadv leteired to That violence is not any
;he less so. because it is organized on a scale so gigantic
th.it It displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for ttx*th by that
of ten thousand for one not to mention the corollarv of
*ho Mosaic law. i c . ot non-rcsi.stancc as enunciated by
3<)
Jesus Christ. I cannot interpret in any other manner the
repressive measures of the all-powerful Government
of India.
Add to this tale of woe the privations of the poor
millions due to India-wide scarcity which I cannot help
thinking might have been largely mitigated, if not altogether
prevented, had there been a bona fide national government
responsible to a popularly elected assembly.
If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must
resort to the law prescribed for Satyagrahis, namely, a fast
according to capacity. I must commence after the early
morning breakfast of the 9th February, a fast for twentyone
days ending on the morning of the 2nd March. Usually,
during my fasts, I take water with the addition of salts.
But nowadays, my system refuses water. This time therefore
I propose to add juices of citrui fruits to make water drink-
able. For, my wish is not to fast unto death, but to survive
the ordeal, if God so wills. The fast can be ended sooner
by the Government giving the needed relief.
I am not marking this letter personal, as I did the two
previous ones. They were in no way confidential. They
were mere personal appeal.
1 am.
Your sincere friend,
M. K. Gandhi
32
[Received by Post]
Confidential Home Department,
New Delhi.
7th February, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
The Government of India have been informed by His
Excellency the Viceroy of your intention as communicated
to him of undertaking a fast for 21 days in certain circum-
stances, They have carefully considered the position, and the
40
conclusions they have reached in the light of such conside-
ration are set out in the statement of which a copy is enclosed,
which they propose, in the event of your maintaining your
present intention, to release in due course to the press.
2. The Government of India, as you will see from their
statement, would be very reluctant to see you fast, and I
am instructed to inform you that, as the statement makes
clear, they would propose that, should you persist in your
intention, you will be set at liberty for the purpose, and for
the duration, of your fast as from the time of its commence-
ment. During the period of your fast there will be no objection
to your proceeding where you wish, though the Government
of India trust that you will be able to arrange for your
accommodation away from the Aga Khan's Palace.
3. Should you for any reason find yourself unable to
take advantage of these arrangements, a decision which the
Government of India would greatly regret, they will of
course suitably amend the statement of which a copy is
now enclosed before it issues. But they wish to repeat, with
all earnestness, their anxiety and their hope that the considera-
tions which have carried so much weight with them will
equally carry weight with you, and that you will not pursue
your present tentative proposal. In that event, no occasion will
of course arise for the issue of any statement of any kind.
Yours Sincerely,
R. Tottenham
P. S. February 8th
In view of the urgency of the matter the text of this
letter was telegraphed to the Governor’s Secretary yesterday
tor communicatian to you to-day.
33
Advunf,' vopv of the piopoteJ Government communique
Statement
Mr. Gandhi has informed His Excellency the Viceroy
that he proposes to undertake a fast of three weeks' dura-
41
tion from the 9th February. It is to be a fast according to
capacity, and during it Mr. Gandhi proposes to add juices
of citrus fruits to water to make water dnnkable, as his
wish is not to fast to death, but to survive the ordeal. The
Government of India deplore the use of the weapon of fast
to achieve political ends. There can, m their judgment, be no
justification tor it, and Mr. Gandhi has himself admitted in
the past that it contains an clement of coercion. The
Government of India can only express their regret that Mr.
Gandhi should think it necessary to employ such a weapon
on this occasion, and should seek justification tor it in any-
thing which the Government may have said or done in
connection with a movement initiated by him and his co-
workers in the Congress Party. The Government of India
have no intention on their part o' allowing the fast to
deflect them from their policy, nor will they be responsible
for Its consequences on Mr. Gandhi s health. They cannot
prevent Mr. Gandhi from tasting If he decides to do so,
he must do so at hts own risk and under his owm arrange-
ments. They have accordingly decided to release him for the
purpose and duration of the last, and any members of his
party living with him who may wish to accompany him.
The Government ot India propose to issue in due course
a full statement on the origin and development ot the move-
ment which was initiated in August last and the mea.sures
which Government have been compelled to adopt to deal
with It. But they think this is a suitable occasion for .i brief
review of the events ot the last tew months.
Mr. Gandhi, in his correspondence with the Viceroy,
has repudiated all responsibility for the consequenpes which
have flowed from the “ Quit India " demand, which he and
the Congress party have pur forward. This contention wmII
not bear examination
Mr. Gandhi’s own statement, before the movement was
launched, envisaged anarchy .is an alternative to the exi.sting
42
order and referred to the struggle as “ a fight to the finish
in the course of which he would not hesitate to run any
risk, however great".
As much has been made of his offer to meet the Viceroy,
it is necessary to p>oint out that at a press interview on the
14th July after the Working Committee resolution was passed,
Mr. Gandhi stated that there was no room left in the
proposal for withdrawal or negotiation; there was no question
of one more chance; aftar all it was an open rebellion which
was to be as short and swift as possible. His last message
was “ do or die." The speeches of those most closely associated
with Mr. Gandhi have been even more explicit and have
given a clear indication of what the Congress High Command
had in mind in launching their attack against Government
a.s by law established and against the agencies and services
by which the life of the country was being conducted, in a
period, be it noted, of exceptional stress and strain and of
grave danger to India trom Japanese aggression.
The instructions is.sued by the various organizations
contained in leaflets which were found to be freely circulating
in almost every part of India and which, on the evidence,
cannot all be di.sowned as unauthorized gave specific instruc-
tions a.s to the methods which were to be employed for
bringing the .idmini.stration to a standstill. The circular of
tlie 3)th July emanating from the Andhra Provincial
^.'ongress Committee is an instance in point It is noteworthy
in this connection that in widely .separated areas all over the
country identical methods of attack on railways and other
communications were employed, requiring the use of special
implement-s and highly technical knowledge Control rooms
ind block instruments in r.iilway stations came in for special
attention, and destruction of telegraph and telephone lines
•ind equipment was earned out in a manner which denoted
careful planning and close knowledge of their working. If
these manifestations of rebellious activities are to he regarded
43
as the result not of Congress teachings, but as a manifestation
of tJie popular resentment against the arrest of Mr. Gandhi
and the Congress leaders, the question may well be asked
to which section of the public the tens of thousands of men
engaged in these violent and subversive activities belonged.
If it is claimed that it is not Congressmen who have been
responsible it would be extraordinary, to say the least, if
the blame were to be laid on non-Congress elements.
The country is, in effect, asked to believe that those
who own allegiance to the Congress Party have behaved
in an exemplary non-violent manner, and it is persons who
are outside the Congress fold who have registered their
resentment at the arrest of the leaders of the movement
which they do not profess to follow. A more direct answer
to the argument is to be had jin the fact that Congressmen
have been repeatedly found engaged in incitement to violence
or in prosecuting Congress activities which have led to
grave disorders.
That political parties and groups outside the Congress
Party have no delusions on the subject may be judged from
the categorical way in which they have dissociated themselves
from the movement, and condemned the violence to which
it has given rise. In particular the Muslim League has on
more than one occasion emphasized the character and in-
tentions of the policy pursued by those of the Congress Party.
As early as the 20th August last, the Working Committee
of the League expressed the view, reiterated many times
since, that by the slogan " Quit India ” what is really meant
was supreme control of the government of the country by
the Congress, and that the mass civil disobedience njovement
had resulted m lawlessness and considerable destruction of
life and property. Other elements in the political life of the
country have expressed themselves in a similar vein, and
if the followers of the Congress Party contend that the
resultant violence was no part of their policy or programme,
44
they are doing so against the weight of overwhelming
evidence.
Mr. Gandhi in his letter to the Viceroy has sought to
fasten responsibility on the Government of India. The Govern-
ment of India emphatically repudiate the suggestion. It is
clearly preposterous to contend that it is they who are
responsible for the violence of the past few months which
so gravely disorganized the normal life of the country — and,
incidentally, aggravated the difficulties of the food situation,
at a time when the united energies of the people might have
been devoted to the vital part of repelling the enemy and
striking a blow for the freedom of India, the Commonwealth
and the world.
34
Detention Camp,
8th February, 1943
Dear Sir Richard,
1 have very carefully studied your letter. 1 am sorry to
.say that there is nothing in the correspondence which has.
taken place between Hi.s Excellency and myself or your
lettter, to warrant a recalling of my intention to fast. I have
mentioned in my letters to His Excellency the conditions
which can induce prevention or suspension of the step.
If the temporary release is offered for my convenience.
1 do not need it. I should be quite content to take my fast
.IS a detenue or prisoner. If it is for the convenience of the
Ciuvemment I am sorry 1 am unable to suit them much as
I should like to do so. 1 can say this much that 1, as a
prisoner, shall avoid, as far as is humanly piossible. every
cause of inconvenience to the Government, save what is
inherent in the fast itself. The impending fast has not been
conceived to be taken as a tree man. Circumstances may
arise, as they have done before now. when I may have to
fast as a free man. If therefore I am released, there will be
no fast in terms of my correspondence above mentioned. I
45
shall have to survey the situation de novo and decide what
I should do. I have no desire to be released under false
pretences. In spite of all that has been said against me, I
have not to belie the vow of Truth and Non-violence which
alone makes life liveable for me. I say this, if it is only for
my own satisfaction. It does me good to reiterate openly my
faith when outer darkness surrounds me, as it does just now.
I must not hustle the Government into a decision on
this letter. I understand that your letter has been dictated
through the telephone. In order to give the Government
enough time, I shall suspend the fast, if necessary, to Wed-
nesday next, 10th instant.
So far as the statement proposed to be issued by the
Government is concerned, and of which you have favoured
me with a copy, I can have no opinion. But it I might have
I must say that if does me aft injustice The proper course
would be to publish the full correspondence and let the
public judge for themselvc.s
Yours sincerely,
M K. GA.\'t>Hl
35
Confidential Home Department,
Government of India,
New Delhi, ‘^th February, 1943
Dear Mr Gandhi,
I am instructed to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter ot 8th February 1943 which has been laid before the
Governor-General in Council The Government of India note
your decision with great regret. Their position remains the
same, that is to say. they are rcadv to set vou at liberts
tor the purpose and duration of your fast But it you art
not prepared to take adsdiitage of that lact and if you fast
while in detention, you will do so solely on your own
responsibility and at your own risk. In that event you will
be at liberty to have your own medical attendents, and also
46
to receive visits from friends with the permission of Govern-
ment during its period. Suitable drafting- alterations will be
made in the statement which the Government of India
would, in that event, issue to the press.
Yours sincerely,
R. Tottenham
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esq.,
(Received by telephone —
IMVIN
Secretary to tlie Government of Bombay)
36
Received on 10-2-’43
at 6-5 P. M.
The 1' the full fe\t of the Governmenfot India communique .
Mr. Gandhi has informcJ His Excellency the Viceroy
that he propose.^ ro undertake a fast ot three weeks’ duration
from the lOth February It is to be a fast according to
capacity, and during it Mr Gandhi proposes to add juiccii
of citrus fruit to water to make water drinkable, as his wish
IS not to last to death, but to survive the ordeal. The Govern-
ment of India deplore the use o1 the weapon ot fasting to
achieve political ends There can, in their judgement, he no
lustification for it, and Mr. Gandhi has himself admitted in
the past that it contains an element ot coercion. The Govern-
.iicnt ot India can only express its regret that Mr. Gandhi
'hould think it nece.s,s,iry to employ such a weapon on this
occasion, and should seek a justification tor it in anything
which Government may have said or done in connection
with the movement initiated bv him and his co-workers in
»
the Congress Party The (.iovernmont ot India have no
intention on their parr ot allowing the fast to deflect their
policy. Nor will they be resixmsible for its conscQucnces on
Mi. Gandhi’s health They cannot prevent Mr. Gandhi from
fasting. It was rheir wish, however, that it he decided to
47
do so, he should do so as a free man and under his own
arrangements, so as to bring out clearly that the respon-
sibility for any fast and its consequences rested exclusively
with him. They accordingly informed Mr. Gandhi that he
would <be released for the purpose and for the duration of
the fast of which he had notified them, and with him any
members of the party living with him who may wish to
accompany him. Mr. Gandhi in reply has expressed his
readiness to abandon his intended fast if released, failing
which he will fast in detention. In other words, it is now
clear that only his unconditional release would prevent him
from fasting. This tTbe Government of India arc not prepared
to concede. Their position remains the same : that is to say,
they are ready to set Mr. Gandhi at liberty for the purpose
and duration of his fast. But if Mr. Gandhi is not prepared
to take advantage of that fact and if he fasts while in deten-
tion. he docs so solely on his own responsibility and at his
own risk. He would be at liberty in that event to have his
own medical attendants, and also to receive visits from
friends with the permission of Government during its
period.
The Government of India propose to issue, in due course,
a full statement on the origin and development of the move-
ment which was initiated in August last, and measures which
Government has been compelled to adopt to deal with it.
But they think this a suitable occasion for a brief review
of the events of the last few months.
Mr. Gandhi, in his correspondence with the Viceroy,
has repudiated all responsibility for the consequences which
have flowed from the Quit India ” demand which he and
the Congress Party have put forward. This contention will
not bear examination. Mr. Gandhi's own statement, before
the movement was launched, envisaged anarchy as an alter-
native to the existing order, and referred to the struggle
" as a fight to the finish in the course of which he would
48
not hesitate to run' any risk, however great.” As much has
been made of his offer to meet the Viceroy, it is necessary
to point out that at a press interview on the 14th of July,
after the Working Committee resolution was passed, Mr.
Gandhi stated ^that there was no room left in the proposal
for withdrawal or negotiation; there was no question of one
more chance; it was an open rebellion which was to be as
short and as swift as possible. His last message was “ Do or
Die.” The speeches of those most closely associated with
Mr. Gandhi have been even more explicit, and have given a
clear indication of what the Congress High Command had
in mind in launching their attack — an attack which- would, if
realized, have most seriously imperilled the whole cause of
the United Nations —against Government by law established,
and against the agencies and services by which the life of
the country was being conducted in a period, be it noted, of
exceptional stress and strain, and of grave danger to India
from Japanese aggression.
The instructions issued by the various Congress organiza-
tions contained in leaflets which were found to be freely-
circulating in almost every part of India — and which, on the
evidence, cannot all be disowned as unauthorized — gave specific
directions as to the methods which were to be employed
tor brining the administration to a standstill. The circular
of the 2^h July emanating from the Andhra Provincial
C'ongress Committee is an instance in point. It is noteworthy
m this connection that in widely separated areas all over the
country, identical methods of attacks on railways and other
communications were employed, requiring the use of special
impliments and highly technical knowledge. Control rooms
and block’ instruments in railway stations came in for special
attention and destruction of telegraph and telephone wires
and equipment was carried out in a manner which denoted
careful planning and close knowledge of their working. If
these manifestations of rebellious activities are to be regarded
49
as the result not of Congress teachings but as a manifestation
of popular, resentment against the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and
the Congress leaders, the question may well be asked, to
which section of the public the tens of thousands of men
engaged in these violent subversive activities belonged. If it
is claimed that it is not Congressmen who have been res-
ponsible, it would be extraordinary, to say the least, if the
blame were to be laid on non-Congress elements. The country
is, in effect, asked to believe that those who own allegiance
to the Congress Party have behaved in an exemplary non-
-violent manner, and that it is persons who are outside the
Congress fold who have registered their resentment at the
arrest of the leaders of a movement which they did not
profess to follow. A more direct answer to the argument is
to be had in the fact that known Congressmen have been
repeatedly found engaged in incitements to violence, or
in prosecuting Congress activities which have led to grave
disorders.
That political parties and groups outside the Congress
•Party have no delusions on the subject may be judged from
the categorical way in which they have dissociated them-
selves from the movement, and condemned the violence to
which it has given rise. In particular the Muslim League
has, on more than one occasion, emphasized the character
and intentions of the policy pf^sued by the Congress Party.
As early as the 20th of August last, the Working Committee
of the League expressed the view, reiterated many times
since, that by the slogan “ Quit India ” what was really
meant was supreme control of the government of the
country by the Congress, and that the mass civil disobedience
movement had resulted in lawlessness and considefable des-
truction of life and property. Other elements in the political
life of the country have expressed themselves in a similar
vein, and if the followers of the Congress persist in their
contention that the resultant violence was no part of their
50
policy or programme, they are doing so against the weight
of overwhelming evidence.
Mr. Gandhi in his letter to the Viceroy has sought to
fasten responsibility on the Government of India. The Go>
vemment of India emphatically repudiate the suggestion. It
is clearly preposterous to contend that it is they who are
responsible for the violence of the last few months, which
so gravely disorganized the normal life of the country and,
incidentally, aggravated the difficulties of the food situation
- at a time when the united energies of the people might
have been devoted to the vital task of repelling the enemy
and of striking a blow for the freedom of India, the Com-
monwealth and the world.
37
Detention Camp,
• 27-9-1943
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
On the eve of your departure from India I w-ould like
to send you a word.
Of all the high functionaries I have had the honour of ’
knowing none has been the cause of such deep sorrow to me
as you have been. It has cut me to the quick to have to
think of you as having countenanced untruth, and that re-
garding one whom you at one time considered as your friend.
I hope and pray that God will some day put it into your
heart to realize that you. a representative of a great nation,
had been led into a grievous error.
With good wishes. I still remain,
Your triend,
M. K. Gandhi
38
Personal Viceroy's Camp, India,
(Simla), 7th October, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I have received your letter of 27th September. 1 am
indeed sorry that your feelings about any deeds or words of
51
mine should be as you describe. But I must be allowed, as
gently as I may, to make plain to you that I am quite unable
to accept your interpretation of the events in question.
As for the corrective virtues of time and reflection,
evidently they are ubiquitous in their operation, and wisely
to be rejected by no man.
M. K. Gandhi, Esq. I am sincerely.
Received on 15-10-1943 LINLITHGOW
III
CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE FAST
39
Detention Camp,
12 February, 1943
Dear Col. Bhandari,
You have told me that the Government have instructed
you to convey to them urgently any wish I might have to
express. You have also given me a copy of the instructions
of the Government about the regulating of friends’ visits.
This is my submission about the visits :
1, It is not fair to leave the initiative to me. In the
present state of my mind I have no initiative about
such visits. If therefore the Government wish that I should
receive visitors they should inform the public that, if any
member of the public specially desires to sec me, they will
give him the permission. Their names need not be referred
to me. For, I will not thwart the wish of any friend
to see me. It is highly probable that my children apd
other relatives as also inmates of the Ashram and other
friends who are intimately connected with me thsough one
or more of my many activities may want to sec me. It
Rajaji, for instance, who had already applied to the Govern-
ment for permission to see me in connection with the communal
problem wants to sec me about that matter or any other,
1 should be glad to see him. But even regarding him 1
52
would not take the initiative of submitting his name to the
Grovemment.
2. If the visitors are permitted to see me without any
restrictions as to the matters they might discuss with me,
the object of discussions would be largely frustrated if die
discussions cannot be published. I would of course, always
and in every circumstance, myself rule out, without needing
any external pressure, any discussion that can, by any stretch
of imagination, be helpful to the Fascist powers, including
Japan. If visits contemplating discussions are to be allowed
the declaration I have suggested to be made by the Govern'
ment should obviously be made forthwith so that such visits
may take place in the early stages of the fast.
3. It is possible that those who have been serving or nursing
me in the Ashram or those whq were attending on me during
my previous fasts may want to stay with me to take part
in the nursing. If they should so wish they should be permitted.
I sec difficulty in the way of making public announcement
on this point. If my proposal commends itself to the Govern- .
ment, I suggest their addressing Shrimati Janaki Devi, thd
widow of the late Seth Jamnalal Bajaj telling her that if
anyone desires during my fast to take part in serving me.
he would be permitted to dc so on her submitting their
names to the Government. She knows all those who have
served me before.
Then there arc two other matters. I have been most
anxious all these months to know all about the stage of
health of Shri Mathooradas Tricumjec. cx-Mayor of Bombay,
a grand-son of one of my sisters long since dead. The
Ciovcrnroent may either let me have the information or they
may permit Shri Mathooradas Tricumjec himself to write
to me. or if he is physically unable to do so, anybody may be
allowed on his behalf to give me the fullest information. When
I was arrested his life was almost despaired of. I read in the
papers however that he had undergone a successful operation.
53
The other thing is in connection with the news that
appears in the Bombay Chronicle received here today, that
Professor Bhansali has embarked on another fast, this time
out of Sjrmpathy with me. I would like, in order to save
time, the Government to convey the following message to
him by express wire or through telephone, whichever may
be the quickest way :
“1 have just read about your sympathetic fast. You have just ended
■your very long fast over Chimur. You have made that your special task.
You should therefore quickly rebuild your body and fulfil the self-allotted
task. Leave God to do with me as He likes. I would not have interfered
if you had not just risen from a fast that might have proved fatal and if
you had not imposed on yourself a special duty. "
If the Government would comply with my request on
this point I would like them to send the message without
any alteration and further to let me correspond with him if
my message does not produce the desired result.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
40
POSmo.N REGARDING INTERVIEWS
1. In respect to procedure, the initiative is left entirely
to Mr. Gandhi.
2. The absence of any restrictions on the .subjects
discussed.
3. The fact that an official will be present during
interviews.
4. Restrictions on the publication of discussions.
(The foregoing was communicated by ('ol. Bhandari per!Mm.itly t>i
Gandhi]! at 1-10 P. M. on 12th February, 1943).
Point!" conveyed by Col. Bhandari from letter dated
14th February, '43 Oii Feb. 16th, '-13
Paragraph 1. If Mr. Gandhi has no initiative about
visits it is equally true that Government have no wishes in
the matter. They therefore regret that they cannot sec their
54
way to making any public announcement beyond that which
is already contained in their communique of February 10th
which made it clear that he would be at liberty to receive
visits from friends with the permission of Government during
the period of his fast. They adhere to their original decision,
which is chat they will communicate to him for his information
the names of those who ask for interview as his friends,
provided they see no objection to any particular individual,
and it will be left to him and or his advisers to take such
action as they think fit.
Paragraph 2. — Government are glad to note the assu-
rances given in the paragraph but regret they must adhere to
their original decision that no account of any interview that
may take place shall be published without their specific
approval. ,
Paragraph 3. If the Inspector General of Prisons con-
Mders that one or two extra nurses are required, the matter
will certainly be considered sympathetically
Paragraph 5 & 6 The Government of India regret
that the reference to Chimur in Mr. Gandhi's draft message
to Professor Bhansali and the implication that the latter is
to continue his agitation on that subject makes it imjxissibie
for the Government of India to communicate the message
as it stands They would, however, be prepared to inform
Professor Bhansali that Mr. Gandhi wishes him to give up
his last in view of the fact that he is only just recovering
trom his first one, or they would be prepared to consider
an alternative message m Mr. Gandhi's own words.
As regard.s the health of Mr. Mathooradas Tncumjec.
Interred to in paragraph 4, the Government of Bombay is
'Making inquiries and will communicate to Mr. Gandhi as
^oon as possible any information that is obtained. In the
meanwhile, Mr. Mathooradas is being informed that he may
himself write letters to Mr. Gandhi on personal and do-
mestic matters.
55
42
Detention Camp,
February 24, 19^
Dear Col. Bhandari,
There seems to be, between Khan Bahadur Kateli and
me, a conflict in the understanding of Government instructions
about interviews. From the correspondence and instructions
you were good enough to read to me I had gathered that
those who were permitted to visit me were not restricted as to
the nature of discussion or its duration, a Government repre-
sentative if necessary being present. Where I am physically
unable to carry on discussion I leave it to Shri Pyarelal to
finish it. Naturally also the visitors who arc intimately
connected with me are seen and talked to by my wife. I
personally can do very little talking. Doctors, for one thing,
have to limit it to the fewest possible minutes. The Khan
Bahadur's instructions are that the talk must be confined
only as between them and me. If such is the position it is
hopeless. Thus, Seth R. D. Birla came and so did Shri
Kamalnayan Bajaj. They know all about the trusts that I used
to regulate. Naturally, I took the opportunity of their visits
and instructed Shri Pyarelal accordingly and he has been
talking to them regarding them. The Khan Bahadur had a
very delicate duty to perform. He did it firmly but as grace-
fully as was possible under the circumstances. The Khan
Bahadur also says he has strict instructions not to allow
visitors to take any notes or pap>ers. During the remaining
days of the fast and convalescence, 1 would like, if possible,
to be undisturbed by such things. I would therefore like
clear instructions which Khan Bahadur and I can .miirually
understand. I have no desire to go behind them.
Shri Devadas Gandhi, my son. has permission to stop at
the Palace as long as he likes. During the permission period
he talks during odd minutes when he thinks he can. Naturally,
the Khan Bahadur cannot be present at those times. I have
56
asked Shri Pyarelal to show him all the correspondence that
has passed between the Government of India and the Govern-
ment of Bombay and myself. I had also the intention of
supplying him with copies of such correspondence. But
since the Khan Bahadur's prohibition, pending Government
instructions, I have asked my son not to take any copies.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
43
Order dated 26th February, 1943, in reply to Gandhiji’s
letter of 24th February. '43. communicated by Col. Bhandari.
2. It has throughout been the intention of Government
that an official should be present during all interviews
Government has not so far insisted on this in respect of
interviews with Devadas and jRamdas Gandhi in view of the
condition of their father, but now that he is improving the
Government desires that they should be allowed interviews
only two or three times a day and this should be subject
to the same conditions as other interviews.
3. The object of the arrangement sanctioned by the
Government was to enable Mr. Gandhi to interview friends.
Government has no objection, if other detenues hapj^cn to
be present during an interview, to their joining in the con-
versation, but when Mr. Gandhi htmself terminates an interview
or is unable to continue it. it should be regarded as closed
and no further conversation allowed with other detenucs.
4. Government does not think that copies of its corres-
pondence with Mr. Gandhi should be allowed to go out of
the detention camp.
44
Detention Camp,
2nd March, 1943
Dear Cdl. Bhandari.
You were good enough yesterday, my day of silence, to
tell me that the Government had restricted to my two sons
57
the admission of outsiders at the breaking of the fast tomorrow.
Whilst I am thankful for the concession I am unable to avail
myself of it. For, as the Government know, I make no dis-
tinction between sons born to me and numerous others who
are as dear to me even as they are. I told you three or four
days ago that, if the Government allowed any outsiders to
be present at the breaking of the fast, they should allow
all — nearly fifty — who are at present in Poona, and who
have been allowed to visit me during the fast. I see that
that was not to be.
Yours sincerely.
M. K. Gandhi
45
Detention Camp,
12-3-’43
Dear Col. Bhandari,
With reference to the talk this mornmg, we would like
to bring the following facts to your notice.
As regards Mrs. Gandhi, she has been suffering from
chronic bronchitis with dialatation of the bronchi. She has also
complained latterly of pain of an anginal character and has
had attacks of tachycardia with heart rate of 180 per minute.
As you must h^e noticed, she often gets puffincss of the
face and eyelids especially in the mornings. Her physical
disabilities are telling upon her mental condition, though
Gandhiji's company mitigates that to a large extent. In view
of all this we are of the opinion that she should have a
whole time nurse companion with her. A person who can
speak her language and is known to her personally^ is likely
to succeed better.
As regards Gandhiji we are of the opinion that he will
require careful nursing and looking after for another month
or so. If Kanu Gandhi can be left for that period it will be
the best, as he is attached to Gandhiji and has been trained
58
to anticipate his wants. If the Government have no objection
he is ready and willing to stay as long as he is required.
Yours sincerely,
M. D. D, Gilder
S. Nayar
46
Dear Col. Bhandari,
Detention Camp,'
13-3-’43
With reference to this morning’s conversation about
Kanu Gandhi’s presence with me during the convalescence
period, not extending beyond a month according to the
doctors' opinion, I beg to say that, if the Government will
not permit him to stay with me during that period, I am
afraid, I must go without his services however valuable they
are. I must confess that I do not like this kind of treatment
which seems to me to be one of the sharp reminders, even
during my helpless period, for which I am quite aware I
am solely responsible, that I am a prisoner. But even a
prisoner may give himself the privilege i-f denying himself
conveniences whose accept.mce may humiliate him, as the
offer to give a suhstitufe for Kanu Gandhi seems to do.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
47
Detention Camp,
dated 13-3-’43
Dear Col. Bha.ndari.
You will remember that we asked for the services of Mr.
Mehta sometime after Gandhqi had started his fast and when
It became evident to us th.at his help in the management of
the case was necessary. He had rendered useful sersnee in
Gandhiji’s previous fasts, and Gandhiji has full confidence in him
Towards the end of the fast we had requested you to
secure his service till Gandhiji had well advanced in convales-
cence. We were therefore surprised this morning when you
59
informed us that his services would terminate on the 17th
instant. Nevertheless we record our opinion that the convales-
cence period is by no means over. You have yourself
observed with us that Gandhiji is still bedridden and unable
to move about by himself. We are, therefore, of opinion that
Mr. Mehta's service should be continued at least up to the
end of this month. We would like you please to bring our
opinion at once to the notice of the Government.
Yours sincerely,
M. D. D. Gilder
S. Nayar
48
Detention Camp,
20-3-’43
Dear Col. Bhandari,
In the course of your conversation with Gandhiji this
morning regarding Shri Dinshaw Mehta's attendance you
remarked that you presumed his visits could now be dispensed
with as I could more or less replace him. Your premise, I
am afraid, is not correct. Whilst it is true that I have been
attending on Gandhiji for some years and have also given
him massage under normal conditions, I have never applied
myself to specialized massage. I have neither got Shri Mehta’s
knowledge nor his experience to enable me to give Gandhiji
the treatment which his system may demand from day to
day during his convalescence. As you probably know Shri
Mehta has had experience of Gandhiji's twentyonc days fast
of 1932 when he attended upon him, whilst I was a prisoner
in the Nasik Central Prison. The treatment of massage etc.
at that time had to be kept up for three raonrhs. I am
writing this as 1 feel it necessary to draw the attention of
the authorities to these facts as also to my own limitations
at the present stage of Gandhiji's convalescence.
Yours truly,
PYARELAL
60
IV
CORRESPONDENCE AFTER FAST
49
Detention Camp,
18th February, 1943
Dear Sir Richard Tottenham,
I have not had the. privilege of coming in contact with
you. For the last twenty years I have been co-secretary with
the late Shri Mahadev Desai to Gandhiji. The occasion for
writing this letter is the Press Communique dated 10th
February, 1943, that has been issued by the Government of India
in connection with Gandhiji's fast. You knew Shri Mahadev
Desai personally. If he had been alive today he would have,
from his precise and tenacious memory, sent a categorical
refutation of the various allegations and insinuations contained
in that document against Gandhiji, which might have com-
pelled conviction. In his absence that duty has devolved
upon me. I am a very poor substitute for the late Shri Maha-
dev Desai, but 1 feel that I should be failing in my duty if
I did not put on record my personal testimony, for what it
may be worth, in refutation of those charges.
I take the following from the Press Communique :
” Mr. Gandhi’s own statement, before the movement
was launched, envisaged anarchy as an alternative to the
existing order, and referred to the struggle as a fight to the
finish in the course of which he would not hesitate to run
any risk, however great. As much has been made of his offer
to meet the Viceroy it is necessary to point out that at a
press interview on the 14th of July last after the Working
Committee resolution was passed, Mr. Gandhi stated that
there was no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or
negotiations, there was no question of one more chance; after
all, it was an open rebellion which was to be as short and
as swift as possible. His last message was ' do or die.' ”
The obvious inference that the Government want the
public to draw from this is that Gandhiji had actually bidden
good-bye to his creed of non-violence in connection with
the contemplated Civil Disobedience struggle, that he had
sanctioned the use of violence in its prosecution, and was
prepared to condone the same. In the above extract Gandhiji's
utterances have been torn from their non-violent context
and presented in a violent setting. Take his last message
* do or die ’. This expression — the exact contrary of ‘ do or
kill ’ — was used by Gandhiji in his closing Hindustani speech
in the A. I. C. C. which was in fact a continuation of the
Hindustani speech on the previous day. The whole of the
earlier portion of this speech was an impassioned reaffirma-
tion of his faith in non-violence and an exhortation to the
people to observe the same. He summed up his speech in
two words which meant “ do your duty and die if you must
in the course of discharging it " I do not know whether a
full report of this speech was allowed to be published m
the press. I give below from memory a few' cullmgs from it,
to illustrate its unmistakable non-violent setting :
“ I am the same Gandhi that I was in 1920. I attach
the same importance to non-violence that I did then. If,
therefore, anybody has no taith in non-violence, let him
not vote for this resolution."
“ The present struggle has its roots in Ahimsa. God
would not have forgiven me if, in the present crisis when
the world is being scorched in the flames of Himsa and
pining for deliverance, I failed to make use of the special
talent which he has vouchsafed to me." ,
“ In this resolution there is no hatred for the British
If people ran amock and used violence against Englishmen,
they would not find me alive in their midst to witness it
And the responsibility for it would be upon those who
perpetrated those outrages.”
Both Shri Mahadev Desai and myself recorded these
utterances as they dropped from Gandhiji’s lips. The notes
of these speeches are not with me here, but they are in
existence. I have, however, before me a gist of these speeches
in Shri Mahadev Desai’s own hand. He had prepared it for
Gandhiji’s use on arrival here and it was found after his
death among his papers.
To reinforce my point let me here mention Gandhiji's
last instructions which he gave me just as he went out to
present himself for arrest on the morning of 9th August
last at Birla House. His words were “ Let every non-violent
soldier of freedom write out the slogan ‘ do or die ' on a
piece of paper or cloth and stick it on his clothes, so that
in case he died in the course of ottering Satyagraha, he might
he distinguished by that sign |rora other elements who do
not subscribe to non-violence.” Scores ot representative
Congress workers came in several lorry loads to Birla House
on that morning to meet Gandhiji who was to have explain-
ed to them his wishes in connection with the A. I. C. C.
resolution of the previous evening. In Gandhiji's absence I
gave them his parting message. 1 explained to them what I
knew from him to be his attitude, namely, that while in the
event of civil disobedience being launched everybody would
be free to go the lull length under Ahimsa, there were two
things to which he would not be a living witness in their
midst. These were a cowardly giving up ot the struggle or
running mad and indulging in violence on their part.
As regards Gandhiji's “ offer ” to meet the Viceroy, it
W. 1 S made by him in his closing speech before the A. I, C. C.
The Gov;^mmenr's communique seeks to discredit it by
saying that, at a press interview on the 14th of July after
the Wardha Working Committee's resolution was passed,
Gandhiji stated that there was no room left in the proposal
for withdrawal or negotiation. This has to be read with the
following interviews ho gave to press correspondents follow'ed
63
by his impassioned declaration before the A. I. C. C. that he
was going to seek an interview with the Viceroy and was
not going to commence civil disobedience before the result
of the interview was known. As I have not the corrected
text of these interviews by me 1 have to satisfy myself by
giving the Statesman’s version which suffers from some obvious
printer’s devils.
The Statesman 7-8- '42
“ Mr. Gandhi answers questions "
Bombay, August 6
“ In an exclusive interview to the Associated Press today, Mr Gandhi
answered a number of questions on the new resolution of the Congress
Working Committee.
, " Q. — Does the resolution mean peace or war ’ There is an interpretation
particularly among the foreign }oumalists, that it means declaration of war
and that the last three paragraphs oi^ the resolution ate the really operative
part. Is the emphasis on the first part or the last part of the resolution
" A. — The emphasis in any non-violent struggle, projected or in operation,
is always on peace War, when it becomes an absolute necessity.
Q — Do you contemplate the immediate establishment of a provisional
government and, if so, how do you expect it to come into being'’ Do you
think that there would be a period of interregnum between the endorsement
of the resolution by the A I C C and the starting of the mass struggle ’
A —If uidependcncc is ushered m with perfect British good will, then
I expect an almost simultaneous establishment of a provisional govern-
ment which being just now based, as it must be of necessity, on non-violence,
will, to command universal confidence, ‘represent the free and voluntary
association of all parties.
Q — Do you contemplate any negotiation between the Congress and
the British Government before launching a mass struggle ’
A — I have definitely contemplated an interval between the passing
of the Congress resolution and the starting of the struggle I do not know
that what I contemplate doing according to my wont can be in any way
descnbed as being in the nature of negotiation, but a letter will certainly
go to the Viceroy, not as an ultimatum but as an earnest* pleading for
avoidance of a conflict If there is a favourable response, then my letter can
be the basis for negotiation.
“ Q — What is the maximum time you are prepared to wait to seejif there
18 any response from the Bntish Government and the United Nations to the
" last minute appeal " of the A I. C. C ’
64
A. — The object with which the demand for immediate withdrawal is
made does not allow of a long interval for the simple reason that the war
will not be suspended while, in expectation of some thing turning up, the
interval is contemplated. The Working Committee itself, which is sincerely
eager to mobilize the whole of free Indian opinion in favour of the wax
effort, IS impatient to do so, and in view of the terrible suspense created
throughout India it is altogether wrong both for the Congress and British
Power to prolong the suspense for a day longer than is warranted by force
of circumstances beyond control.”
The Statesman 9-7-1942
MR, GANDHI’S REPLY TO “NEWS CHRONICLE”.
Bombay, August 8
“ Replying to the Kews Chrontcle editorial Mr. Gandhi in an interview
today said
If the tesolution goes through this evening, 1 shall be the chief actor
in the tiagedy, it is therefore dreadful it any responsible Englishman con-
siders me to be guilty of hatred of the British and an admitted partiality
for appeasement In recent times I have not heard any other Englishman
accusing me of the hatred of the British. Anyway, I emphatically plead
not guilty. My love of the British is equal to that of my own people. I
claim no merit tor it, for I have equal love for all mankind without exception.
It demands nn reciprocity. 1 own no enemy on earth That is my creed.
• The resolution has provided lor the difficulty that the framers could
anticipate. They have accounted for every valid criticism and I can say on
behalf of the Congress that it would any time be prepared to consider and
make allowance for my (any’’) vahd difficulty No one responsible has
even taken the trouble of discussing with the Working Committee of the
Congress the difficulty there is about immediate recognition of India's inde-
pendence. The Congress' consent to the military operations of the Allied
arms during the pendency of the war surely is sufficient answer to my (any ?)
difficulty we could conceive.
‘ The British or the Allies run no risk in recognizing mdependence.
The risk is all on the side of India, but the Congress is prepared to take
it. Not only the British run no risk so .far as the conduct of the war is
concerned, b*it they gam, by this one act of lustice, an ally counting 400
millions and accession of strength that is derived from a consciousness of
having done that justice."
Now, take “ open rebellion which was to be as short
and as swift as possible.” It is common knowledge that
Gandhiji has set the fashion in using military terms in con-
65
5
nection with Satyagrah. Therefore he described the struggle
often as “ a non-violent rebellion.*’ He has repeatedly referred
to himself as a “ rebel " and the Congress frankly and openly
as a “ rebel body As for the meaning of “ as swift and
as short as possible ”, I woidd refer you to the following
excerpts from the clippings referred to already:
Q. — How quickly do you think you can win, and is not a complete
general strike necessary for such speed ?
A. — “ Whether people believe it or not, I must confess that in non-
violent action God is the decisive factor. Whatever strength I possess is
not my own. Every ounce of it comes from the God of Truth who does
not dwell in the clouds up above but who dwells in every fibre of my being.
Therefore it is very difficult for me to speak with the precision say of
General Wavell who thinks as he must that his dispositions and calculations
must be such and can be made such that they cannot be overridden by
any such unknown and intangible power called God, or Truth, or whatever
other name human fancy chooses to give to that Power.
“ You are however right when yoti say that for a swift ending a general
strike is necessary. It is not outside my contemplation, but seeing that I
shal} take every step in terms of my oft repeated declaration that a mass
struggle is not conceived in any inimical spirit but in the friendliest spirit.
I shall move with the utmost caution. If a general strike becomes a dire
necessity I shall not flinch.”
(Statesman, August 7, ’42. Mr. Gandhi answers Questions.)
"... We here feel that Britain cannot be extricated from its critical
position unless India's hearty co-operation is secured. That co-operation is
impossible without the people realizing that they are independent today.
And they have to act swiftly, if they are to retain the independence regained
after insufferable period of foreign domination. No one can change the
nature of a whole mass of mankind by promises when the reality is the in-
dispensable requisite for energizing them.” (Statesman, August 9, ’42)
In the light of - the foregoing the expression ” a fight to
the finish in the course of which he would not hesitate to
run any risk however great ”, loses the sinister meaning
asetibed to it in the communique.
Gandhiji's reference to “all Congressmen being authorized
to act for themselves in the event of interference with the...
.leadership of the movement” has been wholly misunder-
stood. From past experience which had shown that all sort
66
of men set themselves, up as leaders and misled the people ~
he took the precaution of leaving each one to himself to act
as he or she thought best, of course, in terms of non-violence.
Sir, Richard Tottenham, Yours truly
Government of India, Home Department, Pyarelal
New Delhi
50
Home Department.
New DelU, 24th Feb., 1943
Dear Mr. Pyarelal,
I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
dated February 18th addressed to Sir Richard Tottenham.
Pyarelal Esq., Yours truly.
Detention Camp, S. J. L.
Poona
5 |
Detention Camp,
21st May, 1943
Dear Sir Reginald Maxwell,
It was only on the 10th instant, that I read your speech
delivered in the Legislative Assembly on the 15th February
last on the adjournment motion about my fast. I saw at once
that it demanded a reply. I wish I had read it earlier.
I observe that you are angry, or at least were at the
time you delivered your speech. I cannot in any other way
account for your palpable inaccuracies. This letter is an
endeavour to show them. It is written to you, not as an
official, but as man to man. The first thought that came to
me was that your speech was a deliberate distortion of facts.
But I quickly revised it. So long as there was a favourable
construction possible to put upon your language, the un-
favourable* had to be rejected. I must assume therefore that
what appeared to me to be distortions were not deliberate.
You have said that “ the correspondence that led to the
fast is there for anyone to interpret as he chooses”; yet you
have straightway told your audience that “it can perhaps be
67
read in the light of the following facts.” Did you leave
them the choice ?
I now take your “ facts ” seriatim : —
1. “ When the Congress Party passed their resolution
' of August 8th, a Japanese attack on this country was
thought to be likely
Your seem to have conveyed the meaning that the
thought was that of the Congress and that it was gratuitous.
The fact is that the Government gave currency to the
thought and emphasized it by action which even seemed
ludicrous.
2. “ By demanding the withdrawal of British power
from India and by placing the Congress in open opposition
it the Congress Party might be thought to have hoped
for some advantage to themselves if the Japanese attack
succeeded. ”
Now this is not a fact but your opinion wholly contrary
to facts. Congressmen never hoped for, nor desired, any
advantage from Japanese success; on the contrary, they
dreaded it and that dread inspired the desire for the ifnme-
diate end of British rule. All this is crystal clear from the
resolution of the All India Congress Committee (8th August,
1942) and my writings.
3. “ Today, six months after, the Japanese danger has,
at any rate for the time being,. receded and there is little
immediate hope from that quarter.”
This again is your opinion; mine is that the Japanese
danger has not receded. It still stares India in the face.
Your fling that " there is little immediate hope from that
quarter,” should be withdrawn unless you think and ' prove
that the resolution and my writings adveited to in the
previous paragraph did not mean what they said.
4. “ The movement initiated by the Congress has been
decisively defeated.”
I must combat this statement. Satyagraha knows no
defeat. It flourishes on blows the hardest imaginable. But I
68
need not go to that bower for comfort. I learnt in schools
established by the British Government in India that “Free-
dom’s battle once begun is bequeathed from bleeding sire
to son.” It is of little moment when the goal is reached so
long as effort is not relaxed. The dawn came with the
establishment of the Congress sixty years ago. Sixth of
April, 1919, on which All India Satyagraha began, saw a
spontaneous awakening from one end of India to the other.
You can certainly derive comfort, if you like, from the fact
that the immediate objective of the movement was not gained
as some Congressmen had expected. But that is no criterion
of ‘ decisive ’ or any ‘defeat ’. It ill-becomes one belonging
to a race which owns no defeat to deduce defeat of a
popular movement from the suppression of popular exube-
rance, may be not always wisg, by a frightful exhibition of
power.
5. " Now therefore it is the object of the Congress
Party to rehabilitate themselves and regain if they can the
credit they have lost.”
Surely, your own experience should correct this opinion.
You know, as well as I do, that every attempt at suppres-
sion of the Congress has given it greater prestige and popu-
larity. This the latest attempt at suppression is not likely
to lead to a contrary result. Hence the questions of ‘lost
credit ' and ‘ rehabilitation ' simply do not arise.
6. ‘‘ Thus they are now concerned to disclaim responsi-
bility for the consequences that followed their decision.
The point is taken up by Mr. Gandhi in his correspondence
with the ViceYoy. The awkward facts are now disowned
as unprqved.”
‘ They ’ here can only mean ‘ me’. For throughout your
speech I was the target. ‘ Now ’ means at the time of my
fast. I remind you that I disclaimed responsibility on 14th
August last when I wrote to H. E. the Viceroy. In that
same letter I laid it on the Government who by their
69
wholesale arrests of 9th August provoked the people to the
point of madness. “ The awkward facts ” are not awkward
for me when the responsibility rests on the Government and
what you put forward as ‘facts’ are only one-sided allega-
tions awaiting proof.
7. “ Mr. Gandhi takes up his stand; ‘ Surely I can say
with safety that it is for the Government to justify their
action by solid evidence.*
To whom are they to justify themselves ?
Sardar Sant Singh : Before an impartial enquiry
committee.”
Was not Sardar Sant Singh’s answer a proper answer?
How nice it would have been if you had not put in the
interjection. For, have not the Government of India been
obliged before now to justif> their acts by appointing in-
quiry committees, as for instance, after the Jallianwala
Bagh Massacre ?
8. But you proceed, “ Elsewhere in his letters Mr.
Gandhi makes this clear. He says, ’ Convince me that I
was wrong and I will make ample amends.’ In the alternative
he asks, ‘ If you want me to make any proposal on behalf
of the Congress, you should put me among the Working
Committee members.’ So far as can be seen, these were the
demands 'when he conceived his fast. There is no other
solid demand made.”
Here there is a double wrong done to me. You have
ignored the fact that my letters were written to one whom
I considered to be a friend. You have further ignored the
fact that the Viceroy in his letter had asked me to make
clear proposals. If you had borne these two facts in mind,
you would not have wronged me as you have done. But let
me come to the ninth count of your indictment and it will
be clear- to you what I mean.
9. ” But now, fresh light emerges. Government without
granting any of his demands informed Mr. Gandhi that they
70
would release him for the purpose and for die duration of
the fast in order to make it dear they disclaimed respon-
sibility for the consequences. On that Mr. Gandhi replied
that if he was released, he would at once abandon the fast,
and that he had conceived the fast only as a prisoner. Thus,
if he were released, the objects for which he declared his
fast, although still unfulfilled, would recede into the back-
ground. As a free man, he would neither demand these
objects nor fast. Interpreted in this way, his fast would
seem to amount to little more than a demand for release."
Together with the letter containing the offer of release,
a copy of the draft communique that was to be issued by
the Government was delivered to me. It did not say that
the offer was made in order “tp make it clear that the Go-
vernment disclaimed responsibility for the consequences. "
If I had seen that offending sentence I would have sent a
simple refusal. In my innocence, I put a fair meaning on
the offer and in my reply I argued why 1 could not accept
it. And, according to my wont, in order that the Govern-
ment may not be misled in any shape or form, I told them
how the fast was conceived and why it could not be taken
by me as a free man. I went out of my way even to postpone,
for the convenience of the Government, the commencement
of the fast by a day. Mr. Irwin who had brought the offer
and the draft communique appreciated the courtesy. Why
was this reply of mine withheld from the public at the time the
revised communique was issued, and why was an unwarranted
interpretation given instead ? Was not my letter a material
document ?
Now for the second wrong. You say that if I were
released my objects for which I had declared the fast would
recede into the background, and even gratuitously suggest
that as a free man I would neither demand these objects
nor fast. As a free man I could and would have carried on
an agitation for an impartial public inquiry into the charges
71
brought against Congressmen and me, I would also have
asked for permission to see the imprisoned Congressmen.
Assume that my agitation had failed to make any impression
on the Government, I might then have fasted. All this, if
you were not labouring under intense irritation, you could
have plainly seen from my letter, supported, as you would
have been, by my past record. Instead, you have deduced a
meaning which, according to the simple rules of construction,
you had no right to deduce. Again, as a fee man 1 would
have had the opportunity of examining the tales of destruc-
tion said to have been wrought by Congressmen and even
by non-Congressmen. And if I had found that they had
committed wanton acts of murder, then also I might have
fasted as I have done before now. You should thus see that
the demands made in my letter to H. E. the Viceroy would
not have receded into the background if I had been released,
for they could have been pressed otherwise than by the fast,
and that the fast had not the remotest connection with any
desire for release. Moreover, imprisonment is never irksome
to a Satyagrahi. For him a prison is a gateway of Liberty.
10. “ I could quote several resolutions of the Congress
Working Committee against him. . . . Mr. Gandhi himself
took up the subject in the Harijan dated 19th August, 1939.
There he says. ‘Hunger-strike has positively become
a plague.' ”
My views quoted by you have not undergone the slightest
change. If you had read the quotations without passion, it
would have prevented you from putting upon my letter the
construction you have.
11. “ On the ethics of hunger-striking, Mr. Giyidlii had
something to say in the Hartjan of 20th may, 1939, after his
Rajkot fast: ‘I now see that it was tainted by htmsa !’ Further
on he remarks, ‘this was not the way of ahimsa or conversion.’”
I am sorry to have to say that you have wholly misread
my article. Fortunately I happen to have A. Hingorani's
72
collection of my writings “ To the Princes and Their Peoples".
I quote from the Harijan article referred to by you: “ At
the end of my fast I had permitted myself to say that it
had succeeded as no previous fast had done. I now see that
it was tainted with himsa. In taking the fast I sought
immediate intervention of the Paramount Power so as to
induce fulfilment of the promise made by the Thakore
Saheb. This was not the way of ahimsa or conversion:
it was the way of himsa or coercion. My fast to be pure
should have been addressed only to the Thakore Saheb, and
I should have been content to die, if I could not have
melted his heart . . . .” I hope you realize that you misapplied
the stray sentences taken from their setting. I described my
fast as ‘ tainted ' not because it was bad ah initio but because
I sought the intervention of the Paramount Power. I have
given you the credit of being unaware of the article. I
wish you could read it. In any case, may I expect you to
correct the error ? For me the Rajkot episode is one of the
happiest chapters of my life, in that God gave me the courage
to own my mistake and purge it by renouncing the fruits of
the award. I became stronger for the purging.
12. "I must confess that speaking for myself it is certainly
repugnant to Western ideas of decency to exploit against
an opponent his feelings of humanity, chivalry or mercy or
to trifle with such a sacred trust as one's own life in order
to play on the feelings of the public for the sake of some
purely mundane object. "
I must tread with extreme caution upon the ground with
which you arc infinitely more familiar than I can be. Let
me however remind you of the historic fast of the late Mac
Swiney. I know that the British Government let him die in
imprisonment. But he has been acclaimed by the Irish people
as a hero and a martyr. Edward Thompson in his “ You
have lived through all this ” says that the late Mr. Asquith
called the British Government's action a “ political blunder
73
of the first magnitude”. The author adds : “ He was allowed
to die by inches, while the world watched with a passion
of admiration and S 3 rmpathy and innumerable British men
and women begged their Government not to be such a
damned fool.” And is it repugnant to Western ideas of
decency to exploit (if that expression must be retained)
against the opponent his feelings of humanity, chivalry or
mercy ? Which is better, to take the opponent's life secretly
or openly, or to credit him with finer feelings and evoke
them by fasting and the like? Again, which is better, to
trifle with one’s own life by fasting or some other way of self-
immolation, or to trifle with it by engaging in an attempt to
compass the destruction of the opponent and his dependants ?
13. “ What he says in effect is this. You say. Govern-
ment is right and the Congress is wrong. I say the Congress
is right and the Government is wrong. I chose to put the
burden of proof on you. I am the only person to be convinced.
You must either admit you are wrong or submit your
reasons to me and make me the sole arbiter in the matter.
... It seems to me that Mr. Gandhi’s demand is rather like
asking the United Nations to appoint Hitler to adjudge the
responsibility for the present war. It is not usual in this
country to put the accused person on the bench to judge
his own case.”
This is an unbecoming caricature of my letters to the
Viceroy. What I said in effect was this: "You have allowed
me to consider myself as your friend. I do not want to
stand on my rights and demand a trial. You accuse me of
being in the wrong. I contend that your Government is in
the wrong. Since you would not admit your Go'^emment’s
error you owe it to me to let me know wherein I , have
erred. For, I am in the .dark as to how I have erred. If you
convince me of my guilt, I will make ample* ammends.”My
simple request you have turned against me and compared
me to an imaginary Hitler appointed to adjudge his own
74
case. If you do not accept my interpretation of my own
letters, c^n I not say, let an impartial judge examine tlie
tival interpretations ? Will it be an offensive comparison if
I recall the fable of the wolf who was always in the right
and the lamb who was always in the wrong?
14. “ Mr. Gandhi is the leader of an open rebellion. . .
He forfeits that right (the right of being heard) so long as
he remains an open rebel. He cannot claim to function
except through the success of his own method. He cannot ,
take part in public life under the protection of the law that
he denies. He cannot be a citizen and yet not a subject.”
You are right in describing me as the leader of an open
rebellion except for a fundamental omission namely, strictly
non-violent. This omission is on a par with the omission of
‘ nots ' from the Commandments and quoting them in support
of killing, stealing, etc ... You may dismiss the phrase or
explain it away in any manner you like. But when you quote
a person you may not omit anything from his language,
especially an omission which changes the whole aspect of
things. I have declared myself an open rebel on many occasi-
ons, even during my visit to London on the occasion of
the second Round Table Conference. But the anathema that
you have pronounced against me has not been pronounced
before. You will perhaps recall the time when the late Lord
Reading was willing to hold a Round Table Conference in
which I was to be present, although I was leading a mass
civil disobedience movement. It was not called because I
had insisted that the Ali Brothers, who were then in prison,
should be released. British history which I was taught as a
lad had (it that Wat Tyler and John Hampden who had
rebelled were heroes. In very recent times the British
Government treated with Irish rebels whilst their hands were
still red with blood. Why should I become an outcast although
my rebellion is innocent and I have had nothing to do with
violence ’
75
In spite of the validity of my claim that you have
enimciated a novel doctrine. I admit that you made a perfect
statement when you said, “ He cannot claim ,to function
except through t]ie success of .his own method.” My method,
being based on truth and non-violence, ever succeeds to the
extent it is applied. Therefore I function always and only
through the success of my method and to the extent that
I correctly represent, in my own person, its fundamentals.
The moment I became a Satyagrahi from that moment
I ceased to be a subject, but never ceased to be a citizen.
A citizen obeys laws voluntarily and never under compul-
sion or for fear of the punishment prescribed for their breach.
He breaks them when he considers it necessary and welcomes
the punishment. That robs it of its edge or of the disgrace
which it is supposed to imply.
15. “In some of the published correspondence, Mr. Gandhi
has made much of his intention to seek an interview with
the Viceroy. But the Congress resolution still stood, together
with Mr. Gandhi’s own words * do or die.’ The Government
communique, on the subject of his fast, has already remihded
the public of Mr. Gandhi’s statement made on 14th July
that there was no room left in the proposal for withdrawal
or negotiation I may again quote Mr. Gandhi’s own
words ; ‘Everyone of you should, from this moment
onwards, consider yourself a free man or woman and act as
if you are free and arc no longer under the heel of this
imperialism.’ Now listen to this : ‘ You may take it from me
that I am not going to strike a bargain with the Viceroy
for ministries or the like. I am not going to be satisfied w'ith
anything short of complete freedom.’ ‘ We shall 4° or die.
We shall cither free India or die in the attempt.’ ‘ This is
open rebellion.’”
Let me first of all make a vital correction of the quota-
tion you have taken from my press statement made on the
14th July and reported in the Harijan of 19th July.' You
76
h^ve quoted me as saying that ** there was no room left in
the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation.” The real quota-
tion is “ there is no room left for negotiations in the proposal
for withdrawal." You will admit that the difference is material.
The faulty quotation apart, you have omitted from my state-
ment, which occupies nearly three columns of the Harijan,
all the things which amplify my meaning and show the
caution with which I was working. I take a few sentences
from that statement. “ It is possible that the British may nego-
tiate a withdrawal. If they do it will be a feather in their cap.
Then it will cease to be a case for withdrawal. If the British
see, however late, the wisdom of recognizing the freedom
of India without reference to the various parties, all things
are possible. But the point I want to stress is this.” Here
follows the sentence misquoted by you. The paragraph then
proceeds: “ Either they recognize independence or they don't.
After recognition many things can follow, for by that single
act, the British representatives will have altered the face of
the whole landscape and revived the hope of the people
which has been frustrated times without number. Therefore,
whenever that great act is performed on behalf of the
British people, it will be a red letter day in the history of
India and the world. And, as I have said, it can materially
affect the fortunes of the war.” From this fuller quotation,
you will see how everything that was being done was done
in order to ensure victory and ward off Japanese aggression.
You may not appreciate my wisdom, but you may not
impugn my good faith.
Though I have no verbatim report of my speeches before
the All India Congress Committee, I have fairly full notes.
I accept the correctness of your quotations. If you bear in
mind that all things were said with non-violence always as
the background, the'statements become free from any objec-
tion. ” Do or die ” clearly means do your duty by carrying
out instructions and die in the attempt if necessary.
77
As to my exhortation to the p>eople to consider them-
selves .free, I take the following from my notes. “ The actual
struggle does not commence tlus very moment. You have
merely placed certain powers in my hands. My first act will
be to wait upon H. E. the Viceroy and plead with him for
the acceptance of the Congress demand. This may take two
or three weeks. What are you to do in the meanwhile ? I
will tell you. There is the spinning wheel. I had to struggle
with the Maulana Saheb before it dawned upon him that
in a non-violent struggle it had an abiding place. The four-
teen-fold constructive programme is all there for you to
carry out. But there is something more you have to do and
it will give life to that programme. Every one of you should,
from this very moment, consider yourself a free man or
woman and even act as if you are free and no longer under
the heel of this Imperialism, This is no make-believe. You
have to cultivate the spirit of freedom before it comes
physically. The chains of a slave are broken the moment he
considers himself a free man. He will then tell his master;
‘ I have been your slave all these days but I am no longer
that now. You may kill me, but if you do not and if you
release me from the bondage, I will ask for nothing
more from you. For henceforth instead of depending
upon you I shall depend upon God for food and clothing.
God has given me the urge for freedom and therefore I
deem myself to be a free man.’ Apart from your resent-
ment of the ‘ Quit India ’ cry, ask yourself whether the
quotation as found in its own setting is in any way offensive?
Should not a man, longing to be free, first of all cultivate
the spirit of freedom and act accordingly irrespective of
consequences ?
16. “ It is not the method of peaceful persuasion to go
to the person whom you wish to convince armed with a
resolution declaring mass rebellion. The essence of nego-
tiation is that both parties should be uncommitted and that
78
neither should exert the pressiure of force on the other. That
is true in any circumstances. But as between a subject and
the State which rules him the position is still'more emphatic.
It is not for the subject to deal with the State on equal
terms, still less to approach it with an open threat."
At the outset let me make one correction. The resolu-
tion did not “ declare " mass rebellion. It merely sanctioned
the “ starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the
widest possible scale so that the country might utilise all
the non-violent strength it has gathered dturing the last
twenty-two years of peaceful struggle.” I was to “ guide
the nation in the steps to be taken.” The paragraph sanc-
tioning the mass struggle also ‘‘appeals to Britain and the
United Nations in the interest of freedom.”
The essence of negotiation should undoubtedly be that
the parties are uncommitted and that neither “ exerts the
pressure of force on the other.” In the case under conside-
sation the actual position is that one party has overwhelm-
ing force at its disposal and the other has none. About
non-committal too the Congress ha .. commitments except
the immediate attainment of freedom. Subject to that there
is the widest latitude for negotiation.
Your proposition about the subject and the State is I
know a reply to the cry of ‘‘Quit India ”. Only the cry is
intrinsically just and the subject and the state formula is
too antediluvian to have any real meaning. It is because
the Congress has felt the subjection of India as an insuf-
ferable reproach that it has risen against it. A well order-
ed State is subject to the people. It does not descend upon
the people from above but the people make and unmake it.
The resolution of 8th August did not contain any threat
open or veiled. 'It prescribed the limitations under which
the negotiations could be carried on and its sanction was
free of all “ force ”, i. e., violence. It consisted of self -suffering.
Instead of appreciating the fact that the Congress laid all
79
its cards on the table, you have given a sinister, meaning
to the whole movement by drawing unwarranted inferences.
In so far as there was any violence after the 8th of August
last on the part of any Congresshian, it was wholly unauthorized
as is quite clear from the resolution itself. The Govern-
ment in their wisdom left me no time whatsoever for issuing
instructions. The All India Congress Committee finished
after midnight on the 8th August. Well before sunrise on
the 9th I was carried away by the Police Commissioner
without being told what crime I had committed. And so
were the members of the Working Committee and the
principal Congressmen who happened to be in Bombay. Is it
too much when I say that the Government invited violence
and did not want the movement to proceed on peaceful
lines ?
Now let me remind you of an occasion of an open
rebellion when you played an important part. I refer to the
famous Bardoli Satyagraha under Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
He was conducting a campaign of civil disobedience. It had
evidently reached a stage when the then Governor of
Bombay felt that there should be a peaceful end to the
struggle. You will remember that the result of an interview
between H. E. the then Governor and the Sardar was the
appointment of a committee of which you were a distin-
guished member. And the committee’s findings were for the
most part in favour of the civil resisters. Of course you
may say, if you wish, that the Governor made a mistake in
negotiating with the rebel,- and so did you in accepting the
appointment. Consider the reverse position, what would have
happened, if instead of appointing a committee the^ Governor
had attempted heavy repression. Would not the Government
have been held responsible for an outbreak of violence if
the people had lost self-control ?
17. “Government does hold Mr. Gandhi responsible for
the recent happenings that have so disturbed the peace of
80
iadia, caused so much loss of life and i»operty of innocent
persons and brought the country to the brink of a terrible
danger. 1 do not say he had any personal complicity in acts
of violence, . . . but it was he that put the match to the
train carefully laid beforehand by himself and his colleagues.
That he was forced to do so prematurely was not his fault
but our fortune. This was the method by which they hoped
to gain their ends. They may seek to repudiate it, now that
it has proved unsuccessful, but the responsibility is theirs
none- the-less ... If Mr. Gandhi wished to dissociate himself
from them, he could have spoken for himself without con-
sulting the members of the Working Committee. Can he
then, without cancelling the Congress rebellion, without
reparation, without even assurances for the future, claim at
any moment to step back as though nothing had happened
into the public life of the country and be received by
Government and society as a good citizen ?”
I can accept no responsibility for the unfortunate
happenings described by you. I have no doubt whatsoever
that history will record that the responsibility for the happen-'
ings was wholly that of the Government. In the nature of
things I could not put a match to a train which for one
thing was never laid. And if the train was never laid, the
question of prematureness does not arise. The deprivation
of the people of their leaders you may consider'* our fortune",
t consider it a misfortune of the first magnitude for all
concerned. I wish to repudiate nothing of what I have done
or intended. I have no sense of repentance, for I have no
sense of having done any wrong to any person. I have
stated timps without number that I detest violence in any
shape or form. But I can give no opinion about things of
which' I have no first-hand knowledge. I never asked for
permission to consult the Congress Working Committee to
enable me to dissociate myself from violence. I asked for
permission to see them, if I was expected to make any
81
proposals on behalf of the Committee. I cannot cancel die
Congress rebellion which is of a purely non-violent character.
I am proud of it. I have no reparation to make, for I have no
consciousness of guilt. And diere can be no quesdon of
assurances for the future, when I hold myself guildess. The
quesdon of re-entering the public life of the country or
being received by Government and society as a good citizen
does not arise. I am quite content to remain a prisoner. I
have never thrust myself on the public life of the country
or on the Government. I am but a humble servant of India.
The only cerdficate I need is a cerdficate from the inner
voice. I hope you realize that you gave your audience not
facts but your opinions framed in anger.
To conclude, why have I written this letter ? Not to
answer your anger with anger. I have jvritten it in the hope
that you may read the sincerity behind my own words. I
never despair of converting any person even an official of
the hardest type. General Smuts was converted or say
reconciled as he declared in his speech introducing the bill
giving relief in terms of the setdement arrived at between
him and me in 1914. That he has not fulfilled my hope or
that of the Indian settlers which the settlement had inspired
is a sad story, but it is irrelevant to the present purpose. I
can muldply such recollecdons. I claim no credit for these
conversions or reconciliadons. They were wholly due to the
working of truth and non-violence expressing themselves
through me. I subscribe to the belief or the philosophy that
all life in its essence is one, and that the humans are
working consciously or unconsciously towards the realizadon
of that idendty. This belief requires a living faith ,in a living
God who is the ultimate arbiter of our fate. Without Him
not a blade of grass moves. My belief requires me not to
despair even of converdng you though your speech
warrants no such hope. If God has willed it - He may
put power in some word of mine which will touch your
82
heart. Mine is but to make the effort. The result is in
God’s hands.
The Hon’ble Sir Reginald Maxwell, M. K. GANfDHI
Home Member.
Government of Indiat New Delhi
52
Personal
New Delhi, the 17th June, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I have your letter of the. 21st May and have read with
interest your comments on my Assembly speech of the 15th
February. I see you sdll maintain the position which you
took up in your letters to His Excellency), the Viceroy
regarding the Congress resolution of the 8th August and
responsibility for the disturbances that followed it. As you
know. Government have never accepted the construction
which you sought to put upon those events. So long as this
fundamental difference exists, I must regretfully conclude
that there is not sufficient common ground for profitable
discussion of the other points raised in your letter.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi R. Maxwell
53
Detention Camp,
23rd June, 1943
Dear Sir Reginald Maxwell,
I thank you for your reply of 17th instant received on
21st instant to my letter of 21st May last.
I had not hoped that my reply would remove the funda-
mental difference between us, but I had hoped and would
still like to hope that the difference would be no bar to an
admission and correction of discovered errors. I had thought,
as I still think, that my letter did point out some errors in
your Assembly speech of I5th February last. I am.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
83
c
54
Detention Camp,
4th May, 1943
Dear Quaid-i-Azam,
When some time aiter my incarceration, the Govern-
ment asked me for a list of newspapers I would like to have,
I included the “ Daum " in my list. I have been receiving it
witJi more or less regularity. Whenever it comes to me, I
read it carefully. I have followed the proceedings of the
League as reported in the “ Dawn ” columns. I noted your
invitation to me to write to you. Hence this letter.
I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face
to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I
am in your hands.
I hope that this letter will be sent to you and if you
agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me.
One thing I had better mention. There seems to bean
‘ if ’ about your invitation. Do you say I should write only
if I have changed my heart ? God alone knows men’s hearts.
I would like you to take me as I am.
Why should not you and I approach the great question
of communal unity as men determined on finding a common
solution and work together to 'make our solution acceptable
to all who are concerned with it or are interested in it ?
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
55
Secretary, Government of India, ' Detention Camp,
Home Department, 4th May, 1943
New Delhi
5ir.
Will you please forward the enclosed to Quaid-i-Azam
Jinnah ? I am.
Yours faithfully,
M. K. Gandhi
84
56
Home Department.
New Delhi, the 24th May, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
In reply to your letter of the 4th May in which you
have requested the Government of India to forward a letter
of the same date addressed by you to Mr. Jinnah, I am to
inform you that the Government of India have decided that
your letter cannot be forwarded. This decision is in accordance
with the restrictions which, as you are aware, have been
placed on your correspondence and interviews while you are
under detention. Government propose shortly to issue a
communique, of which I enclose an advance copy, stating
die fact that the letter has been withheld and the reasons
therefor.
Yours sincerely.
Received on 26-5- ’43 at 6-30 p. m. R. TOTTENHAM
57
PRESS COMMUNIQUE
The Government of India have received a request from
Mr. Gandhi to forward a short letter from himself to Mr.
Jinnah expressing a wish to meet him.
In accordance with their known policy in regard to corres-
pondence or interviews with Mr. Gandhi the Government
of India have decided that this letter cannot be forwarded
and have so informed Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. They
arc not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence
or contact to a person detained for promoting an illegal mass
movement .which he has not disavowed and thus gravely
embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time. It rests
with Mr. Gandhi to satisfy the Government of India that
he can safely be allowed once more to participate in the
public affairs of the country, and until he does so the dis-
abilities from which he suffers are of his own choice.
85
58
Detention Camp,
27th May, 1943
Dear Sir Richard Tottenham,
I received last evening your letter of the 24th instant
refusing my request to forward my letter addressed to Quaid-
i-Azam Jinnah. I wrote only yesterday to the Superintendent
of this camp asking him kindly to inquire whether my letter
to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, and later, the one dated the 15th
instant, to Right Hon'ble Lord Samuel had been forwarded
to the respective addressees.
I am sorry for the Government’s decision. For, my letter
to the Quaid-i-Azam was sent in reply to his public invita-
tion to me to write to him. and I was especially encouraged
to do so because his language had led me to think that if
I wrote to him, my letter would be forwarded to him. The
public too are anxious that the Quaid-i-Azam and I should
meet or at least establish contact. I have always been
anxious to meet the Quaid-i-Azam if perchance we could
devise some solution of the communal tangle which might
be generally acceptable. Therefore the disability in the present
instance is much more that of the public than mine. As a
Satyagrahi I may not regard as disabilities the restrictions
which the Government have imposed upon me. As the
Government are aware, I have denied myself the pleasure of
writing to my relatives as I am not allowed to perform the
service of writing to my co-workers who are in a sense more
to me than my relatives.
The advance copy of the contemplated communique
with which you have considerately favoured me requires
amendation m more places than one. For, as it stands, it
does not square with facts.
As to the disavowal referred to in the proposed communi-
que, the Government are aware that I regard the non-violent
mass movement, for the launching of which the Congress gave
86
me authority on the 8th August last, as perfectly legitimate
and in the interest of the C^vemment and the public. wAs
it is, the Government left me no time to start the move-
ment. Therefore how could a movement, which was never
started, embarrass “ India's " war effort ? If then, there was
any embarrassment by reason of the* popular resentment of
the Government’s action in resorting to the wholesale arrests
of principal Congressmen, the responsibility was solely that
of the Government. The mass movement, as the resolution
sanctioning it said in so many words, was sanctioned in
order to promote India-wide effort on behalf of the Allied
cause, including the cause of Russia and China, whose
danger was very great in August last and from which, in
my opinion, they are by no means free even now. I hope
the Government will not feel offended when I say
that all the war effort that is being put forth in India is
not India’s but the alien Government’s. I submit that if the
Government had complied with the request of the Congress
as embodied in its August resolution, there would have been
a mass effort without parallel for winning the battle of
human freedom and ridding the world of the menace that
Fascism, Nazism, Japanism and Imperialism are. I may be
wholly wrong: any way this is my deliberate and honest
opinion.
In order to make the communique accord with facts, I
suggest the following alteration in the first paragraph : After
Mr. Jinnah add " in response to his public invitation to Mr.
Gandhi to write to him stating that he ( Mr. Gandhi ) would
be willing to correspond with or meet him according as
he wished.”
1 hope that the remaining portion . of the communique
too will be suitably amended in the light of my submission.
I am.
Yours sincerely
M. K. Gandhi
87
59
Detention CaMi|»,
28th May. 190.
Dear Sir Richard. Tottenham,
I handed my reply to your letter of the 24th uistant,
at about one o’clock yesterday, to the Superintendent. I
hurried the writing and the dispatch in the hope of my letter
reaching you before the publication of the communique. {
was therefore astonished and grieved to find the communique
in the papers received in the afternoon, and Reuter’s report
of the reactions upon it in London. Evidently there was no
meaning in an advance copy of the communique being sent
to me. I regard the communique not only to be inconsistent
with facts, but unfair to me. The only way partial redress
can be given to me is the publication of the correspondence
between us. I therefore request that it may be published.
I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
60
Home Department.
New Delhi, 4th June, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I am directed to acknowledge your letter to Sir Richard
Tottenham dated 27th May, 1943, and to say that the Govern-
ment of India have considered it but see no reason to
modify their communique already published.
Yours sincerely,
Conran Smith
61
Home Department,
New Delhi, the 7th June, '43
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
In reply to your letter to Sir Richard Tottenham dated
28th May, 1943, I am directed to say that the advance copy
88
of die communique stating Govenuaettt’s reasons for sot
forwarding your letter to Mr. Jinnah was fumidied to you
for your personal information and that Gowemment regret
that they see no reason to publish the correspondence.
Yours sincerely,
Conran Smith
D
62
Detention Camp.
15th May. 1943
Dear lord Samuel,
I enclose herewith a cutting from the Hindu dated the
8di Atiril last containing Reuter's summary of your speech
in the House of Lords, during the recent debate. Assuming
the correctness of the summary I feel impelled to write
this letter.
The report distressed me. I was wholly unprepared for
your unqualified association with the one-sided and unjustified
statement of the Government of India against the Congress
and me.
You are a philosopher and a liberal. A philosophic mind
has always meant for me a detached mind, and liberalism a
sympathetic understanding of men and things.
As It seems to me there is nothing in what the Govern-
ment has said to warrant the conclusions to which you are
reported tot have come.
From the summary I select a tew of the items which
in my opinion, are inconsistent with facts.
1. The Congress Party has to a great extent thrown
over democratic philosophy.”
The Congress Party has never “ thrown over democratic
philosophy." Its career has been one progressive march
towards democracy. Every one who subscribes to the attain-
ment of the goal of independence through peaceful and
89
le^timate means and pays four annas per year can become
jts member.
2. “ It shows signs of turning towards totali tar ianism.’*
You have based your charge on the fact that the
Working Committee of the Congress had control over' the
late Congress ministries. notd^successful party in
the House of Commons tvhen
democracy has come to full maturity, the parties will be
running elections and their managing committees will be
controlling the actions and policies of their members. In-
dividual Congressmen did not run elections independently
of the party machinery. Candidates were officially chosen
and they were helped by All India leaders. '* Totalitarian ”
according to the Oxford Pocket Dictionary means “designating
a party that permits no rival loyalties or parties.” “Totalitarian
State ” means “ with only one governing party". It must have
violence for its sanction for keeping control. A Congress
member, on the contrary, enjoys the same freedom as the
Congress President, or any member of the Working Committee.
There arc parties within the Congress itself. Above all the
Congress eschews violence. Members render voluntary
obedience. The All India Congress Committee can at any
moment unseat the members of the Working Committee
and elect others.
3. “ They (Congress Ministers) resigned (not ?) because
they had not the support of their Assemblies. They resigned
because de jure they were responsible to their electorates,
de facto they were responsible to the Working Committee
of the Congress and the High Command. That is not
democracy. That is totalitarianism.” ,
You would not have said this, if you had known the
full facts. The dejure responsibility of the ministers to the
electorate was not diminished -in any way by their de facto
responsibility to the Congress Working Committee, for the
very simple and valid reason that the Working Committee
90
derives its power and prestige from the very electorate to
whom the ministers were responsible. The prestige that the
Congress enjoys is due solely to its service of the people.
As a matter of fact the ministers conferred with the members
of their parties in their respective assemblies and they tendered
their resignations with their approval. But totalitarianism is
fully represented by the Government of India which is res-
ponsible to no one in India. It is a tragic irony that a
government which is steeped in totalitarianism brings that
very charge against the most democratic body in India.
4. “ India is unhappy in that the line of party division is
the worst any country can have , . . it is division according
to religious communities.”
Political parties in India are not divided according to
religious communities. From its very commencement the Con-
gress has deliberately remained a purely political organization.
It has had Britishers and Indians, including Christians, Parsis,
Muslims and Hindus as presidents. The Liberal Party of
India is another political organization, not to mention others
that are wholly non-sectarian. That there are also communal
organizations based on religion and they take part in politics,
is undoubtedly true. But that fact cannot sustain the categorical
statement made by you. I do not wish in any way to minimize
the importance of these organizations or the considerable
part they play in the politics of the country. But I do assert
that they do not represent the political mind of India. It can
be shown that historically the politico-religious organizations
are the result of the deliberate application by the Govern-
ment of the “ divide and rule policy ”. When the British
imperial .influence is totally withdrawn, India will probably
be represented solely by political parties drawn from all
classes and creeds.
5. " The Congress can claim at best barely more than
half the population of India. Yet in their totalitarian spirit
they claim to speak for the whole.”
91
If you measure the representative character of the Cong-
ress by the number of members on the official roll, then it
does not represent even half the population. The official
membership is infinitesimal compared to India's vast population
of nearly four hundred millions. The enrolled membership
began only in 1920. Before that the Congress was represented
by its AU India Congress Committee whose members were
mainly elected by various political associations. Nevertheless
the Congress has, so far as I know, alw,ays claimed to speak
the mind of India, not even excluding the Princes. A country
under alien subjection can only have one political goal, namely,
its freedom from that subjection. And considering that the
Congress has always and predominantly exhibited that spirit
of freedom, its claim to represent the whole of India can
hardly be denied. That some parties repudiate the Congress
does not derogate from the claim in the sense in which it
has been advanced.
6. “ When Mr. Gandhi called upon the British Govern-
ment to quit ‘India, he said -it would be for the Congress
to take delivery."
I never said that when the British quitted India, ‘ the
Congress would take delivery.’ This is what I said in my
letter to H. E. the Viceroy dated 29th February last.
“ The Government have evidently ignored or overlooked
the very material fact that the Congress, by its August
resolution, asked nothing for itself. All its demands
were for the whole people. As you should be aware, the
Congress was willing and prepared for the Government
inviting Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah to form a National Government
subject to such agreed adjustments as may be nqcessary for
the duration of the war, such Government being responsible
to a duly elected Assembly. Being isolated from the Working
Committee except Shrimati Sarojini Devi I do not know
its present mind. But the Committee is not liklely to have
changed its mind.”
92
7. “ If this country or Canada, Australia, New Zealand
or South Africa or the. United States had abstained from
action as the Congress in India abstained . . . then perhaps
the cause of freedom everywhere would have gone under
... It is a pity that the leaders of the Congress do not
realize that glory is not to be won in India by abandoning
the cause of mankinc^!”
How can you compare India with Canada and other
dominions which are virtually independent entities, let alone
Great Britain or the United States wholly independent coim-
tries ? Has India a spark of the freedom of the type enjoyed
by the countries named by you ? India has yet to attain her
freedom. Supposing the Allied powers were to lose, and
supposing further that the Allied forces were to withdraw
from India under military necessity, which I do not expect,
the countries you name may iose their independence. But
unhappy India will be obliged to change masters, if she is
even then in her defenceless state. The Congress does not
abstain out of cussedness. Neither the Congress, nor any
other organization can possibly kindle mass enthusiasm for
the Allied cause without the present possession of indepen-
dence, to use your own expression either de jure or de facto.
Mere promise of future independence cannot work that
miracle. The cry of “ Quit India ” has arisen from a realiza-
tion of the fact that if India is to shoulder the burden
of representing, or fighting for the cause of mankind, she
must have the glow of freedom now. Has a freezing man
ever been warmed by the promise of the warmth of sun-
shine coming at some future date ?
The ^rcat pity is that the ruling power distrusts every
thing that the Congress does or says under my influence
which it has suddenly discovered is wholly evil. It is necessary
for a clear imderstanding that you should know my connec-
tion with the Congress and Congressmen. It was in 1935
diat I was successful in my attempt to sever all formal
93
connection with the Congress. There was no coolness between
the Congress Working Committee members and myself. But
I realized that I was cramped arid so were the members,
whilst I was officially connected with the Congress. The
growing restraints which my conception of non-violence re-
quired from time to time were proving too hard to bear. I felt
therefore that my influence should be strictly moral. I had
no political ambition. My politics were subservient to the
demands of truth and non-violence, as I had defined and
practised for practically the whole of my life. And so I was
permitted by the fellow members to sever the official connec-
tion even to the extent of giving up the four anna member-
ship. It was understood between us that I should attend the
meetings of the Working Committee only when the members
required my presence for consultation in matters involving
the application of non-violence or affecting communal unity.
Since that time I have been wholly unconnected with the
routine work of the Congress. Many meetings of the Working
Committee have therefore taken place without me. Their
proceedings I have seen only when they have been published
in the newspapers. The members of the Working Committee
are independent minded men. They engage me often in
prolonged discussions before they accept my advice on the
interpretation of non-violence as applied to problems arising
from new situations. It will be therefore unjust to them and
to me to say that I exercise any influence over them beyond
what reason commands. The public know how even until
quite recently the majority of the members of the Working
Committee have on several occasions rejected my advice.
8. “ They have not merely abstained from action, but
the Congress has deliberately proclaimed the formula that it
is wrong to help the British war effort .by men or money
and the only worthy .effort is to resist all war with non-
-violent resistance. In the name of non-violence they have
led a movement which was characterized in man y places
94
by the utmost violence and the White Paper 'gives clear
proof of the complicity of the Indian Congress leaders in;
the disorders.”
This charge shows to what extent the British public has
been misled by imaginary stories, as in the Government of
India publication statemeiits have been torn from their conr
text and put together as if they were made at one time or
in the same context. The Congress is committed to non-
-violence so far ^ the attainment of freedom is concerned.
And to that end the Congress has been struggling all these
twenty years, however imperfectly it may be, to express
non-violence in action, and I think it has succeeded to a
great extent. But it has never made any pretence of war
resistance through non-violence. Could it have made that
claim and lived up to it, the face of India would have been
changed and the world would have witnessed the miracle of
organized violence being successfully met by organized non-
violence. But human natureihas nowhere risen to the full height
which full non-violence demands. The disturbances that took
place after the 8th of August were not due to any action
on the part of the Congress. They were due entirely to the
inflamatory action of the Government in arresting Congress
leaders throughout India and that at a time 'which was
psychologically wholly wrong. The utmost that can be said
is that Congressmen or others had not risen high enough in
non-violence to be proof against all provocation.
It surprises me that although you have admitted that
“ this White Paper may be good journalism but it is not
so good as a state document,” you have based your sweeping
judgement on the strength of that paper. If you would read
the very speeches to which the paper makes reference, you
will find there ample material to show that the Government
of India had not the slightest justification in making those
unfortunate arrests on August 9th last and after, or in making
the charges they have brought against the arrested leaders
95
aita their incarceration — charges which have never been
sifted in any court of law.
9. “ Mr. Gandhi faced us with an utterly illegitimate
method of political controversy, levying blackmail on the
best of human emotions, pity and sympathy, by his fast.
The only creditable thing to Mr. Gandhi about the fast
was his ending it.”
You have used a strong word to characterize my fast.
H. E. the Viceroy has also allowed himself to use the same
word. You have perhaps the excuse of ignorance. He had
no such excuse for he had my letters before him. All 1 can
tell you is that fasting is an integral part of Satyagraha. It
is a Satyagrahi's ultimate weapon. Why should it be black-
mail when a man under a sense of wrong crucifies his flesh ?
You may not know that Satyagrahi prisoners fasted in South
Africa for the removal of their wrongs; so they have done
in India. One feist of mine you know, as I think you were
then a Cabinet minister. I refer to the fast which resulted
in the alteration of the decision of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment. If the decision had stood, it would have perpetuated the
curse of untouchability. The alteration prevented the disaster.
The Government of India communique announcing my
recent fast, issued after it had commenced, accused me of
having undertaken the fast to secure my release. It was a
wholly false accusation. It was based on a distortion of
the letter I had written in answer to that of the Govern-
ment. That letter dated the 8th February was suppressed
at the time when the communique was issued. If you will
study the question, I refer you to the following which were
published in the newspapers:—
Myletterto H. E. the Viceroy dated. New Year’s Eve, 19^.
H. E. ’s reply dated, January 13, 1943.
My letter dated, January 19, 1943.
H, E. ’s reply dated, January 25, 1943. '
96
My letter dated, January 29, 1943.
H. K *8 reply dated February 5, 1943.
My letter dated, February 8, 1M3.
Sir R. Tottenham’s letter dated, February 7, 1943.
My reply dated, February, 8, 1943.
And I do not know from where you got the impression
that jt ended the fast, for which supposed act you give me the
credit. If you mean by it that I ended the fast before its time,
I would call such an ending a discredit to me. As it was, the
fast ended on its due date for which I can claim no credit.
10. “ He (Lord Samuel) considered that the negotiations
broke down on points on which they would not have broken
down, had there been any real desire on the part of the
Congress to come to a settlement.”
The statement made by the President of the Congress,
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Pandit Nehru, who carried
on the prolonged negotiations, I venture to think, make it
quite clear that no true man could have shown more real
or greater desire for a settlement. In this connection it is
well to remember that Pandit Nehru was, and I have no
doubt still remains, an intimate friend of Sir Stafford Cripps
at whose invitation he had come from Allahabad. He could
therefore leave no stone unturned to bring the negotiations
to a successful issue. The history of the failure has yet to be
written; when it is, it will be found that the cause lay
elsewhere than with the Congress.
I hope my letter has not wearied you. Truth has been
overlaid with much untruth. If not justice to a ' great
organization, the cause of Truth, which is humanity, demands
an impartial investigation of the present distemper.
Yoxirs sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
The Rt. Hon'ble Lord Samuel,
House of Lords, London
Enclo : 1.
7
97
63
Home Department,
New Delhi, the 26th May, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of May 15th enclosing a letter for "the Right Hon'ble Lord
Samuel. I am to say that, for the reasons which have been
explained to you in another connection, the Government
of India have decided that your letter cannot forwarded.
Yours sincerely
R. Tottenham
64
Detention Camp,
1st June, 1943
Dear Sir Richard Tottenham,
I have your note of the 26th ultimo conveying the
Government’s decision about my letter to the Rt. Hon’ble
Lord Samuel. I would just like to say that the letter is not
political correspondence but it is a complaint to a member
of the House of Lords pointing out misrepresentations into
which he has been betrayed and which do me an injustice.
The Government’s decision amounts to a ban on the ordinary
right belonging even to a convict of correcting damaging
misrepresentations made about him. Moreover, I suggest
that the decision about my letter to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah
is wholly inapplicable to this letter to the Rt. Hon’ble Lord
Samuel. Therefore I request reconsideration of the decision.
I am.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
65
Home Department, New Delhi,
7th June, 1943
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I am directed to acknowledge your letter to Sir Richard
Tottenham dated first June, 1943, on the subject of Govern-
98
ment’s decision regarding your letter to Lord Samuel and
to say that Government regret that they do not see their
way to altier that decision.
Yours sincerely,
Conran Smith
E
66
The Additional Secretary, Detention Camp,
Home Department, Government of India, 16th July, 1943
New Delhi
Sir,
I observe from the daily papers that there is a persistent
rumour going round that I have written to H. E. the
Viceroy withdrawing the A. I. C. C. resolution of 8th August
last. I observe too that much speculation is being built upon
the rumour. I suggest that the Government should- issue a
contradiction of the rumour. For I have neither the authority
not the wish to withdraw the resolution. My persoixal opi-
nion is that the resolution was the only one the A. I. C. C.
could have passed if the Congress was to make any effective
contribution to the cause of human freedom which is invol-
ved in the immediate independence of India.
I am, ect.,
M. K. Gandhi
67
Received on 2-8- ’43 Government of India,
Home Department, New Delhi
From 29th July, 1943
Sir Richard Tottenham, C.S. I., C. I. E., I.'C. S.,
Addl. Secretary to the Government of India,
To
M. K. Gandhi. Esquire, Aga Khan's Palace, Poona
Sir,
In reply to your letter of the 16th July, I am directed
to inform you that the Government of India . do not think
99
it necessary to issue a contradiction of the rumour to which
you refer.
I have the honour to be, Sir, etc.
R. Tottenham
Addl.. Secy, to Govt, of India
V
CORRESPONDENCE ON GOVERNMENT’S
INDICTMENT OF THE CONGRESS
68
Detention Camp,
March 5. 1943
Dear Sir Richard Tottenham,
Gandhiji wishes me to inquire whether he is to be
favoured with a copy of the pamphlet issued by the Home
Department 'containing a portion of the evidence in support
of the charges against the Congress and himself.
Sir Richard Tottenham, Yours truly,
Addl. Secy, to the Government of India, Pyarelal
Home Department, New Delhi
69
Detention Camp,
March 23, 1943
Dear Sir Richard Tottenham,
With reference to my letter to you of the 5th inst. may
I remind you that I have not yet received any reply as to
whether Gandhiji is to be favoured with a copy of the
pamphlet issued by the Home Department coRtaining a
portion of > the evidence in support of the charges against
the Congress and himself?
Sir Richard Tottenham, Yours truly,
Add]« Secy, to the Government of India, PYARELAL
Home Department, New Delhi
100
70
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HOME DEPARTMENT
New Delhi, 19th March, ’43
Dear Sir,
We understand from your letter of March 5th, which
reached me a few days ago, that Mr. Gandhi wishes to have
a copy of the Government of India publication entitled
“ Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942-43”. If
so, I am desired to say that we should be glad to supply it.
Pyarelal, Esqr., Yours truly.
Detention Camp, Poona R. TOTTENHAM
71
Detention Camp,
26th March, 1943
Dear Sir,
With reference to your letter of 19th inst. I have to
say that your interpretation of my letter of March 5th is
correct and Gandhiji will be thankful if a copy of the pamphlet
“ Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942-43 ” is
supplied to him.
Sir Richard Tottenham, Yours truly,
Government of India, H. D., PYARELAL
New Delhi
72
D. O. No. 19-9-43 Poll. (1)
Government of India,
Home Department,
New Delhi, 5th April, 1943
Dear Sir,
With ’reference to your letter of March the 26th, I am
desired to enclose herewith a copy of the pamphlet “ Congress
Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942-43” as requested by
Mr. Gandhi.
Pyarelal, Esq., Yours truly.
Detention Camp, Poona R. TOTTENHAM
101
diem, and 1 have come to the conclusion that there is
nothing in my writings and doings that could have warrant-
ed the inferences and the innuendoes of which the indict-
ment is full. In spite of my desire to see myself in my
writings as the author has seen me I have completely failed.
8. The indictment opens with a misrepresentation. I am
said to have deplored “the introduction of foreign soldiers
into India to aid in India’s defence In the Harijan article
on which the charge is based, I have refused to believe
that India was to be defended through the introduction of
foreign soldiers. If it is India’s defence that is aimed at, why
should trained Indian soldiers he sent away from India and
foreign soldiers brought in instead ? Why should the Congress
— an organization which was bom and lives for the very
sake of India's freedom — he suppressed ? I am clearer today
in my mind than I was when I penned that article on 16th
April, that India is not being defended, and that if things
continue to shape themselves as they are, India will sink at
the end of the war deeper than she is today, 'so that she
might forget the very word freedom. Let me quote the re-
levant passages from the Harijan article referred to by
the author :
'* I must confess that I do not look upon this event with equanimity.
Cannot a limitless number of soldiers be trained our of India's millions ?
Would they not make as good fighting material as any in the world ?
Then why foreigners ? We know what American aid means. It amounts in
the end to American influence, if not American rule added to British. It
is a tremendous price to pay for the possible success of Allied arms. 1 see
no Indian freedom peeping through all this , 'preparation for the so-called
defence of India. It is a preparation pure and simple for the defence of the
British Empire, whatever may be asserted to the contrary. (Harijan, April
26. 1942, p. 128.) (Vide Appendix 1 (T)
9. The second paragraph of the indictment opens with
this pregnant sentence ;
“ It will be suggested that during the period of Mr. Gandhi's first
advocacy of British withdrawal from India and the meeting of the All-
India Congress Committee in Bombay on August 7th. the Congress High
104
CoBunaiid and in the later stages the Congress organization as a wlude
were deliberately setting the stage for a mass movement designed to free
India finally from British rule.”
Let me underline the phrase “it will be suggested".
Why should anything be left to suggestion about a movement
which is open and above board? Much ado has been made
about the simplest things which nobody has cared to deny
and of which Congressmen are even proud. The Congress
organization as a whole ‘deliberately set the stage designed
to free India finally from British rule', as early as the year
1920 and not since my ‘first advocacy of British withdrawal
from India ' as suggested in the indictment. Ever since that
year the effort for a movement has never relaxed. This can
be proved from numerous speeches of Congress leaders and
from Congress resolutions. Young and impatient Congressmen
and even elder men have not hesitated at times to press me
to hasten the mass movement. But I, who knew better,
always restrained their ardour, and I must gratefully admit
that they gladly submitted to the restraint. The contraction
of this long period to the interval between my advocacy of
British withdrawal from India and the meeting of the All-
India Congress Committee in Bombay on August 7th, is
wholly wrong and misleading. I know of no special staging
since 26th April, 1942.
10. The same paragraph then says that “ an essential
preliminary ” to an examination of the type of movement
“ is a clear understanding of the real motives underlying the
move.” Why should motives be searched , when everything
is there in black and white ? I can say without any hesitation
that my motives arc always plain. Why I asked for the
immediate withdrawal of the British power from India has
been discussed by me almost threadbare in public.
11. At page 2 of the indictment, a phrase has been taken
from my article entitled “ One Thing Needful ” dated 10th
May, 1942, and I am represented as saying that I would
105
devote the whole ot my energy “ to this supreme act By
simply detachmg the phrase from its context, mystery has
been made to surround it. The phrase “ supreme act " occurs
in an argument addressed to an English fnend and, if it is
read in its setting, it ceases to be mysterious or objectionable,
unless the very idea of withdr&wal is held objectionable.
Here are the relevant parts from the argument .
‘ 1 lUn convinced, thetefore that the tune has come dunng the war.
not after it, for the British and the Indians to be reconciled to complete
separation trom each other That w'ay and that way alone hes the safety
of both and shall 1 say the world 1 see with the naked eye that the
estrangement is growing Every act of the .British Government is being
interpreted ‘and I think rightly, as being in its own interest and for its
own safety There is no such thing as joint common interest Racial
superiority is treated not as a vice but a virtue This is true not only in
India, but it is equally true in Africa, it is true in Burma and Ceylon These
countries could not be held 6therwise than by assertion of race superiority
This u a drastic disease requiring a drastic remedy I have pointed out
the remedy — complete and immediate orderly withdrawal of the Bntish
from India at least, in reality and properly from all non* European possessions
It will be the bravest and the cleanest act of the Bntish people It will
at once put the Alhed cause on a completely moral basts and may even
lead to a most honourable peace between the waiting nations And the
clean end of Imperialism is likely to be the end of Fascism and Nazism
The suggested action will certainly blunt the edge of Fascism and Nazism
which are an offshoot of Impenaliam
Bntish distress cannot be relieved by nationalise India s aid m the manner
suggested by the writer It is ill equipped for the purpose even if it can
be made enthusiastic about it And what is there to enthuse nationalistic
India '> Just as a person cannot feel the glow of the sun's heat in its absence,
even so India cannot feel the glow of freedom without the actual experience
of It Many of us simply cannot contemplate an utterly Iree India with
calmness and equanimity The first experience is likely to be a shock before
the glow comes That shock is a necessity India is a mighty nation No one
can tell how she will act and with what effect when the shocit is delivered
1 feel, therefore that I must devote the whole of my energy to the
realization of the supreme act The writer of the letter ladmits the wrong
done to India by the Bntish 1 suggest to the wnter that the fust condition
of British success is the present undoing of the wrong It should precede,
not follow, victory The presence of the British in India is an invitation
106
tp Japan to invade India. Tbeir withdrawal lemovea the bait. Assume, how-
ever, that it does not; free India will be better able to cope with ^ invasion.
Unadulterated non-cooperation will then have full sway.”
{Harijan, May 10, 1942, p. 148)
In this long extract, the phrase “ supreme act ” takes its
legitimate place. It does not refer simply to the British
withdrawal. But it sums up all that must precede and succeed
it. It is eui act worthy of the energy not of one person
but of hundreds. This is how I began my ' answer to the
English friend’s letter:
“ I can but repeat what I felt and said in my letter to Lord Linlithgow
recording my impressions of the first interview with him after the declaration
of war. I have nothing to withdraw, nothing to repent of. I remain the
same friend today of the British that I was then. I have not a trace of
hatred in me towards them. But I have never been blind to their limitations
as I have not been to their great virtues."
(Hartjan, May 10, 1942, p. 148)
To read and fully vmderstand my writings, it is necessary
to understand always this background. The whole of the
movement has been conceived for the mutual benefit of India
and England. Unfortunately, the author, ignoring this back-
ground, has approached my writings with coloured spectacles,
has tom sentences and phrases from their context, and
dressed them up to suit his preconception. Thus he has put
out of joint “ their withdrawal removes the bait ”, and
omitted the sentence that immediately follows and which I
have restored in the foregoing extract. As is clear from the
above article, unadulterated non-cooperation here refers
exclusively to the Japanese.
12. The last paragraph at page 2 begins thus :
“ In its earlier stages Mr. Gandhi’s ” Quit India ” move was meant and
was widely Interpreted as a proposal for the physical withdrawal from India
of the British ( italics mine ), and of all Allied and British troops."
I have searched, and so have the friends with me, in vain,
for some expression in my writings which would warrant
the opinion that ‘ Quit India ’ move was meant as a proposal
for the physical withdrawal of the British from India. It is
107
true that colour was lent to such an interpretation by a
superficial reading of a sentence in the article of Harijan of
April 26th, already quoted. As soon as my attention was
drawn to it by an Ejiglish friend, I wrote in the Harijan of
24th May as follows:
“There is evidently confusion in some minds about my invitation to the
British to withdraw. For a Britisher writes to say that he likes India and
her people and would not like willin^y to leave India. He likes too my
method of non-violence. Evidently the writer has confused the individual
as such with the individual as the holder of power. India has no quarrel
with the British people. 1 have hundreds of British friends. Andrews' friend-
ship was enough to tie me to the British people."
With this clear enunciation of my views before him at
the time of penning the indictment, how could he say that
I had "meani" physical withdrawal of the British as dis-
tinguished from the British power? And I am not aware
that my writing was “ widely interpreted as such He has
quoted nothing in support of this statement.
13. The author proceeds in the same paragraph :
“ As late as June 14th, he makes, for the purpose of his scheme, the
assumption ‘that the Commander-in-Chief of the united American and
British armies has decided that India is no good as a base'."
“ For the purpose of his scheme ” is a gratuitous interpola-
tion here. The extract is taken from an interview with
several journalists. I was answering a series of questions. At
one stage I had put a counter question thus, “ supposing
England retires from India for strategic purposes, and apart
from my proposal, — as they had to do in Burma — what would
happen? What would India do?” They replied: “That is
exactly what we have come to leam from you. We would
certainly like to know that.” I rejoined : " Well, therein
comes my non-violence. For we have no weapons. Mind
you, we have assumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the’
united American and British armies has decided India
is no good as a base, and that they should withdraw to some
other base and concentrate the Allied forces there. We can’t
108'
help it. We have then to depend on what stren^ we have.
We have no army, no military resources, no military skill
either, worth the name, and non-violence is the only thing
we can fall back upon.” It is clear from this quotation that
I was not expounding any scheme. I was merely arguing
about possibilities based on assumptions agreed between the
interviewers and myself.
14. The author proceeds:
“ Added strength is given to the belief that this is a correct interpretation
of Mr. Gandhi’s original intentions by the prominence, to which attention
has already been drawn, of the theme that the British withdrawal would
remove any Japanese motive for invading India; for with the British and
Allied armies still in India, how is the bait removed 7 ”
I have just now shown that the physical withdrawal of
the British was never contemplated by me, of the Allied and
the British troops was certainly contemplated in the first
instance. Therefore it is not a question of “interpretation”,
because it is one of fact. But the sentence has been
impressed in order to make what is straight, look crooked.
15. Then, proceeds the author :
" At the same time, he made it clear that on the British departure the
Indian army would be disbanded."
I made clear no such thing. What I did was 'to discuss
with interviewers the possibilities in the event of British
withdrawal. Indian army being a creation of the British
Government, I assumed, would be automatically disbanded
when that power withdrew, unless it was taken over, by a
treaty, by the replacing government. If the withdrawal took
place by agreement and with goodwill on both sides these
matters should present no difficulty. I give in the Appendix
the relevant passages from the interview on the subject,
[vide Appendix I (S),J
16. From the same paragraph I take the following :
“ Bowing to the gathering force of this opposition, and also, as will be
shown later, with a possible view to reconciling disagreement among members
of the Working Committee, Mr. Gandhi discovered the ‘gap’ in his original
proposals. In Harijan of June 14th, he paved the way, — by the slightly
109
cryptic aasertion that, if he had his way, the Indian National Government
when formed would tolerate the presence of the United Nations on Indian
soil under certain well defined conditions but would permit no further
assistance, — for the more definite statement made to an American journalist
in the following week's Hartjan , when in reply to a question whether
he envisaged free India s allowing Alhed troops to operate from India, he
said ' I do It will be only then that you will see real cooperation ' He
continued that he did not contemplate the complete shifting of Alhed troops
from India and that, provided India became entirely free he could not
insist on their withdrawal
This IS for me the key thought opemng the author's
mind. It IS built on finding motives other than those that
are apparent from my language Had I been guided by the
force of the opposition whether from the foreign or the
Indian Press or from Congressmen, I should not have
hesitated to say so It is well known that I am as capable
of resisting opposition that makes no appeal to my head or
my heart, as I am of readily yielding when it does But the
literal fact is that when I gave the country the withdrawal
formula, I was possessed by one idea and one only, that
if India was to be saved a\id also the Allied cause, and if
India was to play not merely an effective but, maybe, a
decisive part in the war, India must be absolutely free now
The ‘ gap ’ was this although the British Government might
be wiUing to declare India’s independence, they might still
wish, for their own and for China’s defence, to retain their
troops in India What would be my position in that case ’
It is now well known that the difficulty was presented to
me by Mr Louis Fischer He had come to Sevagram and
stayed with me for nearly a week As a result of the
discussions between us, he drew up certain questions for me
to answer My reply to his second question, th6 author
describes as a “ slightly cryptic assertion ” paving the way
for a “ more definite statement in the following week’s
Harijan". I give below the whole of the article embodying
the questions and answers It was written on 7 th June,
1942, and appeared in the Harijan dated 14th June, p 188 .
110
Important Questions
A friend was discussing with me the implications of the new proposal.
As the discussion was naturally desultory, I asked him to frame his ques-
tions which I would answer through Hanjan He agreed and gave me
the following
1 Q You ask the Bntish Government to withdraw immediately from
India Would Indians thereupon form a national government, and what
groups or parties would participate m such an Indian government f
A My proposal is onesided, i e , for the Bntish Government to act
upon, wholly irrespective of what Indians would do or would not do I
have even assumed temporary chaos on their withdrawal But if the with-
drawal takes place in an orderly manner it is likely that on their with-
drawal a provisional government will be set up by and from among the
present leaders But another thing may also happen All those who have
no thought of the nation but only of themselves may make a bid for
power and get together the turbulent forces with which they would seek
to gam control somewhere and somehow I should hope that with the
complete final and honest withdrawal of the British power the wise
leaders will realize their responsibility forget their difterences for the
moment and set up a provisional government out of the material left by
the British power As there would be no power regulating the admission
or rejection of parties or persons to or from the Council board, restraint
alone will be the guide If that happens probably the Congress, the League
and the States tepresentatives will be allowed to function and they will
come to a loose understanding on the formation of provisional national
government All this is necessarily guesswork and nothing more
2 Q Would that Indian national government permit the United
Nations to use Indian territors as a base of military operations against
Japan .and other Axis powers
A Assuming that the natioial government is formed and if it answers
mv expectations, its first act would be to enter into a treaty with the United
Nations for defensive operations against aggressive powers it being common
cause that India will have nothing to do with any of the Fascist powers
and India would be morally bound to help the United Nations
3 Q What further assistance would this Indian national government
be ready to tender the United Nations in the course of the present war
against the Fascist aggressors f
A If I have any hand in guiding the imagmcd national government,
there would be no further assistance save the toleration of the United
Nations on the Indian soil under well-defined conditions Naturally there
will be no prohibition against any Indian giving his own personal help by
wav of being a recruit or/and of giving financial aid It should be under-
111
stood that the Indian army has been disbanded with the withdrawal of
British power. Again if I have any say in the councils of the national
government, all its power, prestige and resources would be used towards-
bringing about world peace. But, of course, after the 'formation of the
national government my voice may be a voice in the wilderness and
nationalist India may go wat'-mad.
4. Q. Do you believe this collaboration between India and the Allied
powers might or should be formulated in a treaty of alliance or an agree-
ment for mutual aid 7
A. 1 think the question is altogether premature, and in any case it
will not much matter whether the relations are regulated by treaty or
agreement. 1 do not even see any difference.
Let me sum up my attitude. One thing and oiUy one thing for me is
solid and certain. This unnatural prostration of a great nation — it is
neither ‘ nations ' nor ‘ peoples ’ — must cease if the victory of the Allies
is to be ensured. They lack the moral basis. I see no difference between the
Fascist or Nazi powers and the Allies. All are exploiters, all resort to
ruthlessness to the extent required to compass their end. America and
Britain are very great nations, but their greatness will count as dust before
the bar of dumb humanity, whether African or Asiatic. They and they
alone have the power to undo the wrong. They have no right to talk of
human liberty and all else unless they have washed their hands clean of
the pollution. That necessary wash will be their surest insurance of suc-
cess, for they will have the good wishes — unexpressed but no less certain
— of millions of dumb Asiatics and Africans. Then, but not till then,
will they be fighting for a new order. This is the reality. All else is specu-
lation. I have allowed myself, however, to indulge in it as a test of my
bona fides and for the sake of explaining in a concrete manner what I
mean by my proposal.
What is described as the ‘ more definite statement ’ is
nothing but an impromptu reply given to an American
journalist, Mr. Grover, representative of the Associated
Press of America. If that interview had not chanced to come
about, there might have been no statement ‘ more definite ’
than what appeared in my reply to Mr. Louis Fischer. Hence
the writer’s suggestion that I " paved the way ” for “ the
more definite statement ” .... in the following week’s
Harijan is altogether unwarrtanted, if I may not call it even
mischievous. I do not regard my answers to Mr. Louis
Fischer as a “ slightly cryptic statement”. They arc deliberate
112
answers given to Ideliberate questions framed after a full
discussion lasting a week. My answers show very clearly that
I had no scheme beyond the ‘Quit India’ formula, that all
else was guess, and that immediately the Allied Nations*
difficulty was made clear to me, I capitulated. I saw the
“ gap ” and filled it in, in the best manner I .know. The
‘ definite statement ’, fortunately for me, in my opinion,
leaves little ropm if any for conjectures and insinuations in
which the writer has indulged. Let it speak for itself. Here
are the relevant portions :
It Will Be Felt by the World
Coming to the point Mr. Grover said again : “There is a good deal of
speculation that you are planning some new movement. What is the nature
of it ? ”
“ It depends on the response made by the Government and the people.
1 am trying to find out public opinion here and also the reaction on the
world outside."
" When you speak of the response, you mean response to your new
proposal 7 "
“ Oh yes," said Gandhiji, " I mean response to the proposal that the
British Government in India should end today. Are you startled 7 "
“ I am not, " said Mr. Grover, “you have been asking for it and working
for it. ”
“That's right. 1 have been working for it for years. But now it has
taken definite shape and I say that the Britirii power in India should go
today for the world peace, for China, for Russia and for the Allied cause. 1
shall explain to you how it advances that Allied cause. Complete independence
frees India's energies, frees her to make her contribution to the world crisis.
Today the Allies are carrying the burden of a huge corpse — a huge nation
lying prostrate at the feet of Britain, I would even say at the feet of the
Allies. For America is the predominant partner, financing the war, giving
her mechanical ability and her resources which are inexhaiMtible. America
is thus a parmer in the guilt.”
“ Do you see a situation when after full independence is’granted American
and Allied troops can operate from India 7 ” Mr. Grover pertinently asked.
" I do," said Gandhiji. "It will be only then that you will see real co-
operation. Otherwise all the effort you put up may faiL Just now Britain
is having India's resources because India is her possession. Tomorrow what-
ever the help, it will be real help from a free India."
113
8
“ You think India in control interferes with Allied action to meet
Japan's aggression "> "
“It does.”
“ When I mentioned Allied troops operating I wanted to know whether
you contemplated complete shifting of the present troops from India ? "
“ Not necessarily "
“ It IS on this that there is a lot of misconception '
“ You have to study all I am writing I have discussed the whole question
in the current issue of Hanjan I do not want them to go on condition
diet India becomes entirely free I cannot then insist on their withdrawal,
because I want to resist with all my might, the charge of inviting Japan
to India."
“ But suppose your proposal is rejected, what will be your next move '* "
“ It will be a move which will be felt by the whole world It may not
interfere with the movement of British troops but it is sure to engage British
attention It would be wrong of them to reject my proposal and say India
should remain a slave in order that Britain may win or be able to defend
China I cannot accept that degrading position India free and independent
will play a promment part in defending China Today I do not think she is
rendering any real help to China We have followed the non-embaryassment
policy so far We will follow it even now But we cannot allow the British
Government to exploit it in order to strengthen the strangle- hold on India
And today it amounts to that The way, for instance, in which thousands
are being asked to vacate their homes with nowhere to go to, no land to
cultivate, no resources to fall back upon, is the reward of our non- embarrass-
ment This should be impossible m any free country I cannot tolerate
India submitting to this kind of treatment It means greater degradation
and servility, and when a whole nation accepts servility it means good-bye
for ever to freedom '
India's Gains from British Victory ’
“All you want is the civil grip relaxed You wont then hinder military
activity ^ " was Mr. Grover's next question
“ I do not know I want unadulterated independence It the military
activity serves but to strengthen the strangle- bold, I must resist that too
I am no philanthropist to go on helping at the expense of my freedom
And what I want you to see is that a corpse cannot give^any help to a
livmg body. The Allies have no moral cause for which they are fighting,
so long as they are carrymg this double sin on their shoulders, the sin ot
India's subjection and the subjection of the Negroes and Afncan races "
Mr Grover tried to draw a picture ol a free India after an Allied
victory. Why not wait for the boons of victory ’ Gandhiji mentioned as
the boons of the last World War the ‘Rowlatt Act and martial law and
114
AmntMur. Mt. Grover mentioned more economic and industrial prospetity
— by no means due to the grace of the government, but by the force of
circumstances, and economic prosperity was a step further forward to Swar^.
Gandhiji said the few industrial gams were wrung out of unwilling hands, be
set no store by such gains after this war, those gains may be further shackles,
and It was a doubtful proposition whether there would be any gains — when
one had in mind the industnal policy that was being followed during the
war Mr Grover did not seriously press the point
What Can America Do?
“ You don't expect any assistance from America m persuading Britam
to rehnquish her hold on India," asked Mr Grover half incredulously
"I do indeed," replied Gandhi}i
“ With any possibility of success ”
“ There is every possibility, I should thmk,” said Gandhiji “ I have every
right to expect Amenca to throw her full weight on the side of justice,
if she IS convinced of the justice of the Indian cause,"
“ You don't think the American Government is committed to the British
remaining in India f '
" 1 hope not But British diplomacy is so clever that Amenca. even
though It may not be committed, and in spite of the desire of President
Roosevelt and the people to help India, it may not succeed British propa-
ganda IS so well organized in Amenca against the Indian cause that the
few friends India has there have no chance of being effectively heard.
And the political system is so ngid that public opinion does not affect
the administration ''
'* It may, slowly, ' said Mr Grover apologetically
" Slowly f ' said Gandhiji " I have waited long, and I can wait no longer.
It IS a terrible tragedy that 40 crotes of people should have no say m this
war If we have the freedom to play our part we can arrest the march of
Japan and save China '
What Do You Promise to Do’
Mr Grover, having made himself sure that Gandhiji did not insist on
the literal withdrawal of either the British or the troops, now placing himself
in the position of the Allies, began to calculate the gams of the bargain
Gandhiji of course does not want independence as a reward of any services,
but as a right and in discharge of a debt long overdue " What specific
things would be done by India to save China ' asked Mr Grover, "If India
IS declared independent ’’ "
“ Great things, I can say at once though I may not be able to specify
them today,” said Gandhiji "For I do not know what government we shall
have We have vanous political organizations here which I expect would
be able to work out a projier national solution Just now they are not
115
solid paities, they are often acted upon by the Bntish power, they look
up to It and its frown or favour means much to them The whole atmostdieie
IB corrupt and rotten Who can foresee the possibihties of a corpse coming
to life At present India is a dead weight to the Alhes ”
'* dy dead weight you mean a menace to Bntam and to American
interests here ’ ”
“ 1 do It IS a menace in that you never know what sullen India will
do at a given moment '
“ No, but I want to make myself sure that if genuine pressure was
brought to bear on Britain by America there would be solid support
from yourself’”
“ Myself ’ I do not count — with the weight of 73 years on my shoulders
But you get the cooperation — whatever it can give wiUmgly — of a free
and mighty nation My cooperation is of course there I exercise what
influence I can by my writings from week to week But India's is an
infmitely greater influence Today because of widespread discontent there
IS not that active hostility to Japanese advance The moment we are free,
we are transformed into a nation pnzmg its liberty and defending it with
aU Its might and therefore helpmg the Allied cause '
“ May 1 concretely ask — will the difference be the difference that there
IS between what Burma did and what, say, Russia is doing ’ ’ said Mr Grover
“ You might put It that way They might have given Burma independence
after separating 'it from India But they did nothing of the kind. They
stuck to the same old pohcy of ezploitmg her There was little cooperation
from Burmans, on the contrary there was hostility or inertia They fought
neither for their own cause nor for the Allied cause Now take a possible
contingency If the Japanese compel the Allies to retire from India to a
safer base I cannot say today that the whole of India will be up in arms
agamst the Japanese I have a fear that they may degrade themselves as
some Burmans did 1 want India to oppose Japan to a mem If India was free
she would do it, it would be a new experience to her, in twenty-four hours
her mind would be changed All parties would then act as one man If this
hve *mdependence is declared today 1 have no doubt India becomes a
powerful AUy '
Mr Grover raised the question of communal disunion ks a handicap,
and himself added that before the American Independence there was not
much unity in the States "1 can only say that as soon as the vicious influence
of the third party is withdrawn, the parties will be face to face with reabty
and close up ranks," said Gandhiji “Ten to one my conviction is that the
communal quarrels will disappear as soon as the British power that keeps
us apart disappears”
U6
Why not Dominion Status?
“ Would not Dominion Status declared today do equally well 7 " was
Mr. Grover's final question.
'* No good," said Gandhiji instantaneously. “We will 'have no half
measures, no tinkering with independence. It is not independence that they
will give to this party or that party, but to an indefinable India. It was
wrong, I say, to possess India. The wrong should be righted by leaving
India to herself.” (Hanjan, June 21, 1942, pp. 193 et seq.)
17. The rest of the chapter is taken up with a colourful
description of the draft resolution I sent to Allahabad and a
quotation containing remarks attributed to Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru, and Shri Rajagopalachari on that resolution. Im-
mediately after the publication of the extracts from the
notes seized by the Government, Panditji issued a state-
ment which I append hereto [ vide Appendix V (C) ]. I
cannot understand why the author has disregarded that
important statement, imless for the reason that he disbelieved
Panditji's explanation. As for Shn Rajagopalachari's statement,
the author stands on less insecure ground. Rajaji certainly
holds the views attributed to him. In the interview with
Mr. Grover, the American correspondent, this is what I said
about Rajaji's difference with me :
“ May I finally ask you about your attitude to Rajaji's move ^ '
“ I have declared that I will not discuss Rajap in public. It is ugly to
be talking at valued colleagues. My differences with him stand, but there
ate some things which are too sacred to be discussed in public
But Mr. Grover hiul not so much in mind the Pakistan controversy
as C. R.'s crusade for the formation of a national government Mr Grover
had the discernment to make it clear that C. R. “ could not be motivated
by Bnash Government His position happens to harmonize with them."
“ You are right,” said Gandhiji. It is fear of the Japanese that makes
him tolerate the British rule. He would postpone the question of freedom ^
until after tht war. On the contrary I say that if the war is to be deci-
sively won, India must be freed to play her part to-day. I find no flaw
in my position. I have arrived at it alter considerable debating within my-
self, I am domg nothing in hurry or anger. There is not the slightest room
in me for accommodating the Japanese No, I am sure that India's in-
dependence is not only essential for India, but for China and the Allied
cause." (Hanjan, June. 21, 1942, P 195)
117
18. The first chapter concludes with the following com-
mentary on the draft which had been sent by me to the
Committee at Allahabad :
“ A draft, to repeat, of which the whole thought and background is
one of favouring Japan, a resolution which amounts to running into the
arms of Japan."
And this IS written in spite of Pandit Jawaharlal’s
repudiation of the statement attributed to him, and in spite
of my explanation about differences with Rajaji - all of which
was before the writer.
19. In support of my contention that the author had no
warrant for the opinions expressed in the sentences quoted,
I would like to draw attention to the following extracts
from my* press statement reported in the Bombay Chronicle
of 5th August last .
"As the language ol the ^aft (the one that was sent to Allahabad)
shows. It had many I's to be dotted and T's to be crossed It was sent
through Mixaben to whom I had explained the implications of the draft
and I said to her or to the friends of the Working Committee who
happened to be in Sevagram to whom 1 had explained the draft, that
there was an omission, — deliberate — from my draft as to the foreign policy
of the Congress and, therefore, any reference to China and Russia.
For, as I had said to them, I derived my inspiration and knowledge
from Pandit}! about foreign matters of which he had been a deep student.
Therefore, I said that he could fill m that part in the resolution
But I may add that I have never, even in a most unguarded moment,
expressed the opinion that Japan and Germany would win the war Not
only that; I have often expressed the opinion that they cannot win the war.
if only Great Britain will once for all shed her imperialism I have given
expresson to that opinion more than once m the columns of Hanjan and
I repeat here that in spite of all my wish to the contrary and of others,
tf disaster overtakes Great Britain and the Allied Powers it will be because
even at the critical moment — most critical in her history — she has most
obstinately refused to wash herself of the taint of imperialicm which she
has carried with her for at least a century and a half."
How in the face of this categorical statement the author
could say that the actuating motive' behind the ‘ Quit India '
move was that I was “convinced that Axis would win the
war" passes understanding.
118
20. In support of the same charge the author says :
“ That thia attitude persisted long after the Allahabad meeting of the
Working Committee is shown by the following remark made by M^.n
G andhi t m Hanjan of July 19th, m reply to a question whether it
would not be wiser to postpone his movement until Bntam had settled
with the Germans and the Japanese
“ No, because 1 know you will not settle with Germans without us.'*
I quote below from the article in which this opinion is
expressed. It is from the Harijan of July 19, 1942, pp. 234
and 235, and is entitled “A Two Minutes' Interview”, the
interviewer being a correspondent of the Daily Express, London.
“ But the correspondent of the Daily Express (London) who was among
the first to arrive and who was not staying until the end said he would
be content with just a couple of minutes' interview, and Gandhiji acceded
to his request He had made up his mind that if the demand for withdrawal
which seemed to gather strength every day was rejected, there would be
some kind of a movement. So he asked
“ Would you say that your movement will make it more difficult or
less difficult for us to keep the Japanese out of India ? ”
'• Our movement," said Gandhiji, " will make it more difficult for the
Japanese to come in But of course if there is no cooperation from Britain
and the Allies, I cannot say "
" But,” said Mr. Young, “ think of the war as a whole. Do you think
that your new movement will help the Allied Nations towards victory,
which you have said you also desire f ”
" Yes, if my submission is accepted ”
" What do you mean by your submission ^ — That Britain should
offer non- violent battle ’ ”
" No, no My submission that British rule in India should end If
that IS accepted victory for the Allied powers is assured. Then India will
become an independent power, and thus a real ally, while now she is only
a slave The result of my movement, if it is sympathetically responded to,
IS bound to be a speedy victory. But if it is misunderstood by the British
and they take up the attitude that they would like to crush it, then they
would be responsible for the result, not I "
This was far from convincing Mr Young He would not think of any
movement with equanimity So he made an appeal to Gandhiji's sentiment
— j Sentiment he had more than once expressed .
“ Mr Gandhi, you have been in London yourself. Have you no com-
ment to make on the heavv bombings which the British people have
sustained ^ ”
119
“ Oh Yes. I know every nook and comer of London where 1 lived
for years so many years a^o, and somewhat of Oxford andCambrid^
and h^anchester too; but it is London I specially feel for. I used to read
the Inner Temple Library, and would often attend Dt. Parker's sermons
in the Temple Church. My heart goes out to the people, and when 1
heard that the Temple Chuch was bombed 1 bled. And the bombuig of
the Westminster Abbey and other ancient edifices affected me deeply."
“ TTien don’t you think." said Mr. Young, “it would be wiser to postpone
your movement until we have settled with the Germans and the Japanese 7 ”
" No, because I )mow you will not settle with the Germans without
us. If we were free, we could give you cent per cent cooperation in out
own manner. It is curious that such a simple thing is not understood.
Britain has today no contribution from a free India. Tomorrow as soon as
India is free, she gains moral strength and a powerful ally in a free nation
—powerful morally. This raises En^and's power to the nth degree. This
is surely self-proved.”
It is curious that sentences taken out of a piece breath-
ing concern for the success of the Allied arms are here
presented as an indication of my ‘ pro-Axis ’ mentality I
21. The following passage is then reproduced from my
letter to H. E. the Viceroy of 14th August last as ‘significant':
“ I have taken Jawafaarlal Nehru as my measuring rod. -His personal
contacts make him feel much more the misery of the impending ruin of
China and Russia than I can.”
The misery of the impending ruin of China and Russia
has been^nderlined by the author who thus comments on
the passage :
" They'fotesaw a British rearguard action across India and the devas-
tation that this must entail”.
According to his wont the author has failed to quote
the whole of the relevant part of the letter. Nor has he
guided the reader by quoting the letter in the appendix. I
quote below the relevant part :
c
“ One thing more. The declared cause is common between the Govern-
ment of India and us. To put it in the most concrete terms, it is the
protection of the freedom of China and Russia. The Government of India
think that freedom of India is not necessary for winning the cause. 1 think
exactly the opposite. I have taken Jawaharlal Nehru as my measuring
rod. His personal contacts make him feel much more the misery of the
120
ioqieiuling ruin of China and Rusaia than I can, and may I aay than even
you can. In that miaety be tried to forget hia old quarrel witb imperiaUam.
He dreads much more than 1 do the success of Nazism and FaciSm.
1 argued with him for days together. He fought against my position with
a passion which I have no words to describe. But the logic*of facts over-
whelmed him. He yielded when he saw clearly that without the freedom
of India that of the other two was in great jeopardy. Surely you are wrong
in having imprisoned such a powerful friend and ally.”
The full letter is given in the appendix (vide Appendix IX) .
I suggest that the full quotation gives a meaning wholly
different from that given by the author. The following
passages from Harijan will further prove the:baseIessnessof
the charge of pro- Axis or ‘ defeatist ’ tendency on my part:
Q. “ Is it a fact that your present attitude towards England and Japan
is influenced by the belief .that you think the British and the Allies are
going to be defeated in this war ? ...”
A. ” I have no hesitation in Ba 3 ring that it is not true. On the
contrary 1 said only the other day in Harijan that the Britisher was hard
to beat. He has not known what it is to be defeated.”
{Harijan, June 7, 1942, p. 177)
“ America is too big financially, intellectually and in scientific skill,
to be subdued by any nation or even combination...”
(Harijan, June 7, 1942. p. 181)
22. A further complete answer to the same charge, if
one were still needed, is furnished by my letter to Shrimati
Mirabehn, dictated on the spur of the moment, and never
meant for publication. The letter was written to her in
answer to her questions which carried to me her belief that
the Japanese attack was imminent and that they were likely
to have a walk over. My answer leaves no doubt whatso-
ever as to my attitude. The letter was written after the
Allahabad meeting of the All India Congress Committee.
It was dictated by me to the late Shri. 'Mahadev Desai.
The original is in Shrimati Mirabehn’s possession. I know
that she wrote a letter to Lord Linlithgow from this camp
on December 24th last sending copies of this correspondence
and requesting its publication. She never received even an
acknowledgement of her communication. I hope it was not
121
pigeon-holed without so much as being read. 1 give it in the
appendix for ready reference (vide Appendix II (H) ).
23. In view of the colourful description of my draft re-
solution sent to Allahabad, I reproduce opposite passages
from the resolution, to show that the author has gone to
everything connected with the Congress with the deliberate
intention, as it seems to me, of seeing nothing but evil.
Thus “ Bntain is incapable of defending India ” is followed
by these sentences :
“ It IS natural that whatever she (Britain) does is for her own defence.
There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. It follows
their notions of defence would also differ The Bntish Government has
no trust in India's political parties. The Indian army has been maintained
until now mainly to bold India in subjugation It has been completely
segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as
their own This policy of mistrust still continues and is the reason why
national defence is not entrusted to India's elected representatives "
24. Then there is this sentence taken from the draft :
“ If India were freed her first step would probably be to
negotiate with Japan ”. This has to be read in conjunction
with the following paragraphs from the draft ;
“ This Committee desires to assure the Japanese Government and
people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any
other nation India only desires freedom from all alien domination But
in this fight for freedom the Committee is of opimon that India while
welcoming universal sympathy does not stand in need of foreign military
aid India will attain her freedom through her non-violent strength and
will retain it likewise Therefore the Committee hopes that Japan will
not have any designs on India But it Japan attacks India and Britain
make no response to its appeal the Committee would expect all those
who look to Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-
operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them.
It 18 no part of the duty of those who are attacked to render any assis-
timce to the attacker. It is their duty to offer complete non'-cooperation.
It is not difficult to understand the simple principle of non-violent
non-cooperation • —
1 We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his
orders.
2 We may not look to him for any favours nor fall to his bribes.
But we may not bear him any malice nor wish him ill
122
3 If he wishes to take possession of out fields we will refuse to give
them up even if we have to die m the efforts to resist him
4 If he IS attacked by disease or dying of thirst and seeks out aid
we may not refuse it
5 In such places where the Bntish and Japanese forces are fighting
our non- cooperation will be fruitless and unnecessary
At present our non-coopeiation with the British Government is
limited Were we to offer them complete non-cooperation when they ate
actually fighting, it would he tantamount to placing our country deliberately
in Japanese hands Therefore not to put any obstacle m the way of the Bntish
forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-cooperation
widi the Japanese Neither may we assist the British in any active manner
If we can judge from their recent attitude, the British Government do
not need any help from us beyond our non-interference They desire our
help only as slaves — a position we can never accept
Whilst non-cooperation against the Japanese forces will necessarily
be limited to a comparatively small number and must succeed if it is
complete and genuine, the true building up of Swaraj consists in the millions
of India whol^-heartedly working the constructive programme Without
It the whole nation cannot rise from its age-long torpor Whether the
British remain or not it is our duty always to wipe out unemployment,
to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, to banish communal strife, to
exorcize the demon of untochabihty, to reform dacoits and save the
people from them If crotes of people do not take a living interest in this
nation-building work freedom must remain a dream and unattainable by
either non-violence or violence
I contend that from this setting it is impossible to infer
pro-Japanese attitude or anti-British attitude on my part
or that of the Working Committee On the contrary, there
is determined opposition to any aggression and meticulous
concern for the Allied arms The demand for immediate
freedom itself is bom of that concern. If the search be for
implacable opposition on my part to British imperialism
that searcii is superfluous, for it is patent in all my writings.
25. I would like to close this subject by quoting some
passages from my speeches on the 7th and 8th August last :
Extracts from the Hindustani speech of 7th August
Then, there is the question of your attitude towards the Bntish I
have noticed that there is hatred towards the Bntish among the people
123
They say tl^ey ate disgusted with theit behaviour. The people make no
distinction between British imperialism and the British people. To them
the two are one. This hatred would even make them welcome the Japanese.
This is most dangerous. It means that they will exchange one slavery for
another. We must get rid of this feeling. Our quarrel is not with the
British people, we fight their imi^ialism. The proposal for the withdrawal
of British power did not come out of anger. It came to enable India to
play its due part, at the present critical juncture. It is not a happy position
for a big country like India to be merely helping with money and material
obtained willy-nilly from her while the United Nations ace conducting the
war. We cannot evoke the true spirit of sacrifice and valour so long as
we do not feel thait it is our war, so long as we are not free. I know the
British Government will not be able to withhold freedom from us when
we have made enough self-sacrifice. We must therefore purge ourselves of
hatred. Speaking for myself I can say that I have never felt any hatred.
As a matter of fact I feel myself to be a greater friend of the British now
than ever before. One reason is .that they are today in distress. My very
friendship therefore demand that I should try to save them from their
mistakes. As I view -the situation they ace on the brink of an abyss. It
therefore becomes my duty to warn them of their danger even though it
may, for the time being, anger them to the point of cutting off the friendly
hand that is stretched out to help them. People may laugh, nevertheless
that is my claim. At a time when I may have to launch the biggest struggle
of my life, I may not harbour hatred against anybody. The idea of taking
advantage of the opponent's difficulty and utilizing it for delivering a
blow is entirely repugnant to me.
* * *
There is one thing which 1 would like you always to keep before your
mind. Never believe that the British are going to lose the war. I know
they are not a nation of cowards. They will fight to the last rather than
accept defeat. But suppose, for strategic reasons they are forced to leave
India as they had to leave Malaya, Singapore, and Burma what shall be
our position in that event? The Japanese will invade India, and we shall
be unprepared. Occupation of India by the Japanese will mean too the
end of China and perhaps Russia. I do not want to be the it}Strument of
Russia’s and China's defeat. Pandit Nehru was only today describing to
me the wretched condition of Russia. He was agitated. The picture he
drew still haunts me. I have asked myself the question, ‘ What can I do
to help Russia and China ? ' And the reply has come from within, ‘ You
are being weighed in the balance. You have in the alchemy of Ahimsa a
universal panacea. Why don’t you give it a trial ? Have you lost faith ? ’
124
Out of thi» agony has emerged the proposal for Brmah withdrawal. It
may irritate the Brituhers today and they may misunderstand me; they
may even look upon me as their enemy. But some day they will say that
I was their true fnend.
From the Hindustani speech on 8th August.
After showing concern for China I said :
1 therefore want freedom immediately, this very nightr before dawn,
il It can be had It cannot now wait for the realization of communal
umty. If that unity is not achieved, sacrifices for attaining freedom will
need to be much greater than would otherwise have been the case. The
Congress has to win freedom or be wiped out m the effort. The freedom
which the Congress is struggling to achieve will not be for Congressmen
alone but for the whole of the Indian people.
From the concluding speech in English on 8th August.
It will be the greatest mistake on their (United Nations') part Co
turn a deaf ear to India's non-violent pleading and refuse her fundamental
right of freedom. It will deal a mortal blow to Russia and China if they
oppose the demand of non>violent India which is today, on bended knee,
pleading for the discharge of a debt long overdue. . . I have been the
author of the non- embarrassment pohcy of the Congress and yet today
you find me talking in strong language. My non-embarrassment plea, how-
ever, was always qualified by the proviso, “ consistently with the honour
and safety of the nation ” If a man holds me by the collar and I am
drowning, may I not struggle to free myself from the strangle- hold ? There-
fore there is no inconsistency between our earlier declarations and our
present demand . . 1 have always recognized a fundamental difference
between Fascism and the democracies, despite their many limitations, and
even between Fascism and British imperialism which I am fighting. Do
the British get from India all they want’ What they get today is from
an India which they hold m bondage Think, what a difference it would
make if India were to participate in the war as a free ally. That freedom,
if It is to come, must come today. For she will utilize that freedom for
the success of the Allies, including Russia and Chma. The Burma Road
will once I more be opened, and the way cleared for rendering really effec-
tive help to, Russia.
Englishmen did .not die to the last man in Malaya or on the soil of
Burma. They effected instead, what has been described as a ‘masterly
evacuation '. But I cannot afford to do that. Where shall I go, where shall
I take the forty crores of India ? How is this mass of humanity to be set
aflame in the cause of world deliverance unless and until it has touched
and felt freedom ? Today there is no life left in them. It has been crushed
125
out of tbem If lustre has to be restored to their eyes, freedom has to
come not tomorrow but today Confress must therefore pledge itself to
do or die
These quotations show clearly why I advised the Congress
to make the demand for the withdrawal of British power.
The quotations also show that non-violence, i.e., self-suffermg
and self-sacnfice without retahation, was the key-stone of
the movement
26 The author has had difficulty in finding an adequate
explanation for my agreement to the stationing of Allied
troops in India in spite of the withdrawal of British power
If he had an open mind, there should have been no difficulty.
My explanation was there There was no occasion to doubt
Its sincerity unless there was positive evidence to the con-
trary I have never claimed infellibility or a larger share of
intellect for myself than the ordinary
27 The author says that no “ satisfactory solution ” of
the difficulty raised by Rajaji, namely, that the stationing of
the Allied forces, without the avil power being with the
Bntish Government, would be “ reinstallation of the British
Government in a worse form” was “ever made public by
Mr Gandhi ” The author therefore suggests that “ the
solution was one which he (I) preferred should remain a
secret”, and he proceeds to say
Now while the details of Mr Gandhi i personal solution oi this
problein must remain a matter for speculation an explanation which ful-
fils the logical requirements of the above situation immediately comes to
mind It IS that as has been shown above to be probable Mr Gandhi s
admission of this amendment to his scheme was intended primarily as a
bid for American support and secondarily as a sop to his opponents on
the Working Committee but that he envisaged or planned to create
circumstances in which this permission would be meaninglers that is to
say, circumstances in which the troops would either be forced to withdraw
or would, if they remained, be rendered ineffective
It IS difficult to characterize this suggestion I take it
that the secrecy suggested was to be secret even from the
members of the Working Committee If not they would also
126
become conspirators with me in the fraud to be perpetrated
on the AUied powers. Amazing consequences would flow
from such a fraud. Assume that the British Government
has shed all. power in India, that by an agreement between
the free India Government and the Allied powers, their
troops are stationed in India. This assumption carries with
it the further assumption that the agreement has been
arrived at without any pressure violent or non-violent and
simply from the British recognition of the necessity of
recognizing independence of India. Assume further that the
secret has all this time remained buried in my bosom, and
that I suddenly divulge it to the free India Government and
therefore to the world, and they carry out my plan to
frustrate the terms of the agreement, what would be the
result ? The Allied powers, having all the overwhelming
military strength at their disposal, would forfeit my head to
themselves — which would be the least — and would further let
their righteous rage descend upon the free India Government
and put an end to independence, which was won, not by
military strength, but simply by force of reason, and there-
fore make it impossible, so far as they can, for India to regain
such lost independence. I must not carry this train of thought
much further. The author’s suggestion, if it were true, would
also conclusively prove that all of us conspirators were
thinking, not of the deliverance of India from bondage, or
of the good of the masses, but only of our base little
selves.
28. The difficulty pointed out by Rajaji and on which
the writer has laid stress in order to infer ' secret motive '
on my part was pointed out even more forcibly by another
correspondent and I dealt with it in the issue of Harijan
dated 19th July, 1942, pp. 232 and 233. As the whole of the
article consists of questions and answers which have a
bearing on the author's insinuations, I reproduce them
without apology :
127
PERTINENT QUESTIONS
Q. 1. “If non>violent activity ie neutralized by, and cannot go along
witb, armed violence in the same area, will there remain any scope for
non-violent resistance to aggression in the event of India allowing foreign
troops to remain on her soil and operate from here?
A. The flaw pointed out in the first question cannot be denied. 1
have admitted it before now. The tolerance of Allied troops by Free India
is an admission of the nation's limitatfons. The nation as a whole has
never been and never been claimed to be non-violent. What part is can-
not be said with any accuracy. And what is decisive is that India has not
yet demonstrated non-violence of the strong such as would be required
to withstand a powerful army of invasion. If we had developed that
strength we would have acquired our freedom long ago and there would
be no question of any troops being stationed in India. The novelty of the
demand should not be missed. It is a demand not for a transference of
power from Great Britain to a Free India. For there is no party to which
Britain would transfer such power. We lack the unity that gives strength.
The demand therefore is not based on our demonstrable strength. It is a
demand made upon Britain to do the right irrespective of the capacity of
the pary wronged to bear the consequences of Britain's right act. Will
Britain restore seized property to the victim merely because the seizure
was wrong? It is none of her concern to weigh whether the victim will
be able to hold possession of the restored property. Hence it is that I
have been obliged to make use of the word anarchy in this connection.
This great moral act must give Britain moral status which could ensure
victory. Whether without India Britain would have reason to fight is a
question 1 need not consider. If India is the stake and not British honour
we should know. My demand then loses force but not justness.
Such being the case my honesty and honour require me to provide
for the flaw. If to ask for the withdrawal of the Allied forces means their
certain defeat, my demand must be ruled out as dishonest. Force of cir-
cumstances has given rise to the demand and also to its limitations. It
must be admitted therefore that there will be little scope for non-violent
resistance of aggression, with the Allied troops operating in India as there
is practically none now. For the troops are there to-day enjoying full mastery
over us. Under my demand they will operate under thenati&n's terms.
Q. 2. If the maintenance of India's freedom is allowed to be made
dependent upon arms which, in the existing circumstances, will be led and
controlled by Britain and America, can there be a feeling of real freedom
experienced by the people of India, at any rate, during the duration of
the war?
128
A. U Btitain's dedaration ia honeat 1 ace ao reaaon wJqr'the pnaeiice
of tbe ttoopa dtouU, in diape oc fonn, affect tjie fedint of xcal-fcee-
domJ Did the French feel differently when during the laat war the EngHdt
tioopa were operating in France 7 When my master of yesterday becomes
my equal and Uvea in my hquae on my omn terms, surely his presence cannot
detract from my freedom. Nay. I may profit by his presence wbidi
I have permitted.
Q. 3. Whatever be the terms of die ‘ treaty if the An^-Ametican
ffliUtaxy machine is allowed to operate for the ' defence * of India, can
Indians play anything but a minor and subordinate role in the defence
of diis country?
A. The conception in my scheme is that we do not want these troops
for out defence or protection. If they left these shores we espect to manage
somehow. We may put up non-violent defence. If luck favours ua, the
Japanese may see no reaaon to hold the country after the Allies have
withdrawn, if they discover that they are not wanted. It is all specula-
tion as to what can happen after withdrawal voluntary and orderly or forced.
Q. 4. Supposing the British, not from any moral motive but only to gain a
political and strategical advantage for the time being, agree to a ‘treaty* under
which they axe allowed to maintain and increase their mOitary forces in India,
how can they be dislodged afterwards if they prefer to remain in possession ?
A. We assume their or rather British honesty. It would be not a
matter of dislodging them, it is one of their fulfilling their piloted word.
If they commit breach of faith, we must have strength enough non-violent
or violent to enforce fulfilment.
Q. 5. Is not the position postulated in the preceding question compar-
able to the position that would arise if. for instance, Subbas Babu made
a treaty with Germany and Japan under which India would be declared
'independent' and the Axis forces would enter India to drive the Bridah out 7
A. Surely there is as much difference between tbe South Pole and the
North as there is between the imagined conditions. My demand deals
with the possessor; Subhas Babu will bring German troops to oust the
possessor. Germany is imder no obligation to deliver India bom bondage.
Therefore Subhas Babu’s performance can only fling India from the frying
pan into the fire. 1 hope the distinction is clear.
Q. 6. If (be Congress, as Maulana Saheb has just stated, ' considers
defence as armed defence only is there any prospect of real indepen-
dence for India, in view of the fact that India simply has not got the
resources * independently ' to offer effective armed resistance to a fonnid-
able aggressor? If we are to think in terms of armed defence only, can
India, to mention only one thing, expect to remain independent with her
4000 miles of coast line and no navy and shipbuilding industry 7
129
9
A. Maulana Sahcb, it is well known, not hold my view that any
country can defend itadf widiout force of anna. My daaaand is baaed on
the view that it is possible to defend one's country non>violently.
Q. 7. What material aid could India send to Chins today, even if
she were declased ‘ independent* by the Britiak?
A. India at present ^ves such indifferent and illconceived aid as the
Allies think desirable. Free India can send meh and matfiial that China
may need. India has affinities with China being part of Asia which the
Allies cannot possibly possess and exploit. Who knows that f^ree India
may not even succeed in persuading Japan to do the right by China 7
Why has the author ignored the explanation, for instance,
in answers 2 and 4 which was before him ? Boiled down, my
explanation means that I would trust the Allies to carry out
faithfully the conditions of the contract to be fulfilled by
them, just as I would expect them to trust the Government
of Free India to carry out their part of the contract. British
withdrawal, whenever it comes, will carry with it so much
honour that everything to be done thereafter by either party
will be done with the greatest good-will and utmost sincerity.
I hold that this solution of the difficulty presented is
perfectly comprehensible and satisfactory.
29 . As to secrecy, this is what I said on the 8th August
in my Hindustani speech before the A. I. C. C.. meeting;—
Nothing, however, ihould be done secretly. This is an open rebellion.
In this struggle secrecy is a sin. A free man would not engage in a secret
movement. It is likely that when you gain freedom you will have a C. I. D.
of your own, in spite of my advice to the contrary. But in the present
struggle we have to work openly and to .receive bullets in our chests,
without running away. In a struggle of this character all secrecy is sin and
must be punctiliously avoided. [See also Appendix I (C).]
It is somewhat hard for a man who has avoided secrecy
as a sin to be accused of it, especially when there is no
evidence whatsoever for the charge. ,
30. The author proceeds: —
"... and it is no coinddencr that, at the same time as Mr. Gandhi
was developing his ‘ Quit India ' theme in Harijan, he was also inveighing
against any form of ‘ scorched earth ' policy, (Mr. Gandhi's «nliri»iidg for
the property, largely industrial property, be it noted, which it might have
been necessary to deny to the enemy, contrasts strangely with his readiness
130
to sacrifice countless numbm of Indians in noA'Vudent lesistance to i&d
Japanese. Tlie property must be saved; it ts perhapa legirimate to ask —
for whom 7 )"
“ No coincidence " is a gratuitous suggestion for which
there is no proof. The suggestion behind the parenthetical
gloss is evidently that I was more solicitous about the
property of moneyed men than of the lives and property of
the masses. This appears to me to be a wilful disttvtion of
truth. I give the following Quotations which show the contrary ;
" As a war resister W answer can only be one. I tee neither bravery
nor sacrifice in deatroying life or property for offence or defence. I would
far rather leave, if I must, my crops and homestead for the enemy to use
than destroy them for the sake of preventing their use by him. There is
reason, sacrifice and even bravery in so leavinf my homestead and crops,
if I do so not out of fear but because I refuse to regard anyone as my
enemy, that is, out of a humanitarian motive.
But in India's case there is. too, a practical consideration. Unlike
Russia's, India's masses have no national instinct developed in the sense
that Russia's have. India is not fighting. Her conquerors are."
( Him fan, March 22. 1942. p. 88 )
• • •
" There is no bravery in my poisoning my well or filling it in so that
my brother whq is at war with me may not use the water. Let us assume
that 1 am fighting him in the orthodox manner. Nor is there sacrifice in
it, for it does not purify me, and sacrifice, as its root meaning implies,
presupposes purity. Such destruction may be likened to cutting one's nose
to spite one's face. Warriors of old had wholesome laws of war. Among
the excluded things were poisoning wells and destroying food crops. But
I do claim that there are dyravery and sacrifice in my 'leaving my wells,
:rops and homestead intact, bravery in that 1 deliberately run the risk of
the enemy feeding himself at my expense and pursuing me, and sacrifice in that
the sentiment of leaving something for the enemy purifies and ennobles me.
" My questioner has missed the conditional expression ‘ if I must '. I
have imagined* a state of things in which I am not prepared just now to
die and therefore I want to retreat in an orderly manner in the hope of
resisting under other and better auspices. The thing to consider here is not
resistance but non«destruction of food crops and the like. Resistance,
violent or non* violent, has to be .well thought out. Thoughtless resistance
will be regarded as bravado in military parlance, and violence or folly in
the language of non-violence. Retreat itself is often a plan of rcsistante
131
•ad auy be « pc^cunoi of lieat bxavety and g a criftce. Evet^ ntteat is not
cowardice whkb implies fear to die. Of couige a bcave man would mote
often die in violently or non-vidlently resisting the aggressor in the lateer's
attempt to oust him from his property. But be wfU be^no less brave if
wisdom dictates iwesent retreat.** (Harijan, April 12, 1942, p. 109)
So far there is solicitude only, for the poor man’s
property. There is no mention of industrial i^operty. 1 have
also given my reasons, which I still hold to be j^erfectly
sound, for non-destruction of such property. I have found
only one note in the issues of Harijan in my possession
which refers to industrial property. It is as follows:
“ Suppose there are factories for grinding wheat or pressing oQ seed. 1
should not destroy them. But munitions factories, yes; .... Textile factories
I would not destroy and 1 would resist all such destruction.’*
{Hanjan, May 24, 1942, p. 167)
The reason is obvious. Here too the solicitude is not
for the owners, but for the masses who use food products
and cloth produced in factories. It should also be remembered
that I have all along written and even acted against both
kinds of factories, in normal times, in the interests of village
industries, my creed being to prefer the products of hand-
labour in which millions can be engaged, to those of
factories in which only a few thousands or at best a few lacs
can be employed.
31. Mark too the last sentence in the penultimate
paragraph of the draft resolution sent to Allahabad : " But
it can never be the Congress pohey to destroy what belongs
to or is of use to the memses. ” It is incomprehensible how
the author could, in the face of the foregoing, distort truth
as he has done.
32. In the same paragraph from which 1 have quoted
the parenthetical remark of the author, I find the following :
“ We have however his own admission that he could not guarantee
diat non-violent action would keep the Japanese at bay; he refers indeed
to any such hope as an ‘ unwarranted supposition '. "
And this is cited to support*the conclusion that in order
to prevent India from becoming a battle-field between the
132
AJUed Nations and Japan I was prepaxed “ to omtede to theif
(Japanese) demands Let me quote where the phrase ai
taken from. In an article enttded “ A Fallacy*', in Hunjnri
dated dth July, 1942, 1 have dealt with the following question
addressed to me by a correspondent:
Q. “ You consider it a vital necessity' in terms of non-violence to
allow the Allied troops to remain in India. You also say that, as you can
ilot pcesent a fool-proof non-violent metfhod to prevent Japanese occupation
of India, you cannot throw the Allies over- board. But, don't you consider
that the non-violent force created by your action which will be sufficient
to force the Emtfish to withdraw will be sufficiently -strong to prevent
Japanese occupation also ? And is it not the duty of a non-violent resister
to equally consider it a vital necessity to see that his country, his home
and his all are not destroyed by allowing two foreign mad bulls to fight
a deadly wax on his soil 7 "
My reply to this runs as follows:
A. “There is an obvious fallacy in the question. I cannot all of a
sudden produce in the minds of Britishers who have been for centuries
trained to rely upon their muscle for their protection, a belief which has
not made a very visible impression even on the Indian mind. Non-violent
force must not act in the same way as violence. The refusal to allow the
Allied troops to operate on the Indian soil can only add to the irritation
already caused by my proposal. The first is inevitable, the second would
be wanton.
Again, if the withdrawal is to take place, it won't be due merely to the
non-violent pressure. And in any case what may be enough to affect the
old occupant would be wholly different from what would be required to
keep off the invader. Thus we can disown the authority of the British
rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways. These would be inapplicable
to withstand the Japanese onslaught. Therefore, whilst we may be ready
to facethe Japanese, we may not ask the Britishers to give up their position
of vantage merely on the unwarranted supposition that we would succeed
by mete non-violent effort in keeping off the Japanese.
Lastly, whilst we must guard ourselves in our own way, our non-violence
must precludfi us from imposing on the British a strain which must break
them. That would be a denial of our whole history for the past twenty-
two years.” ( Harijan, July 5, 1942, p. 210 )
The supposition referred to here is my correspondent's,
namely, that the non-violhnt force created by my action, -
which will be sufficient to force the English to withdraw,
133
will t»e sufficiently strong to prevent Japanese occupation
also and therefore 1 should not have resiled from my original
proposition tliat the British power should withdraw their
troops from India. I have shown the absurdity of such a
supposition made for the sake of preventing the retention
of British troops. My belief in the power of non-violence
is unchangeable, but I cannot put it before the British in
order to prevent their use of India as a base, if they consider
it necessary, for dealing with the Japanese menace.
33. The author has further sought to strengthen his
inference by quoting the following from my appeal to the
Japanese :
“ And we are in the unique position of having to resist an impetialism
that we detest no less than yours ( the Japanese ) and Naeism.’'
The author has conveniently omitted the sentences which
follow and which instead of strengthening his inference would
negative it altogether. These are the sentences :
“ Our resistance to it ( British Imperialism ) does not mean harm to
the British people. We seek to convert them. Ours is an unanned revolt
against British rule. An important party in the country is engaged in a
deadly but friendly quarrel with the foreign rulers.
" But in this they need no aid from foreign powers. You have been
gravely misinformed, as I know you are. that we have chosen this particular
moment to embarrass the Allies when your attack against India is imminent.
If we wanted to turn Britain's difficulty into our opportunity, we should
have done it as soon as the war broke out nearly three years ago. Our*
movement demanding the withdrawal of the British power from India should
in no way be misunderstood. In fact, if we are to believe your reported
anxiety for the independence of India, a recognition of that independence
by Britain, should leave you no excuse for any attack on India. Moreover
the leported profession sorts ill with your ruthless aggression against China.
“ I would ask 3 rou to make no mistake about the fact that you will be
sadly disillusioned if you believe that you will receive a wihing welcome
from India. The end and aim of the movement for British withdrawal is
to prepare India, by making her free for resisting all militarist and imperialist
ambition, whether it is called British Imperialism, German Nazism, or your
pattern. If we do not, we shall have been ignoble spectators of the mili-
tarization of the world in spite of our belief that in non-violence we have
the only solvent of the militarist apirit and ambition. Perapnally 1 fear that
^34
without declaring the independence of India the Allied power* will not be ''
aUc to beat the Arie combination which has raised violence to the dignitr
of a religion, 'The Allies cannot best you and your partners utiles* they
beat you in yout ruritless and'akiDed wa r far e. If they copy it, riteir dedararion
that they will save the wotld for d e mocracy and individual freedom mtiac
come to nought. I feel.that they can only gain strength to avoid copying yotir
rutfalessness by declaring and recogniring now the freedom of India, and turning
sullen India's forced cooperation into freed India's voluntary cooperation.
"To Britain and the Allies we have appealed in the name of justice,
in proof of their professions, and in their own self>interest. To you I
appeal in the name of humanity. It is a marvel to me that you do not
see that ruthless warfare is nobody's monopoly. If not the Allies some
other power will certainly improve upon your method and beat you with
your own weapon. Even if you win, you will leave no legacy to your
people of which they would feel proud. They cannot take {side in a recital
of crual deeds however skilfully achieved.
" Even if you win, it will not prove that you were in the right: it
will only prove that your power of destruction was greater. This applies
obviously to the Allies too, unless they peifbtm now the just and righteous
act of freeing India as an earnest and promise of similarly freeing all
other subject peoples in Asia and Africa.
“ Our appeal to Britain is coupled with the offer of free India's
willingness to let the Allies retain their troops in^India. The offer is made
in order to prove that we do not in any way mean to harm the Allied
cause, and in order to prevent you from being misled into feeling that you
have but to step into the country that Britain has vacated. Needless to
repeat that, if you cherish any such idea and will cany it out, we will
not fail in resisting you with all the might that our countty can mustet.
1 address this appeal to you in the hope that our movement may even
influence you and your partners in the right direction and deflect you and
them from the course which is bound to 'end in your moral ruin and the
reduction of human beings to robots.
The hope of your response to my appeal is much fainter than that
of response from Britain. I know that the British ate not devoid of a
sense of justice and they know me. 1 do not know you enough to be
able to judge. All 1 have read tells me that you listen to no appeal but
to the sword. How 1 wish that you are cruelly misrepresented and that 1
shall touch the right chord in your heart! Anyway I have an undying
frith in the responsiveness of human nature. On the strength of rbyt
frith I have conceived the impending movement in India, and it is that
faith which ha* prompted this af^al to you ",
(Hen'jon, July 26, 1942, p. 243 et. sq.)
135
1 have given this long quotati<m because I see that it
is a complete answer to the author’s insinuations, as it is
also an open gate to the whole of my mind regarding the
movement cmitemplated in the resolution of 8th August
last. But the author has many arrows in his quiver. For, in
defence of his inference that I was prepared to “ concede
to their (Japanese) demands ”, he proceeds :
“ Only in the gcip of some dominant emotion would be ( I ) have
contemplated such a capitulation. This emotion was, there seems little
doubt, hia desire to preserve India from the horrors of war. "
In Other words, I would exchange Japanese rule for
British. My non-violence is made of sterner stuff. Only a
jaundiced eye can read such an emotion in the face of the
clearest possible writings of Harijan that I would face all
the horrors of war in order to end the horror of horrors
which British domination is. I am impatient of it because
I am impatient of all domination. I am in “ the grip ” of
only one “ dominant emotion ” and no other — that is India’s
Freedom. The author has admitted this in the same breath
that he has charged me with an unworthy emotion. He has
thus condemned himself out of his own mouth.
34. At page 14 of the indictment the author says:
“ In conclusion there ate the- f^ous words uttered by Mr. Gandhi at
a press conference at Wardha, after the Working Committee bad passed
the resolution of July 14th, .which show clearly how even at that early
stage he was fully determined on a final struggle
“ There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal ox negotiation.
There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an open rebdlion."
" There also lies the answer to those who have since accused Govern-
ment of precipitating the crisis by the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the
Congress leaders, and have suggested that the period of grace referred to
by Mr. Gandhi in his Bombay speech should have been iftilized for
negotiation; “ there is no room left for withdrawal or negotiation ", Mr.
Gandhi had said a month earlier. Moreover the Wardha resolution metdy
threatened a mass movement if the demands of Congress were not accepted:
The Bombay resolution went further. U no longer threatened a movement
with the delay that that might entail It sdiKHoned the movement and if
any further delay was intended, are there not at least good grounds
136
iof believing in tbe light of all that had been, aaid, diat it was to be
used not for the purpose of negotiation but for putting the finishiiig
touches to a plan to which its authors were already comaitted but wbidt
might not yet be completely ready to put into execution?”
I shall presently ^ow that die “ famous worib " attri-
buted to me are partly a distortion and partly an interpolatimi
not to be found in die authendc report oi the Wardha
interview as published in Harijan of 19di July, 1942. Let me
(piote in full the portion of the Wardha interview in which
that part of the quotation which I claim is distorted appears
in its correct form.
" Do you hope that negotiations may be opened by the British
Government 7"
“ They may, but with whom they will do it I do not know. For it is
not a question of placating one piny or other. For it is the uncondiriona!!
withdrawal of tbe British power without reference to the wishes ‘of any
party that is our demand. The demand is therefore based on its justice.
Of coarse it is possible that the British may negotiate a wiritdtawal. U
they do, it will be S feather in their cap. Then it will cease to be a case
for withdrawal. If the British see, however late, tbe wisdom of recognizing
the independence of India, without reference to the various parries, aU
things are possible. But the point I want to stress is this ; viz. that THERE
IS NO ROOM LEFT FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PROPOSAL FOR WITH-
DRAWAL I Either they recognize independence or they don't. After that
recognition many things can follow. For by that one single act the British
reptesentatives will have altered the face of the whole landscape and
revived the hope of the people which has been frustrated times withous
number. Theiefote whenever that great act is petfotmed, on behalf of the
British people, it will be a red lettet day in the history of India and the
world. And, as I have said, it can materially affect the fortunes of war.."
(Capitals mine) (Harijan, July. 1942, p. 233)
The cotresponding quotation in the indictment I reproduce
below in capital letters ;
“ There is no room left in the proposal for
WITHDRAWAL OR NEGOTIATION "
I suggest that in the context from which this is tom
and distorted, it is entirely out of place. I was answering
the question: “Do you hope that negotiations may be
opened by the British (government ? ” As an answer to the
137
question, tlie sentence as it appears in Harijan, *' there is no
room left for negotiations in the proposal for withdrawal”,
is perfectly intelligible and harmonizes with the sentences
laeceding and succeeding.
35. The distorted sentence in the indictment has two
others tacked on to it. They are : “ There is no question
of one more chance. After all it is an open rebellion," The
underlining is the author’s. The two sentences are not to
be found anywhere in the report of the interview as it
appears in Harijan. ' There is no question of one more
chance can have no place in the paragraph about negoti-.
adons with my approach to them as revealed in my answer.
As to ‘ open rebellion I have even at the Second Indian
Round Table Conference used that expression coupled with
the adjecdve non-violent. But it has no place anywhere in
the interview.
36. I have taxed myself to know how the two sentences
could have crept into the author's quotation. Fortunately on
26th June, while this reply was being typed there came the
Hindustan Times file for which Shri. Pyarelal had asked. In
its issue of 15th July, 1942, there appears the following message:
Wardhaganj, July 14
"Thete is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation;
cither they recognize India's independence or they don't," said Mahatma
Gandhi answering questions at a press interview at Sevagtam on the
Congress resolution. He emphasized that what he wanted was not the
recognition of Indian independence on paper, but in action.
Asked if his movement would not hamper war efforts of the United
Nations, Mahatma Gandhi said : " The movement is intended not only to
help China but also to make common cause with the Allies. "
On his attention being drawn to Mr. Amery's latest statement in the
House of Commons, Mahatma Gandhi said : " I am very mudh afraid that
we shall have the misfortune to listen to a repetition of that language in
stronger terms, but that cannot possibly delay the pace of the people or
the group that is determined to go its way. Mahatma Gandhi added.
“ There is no question of one more cbance..After all. it is an open reMlion."
Adced what fonn bis movement svoulS take, Mahatma Gandlu said :
“ The conception is that of a mass movement on the widest possible scale.
138
it will include what is poetible to include in a maw movement ot what
people are capable of doing. ThU wiU be a mam movement of a purely
non*violent character."
Aiked if be would court impriaonmeot tfaia time, Mahatma Gandhi
said: “It is too soft a diing. There isno suchthing as courting impiisoii'
ment this time. My intention is to make it as short and swift as possible."
— A. P. I.
37. This message is an eye-opener for me. 1 have often
suffered from misreporting or coloured epitomes of my
writings and speeches even to the pcunt of being lynched.
' This one, though not quite as bad, is bad enough. The above
A. P. summary gives, if it does, the clue to the author’s
source for the misquotation and the additional sentences.
If he used that source, the question arises why he went
out of his way to use that doubtful and unauthorized source,
when he had before him the authentic text of the full
interview in Harijan of 19th July last. He has made a most
liberal, though disjointed and biased use of the columns of
Harijan for building up his case against me. At page 13 of
the indictment he thus begins the charge culminating in
the misquotation at page 14:
" From this point onwards Mr. Gandhi’s conception of the struggle
developed rapidly. His writings on the subject are too lengthy to quote
in full, but the following excerpts from Harijan illustrate the direction
in which his mind was moving. ’’
On the same page he has quoted passages from page
233 of Harijan from the report of the interview in question.
I am therefore entitled to conclude that the quotation under
examination was taken from Harijan. It is manifest now *-ba«-
it was not. Why not ? If he took the three sentences from
the afore-mentioned A. P. report, why has he quoted them
without hsterisks between the sentences that appear apart
in the A. P. report ? I may not pursue the inquiry, any
further. It has pained me deeply. How the two sentences
not found in the authentic text of the interview found place
in the A. P. summary I do not know. It is for the Govern-
ment to inquire, if they will.
139
38. The authior's quotation having been found wanting,
the whole of his conclusions and inferences based upon it
must fall to the ground. In my opinion therefore die
Government does stand accused not only of ‘ having preci-
pitated but of having invited a crisis by their premeditated
coup. The elaborate preparations they made for all- India
arrests were not made overnight. It is wrong to draw a
distinction between the Wardha resolution and the Bombay
one in the sense that the first only threatened and the second
sanctioned the mass civil- disobedience. The first only required
ratification by the All-India Congress Committee but the
effect of either was the same, i. e., both authorized me to
lead and guide the movement if negotiations failed. But the
movement was not started by the resolution of 8th August
last. Before I could function they arrested not only me but
principal Congressmen all over India. Thus it was not I
but the Government who started the movement and gave
it a shape which I could not have dreamt of giving and
which it never would have taken while I was conducting it.
No doubt it would have been * short and swift’, not in the
violent sense, as the author has insinuated, but in the non-
violent sense as I know it. The Government made it very
swift by their very violent action. Had they given me breathing
time, I would have sought an interview with the Viceroy
and strained every nerve to show the reasonableness of the
Congress demand. Thus there were no " grounds ” “ good "
or bad for believing, as the author would have one believe,
that the “ period of grace ” was to be used for “ putting the
finishing touches to a plan to which its authors were already
committed but which might not yet be completely*ready to
put into execution.’’ In order to sustain such a belief it has
become necessary for the author to dismiss from considera-
tion the whole of the proceedings of the Bombay meeting of
the All India Congress Committee *and even vital parts of
its resolution — save the clause ■ referring to the
140
ntovement — and tbe very awkward word ‘ non-violence '
to which' I shall come presently.
39. I ^e below extracts from my speeches and wrmngs
to show how eajer and earnest I was to avoid conflict and
achieve the purpose by negotiadon and to show that the
Congress aim never was to thwart the Allies in any way:
" It would be chiulish on our part if we said. ‘ we don't want to
talk to anybody and we will by our own strong hearts etpel the Briti^'
Then the Congreas Ccmmittee won't be meeting; diere would be no
resolutions; and 1 should not be seeing press representatives. ”
(Harijan. July 26, 1942. p, 243. )
« * «
Q. “ Cannot there be any arbitration on the question of independence 7"
A. “ No, not on the question of independence. It is possible only on
questions on which sides may be taken. The outstanding question of
independence should be treated as common cause. It is only then that 1
cen conceive possibility of arbitration on the Indo-British qnestion ....
But if there is to be any arbitration — and I cannot logically aay there
should not, for if I did, it would be an arrogation of complete justice on
my aide — it can be done only if India’s independence is recognized."
( Harijan, May 24, 1942, P. 168. )
« • *
An English correspondent : " . . . Would you advocate arbitration for
tbe Indo-Britisb problem 7 . . .”
A. " Any day. I suggested long ago that this question could be decided
by arbitration. . .” {Harijan, May 24, 1942, p. 168.)
• • •
The actual struggle does not commence this very momen^. You have
merely placed certain powets in my bands. My first act will be to wait
upon H. E. tbe Viceroy and plead with him for the acceptance of the
Congress demand. This may take two or three weeks. What are you to
do in the meanwhile 7 1 will tell you. There is tbe spinning wheel. 1 had
to struggle with the Maulana Saheb before it dawned upon him that in a
non-violent struggle it had an abiding place. Tbe fourteen-fold constructive
programme *is all there for you to carry out. But there is something mote
you have to do and it will give life to that programme. Every one of you
should from this very moment consider yourself a free man or woman and
even act ew if you are free and no longer tutder the heel of this imperialism.
This is no make-believe. You have to cultivate the spirit of freedom,
before it comes {diysically. Thd chains of the slave are broken the moment
he considers himself a free man. He will then tell his master : *' I have
141
been your al«ve all these days but I am no longer that now. You may
kill me, but if you do not and if you release me from the bondage, I will
ask for nothing more from you. For. henceforth instead of depending -upon
you I shall depend upon God for food and clothing. God has given me
the urge of freedom and therefore I deem myself a free man."
You may take it from me that I am not going to strike a bargain with
the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not going to be satidSed mitli
anything short of cmnplete freedom. May be he will propose the abolition of
the salt tax, the drink evil etc., but 1 will say, “ Nothing less than freedom.”
Here is a Mantra — a short one— that I will give you. You may
tmpnnt it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression
to it. The Mantra is this : “We shall do or die. We shall either free India,
or die in the attempt. We shall not live to see the perpetuation of slavery.”
Every true Congressman or woman will join the struggle with an inflexible
determination not to remain alive to sec the country in bondage and
slavery. Let that be your badge. Dismiss jails out of your consideration. If
the Government leaves me free, I shall spare you the trouble of filling
the jails. I will not put on the Government the sttain of maintaining a
large number of prisoners at a time when it is in trouble. Let every man
and woman live every moment of his or her life hereafter in the consci-
ousness that he or she eats or lives for achievmg freedom and will die.
rf need be, to attain that goal. Take a pledge with God and your own
conscience as witness that you will no' longer rest till freedom is achieved,
and will be prepared to lay down your lives in the attempt to achieve it.
He who loses his life shall gain it; he who will seek to save it shall lose
It. Freedom is not for the faint hearted. (From the concluding speech in
Hindustani on 8th August before the A. I. C. C.)
Let me sell you at the outset that the struggle does not commence
today. I have yet to go through much ceremonial, as I always do, and this
time more than ever before-~<he burden is so heavy. I have yet to continue
to reason with those with whom I seem to have lost all credit for the time
being. (From the concluding speech in English on 8th August before the
A. L C. C.)
In the same connection I give extracts from the utter-
ances of Maulana Saheb and others in the appendix. ( vide
Appendices V. VI, VII, and VIII. )
40. At page 11 of the indictment the author says :
“ To summarize briefly, Mr. Gandhi did not believe that non-violence
alone was capable of defending India againrt Japan. Nor had he any faith
in the ability of the Allies to do so ; * Britain he stated in his draft
142
Atblw)^ ceaolution, ‘ i* uicapttble of <ief«ndiiig IndM. ’ Hi* ‘Quit*iiidi«’
move wM uitended to tesult in the withdtnral of4he Britieh Govenunent
to be succeeded by a problematical provisional Govenunent. oi as Me.
Gandhi admitted to ^ possible, by anarchy: the Indian army tras to be
disbanded: and - Allied troops were to be allowed to operate only under
the tenns imposed by this provisional Government, assisted by India’s non-
violent tton-c6operation to Japan, for which, as Mr. Gandhi -had slxeady
adasitted, there would be little scope with Allied troops operating in India.
Finally, even if, in the face of the above arguments, it could be supposed
that Mr. Gandhi and the Congress proposed to pin their faith on the
ability of Allied troops to defend India, it should be noted -that the
former himself admitted that the ability of Allied troops to operate effec-
tively would depend upon the formation of a suitable provisional
Government. Now since this Government was to be representative of all
sections of Indian opinion, it is clear that neither Mr. Gandhi nor the
Congress could legitimately commit it in advance to any particttlar course
of action: they could not, that is to say. undertake that it would support
the Allies in defending India against Japan. They could not in fact make
any promise on behalf of this provisional Government unless they intended
that it should be dominated by Congress; the whole trend of Congress
policy, however, coupled with the extravagant promises made in the Bombay
A. I. C. C, resolution on behalf of this proviaional Government, leave
little doubt that this was their intention, a view held, significantly, by
the Muslim League and Muslims in general ! You have then a situation in
which the Allied troops would be dependent for support on a Government
dominated by a clique which has already been shown to be thoroughly
defeatist in outlook, and whose leader had already expressed the intention
of negotiating with Japan.
It is not the intention here to examine the third aim, the establish-
ment of communal unity followed by the formation of 'a provisional
Government, at all closely. Tr has been suggested in the preceding para-
graph that the Congress intended this Government to be under their
domination and a note has been made of the strength added to this view
by the unity of Muslim opinion that the Congress move was aimed at
establishing Congress- Hindu domination over India. It will suffice here
to show, from Mr. Gandhi's own writings, the doubts that he entertained
as to the fedlibility of establishing any such Government.
This brief summary is a perfect caricature of all I have
said or written, and the Congress has stood for and ex-
pressed in the resolution of 8th August last. I hope 1 have
shown in the foregoing pages how cruelly I' have been mis-
•represented. If my argument has failed to carry conviction,
143
I diould be quite ccmtent to be judged on dbe stcength
of the quotations interspersed in the argument and those
in the appendices hereto attached. As against the foregoing
caricature, let me give a summary of my views based on
the quotations referred to above.
1. I believe that non-violence alone is ‘capable of
defending India, not only against Japan but' the whole world.
2. I do hold that Britain is incapable of defending
India. She is not defending India today; she is defending
herself and her interests in India and elsewhere. These are
often contrary to India’s.
3. * Quit India ’ move was intended to result in the
withdrawal of British power if possible with simultaneous
formation of a provisional Government, consisting of members
representing all the principal parties, if the withdrawal took
place by the willing consent of the British Government. If,
however, the withdrawal took place willy-nilly there might
be a period of anarchy.
4. The Indian army would naturally be disbanded, being
British creation — unless it forms part of Allied troops, or
it transfers its allegiance to the Free India Government.
5. The Allied troops would remain under terms agreed
to between the Allied powers and the Free India Govenunent.
6. If India became free, the Free India Government
would tender cooperation by rendering such military aid as
it could. But in the largest part of India where no military
effort was possible, non-violent action will be taken by the
masses of the people with the utmost enthusiasm.
41. Then the summary comes to the provisional Govern-
ment. As to this, let the Congress resolution itself speak.
I give the relevant parts below ;
“ The A. I. C. C.. theiefoie, repeats with all emphasis the demand for
the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of
India’s independence, a provisional Govenunent will be formed and free
India will become an ally of the United t4ations, sharing with them in
the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedcun.
144
Hie inoviBional govemment can only be fonned by the coopention of
the iirincipal parties and groups in the countiy. It will thus be a componte
govemment, representative of all important sections of the people of India.
Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with
all the armed as well as the non>violent fdrces at its command, togethei
with its Allied powers, and to promote the welUbeing and progress of the
workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentiaUy all
power and authority must belong. The provisional govemment will evolve
a scheme for a Constituent Assembly which will prepare a constitution
for the government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This
constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one with
the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the
residuary powers vesting in fhese units. The future relations between India
and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all these free
countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-
operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable
India -to resist aggression effectively with the people's united wiU and
strength behind it.
Lastly, while the A. I. C. C. has stated its own view of the future
governance under free India, the A. L C. C. wishes to make it quite cleat
to all concerned that by embarking on a mass struggle, it has no intention
of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong
to the whole people of India."
I claim that there is nothing in this clause of the reso-
lution that is ' extravagant ’ or impracticable. The concluding
sentence proves in my opinion the sincerity and non-peirty
character of the Congress. And as there is no party in the
country which is not wholly anti-Fascist, anti-Nazi and
anti-Japan, it follows that a govemment formed by thes e
parties is bound to become an enthusiastic champion of the
Allied cause which, by the recognition of India as a free state,
will truly become the cause of democracy.
42. As to communal unity, it has been a fundamental
plank with the Congress from its commencement. Its President
is a Muslim divine of world wide repute, especially in the
Muslim world. It has besides him three Muslims on the
Working Committee. It is surprising that the author has
summoned to his assistance^the Muslim League opinion. The
League can afford to doubt the sincerity of Congress pro-
145
fessions and accuse the Congress of the desire of establishing
a “ Congress-Hindu domination **. It ill becomes the all
powerful Government of India to take shelter under the
Muslim League wing. This has a strong flavour of the old.
Imperial Mantra DIVIDE A2^ RULE. League-Congress
differences are a purely domestic question. They are bound
to be adjusted when foreign domination ends, if they are
not dissolved sooner.
43. The author winds up the second chapter as follows:'
“ Whether the authors of the resolution genuinely believed that the
Congress demand would, if accepted, help rather than hinder the cause of
the United Nations and intended that it should have that effect, depends
on the answer to two questions. In the first place, could any body of
men who honestly desired that result have deliberately called the country,
if their way of achieving it was not accepted, to take part in a mass
movement the declared object of which was to have precisely the opposite
effect by paralysing the whole administration and the whole war effort ?
In the second place, bearing in mind that less than a year previously it
had been proclaimed under Mr. Gandhi's orders to be a " sin ” to help the
war with men or money, can it be denied that these men saw their
opportunity in Britain's danger and believed that the psychological moment
for the enforcement of their political demands must be seized while the
fate of the United Nations hung in the balance and before the tide of
war turned — if it was ever going to turn — in their favour ? The answer
to these two questions is left to the reader."
I have to answer these two questions both as reader
and accused. As to the first question, there is no necessary
inconsistency between the genuine belief that an acceptance
of the Congress demand would help the cause of the United
Nations, i. e., of democracy all the world over and a mass
movement (which moreover was merely contemplated) to
paralyse the administration on non-acceptance of the Congress
demand. It is submitted that the attempt ‘ to paralyse the
administration ’ on non-acceptance proves the genuineness
of the demand. It sets the seal on its genuineness by Congress-
men preparing to die in the attempt to par^se an admini-
stration that thwarts their will to fight the combine against
146
democracy. Thus it is the administration’s dead-set against
the Congress which proves the hollowness of its claim that
it is engaged in a fight for democracy. My firm belief is
that the administration is daily proving its inefficiency for
handling the war in the right manner. China is slowly pining
away while the administration is playing at war-handling.
In the attempt to suppress the Congress it has cut off the
greatest source of help to the millions of China who are
being ground down under the Japanese heel.
44. The second question hardly demands a separate
answer. Congressmen who proclaimed a year ago under my
“ orders ” that it is a " sin " to help the war with “ men
or money " need not be considered here, if I give different
“ orders ". For me, I am as much opposed to all war today
as I was before a year or more. I am but an individual.
All Congressmen are not of that mind. The Congress will
give up the policy of non-violence to-day, if it can achieve
India's freedom by so doing. And I would have no com-
punction about inviting those who seek my advice to throw
themselves heart and soul into the effort to help themselves
and thus deliver from bondage those nations that are wedded
to democracy. If the effort involves military training, the
people will be free to take it, leaving me and those who
think with me to our own non-violence. I did this very thing
during the Boer War, and in the last war. I was a “ good
boy ” then, because my action harmomzed with the British
Government’s wishes. Today I am the arch enemy, not
because I have changed but because the British Government
which is being tried in the balance is being found wanting.
I helped before, because I beheved in British good faith. I
appear to be hindering today because the British Government
will not act up to the faith that was reposed in them. My
answer to the two questions propounded by the author may
sound harsh, but it is the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth as God lets me see it.
147
45. The gravamen, however, of the charges against me
is that “ every reference to non-violence in the forecasts of
the forms the movement would take made by Mr. Gandhi
and his Congress disciples and in the post arrest programmes
and instructions is nothing more than a pious hope or at
best a mild warning which was known to have no practical
value.” It is also described as mere “ lip service”.
46. The author gives no proof to show that it (the
warning) ” was known to have no practical value.” If the
references to non-violence are removed from my writings
and my utterances in order to condemn me and my “Congress
disciples,” the removal would be on a par with the omission
of ‘ nots ' from the Commandments and quoting them in
support of killing, stealing etc. The author, in robbing me
of the one thing I live by and live for, robs me of all I
possess. The evidence given in support of dismissing references
to non-violence as “valueless" mostly consists of innuendoes.
“ It was to be a struggle, a fight to the finish in which
foreign domination was to be ended, cost what it may.” In
a non-violent struggle the cost has always to be paid by
the fighters in their own blood. “ It was to be an unarmed
revolt, short and swift.” The prefix ‘ un ’ in i unarmed,' unless
it be regarded as “ valueless ”, gives ‘ short and swift ’ an
ennobling meaning. For, to make the struggle ‘ short and
swift ’ prisons have to be avoided as too soft a thing and
death to be hugged as a true friend enabling the fighters
to affect opponents’ heart much quicker than mere jail-
going can. Mention by me of * conflagration ’ meant giving
of lives in thousands or more, if need be. The author has
called it a “ grimly accurate forecast". This has «a post-facto
meaning unintended by the author in that a heavy toll of
lives was taken by way of reprisals by the authorities, and
an orgy of unmentionable excesses let loose upon the
people by the soldiery and .the police, if the press
reports and statements by responsible public men are to be
148
believed. “ Mr. Gandhi was prepared to risk the occurrence
of riots." It is true that I was prepared to take such a ririk.
Any big movement whether violent or non-violent involves
certain risks. But non-violent running of risks means a
special method, a special handling. I would have strained
every nerve to avoid riots. Moreover, my first act would
have been to woo the Viceroy. Till then no question of
running any risks could arise. As it was. the Government
would not let me run the risk. They put me in prison. instead!
What the mass movement was to include and how the risk
was to be taken, if at all. the author could not know, for
the movement was never started. Nor had any instructions
been issued by me.
47. The author complains of my “ making full use of
existing grievances." The use began even before the birth
of the Congress. It has never ceased. How could it, so long
as the foreign domination, of which they were a part, lasted ?
48. “ Finally every man and woman was to consider
himself free and act for himself." These last words or at least
their sense finds a place in the resolution itself." This last
sentence is a specimen of suppressio veri. Here is the relevant
extract from the Congress resolution ;
“ They must lemember that non-violence is the basis of this movement.
A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or
for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees
can function. When this happens every man and woman who is participating
in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four
corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom
and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard
road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the
independence wd deliverance of India.”
There is nothing new or startling in this. It is practical
wisdom. Men and women must become their own leaders
when their trusted guides are removed froih them, or when
their organization is declared illegal or otherwise ceases to
function.. True, there were formerly nominal ‘dictators’
149
appointed. This was mote to court arrest than to guide
followers by being in touch with them. For, touch was not
possible except secretly. This time not prison but death was
to be sought in the prosecution of the movement. There-
fore, every one was to become his own leader to act within
the four comers of the square foundation — non-violence.
The omission of the two conditions for every ope becoming
his or her own guide was an unpardonable suppression of
relevant truth.
49. The author then proceeds to consider whether the
movement contemplated by me could, by its very nature, be
non-violent and further whether “ Mr. Gandhi (1) intended
that it should be so or hoped that it .would remain so.”
I have already shown that the movement never having been
started, nobody could say what I had contemplated or hoped
unless my intention or my hope could be justly deduced
from my writings. Let me however observe how the author
has arrived at this conclusion. His first proof is that I have
employed military terms in connection with a movement
claimed to be wholly non-violent. I have employed such
language from the commencement of my experiment in South
Africa. I could more easily show the contrast between my
move and the ordinary ones by using identical phraseology,
so far as possible, and coupling it with non-violence. Through-
out my experience of Satyagraha since 1908, I cannot recall
an instance in which people were misled by my use of military
phraseology. And, indeed, Satyagraha being a “ moral equi-
valent of war ”, the use of such terminology is but natural.
Probably all of us have used at some time or another, or,
are at least familiar with, expressions such as 'sword of the
spirit ’, ‘ dynamite of truth ’, 'shield and buckler of patience’,
‘ assaulting the citadel of truth ’, or ‘ wrestling with God ’.
Yet no one has ever seen anything strange or wrong in such
use. Who can be ignorant of the use of military phraseology
by the Salvation Army ? That body has taken it over in its
150
endiety, and yet I have not known anyone having mistaken
the Salvation Army, with its colonels and captains, for a
military organizaticm trained to the use of deadly weapons
of destruction.
50. I must deny that “it has been shown that Mr.
Gandhi had little faith in the effectiveness of non-violence
to resist Japanese aggression.” What I have said is that
ma ximum effectiveness cannot be shown when it has to
work side by side with violence. It is true that Maulana
Saheb and Pandit Nehru have doubts about the efficacy of
non-violence to withstand aggression, but they have ample
faith in non-violent action for fighting against British domi-
nation. I do believe that both British and Japanese imperi-
alisms are equally to be avoided. But I have already shown
by quoting from Harijan that it is easier to cope with the
evil that is, than the one that may come. [Vide Appendix
II (D) ]
51. I admit at once that there is “ a doubtful propor-
tion of full believers ” in my “theory of non-violence”. But
it should not be forgotten that I have also said that for my
movement I do not at all need believers in the theory of
non-violence, full or imperfect. It is enough if people carry
out the rules of non-violent action. [Vide Appendix IV (A)].
52. Now comes the author’s most glaring lapse -of memory
or misrepresentation in the paragraph under discussion. He
says, "... remember too that he had before him the example
of his previous movements, each professedly non-violent,
yet each giving rise to the most hideous violence. ” I have
before me a list of 20 civil resistance movements beginning
with the yery first in South Africa. I do recall instances in
which popular frenzy had broken out resulting in regrettable
murders. These instances of mob-violence, though bad enough,
were but a flea-bite in proportion to the vast size of this
country — as big as Europq less Russia territorially and bigger
numerically. Had violence been the Congress policy, secretly
151
or openly, or had the Congress discipline been less strict, it
is simple enou^ to realize that the violence, instead of being
a flea-bite, would have been more like a volcanic eruption.
But every time such outbreaks took place the most energetic
measures were taken by the whole Congress organization to
deal with them. On several occasions I had myself resorted
to fasting. All this produced a salutary effect on the popular
mind. And there were also movements which were singularly
free from violence. Thus the South African Satyagraha which
was a mass movement and similar movements in Champaran,
Kheda, Bardoli and Borsad — not to mention others in which
collective civil disobedience on a wide scale was offered —
were wholly free from any outburst of violence. In all these
the people had conformed to the rules laid down for their
observance. The author has thus gone against history in
making the sweeping statement that I had before me the
“ example of previous movements each professedly non-
violent, yet each giving rise to the most hideous violence
My own experience being quite to the contrary, I have not
the shadow of a doubt that if the Government had not, by
their summary action, uimecessarily provoked the people
beyond endurance, there never would have been any violence.
The members of the Working Committee were anxious that
violence on the part of the people should be avoided, not
from any philanthropic motive, but from the conviction borne
in upon them from the experience of hard facts, that violence
by the people could not usher in independence. The education
that the people had received through the Congress was
wholly non-violent, before 1920, because of the leaders’
belief in constitutional agitation and faith in British promises
and declarations, and since 192Q, because of the" belief, in
the first instance induced by me and then * enforced by
experience, that mere constitutional agitation, though it had
served upto a point, could never bring in independence, and
that regard being had to the condition of India, non-violent
152
acdon was the only sanction through which independence
could be attained in the quickest manner possible. The
accumulated experience of the past thirty years, the first
eight of which were in South Africa, fills me with the
greatest hope that in the adoption of non-violence lies the
future of India and the world. It is the most harmless and
yet equally effective way of dealing with the political and
economic wrongs of the down-troddSP portion of humanity.
I have known from early youth that non-violence is not a
cloistered virtue to be practised by the individual for his
peace and final salvation, but it is a rule of conduct for
society if it is to live consistently with htunan dignity and
make progress towards the attainment of peace for which
it has been yearning for ages past. It is therefore sad to
think that a government, the most powerful in the world,
should have belittled the doctrine and put its votaries,
however imperfect they may be, out of action. It is my firm
opinion that thereby they have injured the cause of univer-
sal peace and the AUied Nations.
53. For the author “the certainty” was “that his (my)
movement could not remain non-violent”. For me “the
certainty” was quite the contrary, if the movement had
remained in the hands of those who could guide the people.
54. It is also now “clear” what I meant when I said I
was prepared to go to the extremest limit, that is that I
would continue the non-violent movement even though the
government, might succeed in provoking violence. Hitherto
I have stayed my hand when people have been so provoked.
This time I ran the risk because the risk of remaining supine
in the facf of the greatest world conflagration known to
history was infinitely greater. If non-violence be the greatest
force in the world, it must prove itself during this crisis.
55. The final proof given by the author of my non-
violence being “mere lip .service” consists of the following
caricature of my writing in defence of Polish bravery :
153
“'In otlier words in any fight the weaker of 'the two combatants may
employ as violent measuxes as he likes or is able, and may still be conaideied
to be fighting non-violently; or to pat it in another way, violence when
employed agamst superior odds automatically becomes non* violence. Surely
a very convenient theory for the rebels in an ‘ unarmed revolt "
I claim the writing quoted by the author does not warrant
the misleading deduction. How can I possibly lay down a
proposition against every day experience ? There is rarely a
fight among absolute equals. One party is always weaker
than the other. The illustrations I have given, taken together,
can lead to one conclusion only, namely, that the weaker
party does not make any preparation for offering violence
for the simple reason that the intention is absent, but when
he is suddenly attacked he uses unconsciously, even without
wishing to do so, any weapon that comes his way. The first
illustration chosen by me is that of a man who having a
sword uses it single handed against a horde of dacoits. The
second is that of a woman using her nails and teeth or even
a dagger in defence of her honour. She acts spontaneously.
And the third is that of a mouse fighting a cat with its
sharp teeth. These three illustrations were specially chosen
by me in order to avoid any illegitimate deduction being
drawn in defence of offering studied violence. One infallible
test is that such a person is never successful in the sense
of over-powering the aggressor. He or she dies and saves
his or her honour rather than surrender to the demands of
the aggressor. I was so guarded in the use of my language
that I described the defence of the Poles against overwhelming
numbers as " almost non-violence”. In further elucidation of
this see discussion with a Polish friend. [Vide Appendix
rV (M)].
56. Here it will be apposite to give extracts from my
speeches bearing on non-violence on the 7th and 8th August
last before the A. I. C. C. at Bombay :
" Let me, however, hasten to assure you that I am the same Gandhi
as I was in 15J20. I have not changed in any fundamental respect. I
154
attach the same importance to non-violence that 1 did then. If at all. my
emphaais on it has grown stronger. There is no real contradiction
between the present resolution and my previous writings and utterances.
. . . Occasions like the present do not occur in everybody's and but rarely
in anybody's life. 1 want you to know and feel that there is nothing but
piuest ahtmsa in dl that I am saying and doing today. The draft resolution
of the Working Committee is based on ahimsa, the contemplated struggle
similarly has its roots in ahimsa. If therefore there is any among you who
has lost faith in ahimsa or is wearied of it, let him not vote for this
resolution.
Let me explain my position clearly. God has vouchsafed to me
a priceless gift in the weapon of ahimsa. 1 and my ahimsa are on our
trial today. If in the present crisis, when the earth is being scorched by
the flames of himsa and crying for deliverance, I failed to make use of
the God-given talent, God will not forgive me and I shall be judged
unworthy of the great gift. I must act now. I may not hesitate and merely
look on when Russia and China are threatened.
‘J* ,C
. . . Ours is not a drive for power but purely a non-violent fight for
India’s independence. In a violent struggle a successful general has been
often known to effect a military coup and set up a dictatorship. But under
the Congress scheme of things, essentially non-violent as it is, there can
be no room for dictatorship. A non-violent soldier of freedom will covet
nothing for himself, he fights only for the freedom of bis country. The
Congress is unconcerned as to who will rule when freedom is attained.
The power, when it comes, will belong to the people of India, and it will
be for them to decide to whom it should be entrusted. May be that the
reins will be placed in the hands of the Parsis for instance — as I would
love to see happen — or they may be handed to some others whose names
are not heard in the Congress today. It will not be for you then to object
saying, ‘This community is microscopic. That party did not play its due
part in the freedom's struggle; why should it have all the power ?' Ever
since its inception the Congress has kept itself meticulously free of the
communal taint. It has thought always in terms of the whole nation and
acted accordingly.
... 1 know how imperfect our ahimsa is and how tar away we are
still from the ideal, but in ahimsa there is no final failure or defeat. I have
faith therefore that if, in spite of our shortcomings, the big thing does
happen it will be because God wanted to help us by crowning with success
our silent, unremitting siidkarwi'fBtriving) for the last twenty two years.
155
1 believe that in the history ot the world there has not been a
more genuinely democratic struggle for freedom than oura. I read Carlyle's
History of the French Revolution while I was in prison, and Pandit Jawahar-
lal has told me something about the Russian Revolution. But it is my con*
viction that inasmuch as these struggles were fought tyith the weapon of
violence they failed to realize the democratic ideal. In the democracy which
1 have envisaged, a democracy established by non-violence, there will be
equal freedom for all. Everybody will be his own master. It is to join a
struggle for such democracy that I mvite you today. Once you realize this
you will forget the differences between Hindus and Muslims and think of
yourselves as Indians only, engaged in the common struggle for independence."
( From the Hindustani speech on 7th August before the A. I. C. C. )
After describing personal relations with me Viceroy, the
late Deenabandhu C. F. Andrews and the Metropolitan of
Calcutta, I proceeded:
With the background of this consciousness I want to declare to the
world that, whatever may be said to the contrary and although I may have
today forfeited the regard of many friends in the West and even the trust
of some — even for their love and friendship I must not suppress the voice
within . That something in me which has never deceived me tells me
that 1 shall have to fight on even though the whole world be against me.
. . I hold that there can be no real freedom without non-violence.
This IS not the language of a proud or an arrogant man but of an earnest
seeker after Truth. It is this fundamental truth with which the Congress
has been ezperimentmg for the last twenty-two years Unconsciously, from
Its very inception the Congress has based its policy on non-violence known
in those early days as the constitutional method. Dadabhoy and Pherozeshah
Mehta carried Congress India with them. They were lovers of Congress.
They were, therefore, also its masters But above all. they were true servants
of the nation. They became rebels. But they never countenanced murder,
secrecy and the like. Subsequent generations have added to this heritage
and expanded their political philosophy into the principle and policy of
non-violent non-cooperation which the Congress has adopted. It is not my
claim that every Congressman conforms to the highest tenet of non-violence
even as a policy. I know that there are several black sheep, but I am taking
all on trust without subjecting them to cross examination. 1 trust, because
1 have faith m the innate goodness of human nature which enables people
instinctively to perceive the truth and carries them through crisis. It is this
fundamental trust which rules my life, and enables me to hope that India
156
a(<a whole will vindicate the principle of non* violence duiins the coming
struggle. But even if my trust is found to be misplaced 1 shall not flinch.
I shall not abandon my faith. I shall only say, “ The lesson is not yet fuUy
learnt. I must try again.” (From the English speech on 8th August.)
The Congress has no sanction but the moral for enforcing its decisions.
I believe that true democracy can 'only be an outcome of non-violence.
The structure of a world federation can be raised only on a foundation ot
non-violence, and violence will have to be totally given up in world affairs.
' Solution of the Hindu Muslim question too cannot be achieved by resort
to violence. If Hindus tyrannize over Mussalmans, with what face will they
talk of a world federation 7 It is for the same reason that the Congress ha-
agreed to submit all differences to an impartial tribunal and to abide by
its decisions.
In Satyagraha there is no place for fraud or falsehood. Fraud and
falsehood are today stalking the world. 1 cannot be a helpless witness of
such a situation. I have travelled aO over India as perhaps nobody in the
present age has. The voiceless millions of the land saw in me their friend
and representative, and I identified myself with them to the extent it was
possible for a human being to do so. I saw trust in their eyes, which I now-
want to turn to good account in fighting this Empire, which is built on
and upheld by untruth and violence. However tight the Empire’s control
of us, we must get out -of it. I know bow imperfect an instrument I an>
for this great task, and how imperfect is the material with which I have
to work. But how can I remain silent at this supreme hour and hide ray
light under a bushel ? Shall I ask the Japanese to tarry a while 7 If today
1 sit quiet and inactive in the midst of this conflagration which is enveloping
the whole world, God will cake me to task for not making use of the
treasure. He has given me. But for this conflagration I should have asked
you to;wait a little longer, as I have done all these years. The situation has
now become intolerable, and the Congress has no other course left for it.
( From the concluding speech in Hindustani on 8th August. )
57. Having given proof against me to show that my
professions about non-violence were "valueless”, the author
turns to ijiy colleagues in the Congress High Command to
observe how they interpreted my “views to their Congress
followers and to their masses”. The author secs objection in
Pandit Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Shri Shankerrao
Deo having singled out thf student community for attention.
Attention paid to the student community and peasantry was
157
no new thing introduced for the first time, for the sake of
the struggle, in the history of the Congress. As early as 1920
students were specially invited to join the non-cooperation
movement and several thousand had responded to the call
by suspending their studies. I do not know what happened
after the August arrests, in the Benares Hindu University.
But assuming that some students belonging to it went astray,
that is no ground for associating Pandit Nghru with their
acts. Positive proof would be necessary to establish such
connection. Overwhelming proof can be produced in support
of the contention that his faith in non-violence for the
purpose of achieving Swaraj is inferior to nobody's. The
same thing can be said about his exhortation to the Kisans
of the United Provinces. There is too nothing in favour of
violence, in the other leaders’ speeches so far as one can
judge from the extracts given in the indictment.
58. Having dealt with the leaders’ speeches, the author
comes to “detailed instructions regarding the conduct of the
movement in existence before the All India Congress Com-
mittee meeting in Bombay”. The “first example” has been
“chosen” from Harijan of August 9th. The article is entitled
“Ways of Non-violent Non-cooperation”. As it happens, it is
a discussion in connection with the threatened invasion from
Japan. Thus the article opens :
“Ever since 1920 we are familiar with some oi the ways of offering
non-violent non- cooperation. These included boycott of all government
institutions and services and extended to the non-payment of taxes. They
were directed against a foreign government in occupation of the country
for years. The ways of non-cooperation to adopt against a new foreign
invader would naturally differ in details. It would, as Gandhiji has said,
extend to the refusal of food or water. All non-cooperation calculated to
make the functioning of the enemy impossible has to be resorted to
within the limits of non-violence.”
Then the writer of the article (M. D.) has given samples
of non-violent non-cooperation offered elsewhere than in
India. They arc not examples of. non-violence consciously
exercised. That the whole article was written to show what
158
could be non-violently done to repel the invader, is clear
£roni the final paragraph :
“ What one has to remembei is that in wat reptession would be ten
times as severe as was resorted to in France, but if there is the will to
suffer, the resourcefulness to devise wajrs and means on the lines indicated
in these different instances of passive resistance, and above all the determina-
tion to drive out the invader, cost what it may. victory is certain. The
vastness of odr country, far from being a disadvantage, may be an advantage,
as the invader would find it difficult to cope with resistance on a thousand
and one fronts."
The theme of the article is not racial but anti-invader.
59. The other example given by the author is an extract
from an article by Shri K. G. Mashruwalla in Harijan of
23rd August, 1942. Shri Mashruwalla is a valued co-worker.
He carries non-violence to an extreme which baffles those
who know him intimately. Nevertheless I do not propose
to defend the paragraph quoted. He has guarded himself by
saying that it represents his personal opinion only. He must
have heard me debating the question whether interference
with bridges, rails and the like could be classified as non-
violent. I had always questioned the practicability of the
interference being non-violent. Even if such interference
could conceivably be non-violent, as I hold it can be, it is
dangerous to put it before the masses who cannot be expect-
ed to do such things non-violently. Nor would I expect
the classification of the British power in the same category
as the Japanese for the purposes of the movement.
60. Having allowed myself to criticize the opinion of a
respected colleague I wish to say that Shri Mashruwalla’s
opinion is no evidence of violent intention. At best it is an
error of judgement which is much more likely in a novel
subject like the applicability of ahimsa practised in all walks
of life by masses of mankind. Great generals and statesmen
have been known before now to have committed errors of
judgement without losii^ caste or being accused of evil
intentions.
159
61. Then comes the Andhra circular. I must regard
as forbidden ground for me inasmuch as I knew nothing
about it before my arrest. Therefore I can only comment on
it with reserve. Subject to that caution I consider the
document to be harmless on the whole. This is its gover-
ning clause :
“ The whole movement is based on non-violence. No act which
contravenes these instructions should ever be undertaken. All acts oi
disobedience committed should be overt never covert ( open but not
under cover ).”
The parenthesis is in the original. The following warning
is also embodied in the circular :
“ Ninety nine chances out of hundred chances are for the inauguration
of this movement by Mahatmaji at an early date, possibly a few hours
after the next All India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay. The
D. C. C.'s should be alert and begin to act i mme diately, but please also
take note that no movement should be launched or any overt act done
till Mahatmaji decides. After all be may decide otherwise and you will be
responsible for a great unwarranted mistake. Be ready, organize at once,
be alert, but by no means act.”
As to the body of the circular, I could not make myself
responsible for some of the items. But I must refuse to
judge a thing which 1 cannot correct, especially in the
absence of what the Committee has to say on them, assuming
of course that the circular is an authentic document. I miss
in the indictment the text of the alleged “ written amend-
ment " “ raising ” the ban on the removal of rails.
62. Attention is then drawn to the fifth appendix showing
how my mind was working in the direction of violence under
the “valueless” cover of non-violence, as the author would
say. The appendix gives what purport to be All India
Congress Committee instructions with extracts from my
writings in parallel columns. I have tried to study that
appendix. I have nothing to withdraw from my writings. And
I contend that there is not a trace of violence in the instruc-
tions alleged to be from the All India Congress Committee.
160
63. Independently of the argument in the indictment, I
must now say something about non-violence as I know it.
Its spread in all walks of life has been my mission from
early youth. This covers a period of very nearly sixty years.
It was adopted at my instance as a policy by the Congress
in 1920. In its very nature it was not meant to be paraded
before the world, but it was accepted as a means in-
dispensable for the attainment of Swaraj. Congressmen saw
at an early date that its mere adoption on paper had no
value. It was of use only in so far as it was put into practice
individually and collectively. It was of no more use as a
badge than a rifle in the hands of a person who did not
know how to use it effectively on due occasion. Therisfore
if non-violence has raised the Congress prestige and popularity
since its adoption it has done so in exact proportion to its
use, even as the power which the rifle gives to its possessor
is in exact proportion to its effective use. The comparison
caimot be carried very far. Thus while violence is directed
towards the injury, including the destruction, of the aggressor,
and is successful only when it is stronger than that of the
opponent, non-violent action can be taken in respect of an
opponent, however powerfully organized for violence. Violence
per se of the weak has never been known to succeed
against the stronger in violence. Success of non-violent
action of the very weak is a daily occurrence. I make bold
to say that I have applied to the present struggle the principles
of non-violence as enimciated here. Nothing could be farther
from my thought than injury to the person or property of
those who are manning and regulating the machinery of
British Imperialism as it operates in India. My non-violence
draws a fufldamental distinction between the man and his
machine. I would destroy a harmful machine without
compunction, never the man. And this rule 1 have enforced
in iny dealings with my nearest relatives as also friends and
associates, not without coxGsiderable success.
11
161
64. After diqx>sing of noa-violence die author has
tnaaniferized what he calls the “ ostensible aims ” of the
'WacdEha resolution of July l4th and the Bombay resolution
August Ml as. follows :
“ Thtae nudn oswniible aima are common to both the Waidha taaoltt-.
tion of July 14th (Appendk III>1) and the Bombay resolution of August
8tb (Appendix ni>2). These are :
1. To remove foreign domination over India.
2. To check the growing ill*will against Britain, with its danger of
passive acceptance by the maaaes of aggreuion against India; to build up
a apitit of resistance to aggtesaion among Indiana; and by granting India's
miUions immediate freedom to release that energy and enthuataam which
alone can enable India to play an effective part in her own defence and in
her war as a whole.
3> To achieve communal unity, by the removal of the foreign power
with its policy of divide and rule, which will be followed by the formation of
a ProviaionalGovenunent representative of all sections of the Indian people.
Three further aims appeared for the first time in the Bombay resolution :
4. To bring all subject and oppressed humanity to the side of the
United Nations, thus giving these nations the moral and spiritual leadership
of the world.
5. To assist Asiatic nations under foreign domination to regain their
freedom and to ensure that they ate not again placed imder tihe rule of
any colonial power.
6. To bring about a world federation, which would ensure the disbanding
of national armies, navies and air forces, and the pooling of the world’s
resources for the common good of all.”
He says that “the genuineness of the first of these
aims is undeniable. The- freedom of India, in whatever terms
it may have been expressed, has long been the ‘main goal
of the Congress and it has been shown above how this aim
coincides ‘with one of the main motives underlying the
‘Quit India’ move.’’ Strange, as it appears to me, notwith-
standing this admission of the genuineness of t^e first aim,
he ridicules the others in some shape or fotm. I contend
that all the others follow from the first. Hius if the foreign
domination goes by agreement, illwill against Britain is
automatically turned into goodwill, and the energy of
millions is set free on behalf of the Allied cause. Similar ly
162
ooButtuoal unity mutt follow as day follows nijht wiien,dM
m^t foreign dommation is gone. U nearly foia hundred
million people beoHne free, other portions of oppressed-
humanity must also become free and naturally the AUied
Nations being privy to this freedom, the moral and spiritual
leadership of the world comes to them without seeking. The
fifth aim is included in the fourth, and the sixth is but a
repetition of the aim of the whole of humanity whkh it
must attain or perish without. It is true that the three last
aims were added in Bombay. That surely is not a matter
to cavil at. Even if they were a result of critkima, what is
there wrong about it ? No democratic organization can, afford
to defy criticism, for it has to live upon the fresh air of
criticism. As a matter of fact, however, world federation
and rights of non-white people are no new ideas for Congress-
men. They have been mentioned in Congress resolutions on
other occasions. The paragraph about world federation found
place in the August resolution at the instance of a European
friend, and about non-white people at mine.
65. As to the disturbances that took place after the
arrests of 9th August I have carefully read chapters IV and
V of the indictment detailing them as also the appendices
purporting to be instructions from various bodies. I must
refuse to judge these one-sided statements or unverified
documents. As to the so-called instructions, I can say that,
so far as they are contrary to non-violence, they can never
have my approval.
66. One searches in vain in the indictment for a detailed
account of the measures taken by the Government by way
of reprisals.* And if one is to believe what has been allowed
to appear in the press about these measures, the so-called
misdeeds of exasperated people, whether they can be described
as Congressmen or not, pale into insignificance.
67. Now for the responsibility for the happenings after
the wholesale arrests of 9th August last. The most natural
163
wa^ to look at the disturbances is that they broke out
after the arrests vdiich were therefore the cause. The
indictment has been hramed for the sole purpose, as the
title shows, of fastening the responsibility on the Congress.
The argument seems to me to be this. First I and then the
Congress had been setting the stage for a mass movement
since April 1942 when I first bruited the idea of British
withdrawal popularly known as “ Quit India ". Mass move-
ment was boiuid to result in the outbreak of violence. I and
the Congressmen who had accepted my guidance had intended
that violence should take place. Leaders had been preach-
ing it. Hence the disturbances were to take place in any.
case. The arrests therefore merely anticipated the violent
movement and nipped it in the bud. This sums up the
reasoning in the indictment.
, 68 . I have endeavoured to show that no special stage
for a mass movement was set or contemplated because of
my proposal for British withdrawal, that violence was never
contemplated by me or any Congress leader, that I had
declared that, if Congressmen indulged in any orgy of violence,
they might not find me alive in their midst, that the mass
movement was never started by me, the sole charge for
starting it was vested in me, that I had contemplated
negotiations with the Government, that I was to start the
movement only on failure of negotiations, and that I had
envisaged an interval of “ two or three weeks ” for the
negotiations. It is therefore dear that but for the arrests no
such disturbances would have taken place as happened 90
9th August last and after. I would have strained every
nerve first to make negotiations successful and 'secondly, if
I had failed, to avoid disturbances. The Government would
have been no less able to suppress them than they were in
August last. Only they would have had some case against
me and the Congress. It was the duty of the Government,
before taking action, to study the speeches of the Congress
164
leaders and myself at the All-India Congress Committee
meeting.
69. The Congress leaders were desirous diat the move-
ment should remain non-violent, if only because diey knew
that no violent movement in the existing circumstances
could possibly succeed when matched against a most power-
fully equipped Government. Whatever violence was committed
by people, whether Congressmen or others, was therefore
committed in spite of the leaders' wishes. If it is held
otherwise by the Government it should be proved beyond
doubt before an impartial tribunal. But why seek to shift
the responsibility when the cause is patent ? The Govern-
ment action in enforcing India-wide arrests was so 'violent
that the populace which was in sympathy with the Congress
lost control. The loss of self-control cannot imply Congress
complicity, but it does imply that the power of endurance of
human nature has limitations. If Government action was in
excess of the endurance of human nature, it and therefore its
authors were responsible for the explosions that followed. But
the Government may assert that the arrests were necessary.
If so, why should the Government fight shy of taking the
responsibility for the consequences of their action? The
wonder to me is that the Government at all need to justify
their action when they know that their will is law.
70. Let me analyze the system of Government in vogue
here. A population numbering nearly four hundred millions
of people, belonging to an ancient civilization, are being
ruled by a British representative called Viceroy and Governor-
General aided by 250 officials called Collectors and supported
by a strong British garrison with a large number of Indian
soldiers, trained by British officers, and carefully isolated
from the populace. The Viceroy enjoys within his own
sphere powers much larger than the King of England. Such
powers, as far as I know, are not enjoyed by any other
person in the world. The Collectors are miniature Viceroys
165
in their (rvn q^res. They are first and foreinost, as their
name implies, collectors of revenue in dieir own districts
and have magisterial powers. They can requindon the mihtaiy
to their aid when they think necessary. They are also political
agents for the small chieftains within their jurisdiction, and
they are in the place of overlords to them.
71. Contrast this with the Congress, the most truly
democratic organization in the world — not because of its
numerical strength, but because its only sanction deliberately
adopted is non-violence. From its inception the Congress
has been a democratic body, seeking to represent all India.
However feeble and imperfect the attempt may have been,
the Congress has never in its history of now nearly sixty
years shifted its gaze from the Pole Star of India’s freedom.
It has progressed from stage to stage in its march towards
democracy in the truest term. If it is said, as it has been,
that the Congress learnt the spirit of democracy from Great
Britain, no Congressman would care to deny the statement,
though it must be added that the roots were to be found
in the old Panchayat system. It can never brook Nazi,
Fascist or Japanese domination. An organization whose very
breath is freedom and which pits itself against the most
powerfully organized imperialism, will perish to a man in the
attempt to resist all domination. So long as it clings to non-
violence, it will be uncrushable and unconquerable.
72. What can be the cause of the extraordipary resent-
ment against the Congress into which the Government have
betrayed themselves? I have never known them before to
exhibit so much irritation. Does the cause lie in the ' Quit
India ’ formula ? Disturbances cannot be the cause, because
the resentment began to show Itself soon after the publication
of my proposal for British withdrawal. It ci 3 r 8 tallized into^
the wholesale arrests of 9th August last which were pre-
arranged and merely awaited the passing of the resolution
of 8th August. Yet there was nothing novel in the resolution
166
save die ‘ Quit India ' farmola. Mass nievements have been
kisewn tp be on the Congress prognoatne ever since X9SO.
But freedom seemed elusive. Now the Hindu-Muslim disunity,
now the pledges to the Princes, now the interests of the
scheduled dames, now the vested interests of the Europeans
barred the gateway to freedom. Divide and rule was an ui>
exhaustible well. The sands of time were running out. Rivers
of blood were flowing fast among the warring nations, and
politically minded India was looking on helplessly — the masses
were inert. Hence the cry of ‘ Quit India It gave body to
the freedom movement. The cry was unanswerable, Those
who were anxious to play their part in the world crisis found
vent in that cry of anguish. Its root is in the will to save
democracy from Nazism as well as Imperialism. For, sadsfocdon
of the Congress demand meant assurance of victory of
democracy over any combination of reactionary forces<*and
deliverance of China and Russia from the menace of Japan
and Germany respectively. But the demand irritated the
Government. They distrusted those who were associated with
the demadd and thereby they themselves became the great-
est impediment to the war effort. It is wrong therefore to
accuse the Congress of hindering war effort. Congress, acti-
vity up to the night of 8th August was confined to resolutions
only. The dawn of the 9th saw the Congress imprisoned.
What followed was a direct result of the Government action.
73. The resentment over what I hold to be a just and
honourable desire confirms the popular suspicion about the
bona fides of the Government’s professions’ about democracy
and freedom after the war. If the Government were sincere
they would have welcomed the offer of help made by the
Congress. (^Congressmen who have been fighting for India’s
liberty for over half a centuiy would have flocked to the
Allied banner as one man for the defence of India’s freedom
newly won. But the Government did not wish to treat
India as an equal partner and ally. They put out of action
167
those who made this demand. Some of them are even being
hounded as if they were dangerous ctimixials. I have in mind
Shri. Jaiprakash Narayan and others like him. A reward of
Rs. 5000, now doubled, has been promised to the informant
who would show his hiding place. I have taken Shri.
Jaiprakash Narayan purposely as my illustration because, as
he very rightly says, he differs from a^e on several funda-
mentals. But my differences, great as they are, do not blind
me to his indomitable courage and his sacrifice of all that'
a man holds dear for the love of his country. 1 have read
his manifesto which is given as an appendix to the indict-
ment. Though I cannot subscribe to some of the views
expressed therein, it breathes nothing but burning patriotism
and his impatience of foreign domination. It is a virtue of
which any coimtry would be proud.
74. So much for politically minded Congressmen. In the
constructive department of the Congress also the Govern-
ment have deprived themselves of the best talent in the
country for the organization of hand industries which are
so vital a need in war time. The All-India Spinners Asso-
ciation, which is responsible for having distributed without
fuss over 3 crores of rupees as wages among the poor
villagers whom no one had reached and whose labour was
being wasted, has come in for a heavy hand. Its president
Shri. Jajuji and many of his co-workers have been imprison-
ed without trial and without any known reason. Khadi
centres which are trust property have been confiscated
to the Government. I do not know the law under which
such property can be confiscated. And the tragedy is
that the confiscators are themselves unable to, run these
centres which were producii||^.and distributing cloth. Khadi
and charkhas have been reported to have been burnt by
the authorities. The All-India Village Industries Association
worked by Kumarappa brothers bas also received much the
same treatment. Shri. Vinoba Bhave is an institution by
168
himself. Many workers were incessantly doing creatiTe labour
under his guidance. Most men and women of constructive
organizations are not political workers. They are devoted to
c(Hi4tuctive work of the highest merit. And if some
them have found it necessauy to appear at all on the poli-
tical field, it is a matter for the Government to reflect
upon. To put such wganizations and their supervisors under
^uress is in my opim^ an unpardonable inteiference with
efiort. . self-satisfaction with which the highest
'SSHcials proclaim that limitless men and material are being
had from this unhappy land, is truly amazing, while the
inhabitants of India are suffering from shortage of food,
clothing and many other necessaries of life. I make bold to
say that this scarcity would have been largely minimized, if
not altogether obviated, if instead of imprisoning Congress
workers throughout India, the Government had utilized
their services. The Government had two striking illustrations
of the efficient working by the Congress agency — I mean
the handling of the disastrous Bihar earthquake by Congress-
men under Dr. Rajendra Prasad and of the equally disastrous
flood in Gujarat under Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
75. This brings me to the end of my reply to the indict-
ment. It has become much longer than I had wanted to
make it. It has cost me and my coworkers in the camp no
end of labour. Although I must ask, in fairness to mys^ ynrl
the cause I represent, for the publication of thi5'g||||y, my
chief purpose is to carry conviction to the Government that
the indictment contains no proof of the allegations against
the Congress and me. The Government know that the
public in .India seem to have distrusted the indictment and
regarded it as designed for foreign propaganda. Men like
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the Rt. Hon’ble Shri M. R.
Jayakar have givei^ their opinion that the 'evidence' produced
in the indictment is of no judicial value. Therefore the
Government should withdraw the indictment. I see from the
/ 169
jireiace to die indictment that the Government have in their
pOMesaion “ valuable evidence preaumably mcrinunatini
the detenus. I submit that if tbe Government cannot safely
divulge the evidence, they should discharge the detenugr and
bring to book those who. after discharge, may be caught in
the act of committing or promoting crimes. With limitless
power at their back, they need not resort to unsustainable
accusations. ’
76. It will be noticed that although the indictment is a
Government publication, I have only criticized its unknown
author in the fond hope that the individual members com-
posing the Government of India have not read the originals
on which it is based. For, I am of opinion that no one
having a knowledge of the originals could possibly endorse
the inferences and innuendoes with which it is replete.
77. Lastly, I wish to state that if I have anywhere erred
in analyzing the indictment, and if my error is pointed out
to me, I shall gladly correct myself. I have simply written
as I have felt.
I am, etc.,
M. K. Gandhi
APPENDIX I
BRITISH WITHDRAWAL
" In its earliei stage Mr. Gandhi's ‘ Quit India ' move was meant
and was widely interpreted as a proposal for the physical withdrawal from
India of the British, and of all British and Allied troops."
(Indictment P. 2)
(A) CONFUSION
There is evidently confusion in some minds about my
invitation to the British to withdraw. For a Britislier writes
to say that he likes India and her people and would not like
willingly to leave India. He likes too my method erf non-
violence. Evidently the writer has confused the individual as
such with the individual as the holder of power. India has
170
no quarrel widi the Brituh peoi^. I have hundreds of Bnl^
friends. Andrews’ friendship was enough to tie me to the
British people. But both he and I were fixed in our deter-
mination that the British rule in India in any shape <»: form
must end. Hitherto the rulen have said, “ We would gladly
' retire if we know to whom we should hand over the reins.”
My answer now is. “ Leave India to God. If that is too
much, then leave her to anarchy.” I invite every Britisher
who loves Britain, India and the world to join me in the
appeal to the British power and, if it is rejected, to adopt
such non-violent measures as would compel the power to
comply with the appeal. (Harijan, May 24, 19^. P. 161)
(B) OUT OF TOUCH
I am showing the futility of hatred. I am showing that
hatred injures the hater never the hated. An imperial power
cannot act otherwise than it has been doing. If we are strong
the British becomes powerless. I am therefore trying to wean
the people from their hatred by asking them to develop
the strength of mind to invite the British to withdraw and
at the same time to resist the Japanese. With the British
withdrawal the incentive to welcome the Japanese goes and
the strength felt in securing British withdrawal will be used
for stemming the Japanese inroad. I endorse C. R.'s proposi-
tion that the millions of India can resist the Japanese even
without the possession of arms, modem and ancient, if they
are properly organized. I differ from him when he says that
this can be done even when the British arms are operating
without coordination when you force yourself on the British
power. Experience teaches us that hearty coordination and
cooperation is impossible where mutual trust and respect
are wanting. British presence invites the Japanese, it promotes
communal disunion and other discords, and what is perhaps
the worst of all, deepens the hatred bom of impotence.
Orderly British withdraw^ will turn the hatred into affection
171
and will antomatically remove communal distemper. So far
as I can see two communines are unable to think or see
tilings in their proper perspective as long as they are under
the influence of the third power.
(Harijan, May 31. 1942; P. 175),
(C) FREE INDIA CAN HEIP BEST
Answering to the question of a press correspondent
whether his present policy as revealed by his writings did
not vitiate his own declaration that he was a friend of
China, Gandhiji said: “My answer is an emphatic ‘no’."
I remain the passionate hriend of China that I have
always claimed to be. I know what the loss of freedom means.
Therefore, I could not but be in sympathy with China which
is my next-door neighbour in distress. And, if I believed in
violence and if I could influence India, I would put in
motion every force at my command on behalf of China to
save her liberty. In making, therefore, the suggestion which
I have made about withdrawal of British power, I have not
lost sight of China. But because I have China in mind, I
feel that the only effective way for India to help China is
fo persuade Great Britain to free India and let a free India
make her full contribution to the war effort. Instead of
being sullen and discontented, India free will be a mighty
force for the good of mankind in general. It is true that
the solution I have presented is a heroic solution beyond
the ken of Englishmen. But being a true friend of Britain
and China and Russia, I mu^ not suppress the solution which
I believe to be eminently practical and probably the only
one in order to save the situation and in order to convert
the war into a power for good instead of being what it is,
a peril to humanity.
“ I AM NOT PRO-JAPANESE ”
“Pandit Nehru told me yesterday that he heard people
in Lahore and Delhi saying that I have turned pro-Japanese.
172
I could only laugh at the' suggestion, for, if I am sincere
in my passion for freedom, I could not c(»isciously or un-
consciously take a step which will involve India in the
position of merely changing masters. If, in spite of my
. -resistance to the Japanese menace with my whole soul,
the mishap occurs, of which I have never denied the possi-
bility, then the blame would rest’ wholly on British shoulders.
I have no shadow of doubt about it. I have made no suggestion
which, even from the military standpoint, is fraught with
the slightest danger to British power or to Chinese. It is
obvious that India is not allowed to pull her weight in
favour of China. If British power is withdrawn from India
in an orderly manner, Britain will be relieved of the burden
of keeping the peace in India and at the same time gain in
a free India an ally not in the cause of Empire — because she
would have renounced in toto all her imperial designs, not
pretended but wholly real, of human freedom. That I assert
and that only is the burden of my recent writings and I
shall continue to do so so long as I am allowed by the
British power".
NO SECRECY
“ Now what about your plan; you are reported to have
matured plans for launching some big offensive ? " was the
next question. Gandhiji replied : “ Well, I have never believed
in secrecy nor do I do so now. There are certainly many
plans floating in my brain. But just now I merely allow them
to float in my bradn. My first task is to educate the public mind
in India and world opinion, in so far as I am allowed to do
so. And when I have finished that process to my satisfaction,
I may have to do something. That something may be very
big, if the Congress is with me and the people are with me.
But British authority will have a full knowledge of anything
I may wish to do before I enforce it. Remember I have
yet to see the Maulana Sahib. My talks with Pandit Nehru
are yet unfinished. I may say that they were wholly of a
173
frtendly nature and we have come nearer to each odier
even with the unfinished talk of sresterday. Naturally 1 want
to carry the whole of the Congress with me if I can, as I
want to carry the whole of India with me. For my conception
of freedom is no narrow conception. It is co-extensive with
the freedom man in all his majesty. I shall, therefore,
take no step without the fullest deliberation ”.
TO RESIST SLAVE DRIVERS
“ How are we to help ,in driving away the British from
here ? ” was the first question that was asked.
“ We don’t want to drive away the British people from
here. It is the British rulers whom we are asking quietly
to withdraw. It is the British domination that we want to
vanish from our land. We have no quarrel with the English-
men, many of whom are my friends, but we want the rule
to end altogether, for that is the poison that corrupts all
it touches, that is the obstacle that stops all progress.
“ And what is needed for this are two things — the
knowledge that the domination is a greater evil than any
other evil we can think of, and that we have to get rid of
it no matter what it may cost. The knowledge is so necessary
because the British exercise their power and domination in
all kinds of subtle and insidious ways that it is sometimes
difficult to know that we are bound hand and foot. Next
is the will to throw off the < chains. We have simply to
cultivate the will not to do the rulers' bidding. Is it very
difficult ? How can one be compelled to accept slavery ? I
simply refuse to do the mastet’s bidding. He may torture me,
break my bones to atoms, and even kill me. He will then
have my dead body, not my ^bedience. Ultimately, there-
fore, it is I who am the victor and not he, for he has failed
in getting me to do what he wanted done.
“ That is what I am trying to impress both on those
whom I want to retire and those who are bound in their
174
chains. I am going to use all my powers to do so, hut not
violence — simi^ because I haW no faith in it.
“But I am going to be patient, I am not going to hurry
(HT hustle you. I am busy preparing the atmosphere, and
whatever I will do I shall do having in view the limitations
of our people. I know that neither the rulers nor public
opinion understand the implications of my proposal
“But", asks a friend, “ have we not to see that the remedy
may not be worse than the disease ? There will be. in the
course of resistance, in spite of all our will to prevent them,
clashes and resultant anarchy. May not that anarchy be
worse than the present anarchy which you have called
ordered anarchy ? ”
“ That is a very proper question. That is the considera-
tion that has weighed with me all these 22 years. I waited
and waited until the country should develop the non-violent
strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my
attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot
afford to wait. If I continue to wait I might have to wait
till doomsday. For the preparation that I have prayed for
and worked for may never come, and in the mean time I
may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that
threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even
at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the
people to resist the slavery. But even that readiness, let me
assure you, depends on the non-violent man’s unflinching
faith. All I am conscious of is that there is not a trace of
violence in the remcftest comer of my being, and my cons-
cious pursuit of ahimsa for the last 50 years cannot possibly
fail me at this crisis. The people have not my ahimsa, but
mine should help them. There is ordered anarchy around
and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result
because of the British wjthdrawal or their refusal to listen
to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no
175
way be worse than the present anarchy. After all, thc»e‘
who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of
violence or anarchy, and 1 have a faith that out of that
anarchy may arise pure non-violence. But to be passive
witness of the terrible violence that is going on in the name
of resisting a possible foreign aggression, is a thing I cannot
stand. It is a thing that would make me ashamed of my
ahitnsa. It is made of sterner stutf."
, (Harijan, June 7, 1942, p. 183/184)
♦ ♦ *
(D) WHY NON-VIOLENT NON-CO-OPERATION ?
“Supposing England retires from India for strategic
purposes, and apart from my proposal, — as they had to do
in Burma — what would happen? What would India do?”
“That is exactly what we have come to learn from
you. We would certainly like to know that.”
“ Well, therein comes my non-violence. For we have no
weapons. Mind you, we have assumed that the Commander-
in-Cbief of the United American and British armies has
decided that India is no good as a base, and that they should
withdraw to some other base and concentrate the Allied
forces there. We can’t help it. We have then to depend
on what strength we have. We have no army, no military
resources, no military skill either, worth the name, and
non-violence is the only thing we can fall back upon. Now
in theory 1 can prove to you that our non-violent resistance
can be wholly successful. We need not kill a single
Japanese, we simply give them no quarter.” . . .
“Supposing Britain decides to fight to the last man in
India, would not your non-violent non-cooperation help the
Japanese ? ” asked Mr. Chaplin reverting to the first question
he had asked.
“ If you mean non-cooperation with the British, you
would be right. We have not come to that stage. I do not
want to help the Japanese — not ‘ even for freeing Tndia
176
!adta duting (be past fifty or more years of her struggle
for freedom has learnt the lesson of patriotism and of not
bowing to any foreign power. But when the Btki^ are
otfering violent battle, our non-violent battle — our non-
.violent activity — would be neutralized. Those who believe in
armed resistance and in helping the British military are and
will be helping them. Mr. Amery says he is getting all' the
men and money they need, and he is right. For the Congress —
a poor organization representing the millions of the poor
of India — has not been able to collect in years what they
have collected in a day by way of what I would say ‘ so-
called ’ voluntary subscription. This Congress can only
render non-violent assistance. But let me tell you, if you
do not know it, that the British do not want it, they don't
set any store by it. But whether they do it or not, violent
and non-violent resistance cannot go together. So India's
non-violence can at best take the form of silence — not
obstructing the British forces, certainly not helping the
Japanese. ”
" But not helping the British ? ”
“ Dbn't you see non-violence cannot give any other aid ?"
" But the railways, I hope, you won’t stop; the services,
too will be, I hope, allowed to function.” '
“ They will be allowed to function, as they are being
allowed today. "
"Aren’t you then helping the British by leaving the
services and the railways alone ? ” asked Mr. Belldon.
“We arc indeed. That is our pon-embarrassment policy.”
A BAD JOB
” Don't you think Indian people and leaders have snmp
duty to help accelerate the process (process of withdrawal) ?”
“ You mean by dotting India with rebellions everywhere ?
No, my invitation to the Bfitish to withdraw is not an
one. It has to be made good by the sacrifice of the invitors.
177
12
Public opinion has got to act, and it can act only non'
violently. ”
“Is, the possibility of strikes precluded? " wondered Mr.
Belldon.
“ No, ’’ said Gandhiji, “ strikes can be and have been
non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the
British hold on India they need not be assisted. But before
I decide to take any energetic measure I must endeavour
to show the reasonableness of my demand. The moment it
is complied with. India instead of being sullen becomes an
ally. Remember I am more interested than the British in
keeping the Japanese out. For Britain’s defeat in Indian
waters may mean only the loss of India but if Japan wins
India loses everything
THE CRUCIAL TEST
“ If you regard the American troops as an imposition,
you regard the American Technical Mission also in the same
light ? " was the next question.
“ A tree is judged by its fruit, " said Gandhiji succinctly.
“ I have met Dr. Grady, we have had cordial talks. I have
no prejudice against Americans. I have hundreds, if not
thousands of friends, in America. The Technical Mission may
have nothing but goodwill for India. But my point is that
all the things that are happening are not happening at the
invitation or wish of India. Therefore they are all suspect.
We cannot look upon them with philosophic calmness, for
the simple reason that we caimot close our eyes, as I have
said, to the things that are daily happening in front of our
eyes. Areas are being vacated and turned into military camps,
people being thrown on their own resources. Hundreds, if
not thousands, on their way from Burma perished without
food and drink, and the wretched discrimination stared even
these miserable people in the face. One route for the whites,
another for the blacks. Provision of food and shelter for the
whites, none for the blacks! And discrimination even on
178
their arrival in India I India is being ground down to dust
and humiliated, even before the Japanese advent, not for
India's defence — and no one knows for whose defence. And
so one fine morning I came to the decision to make this
, honest demand : ‘ For Heaven’s sake leave India alone. Let
us breathe the air of freedom. It may choke us, suffocate
us, as it did the slaves on their emancipation. But I want
the present sham to end.”
“ But it is the British troops you have in mind, not the
American ?”
‘‘ It docs not make for me the slightest difference, the
whole policy is one and indivisible."
“ Is there any hope of Britain listening ?”
“ I will not die without that hope. And if there is a
long lease of life for me, I may even see it fulfilled. For
there is nothing unpractical in the proposal, no insuperable
difficulties about it. Let me add that if Britain is not willing
to do so wholeheartedly Britain does not deserve to win.”
iHarijan, June 14, 1942, pp. 185-186-187)
(E) IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL
The following are the questions put by a representative
of The News Chrontcle (London) to Gandhiji (Bombay,
14-5-42) and the latter’s replies to them :
1. Q. You have recently asked the British to withdraw
from India. Do you think it possible in the present circum-
stances for them to withdraw all at once ? To whom are
they to entrust the administration ? ,
A. It has cost me much to come to the conclusion that
the British should withdraw from India, and it is costing
me still more to work out that conclusion. It is like asking
loved ones to part, but it 'has become a paramount duty.
And the beauty and the necessity for withdrawal lie in its
being immediate. They and we are both in the midst of fire.
If they go, there is a likelihood of both of us being safe.
If they do not. Heaven only knows what will happen. I
179
have said in the piainest terms that in my proposal there is
no question of entrusting the administration to any person
or party. That would be a necessary consideration, if the
withdrawal was part of a settlement. Under my proposal,
they have to leave India in God's hands — but in modem
parlance to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine
warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities. From these
a true India will rise in the place of the false one we see.
2. Q. How is your policy of non-embarrassment reconci-
lable with this advice?
A. My policy of non-embarrassment remains intact in
terms in which I have described it. If the British withdraw,
surely there is no embarrassment; not only so, they become
eased of a tremendous burden, if they would calmly consider
the meaning of the enslavement of a whole people. But if
they persist, well knowing that they are surrounded by
hatred, they invite embarrassment. I do not produce it by
stating the truth, however unpalatable it may appear for
the moment.
3. Q. Already there are signs of civil insecurity; and
would not life be even more insecure, were the present
administration suddenly to withdraw ?
A. Of course, there is civil insecurity, and I have already
confessed that insecurity is likely to increase very much
only to give place to real security. The present insecurity is
chronic and therefore not so much felt. But a disease that
is not felt is worse than one that is felt.
4. Q. Were the Japane^se to invade India, what would
your advice be to the Indian people ?
A. I have already said in my articles that it is just
likely that the Japanese will not want to invade India, their
prey having gone. But it is equally likely that they will
want to invade India in order to use her ports for strategic
purposes. Then, I would advise the people to do the same
thing that I have advised them to do now, viz., offer stub-
180
bom non-violent non-cooperetion, end Z make bold to
say that, if the British withdraw and people here folkm
my advice, then non-cooperation will be infinitely niore
effective than it can be today, when it cannot be appreciated
for the violent British action going on side by side.
(Harijan, May 24. 1942, p. 166)
(F) ITS MEANING
Q. What is the meaning of your appeal to the British
power to withdraw from India ? You have written much
recently on the subject. But there seems to be confusion in
the public mind about your meaning.
A. So far as my own opinion is concerned, British autho-
rity should end completely irrespective of the wishes or
demand of various parties. But I would recognize their own
military necessity. They may need to remain in India for
preventing Japanese occupation. That prevention is common
cause between them and us. It may be necessary for the
sake also of China. Therefore I would tolerate their presence
in India not in any sense as rulers but as allies of free India.
This of course assumes that after the British declaration of
withdrawal there will be a stable government established in
India. Immediately the hindrance in the shape of a foreign
power is altogether removed the union of parties should be
an easy matter. The terms on which the Allied powers may
operate will be purely for the Government of the free State
to determine. The existing parties will have dissolved into
the National Government. If they survive they will do so
for party purposes and not for dealings with the external
world. (Harijan, June 21, 1942, p. 197)
.(G) ONLY IF THEY WITHDRAW
“ Till the last day you said there can be no Swaraj
without Hindu Muslim unity. Now why is it that you say
that there will be no unity until India has achieved inde-
pendence ”, the Nagpur cprrespondent of the Hindu asked
Gandhiji the other day.
181
Gandhiji replied, “Time is a merciless enemy, if it is
also a merciful friend and healer. I claim to be amongst the
oldest lovers of Hindu Muslhn unity and I remain one even
today. I have been asking myself why every whole-hearted
attempt made by all including myself to reach unity has
failed, and failed so completely that I have entirely fallen
from grace and am described by some Muslim papers as the
greatest enemy of Islam in India. It is a phenomenon I can
only account for by the fact .that the third power, even
without deliberately wishing it, will not allow real unity to
take place. Therefore I have come to the reluctant conclusion
that the two communities will come together almost imme-
diately after the British power comes to a final end in India.
If independence is the immediate goal of the Congress and
the League then, without needing to come to any terms, all
will fight together to be free from bondage. When the
bondage is done with, not merely the two organizations but
all parties will find it to their interest to come together and
make the fullest use of the liberty in order to evolve a
national government suited to the genius of India. I do not
care what it is called. Whatever it is, in order’ to be stable,
it has to represent the masses in the fullest sense of the
term. And, if it is to be broad-based upon the will of the
people, it must be predominantly non-violent. Ansrway, upto
my last breath, I hope I shall be found working to that
end, for I see no hope for humanity without the acceptance
of non-violence. We are witnessing the bankruptcy of violence
from day to day. There is no hope for humanity if the
senseless fierce mutual slaughter is to continue.
CHanjan, June 21, 19^2. p. 198)
(H) DELIBERATE DISTORTION
I regard my proposal as fool-proof. The operations of
the Allied forces against Japanese aggression have been left
intact under my proposal which agiounts to this that Britain
should become true to her declaration, withdraw from India
182
as conqueror and therefore controller of her destiny/ and
leave India to shape her own destiny vdthout the slightest
interference. This, as I can see, puts her case on a moral
basis and gives her in India a great ally not in* the cause
, of imperialism but in the cause of human freedom. If there
is anarchy in India, Britain alone will be responsible, not L
What I have said is that I would prefer anarchy to the
present slavery and consequent impotence of India.
iHarijan, June 28, 1942, p. 203)
(K) A POSER
There was obviously a gap (about Allied troops) in my
first writing. I filled it in as soon as it was discovered by
one of my numerous interviewers. Non-violence demands
the strictest honesty, cost what it may. The public have
therefore to suffer my weakness if weakness it may be
called. I could not be guilty of asking the Allies to take a
step which would involve certain defeat. I could not guarantee
fool-proof non-violent action to keep the Japanese at bay.
Abrupt withdrawal of the Allied troops might result in Japan's
occupation of India and China’s sure fall. I had not the
remotest idea of any such catastrophe resulting from my
action. Therefore I feel that if, in spite of the acceptance
of my proposal, it is deemed necessary by the Allies ro remain .
in India to prevent Japanese occupation, they should do so,
subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the
national government that may be set up after the British
withdrawal. {Harijan, June 28, 1942, pp. 204, 205)
(L) A FALLACY
Q. You consider it a vital necessity in terms of non-
violence ^o allow the Allied troops to remain in India. You
also say that, as you cannot present a fool-proof non-violent
method to prevent Japanese occupation of India, you cannot
throw the Allies over-board. But, don’t you consider that
the non-violeht force created by your action which will be
sufficient to force the English to withdraw will be sufficiently
183
strong to prevent Japanese occupation also? And is it not
die duty of a non-violent resisrer to equally consider it a
vital necessity to see that his country, his home and his ali
ate not destroyed by allowing two foreign mad bulls to fight
a deadly war on his soil?
A. There is an obvious fallacy in the question. I cannot
«11 of a sudden produce in the minds of Britishers, who have
been for centuries trained to rely upon their muscle for their
protection, a belief which has not made a very visible im-
pression even on the Indian mind. Non-violent force must
not act in the same way as violence. The refusal to allow
the Allied troops to operate on the Indian soil can only add
to the irritation already caused by my proposal. The first is
inevitable, the second would be wanton.
Again if the withdrawal is to take place, it won't be
due merely to the non-violent pressure. And in any case
what may be enough to affect the old occupant would be
wholly different from what would be required to keep off
the invader. Thus we can disown the authority of the British
rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways. These
would be inapplicable to withstand the Japanese onslaught.
Therefore, whilst we may be ready to face the Japanese,
we may not ask the Britishers to give up their position of
vantage merely on the unwarranted supposition that we
would succeed by mere non-violent effort in keeping off
the Japanese.
Lastly, whilst we must guard ourselves in our own way,
our non-violence must preclude us from imposing on the
British a strain which must* break them. That would be a
denial of our whole history for the past twentytwo years.
{Harijan, July 5, 1942, p. 210)
(M) OH ! THE TROOPS
I have to pay a heavy price for having drawn up an
entrancing picture of a free India without a single British
soldier. Friends are confounded now to discover tliat my
184
proposal admits of the presence of British and even American
troops under any circumstance at all.
St has been pointed out that not to consent to the
Allied troops remaining in India during the . period of the
, war is to hand over India and China to Japan, and to ensure
the defeat of the Allied powers. This coiild never have
been contemplated by me. The only answer, therefore, t®
give was to suffer the presence of the troops but under
circumstances the reverse of the existing
My proposal presupposes shedding of all fear and distrust.
If we have confidence in ourselves, we need neither fear
nor suspect the presence of Allied troops.
It will be most assuredly an event of the century and
may be a turning point in the war if Britain can honestly
perform the act of renouncing India with all that the renun-
ciation would mean
As I have said already in the previous issue of Harijan,
the British acceptance of my proposal may itself lead to a
most honourable peace and hence automatic withdrawal of
the troops
It (non-violence) will express itself in her ambassadors
going to the Axis powers not to beg for peace but to show
them the futility of war for achieving an honourable end.
This can only be done if and when Britain sheds the gains
of perhaps the most organized and successful violence the
world has seen.
All this may not come to pass. I do not mind. It is
worth fighting for, it is worth staking all that the nation has.
{Harijan July 5, 1942, P. 212)
(N) FRIENDS’ AMBULANCE UNIT IN INDIA
" We were wondering if it was auspicious for an English
party to arrive in India, when you were asking the British
to withdraw," said Prof. Alexander with a kindly smile.
“ Agatha suggested that we might have a party from India
to work with us, and make of ow party a mixed party
185
“ My first writing said Gandhiji, “ did, I am afraid,
give rise to that kind of fear. That was because I had not
given expression to the whole idea in my mind. It is not
my nature to work out and produce a finished thing all at
once. The moment a question was asked me, I made it clear,
that no physical withdrawal of every Englishman was meant,
I meant the withdrawal of the British domination. And so
every Englishman in India can convert himself into a friend
and remain here. The condition is that every Englishman
has to dismount from the horse he is riding and cease to
be monarch of all he surveys and identify himself with the
humblest of us. The moment he does it, he will be recog-
nized as a member of the family. His role as a member of
the ruling caste must end for ever. And so when I said
‘ withdraw I meant “withdraw as masters”. The demand for
withdrawal has another implication. You have to withdraw,
irrespective of the wishes of anybody here. You do not need
the consent of a slave to give him freedom. The slave often
hugs the chains of slavery. They become part of his flesh.
You have to tear them asunder and throw them away. You
must withdraw because it is yoiur duty to do so, and not
wait for the unanimous consent of all the sections or
groups in India.
“ There is thus no question of the moment being inauspi-
cious for you. On the contrary, if you can assimilate my
proposal, it is the most auspicious moment for you to arrive
in India. You will meet many Englishmen here. They may
have entirely misunderstood what I have said, and you have
to explain to them what exactly I want them to do.
. . . “ And it is well perhaps that your mission begins
with me. Begin it with finding out what exactly is at the
back of my mind by putting to me all the questions that
may be agitating you. ”
That put both the friends at^ease and prompted them
to try to understand the whole of the back-ground of Gandhiji’s
186
mind. And in this connection 1 may mention a curious but
very significant fact. When Sir. Stafford Cripps’ mission
was announced, Prof. Horace Alexander and Miss Agatha
Harrison had sent Gandhiji a cable reminding him of the
.phrase Gandhiji him self had used, viz., “ Andrews’ legacy ”
meaning thereby that in memory of Andrews the best English-
men and the best Indians should come together to bring
about a permanent understanding between England and India.
“ Here, ” their cable seemed to say in effect, “ is one of the
best Englishmen coining to India. You had better settle with
him, as there is a great opportunity.”
It was in reply to this cable that Gandhiji wrote a long
letter to Prof. Horace Alexander soon after the failure of
the Cripps’ mission, — a letter in which he gave expression
for the first time to the demand for British withdrawal. He
had not discussed it with any soul on earth, but as he was
writing the letter the thing that was, so to say, cooking in
his mind ever since his return from Delhi came to his pen.
“ Sir Stafford,” he said in that letter, “ has come and gone.
How nice it would have been if he had not come with that
dismal mission .... How could the British Government
at this critical hour have behaved as they did ? Why should
they have sent proposals without discussing them with the
principal parties? Not one single party was satisfied. In
trying to please all, the proposals pleased none.
“ I talked to him frankly but as a friend, if for nothing
else for Andrews' sake. I told him that I was speaking to
him with Andrews’ spirit as my witness. I made suggestions,
but all to no avail. As usual, they were not practical. I had
not wanted to go. I had nothing to say being ‘ anti-all-wars’.
1 went because he was anxious to see me. All this I mention
in order to give you the background. I was not present
throughout the negotiations with the Working Committee.
I came away. You know ,thc result. It was inevitable The
whole thing has left a bad taste in the mouth.”
187
And' now comes the key paragraph'; “My firm opinion
IS that the British should leave India now in an orderly
manner and not run the risk that they did in Singapore,
Malay and Burma. That act would mean courage of a high
order, confession of human limitations, and right doing
by India. "
Gandhiji’s talk was almost a commentary on the parts
of the letter I have quoted. “ You wiU see that I have used
the words ‘orderly withdrawal *. I had, when I used the
phrase, Burma and Singapore in mind. It was a disorderly
withdrawal from there. For they left Burma and Malay
neither to God, nor to anarchy, but to the Japanese. Here
I say : ‘ Don't repeat that story here.' Don't leave India to
Japan, but leave India to Indians in an orderly manner, ' ''
said he, concluding the talk. The whole talk, even as the
letter I have reproduced, was inspired by the spirit of C.
F, A. and the idea of asking the British to withdraw was
conceived in the friendliest spirit, as it was done with a
remembrance of C. F. A. and all his noble work. As Gandhiji
said, “ So you have now to do what Andrews did — un-
derstand me, pitilessly cross-examine me, and then if you
are convinced be my messenger”. Prof. Alexander felt
overwhelmed and said ; “ We dare not assume his mantle.
We can but try.” (Jtiarijan, July, 1942, p. 215)
(O) IF HARIJAN IS SUPPRESSED
Anxious inquiries are being made as to what I would
do if Hanjan was suppressed. Rumours arc afloat that orders
are on their way. I would ask inquirers not to be agitated
if Hanjan is suppressed. The paper may be suppressed. The
manager has been instructed to stop the paper immediately
orders are served on him. It is no part of the movement
to publish Hanjan in defiance of orders. But Hanjan may
be suppressed, its message cannot be, so long as I live.
Indeed, the spirit will survive the dissolution of the body
and somehow speak through the millions. For, with due
188
atMjlogies to Veer Savarkar .and Quaid-e-Asun Jinnah, I
claiin to represent the joint spirit of millions of Hindus and
Mussalmans, and other non-Hindus who call themselves
children of Hindustan. I am living, and hope to have the
, strength to die, for the freedom of every inhabitant of this land.
Let us see what Harijan is today. It is being published
in English, Hindi, Urdu (2 places), Tamil, Telugu (2 places)
Ooriya, Marathi, Gujarati, Kanarese (2 places). It is ready
to be published in Bengali only awaiting legal permission.
Applications have come from Assam, Kerala and Sindh. All
but one edition have a large circulation compared to the
other weeklies. I suggest that it is no small matter to sup-
press such paper. The loss will be more Govern m ent’s than
people’s. They will incur much illwill by suppressing a
popular paper.
Let it be known too that Harijan is a views-paper as
distinguished from a newspaper. People buy and read it
not for amusement but for instruction and regulating their
daily conduct. They literally take their weekly lessons in
non-violence. It cannot pay the authorities to deprive the
people of their weekly food.
And Harijan is not an anti-British paper. It is pro-British
from head to foot. It wishes well to the British people. It
tells them in the friendliest manner where in its opinion
they err.
The Anglo-Indian papers I know axe Government
favourites. They represent a dying imperialism. Whether
Britain wins or loses imperialism has to die. It is certainly
of no yso now to the British people whatever it may have
been in the past. In that sense therefore Anglo-Indian papers
are really anti-British as Harijan is pro-British. The former
are disseminating hatred day by day by hiding the reality
and bolstering imperialism which is ruining Britain. It is in
order to arrest the progress of that ruin that, frail as I am,
189
I have put my whole soul into a movement which, if' it is
designed to free India from the imperial yoke, is equally
intended to contribute the mightiest 'war-effort in their
behalf. If they suppress Harijan let them know what they
will seek to suppress.
Let me add too that without heeding any pressure from
^putside I am using the greatest restraint in the choice of
printing matter. Nothing is being consciously published that
would give any clue to the ‘ enemy * as to military objectives
or dispositions. Care is being exercised to avoid all exaggeration
or sensational matter. Adjectives and adverbs are well weighed
before being used.' And they know that I am ever ready to
acknowledge errors and mend them.
{Harijan, July 19, 1942, p. 229)
(P) THE WARDHA INTERVIEW
, * :(• jf-
A MASS MOVEMENT
“ Is it possible.” asked the A. P. (America) representative,
“ for you to tell us the things you might do after the All-
India Congress Committee meets and adopts the W. C.
resolution ? ”
" Is not that question a little premature ? Supposing the
A. I. C. C. vetoes the resolution, the whole thing wears a
different aspect. But you may know that it will be a mass
movement of a strictly non-violent character and then you
can fill in the details. It will include all that a mass move-
menf can include.”
“ Will you include closing of liquor shops and foreign
cloth shops ? ”
“ It will depend on the circumstances. I don’t want
rioting as a direct result. If inspite of all precautions rioting
does take place, it cannot be helped. ”
IF IMPRISONED?
“ Will you court imprisonment ? ”
“ I am not going to court imprisonment. The struggle
does not involve courting imprisonment. It is too soft a
190
thing. We had, no doubt, made it a business to court imprison-
ment up to now, but there will be no such thing this time. My
intention is to make the thing as short and swift as possible.”
Quick came another question : “ Will you resort to
^fasting if sent to jail?”
“ It is not my desire this time^ as I have said, to court
imprisonment. But if I am dragged into jail, it is difficult
to say what I may do. But I can fast, as I have fasted before
now, though I should try to avoid such an extreme step so
far as possible
NEGOTIATIONS
“ After the recognition of Free India it starts to function
at once ? ”
“ Yes, from the very next moment. For, independence
will not be on paper but in action. But your next legitimate
question would be — ‘ How will Free India function ? ' And
because there was that knot, I said * Leave India to God or
anarchy.’ But in practice what will happen is this — If with-
drawal takes place in perfect goodwill, the change will be
effected without the slightest disturbance. People would have
to come to their own without disturbance. Wise people from
among the responsible sections will come together and will
evolve a Provisional Government. Then there will be no
anarchy, no interruption, and a crowning glory.”
SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
" Can you visualize the composition of the Provisional
Government ? ”
" I do not need to do so. But I am clear that it won’t
be a party government. All parties — including the Congress —
will automatically dissolve. They may function later and
when they do they may function complementary to one
another, each looking to the other in order to grow. Then,
as I have said, all unreality disappears like mist before the
morning sun — we don’t know how, though we witness
the phenomenon every day,”
191
" But ” adced two of the Indian ccnrespondents radier
impatiently, “ looking to all their past record will the British
luvee sense to come to terms?*'
“Why not? They are htiman beings and I have never
discounted the possibility of human nature’s upward growth,
and no other nation had ever had to face a freedom move-
ment based not principally but wholly on non-violence.”
* *
“ May not your movement hamper the: efforts of the
Allies in China?
“ No, since the movement is intended to make common
cause with the Allies, it should not hamper the Allied effort.”
“But if there is no withdrawal, then disturbances are
boimd to happen ? ”
“You see iUwill is already there. It will grow apace.
Immediately the movement is started, the illwill may be
changed into goodwill if the British people respond. But
even if they don’t respond when people make an effort to
free themselves from a foreign yoke, illwill needs no other
opening. It takes a healthy turn instead of the bad turn
that it has today.
* * ,
FREE INDIA’S CONTRIBUTION
“ You desire to have India’s freedom in order to help
the Allies,” was Mr. Edgar Snow’s question, and the last
question. “ Will Free India carry out total mobilization and
adopt the methods of total war?”
“ That question is legitimate,” said Gandhiji, “ but it is
beyond me. I can only say Free India will make, common
cause with the Allies. I cannot say that Free India will take
part in militarism or choose to go the non-violent way. But
1 can say without hesitation that if I can turn India to non-
violence I will certainly do so. If I succeed in converting
40 crores of people to non-violence, it will be a tremendous
192
«;hing , a wonderful transformation. “ But you won’t oppose
a Wlitatist effort by civil disobedience ? ” Mr. Snow perti-
nently asked. “ I have no such desire. 1 cannot oppose Free
India’s will with civil disobedience, it would be wrong.”
(.Harijan, July 19, 1942, pp. 233, 234)
(Q) AMERICAN OPINION MAY BE ANTAGONIZED
. . . . “ Speaking as an American,” said Mr. Steele, “ I
can say that the reaction of many Americans would be that
a movement for freedom may be unwise at this moment, for
it would lead to complications in India which may be pre-
judicial to the efficient prosecution of the war.”
“This belief is born of ignorance,” replied Gandhiji.
”What possible internal complication can take place if the
British Government declare to-day that India is absolutely
independent ? It would be, in my opinion, the least risk the
Allies could take on behalf of the war effort. I am open to
conviction. If anybody' could convince me that in the midst
of war, the British Government cannot declare India free
without jeopardizing the war effort, I should like to hear the
argument. I have not as yet heard any cogent one.”
OPEN TO CONVICTION
” If you were convinced, would you call off the campaign ?"
“ Of course. My complaint is that all these good critics
talk at me, swear at me, but never condescend to talk to me.”
. ...” If India were made of four hundred million
Gandhis — ” interrupted Mr. Steele.
“ Here,” said Gandhiji, “ we come to brass tacks. That
means India is not sufficiently non-violent. If we had been,
there would have been no parties, and there would be no
Japanese attack. I know non-violence is limited in both numbers
and quality, but deficient as it is in both these respects, it
has made a great impression and infused life into the people
which was absent before. The awakening that showed itself
on April 6, 1919, was a mktter of surprise to every Indian.
193
13
1 cannot today account foe the response we then had from
every nook and comer of the country where no public worker
bad ever been. We had not then gone among the masses,
we did not know we could go and speak to them."
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
" Can you give me an idea who would take the lead in
forming a Provisional Government — you, Congress or the
Muslim League ? "
"The Muslim League certainly can; the Congress can.'
If everything went right, it would be a combined leadership.
No one party would take the lead."
“ Would it be within the present constitutional structure ?”
“The constitution will be dead" said Gandbiji. The
Government of India Act of 1^5 is dead. The 1. C. S. would
have to go and it might be anarchy, but there need be no
anarchy if the British withdraw with goodwill. Free India
Government would set up a constitution suited to Indian
genius, evolved without dictation from outside." .... “The
dictating factor will not be an outside one, but 'wisdom. And
I believe there will be abundant wisdom among us.”
“ Would the Viceroy cease to exist as such ? "
“We shall be friends even then, but on a par, and I
have no doubt that Lord Linlithgow will welcome the day
when he will be one of the people.”
WHY NOT TODAY
“ Why can’t all this be done today, without the British
withdrawal,” said Mr. Emeny returning to the charge.
" The answer is simple. Why can’t a prisoner do a thing
which a free man can do ? *Y ou may not have been behind
prison bars, but I have been and I know. Imprisonment
means civil death, and I suggest to you that the whole of
India is civilly dead. The very breath is controlled by British
power. Then there is another experience that you lack. You
have not been a member of a nation that has been under
subjection for several centuries. Our habit has been that we
194 .
can never be free. You know the case of Shri Subhas Bose,
a man of great self-sacrifice who might have had a distinguished
career in the Indian Civil Service, but who is now an exile
because he cannot possibly tolerate this helpless condition
mid feels that he must seek the help of Germany and Japan."
* « *
(Harijan, July 26, 1942, pp, 242-3)
(R) TO AMERICAN FRIENDS
... I claim to be a votary of truth from my childhood.
It was the most natural thing to me. My prayerful search
gave me the revealing maxim ‘ Truth is God ’ instead of the
usual one ‘God is Truth*. That maxim enables me to see
God face to face as it were. I feel him pervade every fibre
of my being. With this Truth as witness between you and
me, I assert Ithat I would not .have asked my country to
invite Great Britain to withdraw her rule over India, irres-
pective of any demand to the contrary, if I had not seen
at once that for the sake of Great Britain and the AlUed
cause it was necessary for Britain boldly to perform the
duty of freeing India from bondage. Without this essential
act of tardy justice, Britain could not justify her position
before the unmurmuring world conscience, which is there
nevertheless. Singapore, Malaya and Burma taught me that
the disaster must not be lepeated in India. I make bold to
say that it cannot be averted unless Britain trusts the people
of India to use their liberty in favour of the Allied cause.
By that supreme act of justice Britain would have taken
away all cause for the seething discontent of India. She will
turn the growing illwill into active goodwill. I submit
it is worth 'all the battleships and airships that your wonder
working engineers and financial resources can produce.
... We say, ‘ This is the psychological moment for that
recognition. For then and then only can there be irresistible
opposition to Japanese aggression. It is of immense value
to the Allied cause if it is also of equal value to India.
195
The Congress has anticipated and proi^ded for every possiblt
difficulty in the way of recognition. I want you to lodk
upon the inunediate recognition of India’s independence as
a war messure of first class magnitude.
( Harijan, August 9, 1942, p. 264 ) .
(S) A PLEA FOR REASON
• » w
The suppression, of which perhaps the hysterical outburst
in America and Great Britain is a precurser, may cow down
the people for the moment, but it will never put out the
light of revolt once it has been lighted.
<!!(-*
JUSTICE OF CONGRESS DEMAND
The justice of the demand for the ending of British
power has pever been questioned, the moment chosen for
enforcing it is the target of attack. It is clear as crystal in
the Working Committee resolution, why this moment is
chosen. Let me paraphrase it. India is not playing any
effective part in the war. Some of us feel ashamed that it
is so and, what is more, we feel that if we were free from
the foreign yoke, we should play a worthy, nay, a decisive
part in the World War which has yet to reach its climax.
We know that if India does not become free now, the
hidden discontent will burst forth into a welcome to the
Japanese, should they effect a landing. We feel that such
an event would be a calamity of the first magnitude. We
can avoid it if India gains her freedom. To distrust this
simple natural and honest declaration is to court disaster.
AZAD’S STAtEMENT CITED
But the critics say : “ To whom are the Britis,h rulers to
hand the keys on their withdrawal ?" It is a good question.
Here is what Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress
President has said : “ The Congress always stands, firstly for
sympathy towards democratic countries, secondly, never desires
to embarrass Britain and war efforts, and thirdly, it stands
196
■fdt opposition to the Japanese aggression. The Congress does
not desire to take power for itself but for all. If realpow^
is handed over to the Congress, surely it will appcoach other
parties and will persuade them to join." The Congress
President added that he “ had no objection to Britain handing
over power to the Muslim League or any other party pro-
vided it was real independence. That party will have to
approach other parties as no single party can function
properly without the co-operation of other patties."
The only thing needful is to hand over complete control
without reservation save that during the war period the
Allied troops will operate to stem the Japanese or Axis
attack. But they wiU have no power of interference with the
affairs of India which will be as free as Great Britain herself.
NOTHING TO CAVIL AT
Surely, there is nothing here to cavil at for anyone.
That party or a combination which takes over control of
India will have to look to the remaining parties for its
retention of power, There is no hope of the parties coming
together so long as they have to look not to one another
but to an outsider for support and sustenance. Not one of
the Viceroy’s numerous Indian councillors is dependent
upon anybody but the Viceroy for the positions they hold.
How can the great or small representative parties operate
without mutual support?
In a free India even the Congress could not function
efficiently for a day without the support of the smallest party.
For in a free India, at least for some time to come, even the
strongest party will have no ndlitary backing. There will be
na milita^ to back. There will only be a raw police in the
first stage tmless the existing pohce will service the national
government on its terms. But the support, such as it may be.
free India will be able to render to the Allied cause, will be
of a sterling character. Its possibilities will be limitless and
there will be no motive left for welcoming Japanese arms.
. 197
On the contxaiy they mill then look to the Allied arms'
to repel any Japanese or other* attack, unless all Indians by
then become non-violent. In any case, the Allied arms are
there to-day and to-morrow and tiU the end of the war,
whether they are needed for India’s protection or not.
If this presentation of the implications of the Congress'
demand is not appreciated by the Allies’ press or the Allies
themselves Indian public men should be forgiven if they
doubt the sincerity of the fierce opposition which is being
organized with ominous unanimity. The latter can only stiffen
India’s suspicion and resistance.
iHarijan, August 2, 1942, p. 252)
(T) WHAT ABOUT MUSLIMS?
* III III
" But whom are the British to say — ‘ India is free ’ ?"
asked the friends with a certain degree of exasperation.
“ To the world,” said Gandhiji without a moment’s
hesitation. Automatically the Indian army is disbanded from
that moment, and they decide to pack up as soon as they
can. Or they may declare, they would pack up only after
the war is over, but then they would expect no help from
India, impose no taxes, raise no recruits — beyond what
help India chooses to give voluntarily. British rule will cease
from Aat moment, no matter what happens to India after-
wards. Today it is all a hypocricy, unreahty. I want that to
end. The new order will come only when that falsity ends.”
“It is an unwarranted claim Britain and America are
making", said Gandhiji concluding the talk, “the rtaim of
saving democracy and freedom. It is a wrong thing to malro
that claim, when there is this terrible tragedy of hnlHmg a
whole nation in bondage.’’
Q. What can America do to have your d<»TwaTid imple-
mented ?
198
A. If my demand is admitted to be just beyond cavil,
America can insist on the implementing of the Indian demand
as a condition of her financing Britain and supplying her with
her matchless skill in making war machines. He who pays
.the piper has the right to call the tune. Since America has
become the predominant partner in the Allied cause, she is
partner also in Britain's guilt. The Allies have no right to
call their cause to be morally superior to the Nazi cause so
long as they hold in custody the fairest part and one of the
most ancient nations of the earth.
(Harijan, June 14, 1942, p. 187)
(U) FOREIGN SOLDIERS IN INDIA
Among the multitude of questions contained in my
correspondence is the one referring to the advent of foreign
soldiers in India. We have foreign prisoners enough. Now
we have promise of a never ending stream of soldiers
from America and possibly China. I must confess that I do
not look upon this event with equanimity. Cannot a limit-
less number of soldiers be trained out of India’s millions?
Would they not make as good fighting material as any in
the world ? Then why foreigners? We know what American
aid means. It amounts in the end to American influence, if
not American rule added to British. It is a tremendous price
to pay for the possible success of Allied arms. I see no Indian
freedom peeping through all this preparation for the so-called
defence of India. It is preparation pure and simple for the
defence of the British Empire, whatever may be asserted to the
contrary. If the British left India to her fate as they had
to leave Singapore, non-violent India would not lose anything.
Probably ^he Japanese would leave India alone. Perhaps India,
if the main parties composed their differences as they pro-
bably would, would be able effectively to help China in the
way of peace and in the long run may even play a decisive
part in the promotion of world peace. But all these happy
things may not happen, if the British will leave India only
199
when they must. How much more creditable, how much
braver it would be for Britain to offer battle in the Wert
and leave the East to adjust her own position ! There is no
guarantee that ahe will be able to protect, during this war,
all her vast possessions. They have become a dead weight*
round her. If she wisely loosens herself from this weight,
and the Nazis, the Fascists or the Japanese instead of leaving
India alone choose to subjugate her, they will find that they
have to hold more than they can in their iron hoop. They
will find it much more difficult than Britain has. Their very
rigidity will strangle them. The British system had an elasticity
which served so long as it had no powerful rivals. British
elasticity is of no help today. I have said more than once
in these columns that the Nazi power had risen as a nemesis
to punish Britain for her sins of exploitation and enslavement
of the Asiatic and African races.
Whatever the consequences, therefore, to India, her real
safety and Britain’s too lie in orderly and timely British
withdrawal from India. All talk of treaties with the Princes
and obligations towards minorities are a creation designed
for the preservation of British rule and British interests. It
must melt before the stem reality that faces all of us. Princes,
in so far as they rely upon their armed strength, are more
than able to defend themselves against unarmed India. The
big fiction of majority and minority will vanish like the mist
before the morning sun of liberty. Truth to tell there will be
neither majority nor minority in the absence of*he paralysing
British arms. The millions of India would then be an un-
defined but one mass of huznanity. I have no doubt that at
that time the natural leaders will have wisdom enough to
evolve an honourable solution of their difficulties. This pre-
supposes Japan and other Powers leaving India alone. If
they do not, I should hope even then for wisdom to guide
the principal parties to devise a scheme whereby they can
act with one mind to face the new menace.
200 *
Holding the views I do, it is clear why I look upon
the introdiiction of foreign soldiers as a piosidve danger
thoroughly to be deplored and distrusted. present state
of things and the attempt to uphold it are a distinct sign
«of corroding consumption of the body politic in India.
(Harijan, April 26, 1942, p. 128)
APPENDIX n
NOT PRO-JAPANESE
“ We can only infer that in the admittedly possible event of Japaneso
aggression on India after the departure of the British he (I) was prepared
to concede to their (Japanese) demands."
(Indictment p. 8>
(A) IF THEY REALLY MEAN?
Q. If the Japanese really mean what they say and are
willing to help to free India from the British yoke, why
should we not willingly accept their help ?
A. It is folly to suppose that aggressors can ever be
benefactors. The Japanese may free India from the British
yoke, but only to put in their own instead. I have always
maintained that we should not seek any other Power’s help
to free India from the British yoke. That would not be a
non-violent approach. We should have to pay a heavy price,
if we ever consented to take foreign aid as against the
British. By our non-violent action we were within an ace of
reaching our goal. I cling to my faith in non-violence. I have
no enmity against the Japanese^ but I cannot contemplate
with equanimity their designs upon India. Why do they
not realize'that we as free men have no quarrel with them?
Let them leave India alone. And if they are well-intentioned,
what has China done to deseive the devastation they have
wrought there ?
CHarijan, April 26, 1942, p. 136)
201
(B) FRIENDLY ADVICE
. You say you are willing to take all risks. Every
brave man is. At the same time is it not your duty to
prepare the ground up to a point so as to minimize the
risks as far as possible ? The people must, for instance, b»
to shed cowardice and feel that it is possible for us
to stand on our own legs. They must not desire, as so many
do, Japanese help. .
As these columns show, with the overwhelming sense
of the truth as it appears to me, I am taking every care
humanly possible to prepare the ground. I know that the
novelty of the idea and that too at this juncture has caused
a shock to many people. But I could not help myself. Even
at the risk of being called mad, I had to tell the truth if I
was to be true to myself. I regard it as my solid contribu-
tion to the war and to India's deliverance from the peril
that is and the peril that is threatening. It is too my real
contribution to communal unity. No one can visualize what
it will be like. Only it will not be the sham we have had
up to now. It has touched only the few politically minded
people. The masses have remained unaffected by it.
Whilst therefore I will take every imaginable care con-
sistent with the urgency, I cannot guarantee freedom from
cowardice, before taking any forward step. The cowardice
will probably not be shed without much travail. Nor is
waiting possible, till hatred abates. Withdrawal of the hated
power is the only way to rid the land of the debasing hatred.
The cause gone, hatred must cease.
Of course the people must not, on any account, lean
on the Japanese to get rid of the British power^ That were
a remedy worse than the disease. But as I have already
said, in this struggle every risk has to be run in order to
cure ourselves of the biggest disease — a disease which has
sapped our manhood and almost made us feel as if we must
for ever be slaves. It is an insufferable thing. The cost of
202
* tbe cure, I- biow, will be heavy. No price is too heavy to
hay for tbe deliverance. (Harijan, May 31, 1942, p. 172)
(C) IF THEY COME
Q. (1) If the Japs come, how are we to resist them
non-violently ?
(2) What are we to do if we fall into their hands 7
A. (1) These questions come from Andhradesh where
the people rightly or wrongly feel that the attack is immi-
nent. My answer has already been given in these columns.
Neither food nor shelter is to be given nor are any dealings
to be established with them. They should be made to feel
that they are not wanted. But of course things are not
going to happen quite so smoothly as the question implies.
It is a superstition to think that they will come as friend-
lies. No attacking party has ever done so. It spreads fire
and brimstone among the populace. It forces things from
people. If the people cannot resist fierce attack and are
afraid of death, they should evacuate the infested place in
order to deny compulsory service to the enemy.
(2) If unfortunately some people are captured or fall
into the enemy's hands, they are likely to be shot if they
do not obey orders, e.g., render forced labour. If the cap-
tives face death cheerfully their task is done. They have
saved their own and their country’s honour. They could
have done nothing more if they had offered violent
resistance, save perhaps taking a few Japanese lives and
inviting terrible reprisals.
The thing becomes complicated when you. are captured
alive and subjected to unthinkable tortures to compel sub-
mission. You will neither submit to torture nor to the orders
of the enemy. In the act of resistance you will probably
die and escape humiliation. But it is said that death is
prevented to let the victirn go through the. agony of tortures
203
and to serve as an example to others. I however think
that a person who would die rather than go through inhuman
tortures would find honourable means of dying.
(Hanjan, June 14, 1942, p. 189)
(D) WHAT ABOUT RADIO MESSAGES ?
Q. You do not hear the radio messages. I do most
assiduously. They interpret your writings as if your.leanings
were in favour of the Axis powers and you had now veered
round to Subhas Baku’s views about receiving outside help
to overthrow the British rule. 1 would like you to clear
your position in this matter. Misinterpretation of your
known views has reached a dangerous point.
A. I am glad you have asked the question. 1 have no
desire whatsoever to woo any Power to help India in her
endeavour to free herself from the foreign yoke. I have no
desire to exchange the British for any other rule. Better
the enemy I know than the one 1 do not. I have never
attached the slightest importance or weight to the friendly
professions of the Axis powers. If they come to India they
will come not as deliverers but as sharers in the spoil. There
can therefore be no question of my approval of Subhas
Baku's policy. The old difference of opinion between us
persists. This does not mean that I doubt his sacrifice or
his patriotism. But my appreciation of his patriotism and
sacrifice cannot blind me to the fact that he is misguided
and that his way can never lead to India’s deliverance. If
I am impatient of the British yoke 1 am so because India’s
sullenness and suppressed delight of the man' in the street
over British reverses are dangerous symptoms .which may
lead to the success of Japanese designs upon India, if they
are not dealt ‘with in the proper manner: whereas India
finding herself in possession of complete freedom will never
want the Japanese to enter Incjia. India’s sullenness and
discontent will be changed as if by magic into joyful and
204
heatty cooperation with the Allies in consolidating and
preserving ^r liberty from any and every evil design.
(Harijan, June 21, 1942, p, 197)
(E) IF JAPANESE COME?
The British United Press has cabled the following
questions for Gandhiji’s reply. They are couched in evidently
angry language. But Gandhiji had no hesitation in sending
straight replies to them.
Q. 1. Whether Gandhiji is willing to see British go
while Japanese on the Frontier.
A. This question should not occur to anybody who
has read my writings, for they contemplate Allied arms
operating in India during war.
Q. 2. Whether he would urge non-cooperation with
Japanese after Japanese occupation.
A. Japanese occupation is inconceivable while Allied
arms are operating on the Indian soil. If Japanese inflict
defeat on Allied arms and succeed in occupying India 1
would most decidedly advise full non-cooperation.
Q. 3. Whether he would persist in urging ( non-
cooperation ) if Japs shot non-cooperators ;
Q. 4. Whether he would rather be shot than cooperate
himself.
A. to 3 & 4. Non-cooperation worth the name must
invite shooting. In any case I would rather be shot than
submit to Japanese or any other power.
( Harijan, July 26, 1942, p. 248)
(F) QUESTION BOX
Q. " Is it a fact that your present attitude towards
England and Japan is influenced by the belief that you
think the British and the Allies are going to be defeated
in this war ? It is necessary that you clear the position in
this respect. A very important leader in the Congress thinks.
20S
like that and he says that he is sure because he has this
knowledge from his personal talks with you. ’*
A. 1 wish you could have given the name of the leader.
Whoever he is, I have no hesitation in saying that it is
not true. On the contrary I said only the other day in '
Harijan that the Britisher was hard to beat. He has not
known what it is to be defeated. Of the Americans in this
very issue you will see my answer to The Sunday Despatch.
It contradicts the “ leader’s ” statements. He has therefore
either misunderstood me or you have misunderstood him.
■But I have said in my talk for the past twelve months and
more that this war is not likely to end in a decisive victory
for any party. There will be peace when the exhaustion
point is reached. This is mere speculation. Britain may be
favoured by nature. She has nothing to lose by waiting.
And with America as her ally she has inexhaustible material
resources and scientific skilL This advantage is not available
to any of the Axis powers. Thus I have no decisive opinion
about the result of the war. But what is decisive with me
is that I am made by nature to side with weak parties. My
policy of non-embarrassment is based upon that nature and
it persists. My proposal for British withdrawal is as much
in Britain’s interest as India’s. Your difficulty arises from
your disinclination to believe that Britain can ever do justice
voluntarily. My belief in the capacity of non-violence rejects
the theory of permanent inelasticity of human nature.
CHarijan, June 7, 1942, p. 177)
(G) UNFAIR TO AMERICA?
Proceeding evidently on Reuter’s summary ofrGandhiji’s
statement about America during the interview he gave to
the Bombay press, the Sunday Despatch of London sent
Gandhiji the following cable :
" You are reported as saying Ahat America could have
kept out of the war if she had wished. How can you justify
206
such a statement in view of the fact that while at peace
America was attacked by the Japanese whb simultaneous
declared war on her."
To this Gandhiji sent the following reply :
« "Cable just received. Evidently you have not my full'
statement. Part relating to America runs thus :
' I know that 1 have no tight to criticize auch a big nation, 1 don't
know all the facta which have determined Ataerica to throw heiaelf into
the cauldron. But somehow or other opinion has forced itself on me that
America could have remained out and even now she can do so if she divests
herself of intoxication that her immense wealth has produced. And here
I would like to repeat what 1 have said about the withdrawal of the British
power from India. Both America and Britain lack the moral basis for
engaging in this war tinless they put their own houses in order by making
it their fixed determination to withdraw their influence and power both
from Africa and Asia and removed the colour- bar. They have no right to
talk of protecting democracy and protecting civilization and human freedom
until the canker of white superiority is destroyed id its entirety.'
1 adhere to that statement. How America could have
avoided war I cannot answer except by recommending non-
-violent method. My American friendships had led me to
build high hope on American contribution to peace. America
is too big financially, intellectually, and in scientific skill, to
be subdued by any nation or even combination. Hence my
tears over her throwing herself in cauldron.”
( Harijan, June 7, 1942, p. 181)
(H)
[Here see letters No. 104, 105, 106]
(K) • FIRE RAGING IN ME*
A journalist was on a visit here the other day . . . He
was full of the happenings in his province. . . .
He talked of the public feeling in his province. " It is
more anti-British than pro-Japanese," he said. " There is a
vague notion that we have had enough of this rule, and
almost anything would be .better than the existing state of
things. People ate happy when Subhas Babu says on the
207
radio that there are no differences between him and you
and when he says you are now out to fight for liberty at
any cost."
“ But I suppose you • know that there he is wrong,"
said Gandhiji, “and I cannot possibly appropriate the com-,
pliments he is paying me. ‘ Liberty at any cost ’ has a
vastly different connotation for me from what it has for
him- * At any cost ' does not exist in my dictionary. It does
not, for instance, include bringing in foreigners to help us
win our liberty. I have no doubt it means exchanging one
form of slavery for another possibly much worse. But of
course we have to fight for our liberty and make whatever
sacrifice it demands. In spite of all the hypocrisy that you
find in all the inspired press of Britain and America I do
not relent. I deliberately use the word hypocrisy, for they
are now proving that when they were talking of the freedom
of India they did not mean it. So far as I am concerned I
have no douht about the righteousness of my step. It seems
to me to be axiomatic that the Allies are in for a defeat
this time if they will not do this initial act of justice, and
thus put their own case on an unassailable basis. If they
don't, they must face the opposition of those who cannot
tolerate their rule and are prepared to die in order to get
rid of it. Convert the deepening ill-will into good-will is a
sound proposition. It is not open to them to say that we
must smother our consciences and say or 'do nothing because
there is war. That is why I have made up my mind that it
would be a good thing if a million people were shot in a
brave and non-violent rebellion against British rule. It may
be that it may take us years before we can evolve order
out of chaos. But we can then face the world, we cannot
face the world today. Avowedly the different nations are
fighting for their liberty. Germany, Japan, Russia, China are
pouring their blood and money like water. What is our record?
You talk of the newspapers doing good business out of the
208
'war. It is a shame to be thus bought and to refrain from
speaking out at Government's dictation. There is many a
way of eatning an honest crust of bread. If British money —
which is our money — can buy us. Heaven help our country."
■* * *
I do not feel flattered when Subhas Babu says I am
right. I am not right in the sense he means. For there he
is attributing pro-Japanese feeling to me. If I were to discover
> that by some strange miscalculation I had not realized the
fact that I was helping the entry of the Japanese in this
country, I should not hesitate to retrace my steps. As regards
the Japanese, I am certain that we should lay down our
lives in order to resist them as we would resist the British.
But it won't be the work of human hands. It will be the
work of a Force — incalculable and invisible — which works
often upsetting all our calculations. I rely implicitly on it.
Otherwise I should go mad in face of all this torrent of
what I must call irritating criticism. They do not know my
agony. I cannot express it except perhaps by dying."
Was there the slightest suspicion that he wished victory
to the Axis arms in order that the British may be humbled
and their power in India may be destroyed ? Gandhiji asked
the friend to disabuse himself of any such notion. “Destruc-
tion of the British power is not dependent on Japanese or
German arms. If it depended on them, there would be
nothing to be proud of, apart from the blight that would
settle upon the world. But what matters to me is that 1
cannot be happy or proud if some one comes in and drives
away my enemy. Where do I t:ome in there ? I cannot
possibly enthuse over such a thing. 1 want to have the
pleasure of' having offered up my sacrifice for fig h ting the
enemy in my own house. If I have not that strength . I
cannot prevent the other from coming in. Only I must find
a middle path to prevent the new enemy coming in. I am
sure God will help me to 'find the way.
- 209
14
“ 1 do not mind honest, sttong, healthy criticism. All tlK
manufactured criticism that I find being made today is sheer
tomfoolery, meant to overawe me and demoralize the Con-
gress ran^. It is a foul game. They do not know the fire
that is raging in my breast. I have no false notions of prestig4(.
no personal considerations would make me take a step that
I know is sure to plunge the country into a conflagration."
(Harijan, August 2, 1942, pp. 257-258)
(L) LETTER TO CHIANG KAI SHEK
Dear Generalissimo,
I can never forget the five hours' close contact I had
with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I had always felt
drawn towards you in your fight for freedom, and that con-
tact and our conversation brought China and her problems
still nearer to me. Long ago, between 1905 and 1913, when
1 was in South Africa, 1 was in constant touch with the
small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew them first as
clients and then as comrades in the Indian passive resistance
struggle in South Africa. 1 came in touch with them in
Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their thrift, industry
resourcefulness and internal unity. Later in India I had a
very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years and
we all learnt to like him.
I have thus felt greatly attracted towards your great
country and, in common with my countrymen, our sympathy
has gone out to you in yout terrible struggle. Our mutual
friend Jawaharlal Nehru, whose love of China is only excelled,
if at all, by his love of his own country, has kept us in
intimate touch with the developments of the Chinese struggle.
Because of this feeling I have towards China and my
earnest desire that our two great countries should come
closer to one another and cooperate to their mutual advantage,
I am anxious to explain to you that my appeal to the British
power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape
210
or fortn to weaken India’s defence against the Japanese or
embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to
any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not
be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the
cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise
before me as I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom
in this way, and a Japanese domination of either India or
China would be equally injurious to the other country and
to world peace. That domination must, therefore, be pre-
vented, and I should like India to play her natural and
rightful part in this.
I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India
has been a helpless witness of the withdrawals from Malaya,
Singapore, and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these
tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a
repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But
unless we are free, we can do nothing to prevent it, and
the same process might well occur again crippling India and
China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this tragic
tale of woe.
Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by the
British Government, and the recent failure of the Cripps
mission has left a deep wound which is still running. Out
of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal
of British power so that India can look after herself and
help China to the best of her ability.
I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my
belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation
could turn to it. That faith in if is as firm as ever. But I
realize that ^India today as a whole has not that faith and
belief, and the government in free India would be formed
from the various elements composing the nation.
Today the whole of India is impotent and feels frustrated.
The Indian army consists largely of people who have joined
up because of economic pressure. They have no feeling of
211
a cause to fight fot. and in no sense are they a national
army. Those of us who would fight for a cause, for India
and China, with ^armed forces or with non-violence, cannot,
under the foreign heel, function as they want to. And yet
our people know for certain that India free can play evan
a decisive part not only on her own behalf, hut also on
behalf of China and world peace. Many, like me, feel that
it is not proper or manly to remain in this helpless state
and allow events to overwhelm us when a way to effective
action can be open to us. They feel, therefore, that 'every
possible effort should be made to ensure independence and
that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is
the origin of my appeal to the British power to end im-
mediately the unnatural connection between Britain and India.
Unless we make that effort, there is grave danger of
public feeling in India going into wrong and harmful chan-
nels. There is every likelihood of subterranean sympathy
for Japan growing simply in order to weaken and oust
British authority in India. This feeling may take the place
of robust confidence in our ability never to look to out-
siders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn
self-reliance and develop the strength to work our own
salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined
effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has
become a present necessity to enable us to take our due
place among the free nations of the world.
To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in
every way Japanese aggression, I would personally agree,
and I am sure the government of free India would agree,
that the Allied powers might, under treaty wi^h us, keep
their armed forces in India and use the country as a base
for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.
I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author
of the new move in India, I shall take no hasty action. And
whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the
212 -
consideration that it should not injure Chmat or encourage
Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist
world opinion in favour of a proposition which to me
appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthen-
ing of India’s and China's defence. I am also educating
public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues.
Needless to say, any movement against the British Govern-
ment with which I may he connected will be essentially
non-violent. I am straining every nerve to avoid a conflict
with British authority. But if in the vindication of the
freedom which has become an immediate desideratum, this
becomes inevitable, I shall not hesitate to run any risk,
however great.
Very soon you shall have completed five years of war
against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrow
and misery that these have brought to China. My heart
goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and in
admiration for their heroic struggle and endless sacrifices
in the cause of their country’s freedom and integrity against
tremendous odds. I am convinced that this heroism and
sacrifice cannot be in vain; they must bear fruit. To you,
to Madame Chiang and to the great people of China, I
send my earnest and sincere wishes of your success. 1 look
forward to the day when a free India and a free China
will cooperate together in friendship and brotherhood for
their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.
In anticipation of your permission, I am taking the
liberty of publishing this letter in Harijan.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi
{Hindustan' Times, August 15th, 1942 )
Further reference to the same subject will be found in :
Appendix 1
B. Out of Touch p. 171
C. “ I AM Not Pro^Japanese ” p. 172
. 213
K IMPUCATIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL P. 179
K. A POSER P. 183
L. A Fallacy p. 183
Q. American opinion may be antagonized p. 193
R. To American friends p. 195
S. Justice of Congress demand p. 196
„ Azad's statement cited p. 196
„ Nothing to cavil at p. 197
APPENDIX III
congress not for power
‘ It has been suggested in the preceding paragraph that the Congress
intended this government to be under their domination and note has been
made of the strength added to this view by the unity of Muslim opinion
that the Congress move was aimed at establishing Congress-Hindu domi-
nation over India.'
(Indictment p. 12)
(A) NOT RIGHT
Q. Are we tight in believing that you wish the Congress
and the people to become capable as soon as possible of
taking over the administration and to do so on the first
opportunity ?
A. You are not right. I cannot speak for the Congress.
But I want no organization or individual to become capable
of taking over the administration. In non-violent technique,
it is unthinkable. You do not take over power. It may
descend to you being given by the people. In an anarchical
state, all turbulent elements will make a bid for power.
Those who will serve the people and will evolve order out
of chaos will spend themselves in removing chabs. If they
survive, the popular will may put them in as administrators.
This is wholly different from what you have imagined. People
who make a bid for power generally fail to achieve it.
iHariian, May 31, 1942, p. 173)
214 .
• (B) WHAT ABOUT MUSLIMS ?
* * •
“ But what ddes a free India mean, if, as Mr. }innah
said, Muslims will not accept Hindu rule ? ”
A. “I have not asked the British to band over India to
the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to
God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties
will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real res-
ponsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I
shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."
* . * *
(Harijan, June 14. 1942, p. 187)
(C) TO MUSLIM CORRESPONDENTS
. . . I think that even a large number, if not all
of us, prepared to undergo any sacrifice that may fall to
our lot, would impress the British rulers that they can no
longer hold India as a British possession. I believe too that
such a number is available. Needless to say, their action
must be non-violent, irrespective of their belief, as even a
military man’s has often to be. on behalf of his cause. The
fight has been conceived in the interest of the whole of
India. The fighters will gain no more than the poorest Indian.
They will fight not to seize power but to end the foreign
domination, cost what it may. . .
The Congress and the League being best organized
parties in the country may come to terms and set up a
provisional government acceptable to all. And this may be
followed by a duly elected Constituent Assembly.
* ♦ ^ •
( Hartjan, July 12, 1942, p. 220)
(D) AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION
" . How is Britain to know what sort of ‘ resistance ' the proposed
Indian Government would organize, concludes the Manchester Guardian.''
This is a good question. But who can speak for the
proposed Indian Government ? It must be clear that it won’t
215
be Congress Government; nor will it be Hindu Maha Sabha
Government, nor Muslim League Government. It will be All
India Government. It will be a government not backed by
any military power unless the so-called military classes seize
the opportunity and overawe the populace and declare them;
selves the Government as Franco has done. If they play the
game then the proposed Government would be a government,
though provisional in the first instance, broad-based upon
the .will of the people. Let us assume that the military-
minded persons being without the backing of the powerful
British arms will think wise not to seize power. The popular
government to be must represent Parsis, Jews, Indian Chris-
tians, Muslims and Hindus not as separate religious groups
but as Indians. The vast majority won't be believers in non-
-violence. The Congress does not believe in non-violence as
a creed. Very few go to the extreme length I do as the
Manchester Guardian properly -puts it. The Maulana and
Pandit Nehru ‘ believe in offering armed resistance’. And I ’
may add so do many Congressmen. Therefore, whether in
the country as a whole or in the Congress, I shall be in a
hopeless minority. But for me even if I find myself in a
minority of one my course is clear. My non-violence is
on its trial. I hope I shall come out unscathed through
the ordeal. My faith in its efficacy is unflinching. If I could
turn India, Great Britain, America and the rest of the world
including the Axis powers in the direction of non-violence
I should do so. But that feat mere human effort cannot
accomplish. That is in God’s hands. For me ‘ I can but do
or die.' Surely the Manchester Guardian does not fear the
real article, genuine non-violence. Nobody does nor need.
( Harijan, August 9, 1942, pp. 261-2 )
(E) UNSEEMLY IF TRUE
. . . Hindustan belongs to all those who are bom and
bred here and who have no other country to look to. There-
216 •
‘ fore, it belongs to Parsis, Beni Israels, to Indian Christians,
Muslims and other non-Hindus as much as to Hindus. Free
India will be no Hindu raj, it will be Indian raj based not
on the majority of any religious sect or community but on
^he representatives of the whole people without distinction
of religion. I can conceive a mixed majority putting the
Hindus in a minority. They would be elected for their record
of service and merits. Religion is a personal matter which
should have no place in politics. It is in the unnatural con-
dition of foreign domination that we have unnatural divisions
according to religion. Foreign domination going, we shall
laugh at our folly in having clung to false ideals and slogans.
The discourse referred to is surely vulgar. There is no
question of ‘ driving out ' the English. They cannot be driven
out except by violence superior to theirs. The idea of killing
the Muslims if they do not remain in subjection may have
been all right in by-gone days; it has no meaning today.
There is no force in the cry of driving out the English if
the substitute is to be Hindu or any other domination. That
will be no Swaraj. Self-government necessarily means govern-
ment by the free and intelligent will of the people. I add
the word ‘ intelligent ' because I hope that India will be
predominantly non-violent. . . .
(Harijan, August 9, 1942, p. 261)
Further reference to the same subject will be found in :
APPENDIX I
F. Its meaning p. 181
G. Only if they withdraw p. 181
P. Negotiations p. 191*
„ SpAPE OF THINGS TO COME P. 191
S. AzAD’S STATEMENT CITED P. 196
„ Nothing to cavil at p. 197
217
APPENDIX IV
ABOUT NON-VIOLENCE
"Mr. Gandhi knew that any mass movement started in India would
he a violent movement.”
(Indictment p. 391
(A) EXPEDIENCE
Yes. I adhere to my opinion that 1 did well 'to present
to the Congress non-violence as an expedient. I could not
have done otherwise,' if I was to introduce it into politics.
In South Africa too I introduced it as an expedient. It was
successful there because resisters were a small number in a
compact area and therefore easily controlled. Here we had
numberless persons scattered over a huge country. The
result was that they could not be easily controlled or trained.
And yet it is a marvel the way they have responded. They
might have responded much better and shown far better
results. But I have no sense of disappointment in me over
the results obtained. If I had started with men who accepted
non-violence as a creed, I might have ended with myself.
Imperfect as I am, 1 started with imperfect men and women
and sailed on an unchartered ocean. Thank God that, though
the boat has not reached its haven, it has proved fairly
storm-proof. iHarijan, April 12, 1942, p. 116)
(B) NON-VIOLENT NON-COOPERATION
Q. “ There is a report about some new scheme that you
want to propound in one of your Harijan articles about
non-violent non-cooperation *if any invader came to India.
Could you give us an idea?” Was the next question.
A. “ It is wrong. I have no plan in mind. If* 1 had, I
should give it to you. But I think nothing more need be
added when I have said that there should be unadulterated
non-violent non-coopeation and if the whole of India res-
ponded and unanimously offered * it. I should show that
218 .
' without shedding a single drop of blood Japanese arms - or
any combination of arms — can be sterilized. That involves
the determination of India not to give quarter on any point
whatsoever and to be ready to risk loss of several million
lives. But I would consider that cost very cheap and victory
Von at that cost glorious. That India may not be ready to
pay that price may be true. I hope it is not true, but some
such price must be paid by any country that wants to retain
its independence. After all, the sacrifice made by the Russians
and the Chinese is enormous, and they are ready to risk
all. The same could be said of the other countries also,
whether aggressors or defenders. The cost is enormous.
Therefore, in the non-violent technique I am asking India
to risk no more than other countries are risking and
which India would have to risk even if she offered armed
resistance.”
“ But,” promptly came the question, ” unadulterated non-
violent non-cooperation has not been successful against Great
Britain. How will it succeed against a new aggressor ?”
” I combat the statement altogether. Nobody has yet
told me that non-violent non-cooperation, unadulterated,
has not succeeded. It has not been offered, it is true.
Therefore, you can say that what has not been offered
hitherto is not likely to be offered suddenly when India
faces the Japanese arms. I can only hope that, in the face
of danger, India would be readier to offer non-violent non-
cooperation. Perhaps India is accustomed to British rule for
so many years that the Indian mind or India’s masses do not
feel the pinch so much as the advent of a new power would
be felt. But your question is well put. It is possible that
India may*not be able to offer non-violent non-cooperation
But a similar question may be put regarding armed resistance.
Several attempts have been made and they have not suc-
ceeded, therefore it will not succeed against the Japanese.
That leads us to the absurd conclusion that India will never
. 219
be ready for gai ning independence, and seeing that I cannot
subscribe to any such proposition, I must try again and
again till India is ready to respond to the call of non-violent
non-cooperation. But if India does not respond to that call
then India must respond to the call of some leader or some^
organization, wedded to violence. For instance, the Hindu
Mahasabha is trying to rouse the Hindu mind for an armed
conflict. It remains to be seen whether that attempt suc-
ceeds. 1 for one do not believe it will succeed. ”
CHarijan, May 24. 1942, p. 167)
(C) SCORCHED EARTH POLICY
Q. Would you advise non-violent non-cooperation
against scorched earth policy? Would you resist the attempt
to destroy sources of food and water ?
A. Yes. A time may come when I would certainly
advise it, for I think it is ruinous, suicidal, and unnecessary
- whether India believes in non-violent non-cooperation or
in violence. And the Russian and Chinese examples make
no appeal to me. If some other country resorts to methods
which I consider to be inhuman, I may not follow them. If
the enemy comes and helps himself to crops I may be oblig-
ed to leave, because I cannot or care not to defend them.
I must resign myself to it. And there is a good example for
us. A passage was quoted to me from the Islamic literature.
The Khaliphs issued definite instructions to the armies of
Islam that they should not destroy the utility services, they
should not harass the aged and women and children; and I
do not know that the arms of Islam suffered any disaster
because the armies obeyed these instructions.
Q. But what about factories - especially factories for
the manufacture of munitions ?
A. “ Suppose there are factories for grinding wheat or
pressing oilseeds, 1 should not destroy them. But munitions
factories, yes; for I would not tolerate munitions factories
220
in a free India if I bad my way. Textile factories 1 would
not destroy and I would resist all such destruction. However,
it is a question of prudence." Gandhiji continued : “ I have
not suggested immediate enforcement of the whole pro-
.gramme in pursuance of the demand for British withdrawal.
It is there of course. But I am trying, if I am allowed to
continue to cultivate and educate public opinion, to show
that behind this demand of mine there is no ill-will, no
malice. It is the most logical thing that I have suggested. It
is in the interests of all, and since it is an entirely friendly
act, I am moving cautiously, watching myself at every step.
I will do nothing in haste, but there is the fixed determination
behind every act of mine that the British must withdraw.
" I have mentioned anarchy. I am convinced that we are
living today in a state of ordered anarchy. It is a misnomer
to call such rule as is established in India a rule which
promotes the welfare of India. Therefore, this ordered dis-
ciplined anarchy should go, and if there is complete lawless-
ness in India, as a result, I would risk it, though I believe,
and should like to believe that 22 years of continuous effort
at educating India along the lines of non-violence will not
have gone in vain, and people will evolve real popular order
out of chaos. Therefore, if I find that all the best effort
fails, I would certainly invite people to resist destruction
of their property.” (Harijan, May 24, 1942, p. 167)
(D) WHAT WOULD FREE INDIA DO ?
Gandhiji had over and o>^r again said that an orderly
withdrawal would result in a sullen India becoming a friend
and ally. These American friends now explored the impli-
cations of that possible friendship : “ Would a free India
declare war .against Japan ? ”
” Free India need not do so. It simply becomes the
ally of the Allied powers, simply out of gratefulness for
221
the payment of a debt, however overdue. Human nature
thanks the debtor when he discharges the debt
“ How then would this alliance fit in with India’s non-
violence ?”
“ It is a good question. The whole of India is not
non-violent. If the whole of India had been non-violent,
there would have been no need for my appeal to Britain,
nor would there be any fear of a Japanese invasion. But
my non-violence is represented possibly by a hopeless minority,
or perhaps by India's dumb millions who are temperamentally
non-violent. But there too the questiryn may be asked :
' What have they done ?' They have done nothing, I agree;
but they may act when the supreme test comes, or they
may not. 1 have no non-violence of millions to present to
Britain, and what we have has been discounted by the British
as non-violence of the weak. And so all 1 have done is to
make this appeal on the strength of bare inherent justice,
so chat it might find an echo in the British heart It is made
from a moral plane, and even as they do not hesitate to act
desperately in the physical field and take grave risks, let them
for once act desperately on the moral field and declare that
India is independent today, irrespective of India’s demand.”
iHanjan; June 14, 1942, p. 187)
(E) A CHALLENGE
+ * *
The fact is that non-violence does not work in the same
way as violence. It works in the opposite way. An armed
man naturally relics upon h!^ arms. A man who is inten-
tionally unarmed relies upon the unseen force called God
by poets, but called the unknown by scientists. But that
which is unknown is not necessarily non-existent. God is the
Force among all forces known and unknown, l^on-violence
without reliance upon that Force is poor stuff to be thrown
in the dust.
222
I hope now my critic realizes the error underlying hir
question and that he sees also that the doctrine that has
guided my life is not one of inaction but of the highest action.
His question should really have been put thus :
, ‘How is it that, in spite of your work in India for over
22 years, there are not sufficient Satyagrahis who can cope
with external and internal menaces 7 ’ My answer then would
be that twentytwo years are nothing in the training of' a
nation for the development of non>violent strength. That is
not to say that a large number of persons will not show
that strength on due occasion. That occasion seems to have
come now. This war puts the civilian on his mettle no less
than the military man, non-violent no less than violent.
iHarijan, June 28, 1942, p. 201)
(F)
. . . Therefore the golden rule is to dare to do the right
at any cost. But there should be no camouflage, no secrecy,
no make-believe. . . . {Hariian, July 12, 1942, p. 217)
(G) GURU GOVIND SINGH
, . . But for me as a believer in non-violence out and out
they (Guru Govind Singh, Lenin, Kamal Pasha, etc.) cannot
be my guides in life so far as their faith in war is concerned.
I believe in Krishna perhaps more than the writer. But my
Krishna is the Lord of the Universe, the creator, preserver
and destroyer of us all. He may destroy because He creates.
But I must not be drawn into a philosophical or religious
argument with my friends. I have not the qualifications for
teaching my philosophy of life. I'have barely qualifications for
practising (he philosophy I believe. I am but a poor struggling
soul yearning to be wholly good — wholly truthful and wholly
non-violent in thought, word and deed, but ever failing to
reach the idea) which I know to be true. 1 admit, and assure
my revolutionary friends, it is a painful climb, but the pain
of it is a positive pleasure for me. Each step upward makes
223
me feel strongei and fit for the next. But all that pain and'
the pleasure are for me. The 'revolutionaries are at liberty
to reject the whole of my philosophy. To them I merely
present my own experiences as a co-worker in the same
cause even as I have successfully presented them to th^
Ali Brothers and many other friends. They can and do
applaud whole-heartedly the action of Mustafa Kamal Pasha
and possibly De Valera and Lenin. But they realize with me
that India is not like Turkey or Ireland or Russia, and that
revolutionary activity is suicidal at this stage of the country’s
life at any rate, if not for all time, in a country so vast, so
hopelessly divided and with the masses so deeply sunk in
pauperism and so fearfully terror-struck.
{Harijan, July 12, 1942, p. 219)
(H) THE CONFLAGRATION
Q. • What is the difference between Nero and yourself ?
Nero was fiddling when Rome was burning. Will you be
also fiddling in Sevagram after you have ignited the fire
which you will not be able to quench ?
A. — The difference will be known if match, if I have
ever to light it, does not prove a ‘ damp squib ’. Instead
of fiddling in Sevagram you may expect to find me perishing
in the flames of my own starting if I cannot regulate or
restrain them. But I have a grouse against you.* Why should
you shove all the blame on to me for all that may happen
by reason of my taking action for the discharge of an
overdue debt and that, too, just when the discharge has
become the necessary condition of my life ?
In their schools the rulers teach us to sing . “ Britons
never shall be slaves." How can the refrain enthuse their
slaves ? The British arc pouring blood like water and
squandering gold like dust in order to preserve their liberty.
Or, is it their right to enslave India and Africa ? Why
should Indians do less to free themselves from bondage ?
224
leis misuae of language to liken to the action of Nero that of a
who, in order to escape living death, lights his own funeral
pyre to end the agony. iHarijan, July 12, 1942^ p. 228)
(K) IN CASE? OF ILLNESS
But the relevant fact is that so long as the reason
is unimpaired, physical illness is no bar to the conduct of a
non-violent struggle. The peremptory belief in non-violent
conduct is that all urge comes from God — the Unseen,
even Unfelt save through unconquerable faith. Neverthe-
less, as a seeker and experimenter I know that even physi-
cal illness, even fatigue is counted as a defect in a non-
violent person. Mens sana in corpore sano is literally accept-
ed by votaries of truth and non-violence. But that is said
of perfect men. Alas 1 am far from the perfection I am
aiming at. iHarijan, July 19, 1942, p. 229)
(L) FASTING IN NON-VIOLENT ACTION
If the struggle which we are seeking to avoid with all
our might has to come, and if it is to remain non-violent
as it must in order to succeed, fasting is likely to play an
important part in if. It has its place in the tussle with
authority and with our own people in the event of wanton
acts of violence and obstinate riots for instance. .
There is a natural prejudice against it as part of a
political struggle. It has a recognized place in religious
practice. But it is considered a vulgar interpolation in
politics by the ordinary politician though it has always been
resorted to by prisoners in a haphazard way with more
or less success. By fasting, however, they have always
succeeded in drawing public attention and disturbing the
peace of jail authorities.
My own fasts have always, as I hold, been strictly
according to the law of Satyagraba. Fellow Satyagrahis^too
in South Africa fasted partially or wholly. My fasts have
been varied. There was th^ Hindu-Muslim Unity fast of 21
.225
15
days in 1924 started under the late Maulana Mahomed Alt’s*
roof in Delhi. The indeterminate fast against the MacDonald
Award was taken in the Yerawada Prison in 1932. The 21
days' purificatory fast was begun in the Yerawada Prison
and was finished at Lady Thackersey's, as the Governmenjt
would not take the burden of my being in the Prisob in
that condition. Then followed another fast in the Yerawada
Prison in 1933 against the government refusal, to let me
carry on anti-untouchability work through Harijan (issued
from prison) on the same basis as facilities had been allowed
me four months before. They would not yield, but they
discharged me when their medical advisers thought I could
not live many days if the fast was not given up. Then
followed the ill-fated Rajkot fast in 1939. A false step taken
by me thoughtlessly during that fast thwarted the brilliant
result that would otherwise certainly have been achieved.
In spite of all these fasts, fasting has not been accepted as
a recognized part of Satyagraha. It has only been tolerated
by the politicians. I have however been driven to th^ con-
clusion that fasting unto death is an integral part of Satya-
graha programme, and it is the greatest and most effective
weapon in its armoury under given circumstances. Not
every one is qualified or undertaking it without a proper
course of training.
I may not burden this note with an examination of the
circumstances under which fasting may be resorted to and
the training required for it. Non-violence in its positive
aspect as benevolence (I do not use the word love as it
has fallen into disrepute) Is the greatest force because of
the limitless scope it affords for self-suffering without causing
or intending any physical or material injury to the wrong-
doer. The object always is to evoke the best in him. Self-
suffering is an appeal to his better nature, as retaliation is
to his baser. Fasting under proper circumstances is such an
appeal par excellence. If the politician does not perceive its
226 ^
'piropriety in political matters, it is because it is a novel use
of this very, fine weapon.
To practise non-violence in mundane matters is to know
its true value. It is to bring heaven upon earth. There is
no such thing as the other world. All worlds are one. There
is n^ ‘ here ’ and no ‘ there *. As Jeans has demonstrated,
the whole universe including the most distant stars, invisible
even through the most powerful telescope in the world, is
compressed in an atom. 1 hold it therefore to be wrong to
limit the use of non-violence to cave-dwellers and for
acquiring merit for a favoured position in the other world.
All virtue ceases to have use if it serves no purpose in
every walk of life. I would therefore plead with the purely
political-minded people to study non-violence and fasting as
its extreme manifestation with sympathy and understanding.
iHarijem, July 26, 1942, p. 248)
(M) WHAT ABOUT NON-VIOLENCE
Q. — But what about your non-violence ? To what
extent will you carry out your policy after freedom is gained 7
A. — The question hardly arises. I am using the first
personal pronoun for brevity, but I am trying to represent
the spirit of India as I conceive it. It is and will be a mixture.
What policy the national government will adopt I cannot
say. I may not even survive it much as I would love to. If
I do, I would advise the adoption of non-violence to the
utmost extent possible and that will be India's great con-
tribution to the peace of the world and the establishment
of a new world order. I expect that with the existence of
so many martial races in India, all of whom will have a
voice in the government of the day, the national policy
will incline towards militarism of a modified character. I
shall certainly.hope that all the effort for the last twentytwo
years to show the efficacy, of non-violence as a political force
will not have gone in vain and a strong party representing
227
true non-vu^nce will exist in the countrjr. In every case a
free India in alliance with the allied powers must be of great
help to their cause, whereas India held in bondage as she is
today must be a drag upon the war-chariot and may prove
a source of real danger at the most critical moment. r
(Harijan, June 21, 1942, p. ^97)
(N) ANOTHER DISCOURSE
* V *
Bharatanandji, whose acquintance the reader will make
in another column, demurred to the compliment given to
his countrymen, the Poles, by Gandhiji. " You say that the
Poles were ‘ almost non-violent *. I do not think so. There
Was black hatred in the breast of Poland, and I do not
think the compliment is deserved.”
“ You must not take what I say, so terribly literally. If
ten soldiers resist a force of a thousand soldiers armed cap-
a-pie, the former are almost non-violent, because there is
no capacity for anything like proportionate violence in them.
But the instance I have taken of the girl is more appropriate.
A girl who attacks her assailant with her nails, if she has
grown them, or with her teeth, if she has them, is almost
non-violent, because there is no premeditated violence in
her. Her violence is the violence of the mouse against the cat.”
"Well then, Bapuji, I will give you an instance. A young
Russian girl was attacked by a soldier. She used her nails
and teeth against him and tore him, so to say, to pieces.
Was she almost non-violent ?”
“ How can it cease to be non-violence, if offered on the
spur of the moment, simply*’ because it was successful 7” I
interposed.
" No,” said Gandhiji almost inadvertently.
" Then I am really puzzled,” said Bharatanandji. " You
say there should be no premeditated violence a,nd no capacity
to offer proportionate violence. < Here in this case she by
her success proved that she had the capacity.”
228 ■
“lam Sony,” said Gandliiji, “tiiat I inadvertently said
‘ no ’ to Mahadev. There was 'violence there. It was equally
matched.”
“ But then, is not intention ultimately the test ? A
surgeon uses his knife non-violeody. Or a keeper of the
peace uses force against miscreants in order to protect
society. That too he does non-violently," said Bhalratanandji.
“ Who is to judge the intention ? Not we. And for us the
deed in most cases is the test. We normally look at the action
and not at the intention. God alone knows the intention.”
“ Then God alone knows what is himsa and what is
ahimsa."
“ Yes. God alone is the final judge. It is likely that what
we believe to be an act of ahimsa is an act of himsa in the
eyes of God. But for us the path is chalked out. And then
you must know that a true practice of ahimsa means also
in one who practises it the keenest intelligence and wide>
awake conscience. It is difficult for him to err. When I
used those words for Poland, and when I suggested to a
girl believing herself to be helpless that she might use her
nails and teeth without being guilty of violence, you must
understand the meaning at the back of my mind. There is
that refusal to bend before overwhelming might in the full
knowledge that it means certain death. The Poles knew that
they would be crushed to atoms, and yet they resisted the
German hordes. That was why I called it almost non-violence.”
* * *
(Harijan, September 8, 1940, p, 274)
Further reference to the same subject will be found in :
APPENDIX I
C. No SECRECY P. 173
,*. To RESIST SLAVE DRIVERS P. 174
D, Why non-violent non-cooperation p. 176
K. A poser p. 183
L. A« FALLACY P. 183
M. Oh the troops p. 184
Q. Open to cokvicnoN p. 193
229
APPENDIX V
(A)
[Estiacts from Pandit Jawaharlal Nahru'a addreas to the Joumaliata'
Aasociation at Allahabad.]
" We do not wish to take advantage of the pe^ td
Britain, Russia or China, nor do we want the Axis powers
to win. We mean to stop the Japanese and to help China
and the wider cause of democracy and freedom, but the
nature of the peril is such now i^t only to us but through
us to China also that we want to meet it by converting
the war into a peoples’ war as China has done. The pre>
paration of the Government of India is entirely inadequate.
We want to build up the national will to resistance.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION
“We want to take up the present situation, even if we
have to take risk in doing so. We want to save ourselves
from immediate peril and not to take advantage of any
situation, in order to gain .independence. If we remain
passive, we allow the popular will against the British
Government to be broken gradually, and that will break
the popular will to resistance. We want to gamble with
fate if one chooses to call it so — and we will do it
bravely.”
Pandit Nehru said that it was not going to be a long-
drawn-out affair, but it would be short and swift. How
short and swift he did not know, because that depended
on psychological factors. “Ours is not armed force. Our
struggle depends upon the psychological reaction of a few
million."
In reply to a question by an American journalist,Pandit
Nehru said : “ The movement can gain by what we do. and
can be accelerated by what the Government does.” Gandhiji
in his Harijan has indicated the steps, and the first step
may be within a fortnight after* the A. I. C. C. meeting.
230 ,
‘That might be a preparatory step, unless the Govenunent
takes such action as might accelerate it.
* * *
The present decision, the Pandit said, was not taken
in a huff, but they came to the conclusion, following a
cloM analysis of the current world politics and t^e method
of the British Government in fighting the war. He em>
phasized that when the Congress talked of independence,
it was thought that it was in the nature of bargaining.
Therefore the demand for the withdrawal of British power
from India had irritated the British. He explained that this
demand was inherent in the nationalist movement. They
were told that the ‘ Quit India ’ demand was in the nature
of blackmail, and India should wait till the situation was
clear after the war.
Continuing, Pandit Nehru said that they waited these*
years and the Congress was on the point of starting Satya-
graha in 1940, but at the fall of France they desisted from
starting the movement, because they did not want to em-
barrass England during her moment of great peril. They
wanted to face peril as far as possible. They wanted to
prevent the Japanese aggression upon India and help China.
He said that he could not have thrown in his weight with
the British Government because the British policy was so
deep-rooted that they could do nothing. There was no
loophole to function effectively. The Congress wanted India
not to be a passive onlooker.
In conclusion, Pandit Nehru said that the average man
in India looked to the Congress for a lead, and if the
Congress failed, the result would be so lAuch spiritual . . .
disillusionment that it might break their spirit. So the
alternative left to them was to take the risk to shake this
spirit and change the whole of Europe and America into
the conception of the war of freedom. — United Press
iSombay Chronicle, August 1, 1942)
231
(B)
[Extracts Itoin Pandit Jawaharlal Nehnt's speedi on Tilak Pay oaio'
brations. Allahabad.]
My mind is quite clear that our decision is correct, I
can say this with all the authority and dignity of a membot
of ilte Wprking Committee. My mind is at rest. 1 can cfeariy
see the path before us. We can tread it fearlessly and bravdy.
# at •
NO TRUCK WITH AXIS
Pandit Nehru said that he wanted to make it clear tfiat
there was no intention to help Japan or to injure China. He
said : “ If we succeed, that will release tremendous spiritual
forces for the cause of freedom and democracy and will
greatly increase the resistance against Japan and Germany.
If on the other hand we fail. Britain would be left to fight
gainst Japan as best she can.”
« * •
“ CORRECT SLOGAN ”
Gandhiji’s ‘ Quit India ’ slogan correctly represents our
thoughts and sentiments. Passivity on our part at this tnoment
and hour of peril would be suicidal. It will break down all
our will to resistance. It would destroy and emasculate us.
Out step is not merely for the love of independence. We
want to take it to protect ourselves, to strengthen our will
to resistance, to give a fresh orientation to the war, to fight
and to help China and Russia : it is an immediate and
pressing necessity with us.
PEOPIiE’S WAR
Answering the question “ How would you fi^ht against
Japan ?” Pandit Nehru said : “ We would fight in every way
possible with non-violence and with arms — by making it a
people’s war, by raising people's army, by increasing pro-
duction and industrialization, by making it our primacy
consuming passion, by fighting like Russia and China and
232
no once would be too big to pay to achieve our succaae
against the aggressor.*'
m * *
“Struggle — eternal struggle f That is my reply to Mr.
Amery and Sir Stafford Cripps,*' said Pandit Nehru spiritedly
critsaizing the latest statements of Mr. Amery and Sir
Stafford Cripps.
“ India’s national self-respect cannot be a matter of
bargaining “ he added. “ I am galled with sorrow and anger
to note that I for years wanted some settlement because I
felt that Britain was in trouble. They have had their suffering
and sorrow. I wanted my country to move forward step in
step with them as a free country. But what is one to make
of such statements !“ (Bombay Chronicle, August 3, 1942)
(C)
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement on
THE Seized Documents
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has issued the following
statement
I have just seen for the first time the Government’s
communique ’ issuing certain documents obtained during
the police raid from the A I. C. C. office. It is astonishing
to what a pass the Government of India has been reduced
when it has to adopt these discreditable and dishonourable
tactics. Normally such tactics require no answer. But as
there is likely to be misapprehension. I wish to clear up
some matters.
It is not our custom to keep detailed minutes of the
'Working Committee's meetings. Only final decisions ate
recorded. ^ On this occasion the Assistant Secretary took
brief notes unofficially apparently for his own record. These
notes are very brief and dis-jointed and represent several
days’ prolonged debate during which 1 must have spoken
on various occasions for two or three hours. Only a few
sentences were taken down and torn from their context.
233
They often give a wrong impression. None of us had a chance
of seeing these notes or of revising them. The record is very
unsatisfactory and incomplete and hence often incorrect.
In our discussions Mahatma Gandhi was not present.
We had to consider every aspect of the question fully and
to weigh ,the implications of words and phrases in the^raft
resolutions. If Gandhijihad been there, much of this discussion
might have been avoided as he could have explained to us
his attitude more fully.
IMPORTANT OMISSION
Thus when the question of British withdrawal from
India was considered, I pointed out that if the armed forces
were suddenly withdrawn, the Japanese might well advance
and invade the country without hindrance. This obvious
difficulty was removed when Gandhiji later explained that
British and other armed forces might remain to prevent
aggression.
In regard to the statement that Gandhiji expected an
Axis victory, an important qualification has been omitted.
What he has repeatedly said and what I have referred to
is his belief that unless Britain changes her whole policy
in regard to India and her colonial possessions, she is heading
for disaster. He has further stated that if a suitable change
in this policy was made and the war really became one for
freedom for all peoples, then victory would assuredly come
to the United Nations.
MAHATMA’S WAY
The references to negotiations with Japan are also in-
correct, and 'entirely torn from their context. Gandhiji always
sends notice to His adversary before coming into conflict.
He would thus have called upon Japan not only to keep
away from India, but to withdraw from China, etc. In any
event he was determined to resist every aggressor in India
and he advised our people to do so even to the point of
death. They were never to submiV.
234
It is absurd to say that any of us envisaged any arrange^
mcnts with Japan giving her right of passage, etc. What 1
said was that Japan would want this, but we could never
agree. Our whole policy has all along been based on utter>
most resistance to aggression. A. P.
(Bombay Chronicle, August 5, 1942)
(D)
[Extracts from Pandit Jawahaxlal Nehru's speech at the A. 1. C. C.
Meetiiig, August 7, 1942.]
If the British Government were to accept the proposal
it would lead to an improvement of the position both internal
and international from every point of view. The position of
China would be improved. He was convinced that whatever
change might come about in India would be for the better.
The A. I. C. C. knew that Mahatma Gandhi had agreed to
retain and allow the British and armed forces (to be?)
stationed in India. This he agreed to so as not to facilitate
Japanese action on the Indian frontier. Those who wanted
to bring about a change should agree to this.
* « »
Referring to criticisms from America that Congress was
blackmailing, Pandit Nehru said that it was a curious and
amazing charge. It was curious that people who talked in
terms of their own freedom should level this charge against
those who were fighting for their freedom. It was a curious
charge to be made against a people who had been suffering
for the last 200 years. If that was blackmail, then “ our
understanding of the English language has been wrong".
* ♦ ♦
Concluding he said he coaid not take any more risks
and that they should go forward although such step might
involve perils and risks.
The attitude of the Government was one of defeatism.
He could not tolerate it. His only object was to remove
the defeatists* and put in their place valiant fighters.
(Bombay Chronicle, August 8, 1942)
235
APPENDIX VI
[Emactt kom Maulana Abul Kalam And's Speech at the A. L C. C.
Meeting, August 7, 1942.]
The extraordinary danger which India was facing was
such that they could not face it, unless they had in their
hands the reins of power. Danger was knocking at Ifldiaa
doors and it was necessary that they should make all pre-
parations to check the enemy -as soon as he jumped into
our court-yard. That could be done only when they used
every {>ower in their possession. At Allahabad it had been
decided that if Japan stepped into the land they would
resist aggression with all their non-violent strength; but
during the last three months, the world had not stood still.
It had moved fast. The sound of war drums was coming
nearer, while the world was flowing in blood and nations
were fighting and pouring out their lifeblood to preserve
their precious possession of freedom.
* « *
The Congress had made repeated proposals to Britain to
give the people of India that freedom which would enable
them to fight the aggressor. They had not asked for the
keys of power so that they could sit back and make merry.
That was not the way of the world to-day. The whole
world was straining at its leash, was rushing towards freedom.
In these circumstances, if they felt that conditions in India
required a change, if they felt that their only salvation lay
in making and bringing about drastic changes, then they
should take such steps as would bring about those changes.
At the same time they had.to consider the possible con-
sequences of their step on the entire world. They had to
weigh the consequences of their action and inaction carefully
in the balance.
WHEN INDIANS WILL EIGHT
Therefore, the Working Committee had passed a resolu-
tion three weeks ago after fully considering their responsibilities,
236
their duties, the consequeaces of their action and how best
they coukl achieve their object. Their view was that unless
some change was brought about at once, the same fate which
overtook Burma, Malaya and Singapore would overtake this
country also. If they wanted to fight for the safety, freedom
and Honour of India, it was necessary that they should cast
off the shackles that were holding them down, to shake off
that lethargy and go to work in an entirely new spirit. It
was only when they felt that they were fighting for something
which they held sacred that the people of this country could
fight, pour out their energy and blood and lay down their
lives. They had made repeated appeals and entreaties to
bring about this change and as they had failed, it had become'
their duty to take a positive step. That step was certainly
fraught with hardships; but they could do nothing unless they
were prepared to suffer hardships and make sacrifices. It was
only by suffering and strife that they could achieve anything
at all. That was the meaning < of the resolution of July 14.
Outing these three weeks, the message had spread through-
out the land. The resolution only reiterated the position
which they had always taken. As long as three years ago
the Congress had made its position clear and had cast its
lot in favour of democracy and against Fascism. Nothing that
they had done since then was inconsistent with this funda-
mental position. They had always said that they would
whole-heartedly aid the cause of freedom and democracy,
if they were free. For freedom itself they could wait. But
the present question was not merely of freedom but of their
very existence. If they survived and lived, they could have
freedom. But the position now was that tiicy could not live
and survive without freedom.
TWICE-TESTED
Continuiljg, the Congress President said that the demand
they were putting forward before Britain and the United
Nations was to be judged by the one and only test and that
237
test was whether for the sake of the defence India,*
for her very survival, freedom was necessary. India had
become a vital field of battle. If India were free, she could
have kindled a new light throughout the land and the cry of -
victory would ring from every corner. No army could wage g
relentless war unless it had behind it an administration ^ich
had the fullest popular support. If anybody could sho,w them
that what they were doing would contribute to the defeat
of Freedom Powers, they would be prepared to change
their course. But if the argument was merely a threat,
holding out the prospect of civil war and chaos, he for one
would tell them : “ It is our right to wage a civil war; it is
our responsibility to face chaos.”
' Proceeding the Congress President observed that having
thus once tested the gold of their demand, they took the
bright gold and yet applied to it another test and that
test was : “Are we contributing to others' defeat, to others'
misfortune 7 ''
If their demand was such that it would not contribute
to the strength of the Freedom Powers, would not promote
the cause of those powers fighting with valour for their
freedom, they would never have put it forward. They had
considered this question for full nine days. And, the Congress
President said: "Our demand is twice-tested pure gold.”
'* Is the British Government prepared to allow its actions
and policies to be subjected to these same tests ? ” he
challenged.
Answering critics of the Congress, he said that there
was no right thinking man yrho would not accept the tests
he had propounded as valid. It was the duty of the critics
to understand their position correctly and not merely to
give it a bad name.
In this connection he referred to the statement of Sir
Stafford Cripps that if the Congress demand was accepted
the whole government from the Viceroy to the sepoy would
238
Ita^e to leave. Tliis was misrepresentation with a vengeance.
Their resolution had said in clear terms that as soon as
Britain or the Allied Nations declared India's independence,
India would enter into a treaty with Britain for the carrying
^ut of the administration and the conduct of the war to
vict^. They had not asked that all the government
officials should go home, bag and baggage, and aftel reaching
England, return to India for negotiations. Gandhiji had
repeatedly made it clear that ‘ Quit India * demand meant
only the removal of the British power and not the physical
removal of British officers, administrators and army person-
neL All of them, including the armies of Britain and the
Allies, would continue to stay here — only under an agree-
ment with us and not against our will as at present. Not
to see this clear point was suicidal blindness.
SIMULTANEOUS DECISION ON BOTH ISSUES
The Maulana stated: “There was a time for mere
promises. But the resolution of July 14 makes one thing
clear, namely, the condition of India and of the world has
reached a stage when it was absolutely necessary that
everything should be done at once. What we ask for from
Britain and the Allied powers should be done here and
now. We do not rely on mere promises about the future.
We have had bitter experiences of promises having been
broken. They also suspect our promise to fight with them
against the Allies. Let us come together to-day and simul-
taneously decide both the issues — the freedom of India and
India’s complete participation in the war efforts. Let there
be simultaneous declaration of india’s independence and the
sigqpg of a treaty between India and thfi United Nations.
If you do not trust us in this, we cannot trust you, either.”
Concluding Maulana Azad observed that even in this
grave hour when every minute counted, we had decided to
make one last minute appeal to the United Nations, to
demonstrate to them that'the object of India and the Allied
239
powers was the same, that their interests were the same,
that the satisfaction of India’s demand would promote the
welfare of the Allies. But if the Allies were obdurate and
deaf to all appeals, it was their clear duty to do what they
could to achieve freedom, ^
(Bombay Chronicle, August 8, ]fM2>
APPENDIX VII
[Extracts from Saidar Vallabhbhai Patel's public speeches.J
A.
The war was coming nearer India and the fall of Malaya,
Singapore and Burma which were lost led India to consider
all possible steps to prevent a similar fate.
Gandhiji and the Congress thought that such a situation
could be avoided, if only the British left the country. Public
sympathy and co-operation was necessary to keep the enemy
away. If the British left the country, the people could be
galvanized and could be made to fight in the same manner
as the Russians and the Chinese.
It was also Gandhiji’s belief that as long as an imperialist
power remained it could also act as a temptation to another
imperialist power to covet this land, and in this vortex of
imperialist ambitions, war would extend and continue. The
only way to stop this was to end the imperialist regime.
*■ > *
The Congress did not desire anarchy or the defeat of
the British power. But they found themselves helpless. The
curtain had to be rung down before further harm could be
done. If the independence of the country was secured, then
the Congress wodld have achieved its goal. It was prepared
to give a pledge now that the Congress organization would
be disbanded, if that purpose was fulfilled.
* *
Speech at Chowpatty, Bombay,' August 2. 1942.
(Bombay Chronicle, August 3, 1942)
240
B
Let Britain only transfer power to Indian hands whether
it is to the Muslim League or any other party and the
Congress is prepared to dissolve itself, declared Sardar Patel,
addressing a public meeting here (Surat). The Sardar added
that^he Congress was started with Independency of India
as its ipain and only goal and once that was achieved, the
body would willingly cease to function. A. P.
(Bombay Chronicle, August 3, 1942)
c
[Extracts from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's speech at the A. I. C. C.
Meeting. August 7, 1942.]
NO SECRET PLANS
Referring to the charge levelled against the Congress
Working Committee that it had secret plans, the speaker
said that there was nothing secret about the Congress
plans. There were no differences of opinion among the
members of the Working Committee regarding the means
of achieving India’s independence.
* * *
Japan professed love for India and promised her freedom.
But India was not going to be fooled by the Axis broad-
casts. If Japan genuinely wished to secure freedom for India
why did the Japanese Government still continue the war
against China ? It would be Japan’s duty to set China free
before talking of India’s freedom.
FOLLOW MAHATMA’S LEAD
Referring to the struggle ahead, Sardar Vallabhbhai said
that it would be strictly non-violent. Many people were
anxious to know the details of the programme. Gandhiji
was going to place the details before the Nation when the
time came.* The nation would be called upon to follow him.
In case of arrest of the leaders, it would be the duty of
every Indian to be his own guide. It was necessary to bear
in mind that no nation bad won independence without
sacrifices. (Bombay Chronicle, August 8, 19^)
241
16
APPENDIX Vm
[Estrarti from Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s Speech at the Bihar P. C. C.
Meeting, July 31. 1942.]
Explaining the implications of the present Wardha
resolution Dr. Rajendra Prasad emphasized that it was n^t
going to ,be mere jail-going this time. It was going 4b be
more drastic, calling for the worst repression — footing,
bombing, -confiscation of property, all were possible. Congress-
men, therefore, had to join the movement fully conscious
that they might be exposed to all these. The new plan of
action included all forms of Satyagraha based on pure non-
violence and this was going to be the last struggle for the
independence of India. They could face all the armed might
of the world with non-violence, the greatest weapon in the
armoury of Satyagraha, he declared.
* * *
But the Congress had now come to the conclusion that
there could be no unity until British power disappeared.
The .foreign element in the body politic of the country
created such new problems that they proved difficult of
solution. Mahatma Gandhi, therefore, was now of the definite
opinion that there could be no unity in India without Swaraj
though formerly he held the opposite view. This opinion
was the result of bitter experience and the outcome of the
Cripps’ mission.
♦ * *
Concluding Dr. Rajendra Prasad affirmed that the
Congress had no quarrel with any one. The Congress only
hoped to conveft its opposition by its suffering and sacrifice
He was confident that the opposition would aljto join them
in the great cause of India’s freedom.
{ Bombay Chronicle Weekly, August 2. 1942)
APPENDIX rx
[ See here letter Ncr 17 page 13]
242
74
Detention Caitap.
10th September. 1^3
Sir.
On 15th July last I handed to the Superintendent of
thi^Camp for dispatch to you my reply to the Government
of India ppblication entitled “ Congress Responsibility for
the Disturbances 1942-43”. As yet I have no acknowledgement
of the receipt of my reply, let alone answer to what I hold
to be complete refutation of the charges set forth against
me in that publication. I am etc.,
The Additional Secretary, M. K. GANDHI
Home Department, Government of India,
New Delhi
75
From Government of India,
Sir Richard Tottenham, Home Department, New Delhi,
C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S. the ^h September, ’43
Secretary to the Government of India
To
M. K. Gandhi Esquire
Sir,
In reply to your letter of September 10th., 1943, I am
directed to inform you that your letter of the 15th July, 1943,
has been received and is still under consideration.
I am, etc.,
R. Tottenham
Secretary to the Government of India
76
From Government of India,
The Additional Secretary H. D., New Delhi,
to the Government of India, H. D. the i4th October, 1943
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
I am directed to reply to your letter of the 15th July
in which you have attempted to controvert certain passages
243
appearing in the Government publication “ Congress Res-'
ponsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43". At the outset I am
to remind you that the document in question was published
for the information of the public and not for the purpose
of convincing you or eliciting your defence. It was supplied
to you only at your request and in forwarding it GoveriMDent
neither invited nor desired your comments upon i^^ Since,
however, you have thought fit to address Government on
the subject I am to say that Government have given due
consideration to your letter.
2. Government regret to observe that, although your
letter contains lengthy quotations from your own utterances
and writings, it contains no fresh or categorical statement
of your own attitude in regard to the material issues or any
clear repudiation of the disastrous policy to which you and
the Congress party committed yourselves in the series of
events leading to the Congress resolution of the '6th August
1942. The purpose of your letter appears to be to suggest
that you have been misrepresented in some way in “Congress
Responsibility ", but in what substantial respect is not clear.
No attempt was made in the book, as you seem to think,
to charge you with pro-Japanese sympathies and the sentence
at the end of the first chapter, to which you have taken
exception in paragraph 18 of your letter, was merely an
echo of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s own 'words quoted on
the previous page. He has not, as you wrongly allege,
repudiated those words in the published statements to which
you refer. It was, however, one of the purposes of the book
to find an explanation of your actions in your own defeatist
outlook towards *the threat from Japan and your fear that,
unless the Allied forces withdrew in time, India would
become a battle-field in which the Japanese would ultimately
win. This feeling was attributed to you by Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru himself in the course of bis remarks to which
reference has been made above dnd your own draft of the
244
'Allahabad resolution makes it plain that, both in the “ Quit
India" campaign and the Congress resolution which was
intended to enforce it, your object was to be left in a position
in which you and the Congress would be free to make terms
yrith Japan. The Government of India note that your letter
malAs no attempt to meet this imputation, which they still
regard^s true. It is the only explanation which is consistent
with your own statement that “ the presence of the British
in India is an invitation to the Japanese to invade India.
Their withdrawal removes the bait.” Nor have you been able
to explain on any other theory than that suggested in the
book the contradiction between this statement and your
subsequent avowal of your willingness to permit the retention
of Allied troops on Indian soil.
3. The Government of India are not disposed to follow
you into the various verbal points that you have raised.
They do not deny that owing to your habit of reinterpreting
your own statements to suit the purposes of the moment it
is easy for you to quote passages from your utterances and
writings which are in apparent contradiction to any view
attributed to you. But the fact that you admit the discovery
of important gaps in them, or that you have found it necessary
from time to time to put glosses on what you have said, is
of itself evidence of the incredible levity with which, in a
moment of grave crisis, you made pronouncements in regard
to matters of the most vital importance in India’s defence
and her internal peace. Government can only interpret your
statements in the plain sense of the words as it would appear
to any honest or unbiassed reader and they are satisfied
that the book “ Congress Responsibility ” contains no material
misinterpretation of the general trend of your utterances
during the relevant period.
4. You have devoted considerable space in your letter
to an apparent attempt to disown the phrase attributed to
you in the A. P. I. report of a press conference which you
245
held at Wardha on the 14ch of July 1942, where you are
reported to have said “ There is no question of one more
chance. After all it is an open rebellion.” This press message
was reproduced at the time in newspapers throughout India.
You now wish the Government of India to believe that you
first became aware of it on the 26th June 1943. The^:an
only regard it as highly improbable that, if it did not coftrectly
represent what you said, it should not have been brought
to your notice at the time or that you should have left it
uncontradicted during the following weeks while you were
still at liberty.
5. The Government of India also note that you still
seek to cast on the Government the responsibility for the
disturbances for reasons which they can only regard as
trivial and which have already been answered in your
published correspondence with His Excellency the Viceroy,
The point which is clearly established by the book
“ Congress Responsibility ” is that those disturbances were
the natural and predictable consequences of your declaration
of an ” open rebellion ” and the propaganda which preceded
it. That you yourself could have foreseen those consequences
is clear from the statement which you yourself made in
court in 1922 when you admitted the impossibility of dis-
sociating yourself from the “ diabolical crimes of Chauri
Chaura and the mad outrages of Bombay ” and went on to
say that you knew that you were playing with fire but that
you had taken the risk and would do so again. If you now
contend that the consequences were unintended and unfore-
seen this fact is itself an adrAission of your own inability to
judge the reactioAs of your followers. You now seek to
excuse, if not to defend, the barbarities committed in your
own name and that of the Congress rather than to condemn
them. It is clear where your sympathies lie. Yopr letter does
not contain one word of explanation of your own message
“ Do or Die,” nor does it throw any light on your message,
246
quoted in Appendix X of the book, which, if you cannot
disown it, is sufficient to refute your contention that no
movement had been launched by you at the time when the
disturbances took place.
A I am finally to refer to your request for the publica-
tion of your letter. In the first place, I am to remind you
of your* own position, which has already been explained to
you, viz, that, so long as the grounds of your detention
remain unchanged. Government are not prepared to afford
you facilities for communication with the general public,
nor are they prepared themselves to act as agents for your
propaganda. In the second place, I am to point out that you
had ample opportunities during the months preceding the
Congress resolution of the 8th August 1942 to make your
meaning unequivocally clear before you were arrested. The
fact that your own followers interpreted your intentions in
the same way as the Government leaves no scope for further
explanations. I am to inform you, therefore, that Government
do not propose to publish your letter unless and until they
think fit. The decision is, however, without prejudice to
the freedom of Government to use at any time and in
any manner which they think fit the various admissions
contained in the communication which you have voluntarily
addressed to them.
7. To the extent that your present letter maybe designed
to relieve you of responsibility for the Congress rebellion
and the connected events that have taken place. Govern-
ment regret that they cannot accept it as in any way relieving
you of that responsibility, or iildeed, to their regret, as a
serious attempt to justify yourself. They observe again with
regret that you have taken no steps in your letter to
dissociate yourself personally from the Congress resolution
of 8th August, 1942, to condemn unequivocally the violent
outrages which took place in your name after the passing
of that resolution; to declare yourself unequivocally in favour
247
of the use of all the resources of India for the prosecution*
bf the war against the Axis powers and in particular Japan,
until victory is won; and to give satisfactory assurances for
good conduct in future. And in absence of any change of
mind on your part and of any disclaimer of the policy a#
the result, of which it has been necessary to restrain ^our
movements and those of the Working Committee /)f the
Congress, they are unable to take any further action on
your present communication. I am, etc.,
R. Tottenham
Additional Secretary to the Government of India
77
Detention Camp,
October 26, 1943
Sir,
I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 14th
inst. received on 18ch instant.
2. Your letter makes it clear that my reply to the
charges brought against me in the Government publication
“ Congress Responsibility for the disturbances 1942-43” has
failed in its purpose, namely, to convince the Government
of my innocence of those charges. Even my good faith is
impugned.
3. 1 observe too that the Government did not desire
“ comments " upon the charges. Previous pronouncements
of the Government on such matters had led me to think
otherwise. Be that as it may, your current letter seems to
invite an answer.
4. In my opinion, I hive, in my letter of 15th July
last, unequivocally answered all charges referred to in your
letter under reply. I have no regret for what I have done
or said in the course of the struggle for India's freedom.
5. As to the Congress resolution of 8tb. August 1942,
apart from my belief that it is not only harmless but good
all round, I have no legal power to alter it in any way.
248
That can only be done by tbe body that passed that reso-
lution, i. e., the All India Congress Committee which is no
doubt guided by its Working Committee. As the Govern-
ment are aware I offered to meet the members of the
jVorking Committee in order to discuss the situation and
to Ifftow their mind. But my offer was rejected. I had thought
and st4|l think that my talk with them might Aave some
value from the Government stand-point. Hence I repeat
my offer. But it may have no such value so long as the
Government doubt my bona fides. As a Satyagrahi however,
in spite of the handicap, I must reiterate what I hold to
be good and of immediate importance in terms of war effort.
But if my offer has no chance of being accepted so long as
I retain my present views, and if the Government think
that it is only my evil influence that corrupts people, I
submit that the members of the Working Committee and
other detenus should be discharged. It is unthinkable that,
when India's millions are suffering from preventable starva-
tion and thousands are dying of it, thousands of men and
women should be kept in detention on mere suspicion, when
their energy and the expense incurred in keeping them under
duress could, at this critical time, be usefully employed in
relieving distress. As I have said in my letter of I5th July
last, Congressmen abundantly proved their administrative,
creative and humanitarian worth at the time of the last
terrible flood in Gujarat and equally terrible earthquake in
Bihar. The huge place in which I am being detained with
a large guard around me, I hold to be waste of public funds.
I should be quite content to pass my days in any prison.
6. As to “ satisfactory assurances ” ftbout my “ good
conduct " I can only say that I am unaware of any unworthy
conduct at any time. I presume that the impression Govern-
ment have of, my conduct is referable to the charges men-
tioned in tbe indictment, as I have succinctly called “Congress
Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43 “. And since I
249
have not only denied the charges tn toto but on the contrary
have ventured to bring countercharges against the Govern*
ment, I think that they should agree to refer both to an
impartial tribunal. Seeing that a big political organiaation
and not a mere individual is involved in the charges, I hold*
that it should be a vital part of the war effort, to hav^the
issue decided by a tribunal, if mutual discussion and effort are
considered by tbe Government to be undesirable and/or futile.
7. Whilst your letter rejects my request that my letter
of 15th July last should in fairness to me 'be published, you
inform me that their decision in this matter however “ is
without prejudice to the freedom of Government to use at
any time and in any manner which they think fit the
various .admissions contained in the communication which
you have voluntarily addressed to them ”. 1 can only hope
that this does not mean that, as in the case of tbe “ Congress
Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43 ”, garbled
extracts will be published. My request is that my letter
should be published in full, if and when the Government
think fit to make public use of it.
Additional Secretary, 1 am, etc.,
Government of India (H. D.). M. K. Gandhi
New Delhi
78
From New Delhi,
The Additional Secretary the 3rd November, 1943
to the Government of India,
(H. D.) New Delhi
To
M. K. Gandbj. Esquire
Sir,
I am directed to aknowledge the receipt of your letter
dated October 26th, which is under consideration.
I am, 'etc.,
. R. Tottenham
Additional Secretary to* the Government of India
250
7a
From Government of India,
The Additional Secretary Home Department, New Delhi,
to the Government of India, the 18th November, 1943
Home Department
To “
M.*K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
In reply to your letter of October 26th 1 am directed
to say that since there is no change in your attitude towards
the Congress resolution of August 8th, 1942, and Govern-
ment have received no indication that the views of any of
the members of the Working Committee differ from your
own, a meeting between you would appear to serve no useful
purpose. Both you and they are well aware of the conditions
on which such a proposal could be entertained.
I am to add that the other points in your letter have
been noted. I am, etc.,
R. Tottenham
Additional Secretary to the Government of India
VI
CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT
SMT. KASTURBA GANDHI
80
Detention Camp
Date ; 12-3-43
Dear Col. Bhandari.
With reference to the talk* this morning, we would like
to bring the following facts to your notice.
As regards Mrs. Gandhi, she has been suffering from
chronic bronchitis with dilatation of the bronchi. She has
also complained latterly of pain of an anginal character and
has had attacks of tachycardia with heart rate of 180 per
minute. As you must have noticed she often gets puffiness
251
of the face and eyelids especially in the mornings. Her'
physical disabilities are telling upon her mental condition
though Gandhiji’s company mitigates that to a large extent.
In view of all this we are of the opinion that she should
have a whole time nurse companion with her. A person whg
-can speak Jier language and is known to her personally is
likely to succeed better.
As regards Gandhiji, we are of the opinion that he will
require careful nursing and looking after for another month
or so. If Kanu Gandhi can be left for that period, it will
be the best, as he is attached to Gandhiji and has been
trained to anticipate his wants. If the Government have no
objection he is ready and willing to stay as long as he is
required. Yours sincerely,
M. D. D. Gilder
S. Nayyar
81
[Extracts from a letter from Gandhiji to the Secretary to the Govern-
ment of Bombay, dated Nov 18, ’43J
"... It seems to me that those who are lodged with
me have to suffer extra hardship by reason of their being
so lodged. For, it is not only Dr. Nayyar who has to suffer,
others do likewise. Thus Dr. Gilder is debarred from receiv-
ing visits even from his ailing wife and daughter. Little
Manu Gandhi can receive neither her father nor her sisters,
nor can my wife receive visits from her sons or grand-
children. I discount the fact that the former could have
gone out if she relented the restrictions. I know too that
my son Ramdas was permitted to visit his mother when she
was very ill. I do not understand this denial of ordinary
rights of prisoners. I can understand the restrictions against
me by reason of the Government’s special displeasure against
me. But the restrictions against others it js difficult to
understand, unless it be that the Government do not trust
those who are put in charge of us. On any other basis it
252
* is difficult to understand why the Superintendent of the
Camp or even the Inspector General cannot deal with the
wires* of the nature 1 have referred to and with the visitors
who may be permitted to visit the co-detenus.
I request early relief.”
M. K. Gandhi
82
Detention Camp. January 27th, 1944
Sir,
Some days ago Shri Kasturba Gandhi told the Inspector
General of Prisons and Col. Shah that Dr. Dinshah Mehta
of Poona be invited to assist in her treatment. Nothing
seems to have come out of her request. She has become
insistent now and asked me if I had written to the Govern-
ment in the matter. I therefore ask for immediate permission
to bring in Dr. Mehta. She has also told me and my son
that she would like to have some Ayurvedic physician to
sec her. I suggest that the I. G. P. be authorized to permit
such assistance when requested.
I have no reply as yet to my request that Shri Kanu
Gandhi, who is being permitted to visit the patient every
alternate day, be allowed to remain in the camp as a whole-
time nurse. The patient shows no signs of recovery and
night nursing is becoming more and more exacting. Kanu
Gandhi is an ideal nurse, having nursed the patient
before. And what is more, he can soothe her by giving her
instrumental music and by singing hhajans. I request early
relief to relieve the existing pressure. The matter may be
treated as very urgent. •
The Superintendent of the Camp informs me that when
visitors edme, one nurse only can be present. Hitherto more
than one nurse have attended when necessary. The Superin-
tendent used his discretion as to the necessity. But when
* Reference is to a wire to Dr. Sushila Nayyar about the death of
her sister-in-law which was defivered after a delay of one month.
253
difficulty arose I made a reference to the 1. G. P. The mulr
was that an order was issued that a doctor in addition may
be present. I submit that the order has been issued in
ignorance or disregard of the condition of the patient. She
often requires to be helped by more persons than one.
Therefore I ask that there should be no restriction«as to
the numbtsr of the attendants.
It would be wrong on my part if I suppressed the fact
that in the facilities being allowed to the patient grace has
been sadly lacking. The order about the attendants is the
most glaring instance of pin-pricks, besides being in defeat
of the purpose for which attendance during visits of relatives
is allowed. Again, my three sons are in Poona. The eldest,
Harilal, who is almost lost to us, was not allowed yesterday,
the reason being that the I. G. P. had no instructions to
allow him to come again. And yet the patient was naturally
anxious to meet him. To cite one more pin-prick, every time
visitors who are on the permitted list come, they have to
apply to Government Office, Bombay, for permission. The
consequence is that there is unnecessary delay and heart-
burning. The difficulty I imagine arises because neither the
Superintendent nor the I. G. P., has any function except
that of passing on ray requests to Bombay.
I am aware that Shri Kasturba is a Government patient,
and that even as her husband I should have no say about
her. But as the Government have been pleased to say that
instead of being discharged she is being kept with me in
her own interest, perhaps in interpreting her wishes and
feelings I am doing what th^ Government would desire and
appreciate. Her recovery or at least mental peace when she
is lingering is common cause between the GoverViment and
me. Any jar tells on her.
The Additional Secretary to the I am, etc.,
Government of India, K. Gandhi
(Home Department), New Delhi.
254
83
The Secretary to the Detention Camp,
Government of Bombay, (H. D.). January 27, 1944
Bombay
Sir,
J enclose herewith for dispatch a letter addressed to the
Government of India, but it need not be dispafched if the
Goverilment of Bombay can stio moto deal with the matters
referred to therein. As the object is to obtain relief as promptly
as possible, instructions from the Central Government, if
necessary, may be obtained on the ’phone.
I am, etc.,
M. K. Gandhi
84
Detention Camp, January, 31, 1944
Sir,
I sent on 27th instant a very urgent letter addressed
to the Government of India. I am still without a reply.
The patient is no better. The attendants are about to break
down. Four only can work two only at a time on alternate
nights. All the four have to work during the day. The
patient herself is getting restive, and inquires, “ When will
Dr. Dinshah come". May I know as early as may.be— even
tomorrow if possible : -
(1) Whether Shri Kanu Gandhi can come as full time
nurse,
(2) Whether Dr. Dinshah’s services may be enlisted
for the present,
(3) and whether the restriction on the number of
attendants during visits can be aemoved.
I ho(fe it may not have to be said that the relief came
too late.
Secretary ‘to the I am, etc.,
Governffient*of Bombay ( H. D. ) M. K. GANDHI
Bombay
255
85
( Commuiucatioa from Government conveyed by the Superintendent
of the Camp on 31-1-44 at 4 p. m. ).
Regarding request for services of Mr. Dinshah Mehta
and Ayurvedic physician.
“ Government wants to know whether Mrs. QgndUi
has any particular physician in mind and whether she would
want one in addition to Dr. Dinshah Mehta"
86
( Scribbled out reply to the above handed unmediately to the
Superuitendent of the Camp — it being Monday, the day of silence.)
“ She has no particular Ayurvedic physician in mind,
but my son Devadas suggested the name of Vaidyaraj Sharma
of Lahore. Any physician who is admitted will be in addition
to Dr. Dinshah and that too if and when the' latter has
failed to give satisfaction. She has often expressed a desire
to be seen by an Ayurvedic physician. If the permission is
granted, it should be of a general character. She is losing
will power and I have to judge between a multiplicity of
advice so long as I am permitted to have responsibility for
her peace of mind, which is about all that is possible at
this stage
87
Detention Camp,
31st January, 1944
Dear Col. Bhandari,
As you know Smt. Kasturba Gandhi has been gradually
losing ground. Last night she had very little sleep, and this
morning she had a bad collapse. She became very short of
breath (resp. 48)f the pulse was very feeble in volume and
tension and 100 to the minute, and her colour was ashy
grey. She recovered after about twenty minutes' treatment.
Now — at mid-day — she is restless, complains of pain in the
left chest and back, is cyanotic and dyspnoetc. The pulse
rate is 108, the B. P. is ^/50, resp. 40.
256
Under these circumstances we would like to have the'
help in consultation of Dr. Jivraj Mehta ( Yeravada Central
Prison ) and Dr. B. C. Roy ( Calcutta ) who have seen her
in her former illness and, in whom she has faith. We might
state that the patient's condition is such that if the help
of these doctors is to be of any use it should not Jie delayed.
might also point out that as ^he has to be watched
all night and day, nursing has become difficult and patient
herself has been constantly asking ^or Kanu Gandhi and Dr.
Dinshah Mehta.
Yours sincerely,
S. Nayyar
M. D. D. Gilder
P. S. ' Gandhi ji's blood pressure this morning was 206/110.
88
Detention Camp,
February 3, 3944
Shri. Kastuiba asked me yesterday when Dr. Dinshah
was coming, and whether a Vaidya (Ayurvedic physician)
could see her and give her some drugs. I told her I was
trying for both but that we were prisoners and could not
have things as we liked. She has since been repeatedly
asking me whether I could not do something to hasten
matters. She had a restless night again. This is of course
nothing new for her at present. I request immediate orders
about Dr. Dinshah and Vaidyaraj Sharma of Lahore. The
latter will be sometime coming. But Dr. Dinshah can come
even today, if authority is given for calling him in.
1 must confess that I do nof understand this delay when
a patient's life is hanging in the balance and may be saved
by timely aid. After all for a patient alleviation of pain is
as importcUit as the highest matters of state.
Secretary to .the I am, etc..
Government of Bombay,^ M. k. Gandhi
Bombay
257
17
89
From No. S. D. VI/-2035
The Secretary to the Home Department (Political)
(Government of Bombay, H. D. Bombay, Srd February, 1944
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter of the Slst^anuary
and to reply as follows to the 3 points raised by you.
(1) Government have agreed to Kanu Gandhi staying
in for the purpose of helping in nursing Mrs. Gandhi oh
condition that he agrees to be bound by the same regulations
as other security prisoners in the detention camp. Govern-
ment consider that with Kanu Gandhi staying in, the nursing
assistance provided should he adequate and they cannot
agree to any requests for further assistance.
(2) Government have decided that no outside doctors
should be allowed unless the Government medical officer
considers that is absolutely necessary for medical reasons.
The question whether Dr. Dinshah Mehta should be called
in is accordingly for the Government medical officer to
decide on medical grounds.
(3) Interviews with near relatives have been sanctioned
for Mrs. Gandhi. While Government have no objection to
your being present during those interviews they consider
that other inmates of the detention camp should not bo
present except to the extent demanded by the condition of
Mrs. Gandhi’s health. It is understood that the Inspector
General of Prisons has agreed that one attendant may stay
throughout the iiterviews and that a doctor may come in
if necessary. Government considers that normally this should
be adequate, but the matter is one to be decided solely on
medical grounds by the Inspector General of Prisons.
Your obedient servant,
, H. lyANGAR
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, H. D.
258
90
In pursuance of the request for an ayurvedic physician for •Shrimati
Kasturba Gandhi (letter No. 86J, Gandhiji had a talk with the Inspector
General of prisons on the morning of 11-2- '44. He then wrote on the
following confirming what he had already told the jail authorities.
Detention Caipp, 11-2-44
Th^ responsibility for bringing in a non-allopath assistant
would be wholly mine and the Government shall stand
absolved from responsibility for any untoward result following
such treatment. I am not sure that I shall accept the advice
that such Vaidyas or Hakims may give. But if I do and if
the prescription is ineffective, I would like to reserve the
right to revert to present treatment.
M. K. Gandhi
91
I mmediate Detention Camp, February 14, 1944
Sir,
I told you yesterday that Shri Kasturba was so bad
during the night that Dr. Nayyar got frightened and awakened
Dr. Gilder. I felt that she was going. The doctors were
naturally helpless. Dr. Nayyar had therefore to wake up the
Superintendent who kindly phoned the Vaidyaraj. It was
then about I a. m.. Had he been on the premises he would
certainly have given relief. I therefore asked you to let him
stay at the camp during the night. But you informed me
the Government orders did not cover night stay. The Vaidya
however, you said, could be called in during the night. I
pointed out the obvious danger pf delay, but you were sorry
the orders would not allow you to go further. In vain I
argued that the Government having given the authority to
call in Vaidyaraj on condition that I absolved them from
responsibility for any untoward result of the vaidic treatment
they could not' contemplate any restriction on the duration
of the physiciani's stay at the camp so long as it was thought
necessary in the interest of the patient. In view of your
259
rejection of my request, 1 had to trouble the Vaidyaiaj to
rest in his car in front of the gate so that in case of need
he might be called in. He very humanely consented. He had
to be called in and he was able to bring the desired relief.
The crisis has not passed as yet. I therefore repeat my request
and ask fdr immediate relief. I would like, if I can, to^void
the last night’s experience. I do wish that the vexations
caused by the delay in granting my requests about the patient’s
treatment came to an end. Both Dr. Mehta and the Vaidya-
raj were permitted to come in after protracted delay. Precious
time was lost making recovery more uncertain than it was.
I hope you will be able to secure the necessary authority
for the Vaid’s stay in the camp during night, if the patient’s
condition requited it. The patient needs constant and con-
tinuous attention.
The Inspector General of Prisons, Yours etc.,
Poona M. K. Gandhi
92
Detention Camp, February 16th 1944
Sir,
This is in continuation of my letter of the 14th inst. .
When I asked for a Vaidyaraj and took upon myself
the responsibility of changing Shri. Kasturbai's treatment and
absolved the Government physician of all responsibility,
I naturally took for granted that the Vaidyaraj would be
allowed such facilities as would in his opinion be necessary
for carrying out his treatment. The paTient’.s nights are much
worse than her days and jit is essentially at night that
constant attendance is necessary. The Vaidyaraj considers
himself handicapped in his treatment of the case under the
present arrangements.
In order to be within immediate call, he has been good
enough to sleep in his car outside the gate of this camp
for the last three nights and every night he has had to be
called up at least once. This is an unnatural state of things
260
* and though he seems to have infinite capacity for suffering
inconvenience for the sake of the patient, I may not take
undue advantage of his generous nature. Besides it means
disturbing the Superintendent and his staff ( in fact the
^rhole camp) once or more often during the night. For
instance last night she suddenly developed fever with rigour.
The V^dyaraj who had left the premises at l5-30 p. m.,
had to be called in at 12 midnight. I had- to request him to
leave her soon afterwards, although he would have liked to
have stayed with her longer, because so long as he stayed
in it would have meant keeping the Superintendent and his
staff awake which might have been even for the whole night.
I would not do this even for saving my lifelong partner
especially when I know that a humane way is open.
As I have said already the Vaidyaraj considers it necessary
to be in constant attendance on the patient. He varies the
drugs from moment to moment as the patient’s condition
requires. Drs. Gilder’s and Nayyar’s assistance is at my disposal
all the time -they are more than friends and would do every-
thing in their power for the patient. But as I have said in
my last letter, they cannot help while treatment of a wholly
different nature from theirs is going on. Besides being in its
very nature /mpracticable, such a course would be unjust
to the patient, to the Vaidyaraj and to themselves.
I therefore submit below the following three alternative
proposals
Cl) Vaidyaraj should be permitted to remain in the
camp day and night so long as he considers it necessary in
the interests of the patient. •
(2) If the Government cannot agreed:© this, they may
release the patient on parole to enable her to receive the
fuU benefit of the physician’s treatment.
(3) If neither of these two proposals are acceptable to
the Government I request that I be relieved of the res-
ponsibility of looking after the patient. If I as her husband
261
cannot procure for her the help that she wants or that 1 '
think necessary, I ask for my removal to any other place
of detention that the Government may choose. 1 must not
be made a helpless witness of the agonies the patient is
passing through. .
The Government have kindly permitted Dr. MehA to
visit the patient at her repeated requests. His help is ygluable,
but he does not prescribe drugs. She needs the physical
therapy given by him which soothes her greatly but she
cannot do without drug treatment either. Drugs can only
be prescribed by the doctors or the Vaidyaraj. The doctor’s
treatment has already been suspended. In the absence of a
satisfactory reply to this letter by this evening I shall be
constrained to suspend Vaidyaraj’s treatment also. If she
cannot have the drug treatment which she should in full, I
would rather that she did without it altogether.
I am writing this by the patient’s bedside at 2 a. m.
She is oscillating between life and death. Needless to say
she knows nothing of this letter. She is now hardly able to
judge for herself.
The Inspector General of Prisons, I am, etc.,
Poona M. K Gandhi
93
Detention Camp, February 18th, '44
Sir,
Vaidyaraj Shri Shiv Sharma regretfully informs me that
having put forth all the resources at his disposal he has
been unable to produce a condition in Shri. Kasturba so as
to give him hope of final recovery. As his was simply a
trial to see whether Ayurvedic treatment could,yieId better
result, I have now asked Drs. Gilder andNayyar'to resume
the suspended treatment. Dr. Mehta’s assistance was never
suspended and will be continued till recovery or the end.
I want to say that the Vaidyaraj has been most
assiduous and attentive in the * handling *' of this- most
262
difficult case, and I would have willingly allowed him to
continue his treatment if he had wished to do so. But
he would not do it, when his last prescription failed to
bring about the result he had expected. Drs. Gilder and
Nayyar tell me that they would like to receive the benefit
of tBe Vaidyaraj’s assistance in the matter o{ sedatives,
purgatiyes and the like. These have proved effective both
from the doctors' and the patient’s point of view. I hope
that the Government will have no objection to the Vaidyaraj
continuing to come in for the purpose. Needless to say,
under the altered circumstances, be will not be required
for night duty. I cannot refrain from regretfully saying that
had there not been the wholly avoidable delay in granting
my request for allowing the services of the Vaidyaraj and
Dr. Mehta, the patient’s condition might not have been so
near the danger point as it is today. I am well aware that
nothing happens outside the Divine Will, but man has no
other means of interpreting that will apart from the results
he can see.
The Inspector General of Prisons, I am, etc .,
Poona M. K. GanDHI
94
Re : Shri. KASTURBA’s FUNERAL RlTES
(Gandbiji's teply taken down by the Inspector General of Prisons in
writing from dictation at 8-7 p. m. on 22*2-’44 in answer to his inquiry
on behalf of the Government as to what Gandhiji's wishes in the matter
were).
(1) “ Body should be handed over to my sons and
relatives which would mean a* public funeral without inter-
ference from Government.
(2) “*If that is not possible, funeral should take place
as in the case of Mahadev Desai and if the Government
will allow relatives only to be present at the funeral, I shall
not be able to accept the privilege unless all friends who
are as good as relatives to me are also allowed to be present.
263
(3) “ If this also is not acceptable to the Grovemtnent,
then those who have been allowed to visit bet will be sent
away by me and only those who are in the camp (detenus)
will attend the funeral.
“ It has been, as you will be able to bear witness, mjt
great anxiety not to make any political capital out ol^this
most trying illness of my life companion. But Ihav^lways
wanted whatever the Government did to be done with
good grace, which I am afraid, has been hitherto lacking.
It is not too much to expect that now that the patient is
no more whatever the Government decide about tbe funeral
will be done with good grace
05
Detention Camp, 4-3-44
Sir,
It is not without regret and hesitation that I write about
my dead wife. But truth demands this letter.
According to the newspapers Mr. Butler is reported to
have said in the House of Commons on 2nd March, 1944,
“ . . . She was receiving all possible medical care and attention,
not only from her regular attendants but from those desired
by her family ...” Whilst I gratefully acknowledge that the
regular attendants did all they could, the help that was asked
for by the deceased or by me on her behalf when at all
given was given after a long wait and the Ayurvedic physician
was permitted to attend only after I had to tell the prison
authorities that if I could not procure for the patient the
help that she wanted or 1 thought necessary I should be
separated from her, I ought net to be made a helpless witness
of the agonies shd was passing through. And even then I
could make full use of the Vaidyaraj's services only after I
wrote a letter to the Inspector General of Prisons of which
a copy is hereto attached. My application fo^ Dr. Dinshah
was made in writing on 27th January, 1944. The deceased
herself had repeatedly asked the Inspector General of Prisons
264
‘for Or. Dinshah Mehta’s help during practically a month
previous to that. He was allowed to come only from 5-2-’44.
Again, the regular physicians Drs. Nayyar and Gilder made
a written application for consultation with Dr. B. C. Roy
of Calcutta on Slst-^January, 1944. The Government simply
igno^d their written request and subsequent oral^ reminders.
Mr»Butler is further reported to have said, “ No request
for her release was received and the Government of India
believe it would be no act of kindness to her or her family
to remove her from, the Aga Khan's palace." Whilst it is
true that no request for her release was made by her or by
me (as Satyagrahi prisoners it would have been unbecoming)
would it not have been in the fitness of things if the Govern-
ment had at least offered to her, me and her sons to release
her ? The mere offer of release would have produced a favour-
able psychological effect on her mind. But unfortunately no
such offer was ever made.
As to the funeral rites, Mr. Butler is reported to have
said, ** I have information that the funeral rites took place
at the request of Mr. Gandhi in the grounds of the Aga
Khan’s palace at Poona and friends and relatives were present.’’
The following however was my actual request which the
Inspector General of Prisons took down in writing from
dictation at 8-7 p. m. on 22-2-’44.
“ (I) Body should be handed over to my sons and relatives which
would mean a public funeral without interference from Gevemment.
(II) If that U not possible, funeral should take place as m the case of
Mahadev Desai and if the Government will allow relatives only to be present
at the funeral, I shall not be able to ^ccept the privilege unless all friends
who are as good as relatives to me are also allowed to be present.
(III) If»this also is not acceptable to the Government, then those
who have been allowed to visit her will be sent away by me and only
those who are in the ramp (detenus) will attend the funeral.
“ It has bee?, as you will perhaps be able to bear witness, my great
anxiety not to make any political capital ^out of this most trying illness
of my life compamon. But I Wave always wanted whatever the Govetn-
• 265
ment did to be done with good grace, which I am afraid, baa been hither-*
to lacking. It is not too much to expect that now that the patient is no
more whatever the Government decide about the funeral will be done
with good grace.”
Government will perhaps admit that I have scrupulously
avoided making any political capital out of my wife’^ pro-
tracted illness and the difficulties I experienced from the
Government. Nor do I want to make any now. But id* justice
to her memory, to me and for the sake of truth I ask the
Government to make such amends as they can. If the news-
paper report is inaccurate in essential particulars or the
Government have a different interpretation of the whole
episode, I should be supplied with the correct version and
the Government interpretation of the whole episode. If my
complaint is held to be just, I trust that the amazing state-
ment said to have been made in America by the Agent of
the Government of India in U. S. A., will be duly corrected.
The Additional Secretary to the I am, etc..
Government of India, M. K. Gandhi
(Home Department), New Delhi
96
From No. III/43-M. S.
The Additional Secretary Government of India, H. D.
to the Government of India, New Delhi,
Home Department, New Delhi the 21st March, 1944
To
'M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
In reply to your letter of 4th March regarding Mr.
Butler's reply to a question in the House of Codimons on
the 2nd March, 1944, 1 am directed to say that the Govern-
ment of India regret that you should feel that they were
unreasonable or obstructive about the calling' in of special
medical attendants. The Govemm&nt of Indik were always
266
‘ready to allow any extra medical aid or conaultation whidi
the Government doctors considered necessary, andchey do
not think that there was any delay in summoning outside
aid when the Government doctors decided that it was
Impeded. It was on January 28th that they were first informed
that <Mts. Gandhi had asked for the services of Dr. Dinshah
Mehta; and it was not until January 31st that’ they were
told that Dr. Gilder had asked for consultation with certain
other doctors. On February 1st the Bombay Government were
explicitly informed that any extra medical aid or consulta-
tion might be allowed which the Government doctors con-
sidered necessary or useful. If Dr. Dinshah Mehta was not
called in earlier, it was due to the view originally expressed
by both Col. Bhandari and^ Dr. Gilder that his services
could not be of any use, but he was summoned as soon
as the Government doctors revised that opinion. Your
letter of January 27th, which did not reach the Government
of India until February 1st, made some reference to your
wife’s wish to see an Ayurvedic physician, but no name
was mentioned and it was not until February 9th that a
definite request for the services of Vaidyaraj Sharma was
received. The request was then granted within 24 hours and
as soon as the Government of India were made aware of the
difficulties resulting from his not being accommodated inside
the Palace, the necessary permission was given for him to
reside there. In the circumstances the Government of India
feel that they did everything possible to ensure that your
wife received all the treatment that you wished during her
illness. ,
2. As to the question of release, tba Government of
India still ‘feel that the course they adopted was the best
and kindest. It was reported to them on January 24th that
your son, Devadas Gandhi, had asked bis mother whether
she would like to be released on parole and she had replied
that she would not like *10 leave the Palace without her
267
husband. Government have .made no use of this report, sinbe
it was the record *of a private conversation; but it confirmed
them in the view expressed above. The misunderstanding
about the statement in America quite wrongly attributed
to Sir Girjashanker Bajpai has been cleared up by answei^
to questions in the Legislative Assembly which you *havc
doubtless seen. ,
3. The arrangements for the funeral were understood
here to be in accordance with your wishes. The Govern-
ment made enquiries on the point and were informed that
you had not special preference between the first two alter-
natives mentioned in your letter.
4. In these circumstances, the Government of India do
not think that Mr. Butler’s reply to the parliamentary
question was incorrect in substance.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
R. Tottenham
Additional Secretary to the Government of India
Received on 27-3- '44
97
Detention Camp,
April 1st 1944
Sir,
I beg to acknowledge your letter of 21st March handed
to me on the 27th.
As to extra medical aid I wish to state that the first
request for the services of Dr. Dinshah Mehta was made
by the deceased *■ verbally to Col. Advani sometime in
December last. When repeated verbal requests* met ' with
little or no response I had to make a written request
addressed to the Government of India dated, 27-l-'44. On
the 31st of January I sent a reminder to the Government
of Bombay (App. A.), and so did Drs. Nayya'r and Gilder m
268
'a letter addressed to the Inspector General of Prison
( ApP*>B). I wrote again on the 3rd of February to the
Government of Bombay ( App. C ), who sent a reply ( App»
D ) which resulted in Dr. Dinshah being brought in on ^e
5th of February last, i. e., after an interval of over six weeks
ftoid*tbe date of the first request. And even when permission
was grated, restrictions were placed upon the * number of
his visits and the time he was to take in administering
treatment. It was not without difficulty that these restric-
tions were later relaxed and then removed.
As to the reference in the letter under reply to Dr.
Gilder, I showed it to him. The result was the attached
letter addressed by him to the Government which he has
asked me to forward ( App. E ). While it shows that Dc.
Gilder never expressed the opinion attributed to him, it
does not alter the tragic fact that Dr. Dinshah *s services
were held up for over six weeks.
The question of calling in a non-allopath was definitely
and formally raised before the Inspector General of Prisons
by my son after his visit to this camp early in December
last. On Col. Bhandari mentioning to me my son’s request
to him I told him that if my son thought that non-allopathic
treatment should be tried, the Government should permit
it. While the consideration of my son’s request was on the
anvil, the patient's condition began to worsen and she her-
self pressed for the services ot an Ayurvedic physician. She
spoke to both the Inspector General of Prisons and Col.
Shah several times, again with no result. In despair I wrote to
the Government of India on 27-l-’44. On the 31st of January
the Superintendent of this camp enquired on behalf of the
Government, among other things, whether the deceased had
any particular Ayurvedic physician in mind to which I
replied in wi;iting, it being my silence day ( App. F ). As
no relief was forthcoming as a result, and the patient’s
condition admitted of nb delay, I sent an urgent letter to
269
ti^e Government of Bombay on the 3rd of February (App.’
G ). It was on the 11th of February that a local Vaidya
was sent and on the 12th that Vaidyaxaj Sharma was brought
in. Thus there was an interval of more than eight weeks
between the first request for non-allopathic aid and actual
bringing in of that aid. ^ ^
Before’ Vaidyaraj Sharma came I had been aske4 to give
a written undertaking (which 1 gladly did) that I absolved
the Government of all responsibility about the result of his
treatment ( App. H ). The Vaidyaraj was thus in sole charge
of the case for the time being. One would have thought
that a physician in sole charge of a patient would have all
such facilities of visiting and watching the patient as he
considered necessary. And yet there was no end to the
difficulties in getting these facilities for him. These have
been alluded to in the enclosure to my letter of 4 - 3-44
and in App. G.
All this time the patient was passing through great
suffering, and her condition was deteriorating so rapidly
that every delay weighed against chances of her recovery.
Whether the delays and difficulties experienced by tbe
patient and me were caused by one department of the
Government or another, or even by the Government
doctors, the responsibility surely rests with the Central
Government.
I note that the Government have maintained complete
silence over the written request (which was reinforced by
subsequent verbal reminders) of Drs. Nayyar and Gilder to
call Dr. B. C. Roy in consultation, and have not even
condescended to give their reasons for not granting the
request. '
Similarly the letter under reply is silent about the dis-
crepancy, pointed out by me in my letter dat^d 20-3- ’44, in
the Hon. the Home Member’s statement in the Assembly
that trained nurses were in attendance. The fact is that they
270
•never were. Let me add here that nurses of the deceased’s
choice who were permitted were brought after considerable
delay, especially Shri Kanu Gandhi.
I hope, after a calm perusal of this bare recital of facts
apd of the relevant copies of correspondence attached hereto,
it wiM'be conceded that the claim of the Government of
India that “ they did everything possible ” to ensure chat
the deceased received all the treatment that I wished during
her illness is not justified. Much less can Mr. Butler’s claim
be justified. For, he Went further when he said, ’’ She was
receiving all possible medical care and attention, not only
from her regular attendants, but from those desired by her
family." Does not the statement of the Government of
Bombay (App. D), “ Government have decided that no out*
side doctors should be allowed unless the Government medical
officer considers that it is absolutely necessary for medical
reasons ” contradict the above claims ?
On the question of release, and the report received by
the Government of India of a “ private conversation ” my
son had with his mother in this connection, a prisoner can
have no “ private " conversation with anybody from outside.
Therefore, so far as I am concerned the Government are
free to make use of the conversation after verification (usual
and obligatory in such cases) by my son. In any case the
Government would have been absolved from all blame if they
had made an offer of release and laid on me the burden of
deciding what was ” best and kindest ” for her.
As to the arrangements far the funeral my letter to the
Government dated 4-3-’44 embodying actual request,
which the* Inspector General of Prisons took down in writing
from dictation, speaks for itself. It therefore astonishes me
that on “ enquiries ” made by the Government they were
“ informed ” that I had “ no special preference between the
first two alternatives ” mehtioned in my letter. The information
271
given to the Government is wholly wrong. It is inconceivable*
that given the freedom of choice I could ever be reconciled
to the cremation of a dear one being performed in a jail
compound (lyhich this camp is today) instead of the con-
secrated crepation ground.
It is not pleasant or easy for me to write aboulf such
personal matters to the Government. But I do sq in this
case for the sake of the memory of one who was my faithful
partner for over sixty two years. I leave it to the Government
to consider what could be the fate of other prisoners not
so circumstanced as Shn Kasturba was.
The Additional Secretary to the
Government of India
(Home Department),
. Hew Delhi
(Enclosures A to H).
A Letter No 84, p 255
B Letter No 87, p 256
C Letter No 88. p. 257
D Letter No 89, p. 258
E
Detention Camp,
March 31st, 1944
Sir,
Your letter of the 21st March to Mahatma Gandhi
contains the statement .
“ It was on January 28th that they were firsL informed
that Mrs. Gandhi had asked for the services of Dr.
Dinshah Mehta. ... If Dr. Dinsbah was not called in
earher, it was due to the view originally expressed by
both Col. Bhandari and Dr. Gilder that his* services would
I am,
Yours etc.
M. K. Gandhi
not be of any use, but he was summoned as soon as the
Government doctors revised that opinion.”
Surely, coupling of my name with that of Col. Bhandari
is a mistake ! The Government doctors in attendance were
Col. Bhandari and Col. Shah. As far as I an} concerned,
sometilhe in December last, at one of Col. Advani's evening
visits (when he was officiating for Col. Bhandari) Smt.
Kasturba Gandhi asked him to allow Dr. Dinshah Mehta to
come in and Col. Advaiti was good enough to ask my opinion
on the advisability of Dr. Dinshah's coming. As I had not
talked over the matter with my colleague Dr. Sushila Na 37 ar,
nor with the patient or her husband, I told Col. Advani, I
would give him a reply later. At his visit the next morning,
I told him my considered opinion that Dr. Dinshah’s presence
would be a great help.
When the whole of January had passed and permission
for Dr. Dinshah had not come. Dr. Nayyar and myself sent
a gentle reminder in our letter of 31st January. A copy is
hereto appended.
I might state that though in that letter we had asked
for a consultation with Dr. B. C. Roy, no notice seems to
have been taken of it or of verbal reminders.
You will permit me to draw your attention to another
inaccuracy, viz. about the employment of trained nurses. No
trained nurse ever came inside the camp. Before the arrival
of Smt. Jaiprakash Narayan and Shri Kanu Gandhi when
nursing was becoming difficult we were given the services
of a woman who had acted as a badli ayah at the mental
hospital. She struck work inside of a week and asked the
Superinten^lent for her discharge.
The Additional Secretary to the I have etc..
Government of India M, D. D. GlLDER
(Home Department).
New» Delhi
18
273
F. Letter No. 85. p. 256
G. Letter No. 91. p. 259
H. Letter No. 90, p. 259
98
Detention Camp, April 1944
Dear Col. Bhandari, ,
In the Government of India's letter to me dated March
31st 1944 there occur these two passages:—
“ It was on January 28th that they were first informed
that Mrs. Gandhi had asked for the services of Dr.
Dinshah Mehta. ... If Dr. Dinshah Mehta was not
called in earlier, it was due to the view originally expressed
by both Col. Bhandari and Dr. Gilder that his services
would not be of any use, but he was summoned as soon
as the Government doctors revised that opinion
“ The arrangements for the funeral were understood
here to be in accordance with your wishes. The Govern-
ment made enquiries on the point and were informed that
you had no special preference between the first two alter-
natives mentioned in your letter”.
Dr. Gilder has no recollection of his having given the
opinion attributed to him. I have never expressed indifference
as to whether the deceased was cremated in the consecrated
public cremation ground or in the jail compound which this
camp is. Can you please throw light on the discrepancies ?
Yours etc.,
M. K. Gandhi
99
Detention Camp, Aprih ^nej, 1944
Sir,
This IS in continuation of my letter of yesterday’s date
to the Government of India. For, after handing the letter
to the Superintendent of the Camp on looking at the papers,
274
I came upon the following startling statement in the
Hindustan Times of 30-3-*44 :
“ New Delhi, Wednesday, — Today in the Council
of State, Lala Ramsarandas asked whether and when
Mah|tma Gandhi had asked Government to permit the
emlhent Ayurvedic physician Pandit Shiv •Sheurma to
take up the treatment of Mrs. Gandhi.
“The Home Secretary, Mr. Conran Smith, replying said
the first definite request for Pandit Sharma's services was
made to the Government of India on February 9 and
was granted on February 10. He understood that Pandit
Sharma paid his first visit a day or two later. A.P.I.”
The fact is that Vaidyaraj Shiv Sharma's name was first
submitted to the Government on 31st January, 1944 and
not on the 9th February. But my letter of yesterday will
show further that the first request for a non-allopathic
physician was made early in December 1943. May I look
for correction of the statement referred to ?
The Additional Secretary to . I am,
the Government of India, Yours etc.,
New Delhi M. K. Gandhi
99 A
Detention Camp,
March 20th, 1944
Sir,
I have read with painful interest the answer given on
behalf of the Government in the Central Assembly about
the facilities, medical and otherwise, given to my deceased
wife. I had hoped for a better response tg my letter of 4th
March 194^, assuming that it was in Government’s hands
when the answer was given. Beyond the admission that the
deceased was never offered 'release the statement makes no
amends for the misrepresentations pointed out in that letter.
On the contrai^y it adds qne more by stating that " trained
nurses were made available. . . . ’’ No trained nurse was asked
275
for or supplied. AaAya, however, was sent in the place of*
Shri. Prabhavati Devi and Shri Kanu Gandhi for whom my
wife had asked. The Aya left in less than a week because
she found herself ill-fitted for the work entrusted to her.
Only then, and after some further delay, and repeated request
about Shri Kanu Gandhi were the two allowed td come.
The facilities have been recited as if they had been granted
promptly and willingly. The fact is that most of ^them when
not refused were granted as if grudgingly and when it was
almost too late.
My object in writing this letter is not to make the
complaint ( though quite legitimate ) that the facilities came
too late. My complaint is that in spite of my representation
of 4th inst. the Government instead of giving the naked
truth have seen fit to give a varnished version.
The Additional Secretary, I am,
Government of India Yours etc.,
( Home Department ) M. K. GANDHI
New Delhi
100
From No. III/7/43-M. S.
The Additional Secretary to the Government of India,
Government of India, Home Department
Home Department, New Delhi
New Delhi 30th March, 1944
To
M. K. Gandhi Esquire
Sir,
In reply to your letter 6f March 20th, I am directed
to say that the Government of India were in^formed on
December 22nd that a request has been made for the services
of Kanu Gandhi and the wife of Mr. Jaiprakash Narain. A
telegram was sent the same day to the Government of Bihar
in whose custody the latter was, asking wl^ther arrange-
ments could be made for her transfer to Poona. The Bombay
276
Government were, meanwhile, informed on December 23rd
that, if extra nursing was necessary, the correct course would
be to provide professional nurses for that purpose. On
December 24th the Government of India heard from the
Government of Bihar that they had no objection to the
tranter of Mrs. Jaiprakash Narain and the Bombay Govern-
ment were informed on the same day that they might take
up the matter with the Government of Bihar if satisfactory
arrangements could not be made to supply professional
nurses as previously suggested. On January 3rd the Govern-
ment of India were informed that professional nurses employed
for Mrs. Gandhi had left and that arrangements were being
made for the transfer of Mrs. Jaiprakash Narain. Thereafter,
it was learnt that Kanu Gandhi had been paying visits to
the Aga Khan's Palace and on January 27th the Government
of India received a renewed request that he might be
allowed to stay in the Palace to help in nursing your wife.
This permission was granted on January 29th, though it
appears that even before the receipt of this letter, the
Bombay Government had agreed to his staying in the Palace.
In these circumstances, the Government of India Consider
that the reply given in the Legislative Assembly, to which
you refer, was substantially correct. They have now been
informed by the Bombay Government of the fact, of which
they had no previous knowledge either from the Govern-
ment's letter or from yours, that it was your wife who said
that she preferred an Ayah to a trained nurse and that her
wishes in this respect were complied with. They consider it
hardly necessary to publish this fact.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
R. Tottenham
Addl. Secretary to the Government of India
277
101
Detention Camp,
April 13th, 1944
Sir,
I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 30^
March received by me on the 6th of April. It is godOaproof
to show how ill-informed the Central Government were
about the whole situation.
As to “ trained nurses,” I draw attention to the state-
ment made on behalf of the Government that they ” were
made available ftr a short period.” That my wife preferred
an Ayah to a trained nurse is hardly relevant to the con-
sideration whether trained nurses were in fact supplied.
Therefore that statement seems to me clearly to demand
public adjustment.
I hope to have satisfactory reply regarding other matters
contained in my letter of April 1st, 1944.
Addl. Secy, to the Govt, of India, I am etc..
New Delhi M. K. Gandhi
102
From Home Department,
Sir llichard Tottenham. New Delhi,
C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., 29th April, 1944
Addl. Secretary to the Government of India,
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Detention Camp,
Poona
Sir,
The Government of India have read with regret your
letters of April 1st, 2nd and 13tb. They belie vh that no
impartial judgement would support the complaints you have
made against them. At the same time, they feel that it is
impossible to expect from you in your bereavement a fair
recognition of their endeavours to*do all that'was reasonably
278
possible to meet the request that reached them, and that
no useful purpose would be served by continuing the
correspondence.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
R. Tottenham
Add]. Secretary to the Government of Indiq
[ See also in this connection letter No. 110, pata; 1 and 2 (p p. 290
291 and 292) and letter No. 112, para 1 (p. 298) ]
VII
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GOVERNMENT
ON SHRIMATI MIRABEN’S LETTER TO
GANDHIJI ABOUT ORISSA
103
Detention Camp, Aga Khan’s Palace, Poona,
Christmas Eve, 1942
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
My only excuse for writing you this letter is the deep
pain I feel, as one born of English parents, over the false-
hoods regarding Gandhiji and the Indian National Congress,
which 'seem to have appeared in certain English papers
without being officially contradicted.
Within the limits of the newspapers that reach me here,
I have been watching the evergrowing volume of anti-Con-
gress propaganda in the British press. Of the various untruths
that axe being circulated, I want, in this letter, to deal with
only one; namely the assertion that Gandhiji and the Congress
are pro-Japanese. For samples^ of such propaganda that has
come to my notice, I would refer you to the Bombay Chronicle
Weekly, of Nov. 29th, 1942, page 22, and to the Hindu,
(Dak Ed.) of Dec. 19th, 1942, page 4, column 3.
Amongst, the quotations and facsimiles given in the
Bombay Chronicle Weekly is a photograph of the first page of
the London Dat/y Sketch of Aug. 5th, 1942, showing a full page
279
headline "Gandhi's India — Jap Peace Plan Exposed”, and lower
down, on the same page, a photograph of myself with the
sub-heading, “ English Woman Gandhi's J ap Peace Envoy
The “Punch" cartoons of which facsimiles are also given,
are, if possible, even more disgraceful. In the Hind^ thert
is a protest; by Shri K. M. Munshi from which it ^ould
appear that this libellous propaganda has spread even to the
London Daily Herald.
Now the reason for my bringing this matter before you
is that I have in my possession correspondence that passed
between Gandhiji and myself while I was in Orissa, after
the April meeting of the A. 1. C. C. at Allahabad, which
proves beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Gandhiji is cent
per cent anti-Japanese.
The correspondence, of which I et^close copies, consists
of a confidential report, with questionnaire regarding the
then anticipated Japanese invasion, which I sent to Gandhiji
by special messenger from Orissa, where he had deputed me
for helping the Congress workers generally, especially as a
Japanese attack on the East Coast was hourly expected.
The Report which I have with me is the original draft,
written in my own hand. It is not dated or signed, as these
things I affixed to the typewritten copy which was sent; but
it must be just about 3 to 4 days previous to Gandhiji's
reply dated 31-5-’42, which he dictated to the late Shri
Mahadev Desai, and forwarded to me at once by the returning
special messenger. Of this I have the original in Shri Mahadev
Desai's own handwriting, and signed “ Bapu ” by Gandhiji.
The interview referred to In the first paragraph of the
letter, was one I 'had on 25-5- '42 with Mr. "VVood, then
Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa, at which Mr.
Mansfield was also present.
Seeing that no God-fearing ruler could, vv.th any peace
of mind, allow the above mentioned slanderojis propaganda
on the part of his own people, against those whom he had
290 .
rendered unable to reply, to continue uncheked once he had
unchallengeable proof of its falsehood. I put trust in the
belief that you will publish the enclosed correspondence
together with this covering letter, and refute the assertions
these British journals.
I*haay add that since I am personally acquainted with
the members of the Working Committee and fiave freely
discussed these matters with them, I can say with confidence
that their feelings have been unequivocally anti-Japanese and
anti-Fascist. throughout.
Believe me.
Ends: (Items No. 104, 105) Yours sincerely,
Miraben
104
Question of Invasion and Occupation by the
Japanese
We may take it that the Japanese will land somewhere along the Orissa
coast. Probably there will be no bombing or firing at the time ol lauding,
as there ate no defence measures on the coast. From the coast they will
advance rapidly across the flat dry rice fields, where the only obstructions
are rivers and ditches, now mostly dry and nowhere unfnrdable. As far as
we arc able to make out there will be no serious attempt to hold the
Japanese advance until the hilly and wooded regions of the Onssa States
arc reached. The army of defence, whatever it is, is reported to be hidden
in the jungle ol these parts. It is likely to make a desperate attempt to
defend the Jamshedpur road, but the chances of its being successful must
be very small. That means we may expect a battle to be fought in the
north west of Onssa, after which the Japanese army will pass on into
Bihar. At that time the Japanese are not likely to be broadly distributed
over the country, but concentrated on their lines of communication between
the sea and their advancing array. Th>> British administration will have
previously disappeared from the scene?
The problem before us is, in the event of these Sihings happening, how
are we to ac? ?
The Japanese armies will rush over the fields and through tlic villages,
not as avowed enemies of the population, but as chasers and destroyers of
the British and American war effort. The population in its turn, is vague
in its feelings. The^ strongest feeling is fear and distrust of the British,
which is growing day by day, on*accoontof the treatment they are receiving.
281
Anything that is not Bntuh is therefoce something welcome. Here is h
funny example. The villagets m some patts say — “ Oh, the aeroplanes that
make a great noise are British, but there are silent planes also, and they
ace Mahatma's planes." I rhink the only dung possible for these simple
innocent people to learn is the attitude of neutrality, for it is, in reahty,
the only position that can be made logical to them. Ihe British not qfAy
leave them to their fate without even instructing them in self^yotection
from bombing etc., but they issue suclt orders as will, if obeyed, kill them
before the day of battle comes. How then can they be ready endiusiastically
to obstruct the Japanese who are chasing this detested Sa], especially when
the Japanese are saying, “ It is not you we have come to fight.” But 1
have found the villagers ready to take up the position of neutrality. That
16 to say, they would leave the Japanese to pass over their fields and village^,
and try as far as possible not to come m contact with them. They would
hide their food-stuffs and money, and decline to serve the Japanese But
even that much resistance would be difficult to obtain in some parts, the
dislike of the British Ra] being so great, that anything anti-British will be
welcomed with open arms I feel we have got to try and gauge the maxi-
mum resistance which the average inhabitants may be expected to put up,
and maintain, and make that our definite stand. A steady, long sustained
stand, though not cent per cent resistance, will be more effective m the
long run than a stiff stand which quickly breaks
This maximum sustainable stand which we -may expect from the avera^
people IS probably .—
1. To resist tirmly. and mostly non- violently, the comandeenng by
the Japanese of any land houbes, or movable property
2. To render no forced labour to the Japanese.
3. Not to take up any sort of administrative service under the Japanese.
(This may be hard to control in connection with some types of city
people. Government opportunists and Indians brought in from other parts.)
4. To buy nothing from the Japanese.
5. To refuse their currency and any effort on their part at setting
up a Ra]
( Lack of workers and lack of«time make it very hard, but we have
to strive to stem the^ide. )
Now as to certain difficulties and questions which ansa
1 The Japanese may offer to pay for labour, food and materials in
Bntish currency notes. Should the people refuse to sell for good pnces
or work for a good wage 7 For long sustained resistance aiver many months
It may be difficult to prevent this. So long as they refuse to buy or take
“ service ", the exploitation danger is kept off.
282
Z Wbat should be done about the lebtnldug of tenses, canals etc.
which the British will have blown up ? We shall also need the bridges
and t canals. Should we therefore set our hands to their reliuilding, even
if it means working side by side with the Japanese, or should we retne on
the approach of Japanese bridge builders ?
^ 3, If Indian soldiers, who were taken prisoners in Singapote and
Burma, Jagd with the Japanese invading army, what should be our attitude
towards them 7 Should we treat tltem with the same aloofi^ss as we are
to show tlv Japanese or should we not try to wm them over to our way
of thinkmg ">
4 After the exodus (before the approaching Japanese) of the British
Raj, what shall we do about currency ’
5. After battles have been fought and the Japanese armies will have
advanced, the battlefields will be left strewn with dead and wounded. I
thmk we tnuft unhesitatingly work side by side with the Japanese m burning and
burying the dead and puking up and serving the wounded ^ The Japanese are
likely to attend to the lightly wounded of their own men and take prisoner
the lightly wounded of their enemy, but the rest would probably be left,
and It will be our sacred duty to attend to them For this we are from
now planning the traiamg of volunteers under the guidance of local doctors.
Their services can also be used in case of mtemal disturbances, epidemics etc.
6. Besides dead and wounded on the battle-field, a certain amount of
nfles, revolvers and other small arms are likely to be left lying about un-
picked up by the Japanese It we do not make a point ot collecting these
things they are likely to fall into the hands of robber^, thieves and other
bad characters, who always come down like hawks to loot a battle-field.
In an unarmed country like India this would lead to much trouble. In the
event of our collecting such arms and ammunition, what should we do with
them ^ My instinct is to take them out to sea and drop them in the ocean.
Please tell us what you advise.
105
Sevagram
Via Wardhev-
C. P.
31-5-’42
ft. ifkl, (Mira whom God may bless)
I have y«ur very complete and illuminating letter The report of the
interview is perfect, your answers were straight, unequivocal and courageous.
I have no criticism to make I can only say ‘ Go on as you are doing.' 1
can quite clearly, see that you have gone to the right place at the right
time I therefore need do nothing more than come straight to j^ur questions
which are all godfl and relevant.
283
Q 1 1 think we must tell the people what they should do They will
act according to tj^eir capacity. If we begin to judge their capacity and
give directions accordingly our directions will be halting and even com-
promising which we should never do. You will therefore read my instruction^
in that light Remember that our attitude is that of complete non- cooperation
with Japanese army, therefore we may not help them in any way, nor giay
we profit by any dealings with them Therefore we cannot sell ^l!ii|.'thing to
them If people are not able to face tne Japanese army, they will do as
armed soldiers do, i e retire when they are overwhelmed Aitd if they do
BO, the question of having any dealings with Japanese does not p&d should
not arise If, however, the people have not the courage to resist Japanese
unto death and not the i.outage and capacity to evacuate the portion
invaded by the Japanese, they will do the best they can in the light of
instructions One thing they should never do — to yield willing submission
to the Japanese That will be a cowardly act and upworthy of a freedom
loving people They must not escape from one fire only to tall into another
and probably more terrible Their attitude therefore must always be ol
resistance to the Japanese No question, therefore, arises of acceptmg
British currency notes or Japanese corns Thev will handle nothing from
Japanese hands So far as dealings with our own people are concerned
they wdl either resort to barter or make use of such Biitish currency
that they have, in the hope that the National Government that may take
the place of British Government will take up from the people all the
British currency in accoidance with its capacity
(2) Question abhut cooperation in bridge building is covered by the
above There can be no questmn of this cooperation
(3) If Indian soldiers come in contact with our people, we must fra-
ternize with them it they are well disposed and invite them if they can
to join the nation Probably they have been brought under promise
that thev will deliver the country from foreign yoke There will
be no foreign yoke and they will be expected to befriend people and obey
National Government that might have been set up m place of British
Government If the British have retired in an orderly manner leaving things
in Indian hands the whole thing can work splendidly and it might even
be made difficult (or Japanese to Settle down in India or any part of it
in peace, because tbeii will have to deal with a population which will be
sullen and resistant It is difficult to say what c,ui happerf It is enough
if people are trained to cultivate the power of resistance no matter which
power is operating — the Japanese or the British
(4) Covered by (1) above.
(5) Th4 occasion mav not come, but it it does ,>cuoperation will be
permissible and even necessary.
284
(6) Youi answer about the arms found on the wayside is most temptiafS
and perfectly logical. It may be followed but I would not rule out the
idea of worthy people finding them and storing them in a safe place if they
can. If it is impossible to store them and keep them from mischievous
people yours is an ideal plan.
Love,
BAPU
f06
Detention Camp, 26th February, 1944
Sir,
I have read the speech of the Honourable the Home
Member in the Assembly on the debate arising out of the
ban on Shrimati Sarojini Devi. The speech has reference
among other things to the correspondence between Shrimati
Mirabai and myself, and the Government refusal to publish
that correspondence. The following is the relevant portion
of that speech :
“ She ( Shrimati Sarojini Devi ) refers, and the point
has been raised in this debate, to a letter said to have been
written by Miss Slade to Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Gandhi's
reply and I have been asked why no publicity has been
given to that letter. That letter was written and answered
long before the Congress leaders were placed in detention.
If Mr. Gandhi wished to give publicity to that letter he
was perfectly free to do it himself. But it was a confidential
communication addressed to him and I do not see any
reason why Government should disclose a communication
of that nature, I might say that it would not help t*he
Congress case if it were disclosed.
“Then it has been said that Mrs. Naidu wished to defend
the Congress from the implication of being pro-Japanese.
Government have never at anytime, either here or at home,
charged the Congress with being pro-Japanese. Weil, the
allusion to fhat in the booklet called ‘ Congress -Responsi-
bility ’ refcrs.to a statement quoted from Pandit Nehru
himself. I have not thS time to quote it at length, but if
285
Honourable Members will refer to the quotation givei^
in the ' Congress Responsibility ’ pamphlet they will easily
find the passage in question."
Assuming that the report is correct, it makes strange
reading.
c
Firstly, as to the non-publication by me of this corres-
pondence between Shrimati Mirabai and myself, surely the
publication was unnecessary until the charge of being pr
Japanese was spread abroad.
Secondly, why do the Government feel squeamish abotiT
publishing " confidential correspondence ” .when, both the
correspondents have invited publication ?
Thirdly, I do not understand the reluctance of tb
Government to publish the correspondence when, accordir
to the Honourable the Home Member, the correspondence
will not serve the Congress case.
Fourthly, the Government seem intentionally or unintep
tionally to have suppressed the very relevant fact that
Shrimati Mirabgi wrote to Lord Linlithgow drawing attention
to the libellous propaganda in the London press at that^
time containing allegations that I was pro-Japanese, which
allegations she invited him to repudiate. Her letter to Lord'
LinUthgow enclosed copies of correspondence referred to,
and asked for its publication. It was written on December'
24th, 1942, long before the Government publication entitled'
“ (!^ongress Responsibility ", which bears the date February “
13th, 1943, appeared.
Fifthly, as to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's alleged state-
ment before the Working Committee, I have already made
it clear in my reply to the Government pamphfet that it^
was wholly wrong on their part to make use of the unautho-
rized notes of the discussions at the Allahabad meeting of
the Working Committee, after Pandit Nehru’s emphatic
repudiation published in the daily press.
286
It is difficult for me to understand the Honourable tbe
Home Member’s speech and the Government persistence
in malting charges and innuendoes against Congress people
whom they have put in custody and thus effectively pre-
v^ted from answering those charges. I hope, therefore,
tlmt tb^ Government will at the very least see their way
to publish the correspondence referred to, namely Shrimati
Mirabai’s* letter to Lord Linlithgow of the 24th December,
*^142, together with the enclosures.
Enclosures. (Items No. 103, 104 and 105) I am etc.,
'he Secretary to the Government M. K. Gandhi
of India, New Dfelhi
107
s
.„om
^ The Additional Secretary
to the Government of India
Co
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
llR.
In reply to your letter dated February 26th, I am directed
i say that Government do not think that ai.y useful purpose
would be served by publishing the correspondence in question.
So far as Government are concerned, there is the statement
[a the Home Member’s speech — “ Government have never
at any time, either here or at home, charged the Congress
with being pro-Japanese”. They do not see how this can
be regarded as ” Government persistence in making charges
and innuendoes against Congress people”.. So far as Pandit
TawaharlabNehtu is concerned, I am again to refer you to
para. 2 of my letter of October 14th, 1943, in which it was
made clear that he did not, in his public statement, repudiate
he words id the Congress Responsibility pamphlet to
vhich you take ’exception in paragraph 18 of your letter
287
No. II/4/44-M. S.
Government of India
Home Department
New Delhi,
the llth March, 1944
of July 15th, 1943. There can, therefore, be no question oi
Government’s having made use of that passage after bis
repudiation of it.
I haye the honour to be.
Sir,
Your most obedient, servalit.
R, TOTTENHAJVf
Additional Secretary to the Govt, of India
viir
CORRESPONDENCE WITH H. E. TiIe VICEROY
(LORD WAVELL)
108
Detention Camp,
February 17, 1944
Dear Friend,
Although I have had not the pleasure of meeting yon,
I address you on purpose as ‘ dear friend’. I am looked
upon by the representatives of the British Government as
a great, if not the greatest enemy of the British. Since I
regard myself as a friend and servant of humanity including
the British, in token of "my good will I call yqu, the fore-
most representative of the British in India, my ‘friend’.
I have received, in common with some others, a notice
informing me for the first time, why I am detained, and
conferring on me the right of representation against my
detention. I have duly sent my reply, but I have as yet
heard nothing from the Government. A reminder too has
gone after a wait of thirteen days.
I have said swme only have received notices, because,
out of six of us in this camp, only three have received them.
I presume that all will receive them in due course. But my
mind is filled with the suspicion that the notices have been
sent as a" matter of form only, and not with "any intention
to do justice. I do not wish to burden" this letter with
288
•argument. I repeat, what 1 said in^ the correspondence with
your predecessor, that the Congress and 1 are wholly in-
nocent of the charges brought against us. Nothing hut afi
impartial tribunal to investigate the Government case, and
the Congress case against the Government will bring oitt
Ac tn^. ^
l^he speeches recently made on behalf of tj^e Govern-
ment in-- the Assembly on the release motion, and the gagging
order on Shri. Sarojini Devi, I consider to be playing with
fire. 1 distinguish between defeat of Japanese arms and
Allied victory. The latter must carry with it the deliverance
of India from the foreign yoke. The spirit of Indiai demands
complete freedom from all foreign dominance and would
therefore resist Japanese yoke equally with British or any
other. The Congress represents that spirit in full measure.
It has grown to be an institution whose roots have gone
deep down into the Indian soil. I was therefore staggered
to read that the Government were satisfied with things as
they were going. Had they not got from among the Indian
people the men and money they wanted ? Was not the
Government machinery running smooth ? This self-satisfac-
tion bodes ill for Britain, India and the world, if it does not
quickly give place to a searching of hearts in British high places.
Promises for the future are valueless in the face of the
world struggle in which the fortune of all nations and there-
fore of the whole of humanity is involved. Present perfor-
mance is the peremptory need of the moment if the war is
to end in world peace and not be a preparation for another
war bloodier than the present, if, indeed, there can be a
bloodier. Therefore real war Iffort must mean satisfaction
of India’^ demand. “ Quit India ” only glVes vivid expression
to that demand, and has not the sinister and poisonous
meaning attributed to it without warrant by the Government
of India. The expression is charged with the friendliest
feeling for Britain in terms of the whole of humanity.
289
19
I have done. I thought that, if I claim to be a icieiuX
of the British, as I do, nothing should deter me from sharing
my deepest thoughts with you. It is no pleasure for me to
be in this Camp, where all my creature comforts are supplied
without any effort on my part, when I know that millions
outside are starving for want of food. But I shcmld fdel
utterly helpless if £ went out and missed the food by Vbich
alone living becomes worth while. I am,
His Excellency the Viceroy, Yours sincerely.
Viceroy's Camp M. K. GANDHI
109
Viceroy's Camp, India (Nagptir)
25th February, 1944
Dear Mr. Gandhi,
I thank you for your letter of February 17th.
You will by now have received the reply to your repre-
sentation. I am sorry to hear that three of those in the Aga
Khan's Palace have not received notices. This will be looked
into at once.
I expect you have seen in the papers reports of the
speech I made to the Legislature on the same day on which
you wrote that letter. This states my point of view and
I need not repeat what I said then. I enclose a copy for
your convenience if you wish to read it.
I take this opportunity to express to you deep sympathy
from my wife and myself at the death of Mrs. Gandhi. We
understand what this loss must mean to you after so many
years of companionship. Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi Esq. Wavell
HO
Detention Camp, 9th March, 1944
Dear Friend,
I must thank you for your prompt reply to my letter
of 17th February. At the outset I send you and Lady Wavell
my thanks for your kind condolences on the death of my
290
wife. Though for her sake I have welcomed her death as
bringing freedom from living agony, I feel the loss more than
1 had thought I should. We were a couple outside the
ordinary. It was in 1906 that, by mutual consent and after
ynconscious trials, we definitely adopted self-restraint as a
nile pi life. To my great joy this knit us together as never
before. We cease^ to be two different entities. Without my
wishing' it, she chose to lose herself in me. The result was
she became truly my better half. She was a woman always of
very strong will which, in our early days I used to mistake for
obstinacy. But that strong will erfabled her to become, quite
unwittingly, my teacher in the art and practice of non-
-violent non-cooperation. The practice began with my own
family. When I introduced it in 1906 in the political field
it came to be known by the more comprehensive and specially
coined name of Satyagraha. When the course of Indian
imprisonments commenced in South Africa Shri. Kasturba
was among civil resisters. She went through greater physical
trials than I. Although she had gone through several
imprisonments, she did not take kindly to the present incar-
ceration during which all creature comforts were at her
disposal. My arrest simultaneous!;} with that of many others,
and her own immediately following, gave her a great shock
and embittered her. She was wholly unprepared for my
arrest. I had assured her that the Government trusted my
non-violence, and would not arrest me unless I courted
arrest myself. Indeed, the nervous shock was so great that
after her arrest she developed violent diarrhoea and, but
for the attention that Dr. Sushila Nayyar, who was arrested
at the same time as the deceased, was able to give her, she
might haye died before joining me in ttiis detention camp,
where my presence soothed her and the diarrhoea stopped
without any further medicament. Not so the bitterness. It
led to fretfalness ending in painfully slow di^lution of
the body.
291
2. In the light of the foregoing you will perhaps under-
stand the pain I felt when I read in the papers the statement
made on behalf of the Government which I hold was an
unfortunate departure from truth regarding her who was
precious to me beyond measure. I ask you please to send
for and read the complaint in the matter which, have
forwarded to the Additional Secretary to the Government
of India (Home Department). Truth is said to be the first
and the heaviest casualty in war. How I wish in this war
it could be otherwise in the case of the Allied powers !
3. 1 now come to your address which you delivered before
the Legislature and of which you have kindly sent me a copy.
When the newspapers containing the address were received,
I was by the bedside of the deceased. Shri. Mirabai read to
me the Associated Press report. But my mind was elsewhere.
Therefore the receipt of your speech in a handy form was
most welcome. I have now read it with all the attention
it deserves. Having gone through it, I feel drawn to offer
a few remarks,, all the more so as you have observed that
the views expressed by you “ need not be regarded as final”.
May this letter lead to a reshaping of some of them !
4. In the middle of page two you speak of the welfare
of the “ Indian peoples ”. I have seen in some Viceregal
pronouncemehts the inhabitants of India being referred to
as the people of India. Arc the two expressions synonymous ?
5. At page thirteen referring to the attainment of self-
government by India you say, ” I am absolutely convinced
nbt only that the above represents the genuine desire of the
British people, but that they wish to see an early realization
of it. It is qualified only at present by an absolute determination
to let nothing stand in the way of the earlies*- possible
defeat of Germany and Japan; and by a resolve to see that
in the solution of the constitutional problem full account
is taken qf the interests of those who have loyally supported
us in this war and at all other times — the soldiers who have
292
served the common cause; the people who have worked
with us; the Rulers and populations of the States to whom
we are pledged; the minorities who have trusted us to see
that they get a fair deal but until the two main
Indian parties at least can come to terms, I do not see any
immediSte hope of progress," Without reasoning it out, I
venture to give my paraphrase of your pronouncement. “We,
the British shall stand by the Indian soldier whom we have
brought into being and trained for consolidating our rule
and position in India, and who, by experience, we have found
can effectively help us in our wars against other nations.
We shall also stand by the Rulers of the Indian States,
many of whom are our creation and all of whom owe their
present position to us, even when these Rulers curb or
actually crush the spirit of the people whom they rule.
Similarly shall we stand by the minorities whom too we have
encouraged and used against the vast majority when the
latter have at all attempted to resist our rule. It makes no
difference that they (the majority) seek to replace it by a
rule of the will of the people of India taken as a whole. And
in no case will we transfer power unless Hindus and Muslims
come to us with an agreement atnong themselves. ” The
position taken up in the paragraph quoted and interpreted
by me is no new thing. I regard the situation thus envisaged
as hopeless, and I claim in this to represent the thought of
the man in the street. Out of the contemplation of this
hopelessness was born the anguished cry of ‘ (Juit India
What I sec happening in this country day after day provides
a complete vindication of the ‘ Quit India ’ formula as defined
by me in my considered writings.
6. I ribte as I read your speech that you do not regard
the sponsors of the formula of ‘ Quit India ’ as outcasts to
be shunned by society. You believe them to be high-minded
persons. Then, treat them as such and trust tWeit inter-
pretation of tlfeir own formula and you cannot go wrong.
293
7. After developing the Cripps offer you have said at
page sixteen in the middle of the paragraph, . tbe
demand for release of these leaders who are in' deftention
is an utterly barren one until there is some sign' on ^eir
part of willingness to cooperate. It needs no consultation
with any one or aifything but hi,s own conscience foe any
one of those under detention to decide whether, he will
withdraw from the ‘ Quit India * resolution and the policy
which had tragic consequences, and will cooperate in the great
tasks ahead. " Then again, revetting to the same subject
you say on pages nineteen and twenty, “ There is an im-
portant element which stands aloof; I recognize how much
ability and high-mindedness it contains; but I deplore its
present policy and methods as barren and unpractical. I
should like to have the co-operation of this element in
solving the present and the future problems of India. If its
leaders feel that they cannot consent to take part in the
present Government of India, they may still be able to
assist in considering future problems. But I see no reason
to release those responsible for the declaration of August
8th, 1942, until I am convinced that the policy of non-co-
operation and even of obstruction has been withdrawn — ^not
in sackcloth and ashes, that helps no one — but in recogni-
tion of a mistaken and unprofitable policy. ”
8. I am surprised that you, an eminent soldier and man
of affairs, should hold such an opinion. How can the with-
drawal of a resolution, arrived at jointly by hundreds of
men and women after much debating and pareful considera-
tion, be a matter of individunl conscience ? A resolution
jointly undertaken! can be honourably, conscientiously and
properly withdrawn only after joint discussion and delibera-
tion. Individual conscience may come into play after this
necessary step, not before. Is a prisoner ever free to
exercise hiS conscience ? Is it just and proper to expect
him to do so ?
294
9. /^ain, you recognize “ muck ability and hi^-minded-
neaa ” in diose who repres^t the Congress organization
and then deplore their present policy and methods as
“ barren aftid unpractical Does not the second statement
Cgncel the first ? Able and highminded men may come to
erronecms decisions, but I have not before heard such
people’s policy and methods being described as ^‘barren and
impractical Is it not up to you to discuss the pros and
cons of their policy with them before prono uncing judgement
especially when they are also admittedly representatives of
millions of their people ? Does it become an all-powerful
Govenunent to be afraid of the consequences of releasing
unarmed men and women with a backing only of men and
women equally unarmed and even .pledged to non-violence ?
Moreover, why should you hesitate to put me in touch
with the Working Committee members so as to enable me
to know their minds and reactions ?
10. Then you have talked of the “tragic consequences"
of the ‘ Quit India ’ resolution. I have said enough in my
reply to the Government pamphlet “ Congress Responsibility
etc, ” combating the charge that the Congress was respon-
sible for those consequences. I ccanmend the pamphlet and
my reply to your attention, if you have -not already seen
them. Here I would just like to .emphasize what I have
already said. Had Government stayed action till they had
studied my speeches and those of the members of the Working
Committee history would have been written differently.
11. You have made much of the fact that your Executive
Council is predominantly Indipn. Surely, their being Indians
no more makes them representatives qf India than non-
Indians. Conversely it is quite conceivable that a non-Indian
may be a true representative of India, if he is elected by
the vote of the Indian people. It would give no satisfaction
even if the head of the Indian Government was a distin-
guished IndiaA not chosen by the free vote of the people.
295
12. Even you, I am sorry, have fallen into the common
error of describing the Indian forces as having been recruited
by “ voluntary enlistment A person who takes to soldiering
as a profession will enlist himself wherever he gets his market
wage. Voluntary enlistment has come to. bear by association
a meaning much higher than that which attaches^ ^o an
enlistment like that of the Indian soldier. Were those who
carried out the orders at the Jallianwalla massacre volunteers!?
The very Indian soldiers who have been taken out of India
and are showing unexampled bravery will be ready to point
their rifles unerringly at their own countrymen at the orders
of the British Government, their employers. Will they deserve
the honourable name of volunteers?
13. You are flying all over India. You have not hesitated
to go among the skeletons of Bengal. May I suggest an
interruption in your scheduled flights and a descent upon
Ahmednagar and the Aga Khan's Palace in order to probe
the hearts of your captives ? We are all friends of the British,
however much we may criticize the British government and
system in India. If you can but trust, you will find us to
be the greatest helpers in the fight against Nazism, Fascism,
Japanism and the like.
14. Now I revert to your letter of the 25th February.
Shri Mirabai and I have received replies to our representations.
The remaining inmates have received their notices. The reply
received by me I regard as a mockery; the one received by
Shri. Mirabai as an insult. According to the report of the
Home Member’s answer to a qi^stion in the Central Assembly,
the replies received ^y us seem to be no replies. He is repotted
to have said that the stage “ for the review of the*’cases had
not yet arrived. Government at present were only receiving
representations from prisoners ”. If their presentations in
reply to the Government notices are to be conadered merely
by the executive that imprisoned them witho'ifc trial, it will
296
'amount to a farce and an eye>wash, meant perhaps for foreign
consumption, but not as air^ indication of a desire to do
justice. My views are known to the Government. I may be
cons^lered an impossible man — though altogether wrongly
l,,wouid protest. But what about Shri. Mirabai ? As you know
she i% l^e daughter of an Admiral and fprmer Commander-
-in-Chief of these .waters. But she left the lifeaof ease and
chose instead to throw in her lot with me. Her parents,
recognizing her urge to come to me, gave her their full
blessings. She spends her time in the service of the masses.
She went to Orissa at my request to understand the plight
of the people of that benighted land. That Government was
hourly expecting Japanese invwion. Papers were to be removed
or burnt, and withdrawal of the civil authority from the
coast was being contemplated. Shri. Mirabai made Chaudwar
(Cuttack) airfield her headquarters, and the local military
commander was glad of the help she could give him. Later
she went to New Delhi and saw General Sir Allen Hartley
and General Molesworth, who both appreciated her work
and greeted her as one of then own class and caste. It there-
fore baffles me to understand her incarceration. The only
reason for burying her alive, so fy as I can see, is that she
has committed the crime of associating herself with me. I
suggest your immediately releasing her, or your seeing her
and then deciding. I may add that she is not yet free from
the pain for the alleviation of which the Government sent
Capt. Simcox at my request. It would be a tragedy if she
became permanently disabled in detention. I have mentioned
Shri. Mirabai’s case because it is typically unjust.
15. I apologize to you for a letter which has gone beyond
length I* had prescribed for myself. It has also become very
personal and very unconventional. That, however, is the
way my loyalty to friends works. I have written without
reservation. Your Jetter and your speech have gjyen me the
opening. For ‘the sake. of India, England and humanity I
297
hcq>e you will treat this as an honest and friendly, if candid,
response to your speech.
16. Years ago while teaching the boys and girls of
Tolstoy Farm in South Africa 1 ^ppened to read to jtbesn
Wordsworth’s “ Character of the Happy Warrior”. It recui^
to me as I am writjng to you. It will delight my hea;{t to
realize that .warrior in you. Thefe will bf little difference
between the manners and methods of the Axis powers and
the Allies if the war is to resolve itself into a mere trial of
brute strength.
I am.
His Excellency the Viceroy. Yours sincerely.
Viceroy’s Camp M. K. Gandhi
111
The Viceroy’s House.
New Delhi.
28th March. 1944
Dear mr. Gandhi,
I have your letter of March 9th, You will receive a
separate reply from the Home Secretary on yom complaint
about Mr. Butler's answer to a question in the House of
Commons. I can only say ^hat I deeply regret if you are
left with the impression that the Government of India have
been unsympathetic in the matter of Mrs. Gandhi’s illness.
Miss Slade’s case will be examined in the light of what you
say about her.
I do not think it profitable that we should enter into
lengthy argument, and do' not propose to answer in detail
the point you raise in your letter. But I think it best to
give you a clear statement of my views on the future develop*
ment of India and the reasons for your present detention.
The draft declaration of H. M. G. which Sir Stafford
Cripps brought to India stated in unmistakable terms the
intention o^ of H. M. G. to give India self-igoverhment under
a constitution of her own devising, arrived at by agreement
298
'between the piincipal elements. 1 need hardly say that I am
in entire accord with that aidk, and only seek the best «»*«««■
to implement it without delivering India to confusion ^nd
turnM)jl. Much wisdom and spirit of goodwill and compromise
^sill be required to arrive at the right solution, but with
good leadership I am sure a solution cap be found.
Meanwhile there is much work to be done,aparticularly
in the economic field, in preparing India to take her proper
place in the modem world She must be ready to welcome
change and progress in many hitherto unfamiliar directions
and to raise the standard of living of her population. Such
work is primarily non-political : it may well hasten a political
settlement, but cannot await it. It will give rise to many new
and absorbing problems demanding the best abilities that
India can bring to bear on them. India cannot be expected
to tackle these problems in isolation from the rest of the
world, or without the aid that Britain can give and the
services of an experienced administration. But it is work in
which leaders of all parties can cooperate with the certainty
that they arc helping the country towards the goal of freedom.
I regret that I must view the present policy of the
Congress party as hindering atyl not forwarding Indian
progress to self-government and development. During a
war in which the success of the United Nations against the
Axis powers is vital both to India and to the world, as you
yourself have recognized, the Working Committee of Congress
declined to cooperate, order^ Congress ministries to resign,
and decided to take no part in the administration of the
country or in the war effort ^which India was making to
assist the United Nations. At the greatest crisis of all for
India, at* a time when Japanese invasion was possible, the
Congress party decided to pass a resolution calling on the
British to leave India, which could not fail to have the most
serious effeci on our ability to defend the frontiers of India
against the Jfipanese. I em quite clear that India's problems
299
cannot be solved by an immediate and complete Withdrawal
of the British.
I do not accuse you or the Cbngress party of any wish
deliberately to aid the Japanese. But you are too Intelligent
a man, Mr. Gandhi, not to have realized that the effect
your resolution mu$t be to hamper the prosecution "oi the
war; and it ^ clear to me that you had lost confidence in
our ability to defend India, and were prepared to take
advantage of our supposed military straits to gain political
advantage. I do not see how those responsible for the safety
of India could have acted otherwise than they did and could
have failed to arrest those who sponsored the resolution.
As to general Congress responsibility for the disturbances
which followed, I was, as you know, Commander-in-Chief
at the time; my vital lines of communication to the Burma
frontier were cut by Congress supporters, in the name of
the Congress, often using the Congress flag. I cannot there-
fore hold Congress guiltless of what occurred; and I cannot
believe that you, with all your acumen and experience, can
have been unaware of what was likely to follow from your
policy. I do not believe that the Congress party’s action in
this matter represented th^ real feeling of India, nor that
the Congress attitude of non-cooperation represents the
opinion of anything like a majority of India.
To sum up, I believe that with general cooperation we
can in the immediate future do much to solve India's
economic problems, and can ipake steady and substantial
progress towards Indian self-government.
I believe that the greatest contribution that the Congress
party can make towards India’s welfare is to abandon the
policy of non-cooperation and to join wholeheartedly with
the other Indian parties and with the British in helping
India forward in economic and political progress — not by
any dramatic or spectacular stroke, but by Jiard steady work
towards the end ahead. I think that the greatesf service you
300
could do tp India would be to advise unequivocally such
cooperation.
In the meantime I regard it as my task in the interests
of Ii^a, of which I am a sincere friend, to concentrate all
my ^orts on bringing this war to a .victorious conclusion^
and to prepare for India's advancement after the war. In
this task I feel I can counf on very considerably cooperation
from the majority of Indians.
Yours sincerely.
M. K. Gandhi, Esq. Wavell
112
Detention Camp, April 9th, 1944
Dear Friend,
I have your letter of 28th March received by me on
the 3rd instant. Please accept my thanks for it.
I take up the general matter first.
You have sent me a frank reply. I propose to reciprocate
your courtesy by being perfectly frank. Friendship to be true
demands frankness even though it may some time appear
unpleasant. If anything I say offends you, please accept my
apology in advance.
It is a pity that you have refused to deal with impor-
tant points raised in my letter.
Your letter is a plea for cooperation by ^he Congress
in the present administration and failing that in planning for
the future. In my opinion, this requires equality between the
parties and mutual trust. But equality is absent and Govern-
ment distrust of the Congress can be seen at every turn. The
result is that suspicion of Government is universal. Add to
this the fact that Congressmen have no ^aith in the compe-
tence of the Government to ensure India’s future good. This
want of faith is based upon bitter experience of the past
and present 'Condu.ct of the Bririsb administraticp of India.
Is it not high time that you cooperated with the people of
301
India, tlxough dieir elected representattvea instead of capect-*
ing cooperation from tliem ?
All this was implied in the August resolution. The sanc-
tion behind the demand in the resolution was, net vi^nce,
but self-suffering. Anyone, be he Congressman or oth^ wl^o
acted against this pile of conduct had no authoritjut^ use
the Congress name for his action. But, I see that tUs re-
solution repels you as it did Lord Linlithgow. You Idiow that
I have joined issue on the point. I have seen nothing since
to alter my view. You have been good enough to credit me
with “ intelligence ”, “ experience ” and ” acumen |’. Let me
say that all these three gifts have failed to make me realize
that the effect of the Congress resolution “ must be to hamper
the prosecution of the war”. The responsibility for what
followed the hasty arrests of Congressmen must rest solely
on the Government. For, they invited the crisis, not the
authors of the resolution.
You remind me that you were Commander-in-Chief at
the time. How much better it would have been for all
concerned if confidence in the immeasurable strength of
arms had ruled ^your action instead of fear of a rebellion!
Had the Government staged their hand at the time, surely,
all the bloodshed of those months would have been avoided.
And it is highly likely that the Japanese menace would have
become a thing of the past. Unfortunately it was not to be.
And so the menace is still with us, and what is more, the
Government are pursuing a policy of suppression of liberty
and truth. I have studied the .latest ordinance about the
detenus, and I recall the Rowlatt Act of 1919. It was popu-
larly called the Black Act. As you know it gave rise to an
unprecedented agitation. That Act pales into insignificance
before the series of ordinances that are being showered from
the Viceregal throne. Martial law in effect governs not one
province, as in 1919, but the whole of Indie. Things are
moving from bad to worse.
302
You ‘ It is clear to me that you had lost confidence
in our ability to defend In(^ and were prepared to take
advantage of our supposed military straits to gain political
advwtage,” 1 must deny both the charges. I venture to
suggest that you should follow the golden rule, and withdraw
^ur statement and suspend judgement till you have submitted
the e'^idence in your possession to an impartial tribunal and
obtained its verdict. I confess that I do not make the request
with much confidence. For. in dealing with Congressmen
and others Government have combined the prosecutor, judge
and jailor in the same person and thus made proper defence
impossible on the part of the accused. Judgements of courts
are being rendered nugatory by fresh ordinances. No man's
freedom can be said to be safe in this extraordinary situation.
You will probably retort that it is an exigency of the war.
I wonder !
As I visualize India today, it is one vast prison contain-
ing four hundred million souls. You are its sole custodian.
The government prisons are prisons within this prison. 1
agree with you that whilst you hold the views expressed in
your letter under reply, the proper place for one like me is
a government prison. And unless there is a change of heart,
view and policy on the part of tSe Government, I am quite
content to remain your prisoner. Only, I hope, you will listen
to the request made by me through the proper channels to
remove me and my fellow prisoners to some other prison
where the cost of our detention need not be even one tenth
of what it is today.
As to my complaint about Mr. Butler's statement and
later the Home Secretary’s. 1 have received two letters
from the^Home Department in reply. I ‘am sorry to say,
they have appeared to me highly unsatisfactory. They ignore
patent facts and betray an obstinate refusal to face truth
even on a wholly non-political issue. My correspondence with
the Home Department continues. I invite your attention to
303
it, if you can spare the time and are interested m|the subject.*
I am glad and thankful thag Shri. Mirabai’s (Miss Slade's)
case is being considered in the light of what I said about
her in my letter. l«am,
His Excellency the Viceroy, Yours sincerely,
Viceroy’s Camp M. K. GandhJ
EC
MISCELLANEOUS
113
A
EXPRESS WIRE Detention Camp,
February 16th, '44
Honourable Finance Member, New Delhi,
Having read your statement about salt clause in Gandhi**
Irwin Agreement I beg to draw your attention to notice
that was issued by Sir George Schuster explaining implications
of that clause. Any amendment should be in terms of that
notice. GANDHI
114
From No. S. D. VI/-3847
The Secretary to the Home Department
Government of Bombay, Bombay, 25th February, 1944
Home Department
To
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
On the 16th February, 1944, you requested that the
following telegraphic message be transmitted to the Finance
Member of the Government 6f India ;
“ Having read younatatement about salt clause in Gandhi-lrwin Agree-
ment 1 beg to draw your attention to notice that was issued by Sir George
Schuster explaining implications ot that clause. Any amendment should be
in terms of that notice.”
This ■ message was communicated by the Inspector
General of Prisons the same day to this Go*'emment who
304
passed it dh inimediately'ldi the Government oi India. The
Finance Member has now re|uested chat the following reply
diould be communicated to you:
“ciMtet flisciusion in House it was felt best course to leave matters
to be regulated as hitherto by notification issued in 1931 thrms of which
iJhre been scrupulously observed by Government. No amendment was
therefdfe^made.''
Secretary to the
Government of Bombay,
Home Department
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
H. lYANGAR
115
B
Detention Camp, March 4, '44
Sir,
In reply to a question in the Assembly, the Honourable
the Home Member is reported to have said, “ The provision
for the expenses of Mr. Gandhi and those detained with
him in the Aga Khan’s Palace amounted to about Rs. 550/-
a month.”
In my letter to you dated 26th October last I remarked
as follows : “ The huge place in «vhich I am being detained
with a big guard around me, I hold to be waste of public
funds. I should be quite content to pass my days in any prison.”
The Honourable the Home Member’s reply quoted above
is a sharp reminder to me that I should have followed up
the remark just referred to by me. But it is never too late
to mend. I therefore take up the question now.
•The expenses on behalf pf my companions and me are
not merely Rs. 550/- per month. The^ rejit of this huge place .
(of whidi only a portion is open to us) and the expense of
maintaining the big outcr guard and an inner staff consisting
of Superintendent, Jamidar and sepoys have got to be
added. And to this a large squad of convicts fre^' Yenvtii^
to serve the ''inmates ayd to look after the garden. VrmwiMiri
305
tlie whole of this expense is. from my pointof whoitjr'
unnecessary; and when peopl^ are dying of starvation, k k
almost a crime against Indian humanity. 1 ask that my
companions and I be removed to any regular -prison C^^em-
ment may choose. In conclusion, I cannot conceal frcm a^-
self the sad thought that the* whole of this expen^ ^omes,
from taxes /collected from the dumb miiyons of India.
To I am, etc.,
The Additional Secretary to the M. K. Gandhi
Government of India,
(Home Department), New Delhi
116
Detention Camp, April 21st, 1944
Sir,
1 wrote to you on the 4th March requesting the
(Government to transfer the party of detenus in this camp
to a prison where the expense entailed m our detention here
may be materially reduced. I request an early decision in
the matter.
To , I am, etc..
The Additional Secretary to the M. K. GandHW
Government of India (H. D.),
New Delhi
117
C
Detention Camp, May 3rd, 1944
Sir,
Shri Jamnadas came in yesterday. When 1 was asked
whether I would sge liim I had consented so as'to cause as
little disappointment as possible for the future. Mjf position
is that whilst I would be glad .to see any relatives who
might secure government permission, I must not break the
rule I hava, made for myself, that I would deny myself the
pleasure, so long as the government restrict the permission
306
m
tmly to lelatives and exclude the members of the ' Ashram^
" or those who stand in the vame category. I regard them olf
e(}ual with my relatives. The Gcwemment were good enough’
ts^^anf such permission during my fast last|year widiout
^any untoward result so farinas I know. Can they do likewise
dupng my convalescence i^ch bids fah to he protracted ?■
To ^ •! am, etc..
The Secretary to the M. K. Gandhi
Government of Bombay (H. D.), Bombay
118
D
Detention Camp,
6th May, 1944, 7-45 A, M.
sm.
I have been told by the Inspector General of Prisons
that the party of detenus m this camp is to be discharged
at 8 a. m., today. I wish to put on record the fact that by
reason of the cremation of the corpses of Shri Mahadev
Desai and then my wife the place of cremation which has
been fenced off becomes consecrated ground. The party has
daily visited the ground twice and offered floral tributes
to the departed spirits and said' prayers. 1 trust that the
plot will be acquired by the Government with the right
of way to It through H. H. the Aga Khan’s grounds, sc
as to enable those relatives and friends, who wish, to visit
the cremation ground whenever they like. Subject to the
permission of the Government, I would like to arrange for
the upkeep of the sacred spot and daily prayers. I hope
that the necessary steps will* be taken by the Government
in terms of my prayer. My address yilk be Sevagram, via,
Wardha* (C. P.).
To I am, etc.,
The Secretary to the M. K.* Gandhi
Govemmen .tof Bombay,
Home Department, Itombay
307
From No. S. D. VI/-75
-The Secretary to the Home Department (PoIiticiU^
Government Bombay, H. D- Poona, 7th J«ly,
M. K. Gandhi, Esquire
Sir,
I eun directed to refer to your letter dated the 6^ May,
1944, in which you request that Government should acquire
the plot on which the bodies of Mrs. Gandhi and MtJ
Mahadev Desai were cremated, together with the right oi(
way to it through His Highness the Aga Khan's grounds so
as to enable relatives and friends to visit the cremation
ground whenever they liked. In reply I am to inform yoii
that It is legally impossible for Government to acquire th4
site compulsorily under the Land Acquisition Act. Govemj
ment considers that the matter is one for private negot^
ation between you and His Highness the Aga Khan. I ad
to add, however, that your request has been communicate^
to His Highness the Aga Khan and is now understood tt
be under his consideration. Government understands that hi
has no objection, ifl the meanwhile, to the relatives of Mn
Gandhi and Mr. Mahadevi Desai and any other person
suggested by you going through the palace grounds to thi
place of cremation on the understanding that this is by hi
leave and licence. Your obedient servant,
H. lyangar
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, H. E
120
“ Dilkhusha ” Panchgani, July 9th, 194
I have received yOur letter of 7th instant in connect
with the ground in H. H. .the Aga Khan’s Palace wher
Shri Mahadev Desai’s and Smt. ILlsturba Gandhi’s bodie
were cremated. My purpose is tserved by the preset!
arrangement for which I thank the Govqmmeiit.
Secretary to the Yours etc.,
1^0" nment of Bombay (H. D.), Poq ia M. K. Gandh
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